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Frank Ross McCoy in France, 1919. (Courtesy National Archives)
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Kansas Open Books Preface

Diplomat in Khaki: Major General Frank Ross McCoy and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1949, is both my ﬁrst book and my second. It comes ﬁrst in the sense
that it is a slightly revised version of my Princeton University PhD dissertation,
written during the latter part of the 1970s. It is second in the sense that before
Diplomat in Khaki appeared in print in 1989, I had published The Pentomic
Era, a brief study of the U.S. Army during the interval between the Korean War
and the Vietnam War.
Dissertations tend to address fairly narrow, not to say abstruse, topics. Mine
was no exception. I undertook this study of Frank Ross McCoy with a speciﬁc
purpose in mind: to challenge the assumption, then commonly accepted among
military historians, that prior to World War II ofﬁcers of the U.S. Army had
played essentially no role in formulating and implementing American statecraft.
By tracing McCoy’s career and that of his mentor Leonard Wood, I exposed
that assumption as misleading, if not simply wrong. From a historiographical
perspective, this was an exceedingly minor accomplishment, which in the decades since has gone essentially unnoticed.
In retrospect, I have two regrets about Diplomat in Khaki. The ﬁrst is that I
ought to have made Wood, a far more interesting and consequential ﬁgure than
McCoy, the centerpiece of my study. But as an apprentice historian, I viewed
Wood as too “big.” I lacked the necessary gumption to take on such a huge (to
my mind) ﬁgure. Compounding my regret is the fact that although Wood has
been the subject of several biographies, in my view not one has done him justice.
There is a great life-and-times book waiting to be written about this ambitious
ix
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and colorful soldier-imperialist. I am now too old to take on that project, but
some ambitious young scholar ought to.
My second regret relates to focus. As written, Diplomat in Khaki is a book
about civil-military relations in the guise of a biography. I have long since
concluded that the book’s true theme should have been the emergence of the
American empire. The various adventures that Wood and McCoy undertook,
whether separately or together, from Cuba and the Philippines to Nicaragua and
occupied Japan, illustrate the varying experiments with imperialism undertaken
by the United States through the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. It is an important story and I could have done a better job telling it. Back then, however,
I was myself a serving ofﬁcer and not prepared—or perhaps willing—to think
critically about America’s actual role in the world.
In the decades since, I’ve tried to make up for that missed opportunity.
Andrew Bacevich
Walpole, Massachusetts
August 2019
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Preface

According to the standard view, the United States Army before World War II
occupied only a peripheral place in American life. Scholars have tended to
dismiss American soldiers before 1941 as enjoying neither influence nor
popularity. Apart from intermittent emergencies, political authorities in Washington before that time seldom showed interest in military affairs or in the army
as an institution. The nation's military posture-measured by the beggarly state
of the regular establishment surviving between periodic military adventuresstemmed in part from the geographic invulnerability of the United States. The
absence of any credible threat to American security made an army of European
scale unnecessary. Yet historians advancing this interpretation regularly cite two
other influences on American military policy. The first concerned the way
Americans have traditionally viewed the use of force, a view springing from a
long-standing tendency to see war and peace as distinct and wholly separate
phenomena. A corollary of this notion was that only war legitimized the use of
force in international politics; once war ended, force became impermissible. One
historian summarized American thinking about force this way: "In the night of
war the soldier by 'victory' restored the peace which the statesman had somehow
lost. With the dawn of peace, the soldier marched back to his barracks, and the
statesman resumed the direction of affairs. There was little in this view for
politics in time of war and very little for force in time of peace."
The second influence, related to the first, was the idea that military and
democratic values were antithetical and that a large standing army constituted a
threat to liberty. This alleged antagonism enforced upon soldiers an isolation
from the mainstream of American life. Generations of scholars have accepted
popular antimilitarism and the soldier's consequent estrangement from society
as cardinal determinants of American military history. This notion of alienation
ix
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X

defined and stunted the study of American civil-military relations, reducing it to
an extended debate as to the effects of the military' s supposed isolation. 1
Recently, historians have begun challenging this interpretation. Pioneering
studies by Richard D. Challener, John Morgan Gates, Peter Karsten, Richard H.
Kohn, Paul A. C. Koistinen, Jack C. Lane, and others have enlarged our
understanding of the military's role in American life. These writers do not
constitute a coherent "revisionist school." Yet they question whether American
views about the utility of force were quite so naive as they are often portrayed,
and they reject the assumption of a military establishment divorced from society.
They have sought to redefine the tenor of relations between soldiers and civilians
and to integrate the military into the overall fabric of American history.
Cumulatively, their efforts make it impossible any longer for Americans to see
themselves as a uniquely unwarlike people with a military heritage composed of
long intervals of peace interrupted only by occasional outbursts of crusading
idealism. 2
This study employs biography as a vehicle to explore further some of the issues
raised by these revisionists. Its twofold aim is to examine the relationship
between American military and political elites and to assess the army's
contribution to American foreign policy during the half-century following the
Spanish-American War. Its subject, Maj. Gen. Frank Ross McCoy, was an army
officer whose extraordinarily diverse career spanned the nine administrations
from William McKinley to Harry S Truman. A leader of proven skill and courage
in battle, McCoy did not march back to his barracks when war ended. In the
absence of declared war, he played a recurring role in the ceaseless conflict of
international politics, first as an aide or junior assistant and later as an advocate
or principal in his own right. Adept at the noncoercive methods of diplomacy, he
also understood the utility of force to achieve policy objectives even in peacetime.
This book focuses on the periods of McCoy's life that fall between wars. As a
result, it departs from the tendency of conventional military biography to stress
combat episodes in which the subject figures prominently. One consideration
shaping this narrative was my desire to show how McCoy's close connections with
men such as Leonard Wood, Theodore Roosevelt, and Henry L. Stimson enabled
him to enjoy a long and fruitful career as an agent of American diplomacy. Of
course, when deploying as an expeditionary force to Cuba in 1898 or to France
during World War I, the army in which McCoy served was functioning as a
political instrument, a fact overlooked by those who insist on seeing American
wars as righteous crusades. For the purposes of this study, however, McCoy's
participation in those wars is less important than his role in peacetime missions
to Latin America or the Far East. For there, too, and with much greater
frequency, the army served as an instrument of the national purpose.

I alone am responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation contained herein.
Many others have contributed to the preparation of this work, however, and
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XI

deserve credit for whatever merit it may possess. I would be remiss if I failed to
express my appreciation for their assistance and support. My earliest debt is to
Col. Paul Miles, who first brought Frank McCoy to my attention. At the United
States Military Academy where I began this book, Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Griess
and Brig. Gen. Roy K. Flint, at that time the head and deputy head respectively
of the Department of History, provided sympathetic interest that enabled me to
devote my summers at West Point to research and writing. Richard D. Challener
and Arthur S. Link both read the manuscript at an early stage, providing valuable
guidance and direction. Col. James L. Abrahamson carefully read each chapter as
it was drafted, provided gentle criticism where necessary, and offered encouragement throughout. I learned much from him, of a scholarly nature and otherwise,
and will always cherish our association. Deborah Bittle and Myrna Watkins typed
different versions of the manuscript and saved me from innumerable errors. The
staff at the University Press of Kansas provided the right mix of advice along
with sympathetic understanding of the sort needed by an author whose daily
endeavors involve the American army's present-day concerns rather than its past.
Jenny, Amy, Andy, and Kate generously permitted "the mole" to work at his
desk for long hours without discernible purpose. Their frequent queries as to
whether or not the final chapter had yet been completed provided a useful spur to
bring things to a close. My greatest debt, however, is to my wife, Nancy. In this, as
in all other endeavors, her patience, confidence, and affection sustained me.
A. J . Bacevich
Wellesley, Massachusetts
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1

The Road to Kettle Hill

At an early age, the boy learned to revere those dedicated to serving their
country. He also acquired an unshakable faith, typical of his time, in his country's
greatness, as evidenced by its indisputable economic, political, and racial
superiority. He attributed that superiority in no small measure to the efforts of
those great leaders who appeared at critical moments to guide the nation to its
destiny. As a graduating senior in June 1892, he summed up these conclusions of
his boyhood in an address to his high school class. Love of liberty had always
been a peculiarly Anglo-Saxon trait, he told his schoolmates, adding expansively
that even "two thousand years ago our ancestors worshipped freedom and [had
been] ready to fight to the death" for it. For centuries, Englishmen had kept alive
the fire of liberty. After the discovery of the New World, colonization "fanned [it]
into an unquenchable flame." This transplanting of English values across the
Atlantic had profound consequences. From it emerged a new society: a people
with an air of freedom that generated "an intense and persistent energy,
distinctly American"; an economy "fifty years ahead of Europe in progressiveness" yet still "advancing at a rate which no other has ever equalled"; and a
political system that shone as "the World's Charter of Liberty." Such achievments, however, had not come cheaply. They owed their existence to the sacrifices
of the "great and noble men" who had led the country and to those citizens who
served it in time of need. 1
Such windy patriotism, of course, has long typified American commencementday oratory. But for Frank Ross McCoy, the sentiments expressed were heartfelt.
They reflected the ideals distilled from his youth. More important, they
summarized beliefs that were representative of his generation. These beliefs
sustained McCoy throughout a long career in which he played a noteworthy role
in twentieth-century America's attempt to graft its values onto an unreceptive

DiplomatInKhaki

Page 1

06/11/20 3:18 PM

CHAPTER I

2

world. They carried him into the councils of the "great and noble men" of his
own day whose views often paralleled his own. Such ideals would not always serve
the young man or the United States well, but to both they imparted a sense of
confidence and direction that withstood decades of erosion.
McCoy's heritage befitted such beliefs. For generations after his great-greatgrandfather Thomas had emigrated from Scotland to central Pennsylvania in the
eighteenth century, his family prospered as prominent residents of the Juniata
Valley west of Harrisburg. The McCoys had early established a tradition of
patriotic service: Thomas's five sons fought in the War for Independence, with
William, great-grandfather of Frank, being captured while a member of the
Seventh Pennsylvania Regiment. William's son, John, served with the militia
during the War of 1812, and his grandson, Thomas Franklin McCoy, twice
interrupted a successful legal practice for military service, first campaigning in
Mexico with Winfield S. Scott as an officer of the Eleventh U.S. Infantry (Juniata
Guards) and later returning to uniform in 1861. Beginning the Civil War as a
lieutenant colonel and his state's deputy quartermaster, Thomas McCoy rose to
the rank of brevet brigadier general, commanding the 107th Pennsylvania
Volunteers.
After the war, General McCoy returned to Lewistown, Pennsylvania, and
married Margaret Eleanor Ross. On October 29, 1874, Mrs. McCoy gave birth to
the couple's first child, Frank Ross. The boy's early years in Lewistown were
uneventful. He suffered through the usual childhood diseases-scarlet fever,
diphtheria, and pneumonia-and although small, pursued the usual childhood
games with elan. An unexceptional student, Frank possessed a lively curiosity
that made him an avid reader. His relations with his parents, especially his
mother, and with his younger sisters and brother were warm and affectionate.
The McCoys raised their children to be responsible citizens and devout
Presbyterians. But to a young boy thrilling to the military exploits of his
forebears, patriotism and service were the values that suffused his childhood.
Mexican colors captured at Chapultepec and the sword worn by his father as a
heroic regimental commander were displayed prominently in the house, reminding him of the family's martial tradition. It is hardly surprising, then, that the
high school graduate of 1892 had already decided upon a military career of his
own by seeking entrance to the U.S. Military Academy.2

Gaining admission to West Point proved to be no easy task. Although McCoy
received an appointment from Congressman Thad Mahon of Pennsylvania's
Eighteenth District, the prospective cadet still had to pass a rigorous entrance
examination. To qualify, he had first to meet the academy's exacting physical
standards. McCoy's first attempt to do so ended in dismal failure. The army
surgeons who examined the slight, 120-pound candidatP, classified him as flatchested, nervous, and suffering from irregular "heart-action" indicating "proba-
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hie valvular trouble." In short, McCoy was unfit for military service. Undaunted,
he traveled to Highland Falls, New York, outside the academy's main gate, and
there enrolled in Braden's Preparatory School to cram for the entrance exam and
undergo a medical reexamination. His persistence paid off. By the summer of
1893, he had overcome both hurdles and on June 21 joined the Corps of Cadets
as a member of the class of 1897. 3
Faithfully adhering to the regimen that Sylvanus Thayer had devised in the
1820s, West Point had achieved renown as a school of engineering as much as of
military science. Yet the academy that Frank McCoy entered in 1893 had
stagnated. Once it reached the zenith of its prestige during the Civil War, its
leaders-above all, the powerful Academic Board-became increasingly reluctant to tamper with the system credited with securing the institution's past
success. At a time when American higher education was undergoing far-reaching
modernization, West Point, once a center of academic innovation, stood still.
Failing to keep pace with the latest developments in the sciences and engineering
or to broaden its curriculum to include the humanities, it succumbed to
mediocrity. 4
The Academic Board rationalized the institution's educational shortcomings,
claiming that the curriculum was designed, in the words of one member, "not at
all for its utility," but "chiefly because of its value in mental discipline and
development." Thayer's latter-day disciples viewed the academy's purpose as
character building rather than education. According to Prof. Charles W. Larned,
West Point's scholastic inferiority mattered little because as "a school of
character" its genius remained undiminished. Larned and his colleagues
believed that the key to character development lay in isolating their charges from
the civilian world's harmful "atmosphere of commercialism" while immersing
them in an environment of hard work, high standards, and integrity. Above all,
the cadets learned to respect authority: "The entire existence of the Cadet is one
of subordination," observed Larned. The faculty's contribution to this process
was not to teach but to train, employing methods that were frankly coercive. The
goal was a system of virtually total control, requiring of the cadets "a rigid
accountability for every moment of their time and every voluntary action." Those
who survived this ordeal to receive their commissions would have acquired the
soldierly attributes of obedience, self-discipline, courage, and honor while being
"free from the bias of either political or commercial interest." They would have
become something distinct from the average American. 5
McCoy's encounter with such grim high purpose probably did him little harm
and may even have provided occasional benefit. Yet in thoroughness and
intensity, the overall experience fell short of Professor Lamed's intentions. As his
later career would amply demonstrate, McCoy did master the military virtues
somewhere along the line. Whether he did so as a result of attending the
academy, or despite it, is difficult to say. He had come to West Point, after all,
already professing a commitment to those values that Larned strove so mightily
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CHAPTER I

McCoy as a cadet, U.S. Military Academy, class of 1897. (Courtesy U.S. Military
Academy Archives)

to inculcate. McCoy wanted to be a good soldier-honorable, loyal, and brave.
While still at home, he had acquired the rudiments of obedience and selfdiscipline. At most, the military academy may have reinforced certain traits that
already characterized McCoy and most others who sought admission.

Character building aside, McCoy did his best to enjoy West Point. Years later, he
complained of the academy's narrow education and its narrow point of view. But
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throughout four years as a cadet, he avoided academic trouble, remammg
comfortably near the middle of his class. Poor in mathematics and engineering,
he fared better, though not brilliantly, in foreign languages and the single history
course offered. He devoted much of his time to books unrelated to schoolwork.
Despite his small size, McCoy earned his varsity "A" as a baseball outfielder and
catcher. He participated in other extracurricular activities and earned a reputation for being socially adept. (The caption of his Howitzer yearbook portrait
reads: "I am the very pink of courtesy.") He also displayed the sort of mild
rebelliousness guaranteed to win the regard of his peers. In the summer of 1893,
for example, he organized his fellow plebes into a short-lived movement to
subvert the "obsolete and effete" fourth-class system that made West Point's first
year particularly excruciating. Such exploits helped him garner an impressive
total of 356 demerits over the course of four years. His most recurrent
delinquency was tardiness-he was reported late or absent 106 times-but other
offenses ranged from smiling in ranks and yelling in the latrine to "allowing
members of (his] company to sit on tents and crow in a ridiculous manner" while
at summer camp. Yet McCoy's relations with the tactical department remained
cordial enough for him to be named a cadet company commander as a first
classman. 6
Perhaps the high point of McCoy's cadet career occurred in August 1893 when
Chicago feted the Corps of Cadets for ten days at the Columbian Exposition. At
the fair, according to one newspaper, the cadets availed themselves of "breakfasts
without number, flirtations by the score, dinners that test the liver, hops and
receptions at the rate of three a night, concerts, and bathing in the lake."
According to another account, "acres of people ... jammed, pushed, and mauled
themselves in a wild effort to see the West Point cadets" at evening parade. "The

A thrilling moment for a young West Pointer: the Corps of Cadets on evening parade
at the Columbian Exposition, August 1893. (Courtesy Library of Congress)
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crowd was simply beyond human ken." The Corps of Cadets, concluded another
reporter, "attract[ed] more attention from world's fair visitors than any other
exhibit." 7 The experience made a lasting impression on McCoy. "Never," he
reported to his parents, "has a body of young men been treated in such a royal
manner." "Nearly every concern there from the 'Ferris Wheel' to the Beduin
[sic] and Java Villages had special performances for us .... At such times they
always treated us to refreshments and I think I have eaten something from every
nation on the globe... . One would think," he added, "that the 'Corps of Cadets'
were the only people around. " 8
Despite the supposed unpopularity of American soldiers, and despite the
physical and intellectual isolation that Larned and his colleagues believed to be
the hallmarks of the West Point experience, the young cadet who carefully
preserved his newspaper clippings of the fair had gained an inkling of the
ambiguity with which his countrymen viewed the military. He had listened to
Americans cheering that special group of soldiers to which he belonged,
celebrating its members as exemplary representatives of the nation. Perhaps as a
result, the crabbed perception, common among many soldiers, that popular
hostility inevitably left the army ignored and unappreciated would never
persuade McCoy. Nor would he accept the usual corollary: that such sentiments
perforce confined military men exclusively to that narrow role defined by their
specific area of expertise. The fair gave McCoy a glimpse of the potential for a
military elite to assert for itself a broader part in national life. It was the most
important lesson he was to take from his years as a cadet.
McCoy survived West Point, finishing thirty-fourth in a class of sixty-seven.
Notwithstanding his frail appearance-the doctor performing his graduation
physical pronounced him sickly and emaciated-he was commissioned a second
lieutenant of cavalry in June 1897. Two months later, he reported to his first
station: Fort Meade, South Dakota, home of the Eighth U.S. Cavalry. At that
desolate post, McCoy might have remained indefinitely, his enthusiasm and
ambition waning in the face of the tedium of garrison life. Within a year,
however, war intervened to save him from that fate and to set him off ·on an
adventure that ultimately changed the place of the United States in the world as
well as the army's place in America. 9

From his distant vantage point at Fort Meade, McCoy followed the course of the
Cuban imbroglio that progressively threatened to involve the United States.
More than a bit of a jingo, he applauded the gradual toughening of the American
position toward Spain, confident that such a policy would have "a salutary effect
on the greasers." Once American toughness culminated in war in April 1898,
McCoy's only interest was to get into the fight. He requested and received an
immediate posting to the Tenth U.S. Cavalry. As one of the army's two black
cavalry regiments, the unit was generally considered an inferior assignment for
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an officer, despite the superb record of the Buffalo Soldiers. In this instance,
however, racial fastidiousness was less important than the fact that the War
Department had slated the Tenth Cavalry to participate in the liberation of Cuba. 10
McCoy joined his new unit at Camp Thomas, Georgia, on May 9 and was
assigned to Troop A, commanded by Capt. William H. Beck. The young
lieutenant found his regiment engaged in a crash program of training raw
recruits who were steadily trickling in to fill the unit to its wartime strength.
Sweltering in heavy woolen uniforms brought from their home station in
Montana, the regiment's veterans were still better off than the new arrivals, who
showed up with only the clothes on their backs and thus had to be furloughed
home to retrieve the underclothing that the army could not provide. Less than a
week after McCoy arrived, the entire unit interrupted its routine to entrain for
Lakeland, Florida. Here, as at Camp Thomas, shortages of equipment and
experienced leaders, the lack of a well-defined training program, and the hostility
of local whites all hampered efforts to prepare for combat. Yet within a month,
the regiment moved again, this time leaving its horses behind as it traveled to
Tampa, headquarters of the U.S. expeditionary forces. Arriving without rationsthe owner of a local restaurant refused to serve the regiment because "to have
colored men eat in her dining room would ruin her business"-McCoy's unit
immediately crowded onto the steamer Leona, moored in Tampa Bay. Here the
men waited, confined to ship and provided only with combat rations of canned
beef, canned beans, and hardtack. 11
After seven cramped, scorching days in the harbor, the Tenth Cavalry set sail
with the rest of General William Shafter's Fifth Corps. Although it gave the
impatient cavalrymen a psychological boost, putting to sea neither eased the fetid
conditions between decks nor improved the quality of rations. Indeed, conditions
grew worse: After several days at sea, the Leona's supply of water became
brackish and scarcely drinkable. Finally, on June 20, the convoy bearing
Shafter's force of 16,000 soldiers completed its voyage around the eastern tip of
Cuba and arrived off Santiago, the principal American objective. While McCoy
recovered from a bout of seasickness, the high command debated its next step.
After two days of hesitation, Shafter decided to avoid storming Santiago's wellfortified heights. Instead he would put ashore at Daiquiri, 18 miles to the east. 12
The American command managed this landing-to the extent that it was
managed at all-according to what Theodore Roosevelt called the go-as-youplease principle. Because the bay at Daiquiri could not accommodate the
expedition's transports, makeshift landing craft, towed by steam launches and
supported by fire from a squadron of warships, delivered the army ashore. Two
troopers of the Tenth Cavalry who drowned when their boat capsized in the surf
became the campaign's first casualties. Horses and mules, McCoy recalled, were
simply dumped into the sea and expected to make their own way ashore.
Fortunately, the entire operation was unopposed, and by late afternoon McCoy's
regiment had established itself on the beach in comparative safety. 13
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The following morning, while the bulk of the American force was still coming
ashore, McCoy's troop joined other elements assembling to form Maj. Gen.
Joseph Wheeler's Cavalry Division. This organization was not as imposing as its
name suggested. Although cavalry, its troopers did not have horses, and despite
the six different regiments that comprised the fighting strength of the division,
its rolls numbered fewer than 2,700 officers and men. Furthermore, the division's
various units had never trained together under Wheeler's control. Even so, dawn
on June 23 found this composite force optimistically setting out on a reconnaissance in the direction of Santiago.
Jungle so thick that McCoy "could not see the sky overhead" slowed the
Americans' advance. Yet, however halting, the movement sufficed to intimidate
the Spanish forces, who fell back toward Santiago. On the morning of June 24,
the Americans stumbled onto a 1,500-man rear guard at La Guasimas, a steep,
well-fortified hill, thereby precipitating the campaign's first real fight. Although
badly outnumbered, two squadrons of regulars, one each from the First and
Tenth Cavalry, supported by the Rough Riders of the First Volunteer Cavalry,
attempted a coordinated assault. In thick vegetation and under heavy fire, the
attack by the inexperienced Americans soon dissolved into a disorganized melee.
As the Tenth Cavalry's regimental historian proudly noted, however, "the men
needed no leading," and they carried the position, inflicting heavy casualties on
the defenders. Although one Buffalo Soldier was killed and several others were
wounded, success boosted the spirits of those who had been distressed by the
handling of the campaign thus far. An elated McCoy bragged to his parents of
"driving the Dagoes" from the field and proudly gave credit to his troops: "The
men did nobly, even the Rough Riders were as cool and brave as the regulars, and
our discipline was perfect. " 14
Pushing on toward Santiago, the Tenth Cavalry reached Sevilla, 8 miles east of
the city, on June 26 and bivouacked there for four days. The mismanagement that
characterized the entire campaign made the pause an unpleasant one. Baggage
left on the Leona was lost. Rations were virtually inedible and hard to come by at
that. Potable water was too scarce to permit the men to wash. In the hope of
reducing the risk of fevers, nearby streams were put off limits for bathing.
Lacking a brush or comb, McCoy shaved his head, his "bald pate, rocky beard,
and hopeful mustache" thereafter presenting an incongruous picture. The large
numbers of Cubans pestering the Americans were another irritant. Like many of
his compatriots, McCoy developed a low opinion of the people the army had
come to liberate, dismissing them as "the most worthless ... lot of bushwackers
extant." Cuban troops under General Demetrio Castillo failed to provide
promised support at La Guasimas, yet it seemed to McCoy that they were "all
around when there is no fighting," useless to the Americans, "barring helping us
eat our rations." 1s
By June 30, the American command had untangled itself sufficiently to resume
the offensive. The San Juan heights, a range of hills running generally north to
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south and shielded on the east by the Aguadores River, controlled the approaches
to Santiago. Spanish fortifications on San Juan Hill and Kettle Hill, the dominant
features of the range, held the key to the position. Wary of a costly direct assault
against these strong points, Shafter planned to launch Brig. Gen. Henry W.
Lawton's division against El Caney, 3 miles north of San Juan Hill, pivoting the
division to the south once success had been gained and thereby enveloping the
main Spanish position. The remainder of Shafter's corps, including the Cavalry
Division, would remain east of San Juan Hill and join in the attack once Lawton's
force had completed its maneuver. 16
Shafter's ambitious plan disintegrated at virtually the moment of execution.
Stubborn Spanish resistance on July 1 stalled the drive on El Caney. Securing an
objective that they had expected to find lightly defended cost the Americans ten
hours of fighting and 440 casualties. To prevent the Spanish from reinforcing El
Caney and perhaps even repulsing Lawton's attack altogether, Shafter felt
compelled to release the remainder of his forces against the main objective. Here
again, faulty American staff work resulted in a near debacle. To deploy to their
assigned attack positions, the Americans first had to cross Las Guamas creek. But
the stretch of creek below Kettle Hill contained only a single ford, reached by way
of a narrow, open road that lay within range of Spanish guns. The ill-timed
deployment of an American reconnaissance balloon above the road fixed the
attention of any Spanish gunners who might not have grasped the importance of
the target before them. As successive American units jammed into this natural
bottleneck (soon nicknamed the "Bloody Ford"), they suffered heavy casualties
and even panic-the Seventy-first New York Infantry simply lay down and
refused to go farther. Once across, the men waited, still under fire, as
commanders tried to reorganize for the assault. The frustration of such
prolonged delay proved to be too much: At 12:30 P.M. and without orders, as
McCoy recalled years later, the Buffalo Soldiers, along with the First Cavalry, the
Ninth Cavalry, and the Rough Riders, began charging up Kettle Hill. Moving in
two ranks, "crawling, running, stumbling ... up the slope of the hill in the
terrific heat, all in the face of a galling fire," the Americans routed the defenders.
Nearly half of his regiment's officers became casualties during this sharp fight,
but McCoy emerged unscathed. And he had done well. McCoy's "coolness and
skillful performance of duty under heavy fire," reported his commander, "could
not be surpassed." 17
The occupation of Kettle Hill by no means ended the action. While
consolidating their hold on the crest, the Americans continued to take fire from
enemy marksmen who had withdrawn only a short distance. Sensing a counterattack, Captain Beck dispatched McCoy forward with a team of sharpshooters and
instructions to "pick off Spanish officers trying to reorganize their troops."
McCoy directed his patrol onto the forward slope of the hill, exposing himself to
enemy view as he scanned the distance through his field glasses. An alert enemy
sniper put an end to the American lieutenant's nonchalance, however, by putting
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a bullet in his left leg below the knee. McCoy's orderly, Pvt. Daniel Blue, himself
already hit in the shoulder, hastily applied a dressing to the wound and dragged
the officer to cover behind a tree.
Conscious but unable to move, McCoy watched the continuing American
efforts to secure their position. "There was a din of shouting and cursing," he
recalled, '' as the officers urged their men on. Drivers lashed the mules and
horses pulling the heavy guns and wagons. The air was filled with gunpowder
smoke and the crash of shells and the whine of bullets.'' A battery of artillery
unlimbering nearby attracted Spanish fire, making McCoy's "pleasant observation post" progressively less tenable. The commander of the First Volunteer
Cavalry, Col. Leonard Wood, a military surgeon until the war broke out, saw that
McCoy's wound was still bleeding and stopped to apply his own dressing to it and
to order the lieutenant's evacuation. "Braced . . . up with his sympathy and
interest," McCoy became "a devoted admirer from that moment." 18
At Wood's direction, McCoy was moved to an aid station at the Bloody Ford.
From there, a mule-drawn ambulance hauled him and several others back to the
American coastal base at Siboney. While his comrades won the battle of San Juan
Hill and the surgeons manning a hastily erected hospital cared for the critically
wounded, McCoy lay untended for a full day, except for a tin cup of wine and a
plate of slumgullion that he cadged from a passer-by. Eventually, McCoy was
moved down to the beach in preparation for further evacuation. A whaleboat
carried him out to the S.S. Iroquois, pressed into service as a hospital ship, but
rough seas complicated the problem of transferring him to the ship. A large wave
struck the ship as he was about to be hoisted aboard, dumping McCoy into the
Caribbean. "I was picked up by a boat hook," he recalled, "and dragged in like
a wet rat.'' On July 5, he finally reached Key West, Florida, and was hospitalized,
by this time expressing "very thankful feelings to our heavenly Father" for
having survived. Less than two weeks after going ashore at Daiquiri, "the war
was over as far as I was concerned." 19
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In Cuba with Wood

It strikes me .. . as highly romantic,
that the pearl of the Antilles that Spain 's grandees
proved unable to govern, was set on its feet
as a nation . . . by an ex-army doctor,
a second lieutenant of cavalry, a first lieutenant
of infantry . . . and a German-Jew top sergeant.

HERMANN HAGEDORN TO FRANK ROSS McCOY 1

With the Santiago campaign at an end, the men of the Tenth Cavalry departed
Cuba for a detention camp at Montauk Point, Long Island, where they remained
until medical authorities certified them as free from communicable diseases.
Following convalescent leave, McCoy rejoined his regiment there in late August
1898. Although still a second lieutenant, he now commanded a succession of
cavalry troops as the Tenth Cavalry shuttled from Montauk Point to Huntsville,
Alabama, in October and then to Fort Clarke, Texas, in January 1899. His Cuban
experiences having whetted his appetite for adventure, McCoy felt impatient at
being relegated to garrison life. Excited by reports of an American campaign
against Filipino insurgents, he wired a friend at the War Department to arrange
a transfer to the Philippines with a cavalry unit "or [in] any other capacity." But
no vacancies existed. 2
In the spring, his prospects brightened when the War Department ordered his
regiment back to Cuba. A sizable force had stayed in Cuba after the war to
maintain order and provide a visible American presence. Many units assigned to
this role encountered difficulty. Volunteers who had enlisted for the glorious war
against Spain lacked the discipline and temperament for occupation duty-they
wanted only to go home. Even more serious was the malaria and yellow fever that
11
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were exacting a terrible toll. The War Department was counting on the regulars
who replaced the departing volunteers to improve the quality of the occupation
force. Army medical authorities also hoped-as events proved, in vain-that
black soldiers would be immune to the tropical diseases felling so many white
soldiers. Thus, the end of May found McCoy's Troop A garrisoning the town of
Manzanillo, across the Sierra Maestra mountains from Santiago. He confessed to
his family that closer and longer acquaintance with the Cuban people only
confirmed the low opinion that he had formed so quickly and vigorously in 1898.
Overall, however, he found duty with the occupation forces to be to his liking.
"After two years of service in the Army," he told his parents, "after trying it in
several parts of the country, in post and in the field, and enjoying all of it, I say it
with a good deal of satisfaction that I'm satisfied with my lot." He added a single
caveat that he was not perfectly satisfied, of course, so long as he was deprived of
"so much good experience and excitement in the Phillippines [sic]. " 3
Cuba offered an excitement of its own, though of a different sort than that
encountered by army officers assigned to recent Pacific acquisitions of the United
States. On December 20, 1899, Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood became military
governor in Havana, ending the year-long drift of American policy regarding
Cuba. In sharp contrast to the modest goals and passive methods of the previous
governor, General John R. Brooke, Wood inaugurated a phase of the American
occupation that was ambitious in scope and dynamic in character. Unlike Brooke,
Wood entered into his responsibilities with a well-defined vision. General Adna R.
Chaffee, for a brief, unhappy time the new governor's chief of staff, observed that
Wood was a man "impressed with the idea [that] he has a mission" in Cuba, that
he had been "charged with a great transformation." The objective of that
mission, in Wood's words, was "the establishment ... in a Latin military colony
.. . of a republic modeled closely upon the lines of our own great Anglo-Saxon
republic." Conversion of the ramshackle former Spanish possession into a
progressive, efficient society would lay the foundation for a permanent and
mutually advantageous Cuban-American partnership, perhaps culminating in
outright annexation by the United States.4
By all accounts, the conditions existing in Cuba in the early days of the
American occupation were appalling. Cuban cities and towns were pestholes.
Unable to provide even minimal public services, government had acquired a welldeserved reputation for inefficiency and corruption. According to Wood, the
prevalence of old customs and ideas bequeathed by Spain resulted in the "entire
destruction of public spirit and interest in good government.'' Public institutions
lay in shambles. Education was without organization and of little value; prisons
were so backward as to be simply medieval; medical facilities were found to be
hospitals only in name; taxation was inequitable. The courts had long ceased
dispensing justice: "There seemed to be an unlimited number of ways of getting
a man into prison," reported Wood to the War Department, "but unless rich and
influential it was difficult for him to find his way out." Most depressing of all was
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IN CUBA WITH WOOD

McCoy (fourth from right) as a cavalry subaltern in occupied Cuba, 1899. (Courtesy
U.S. Army Military History Institute)

the treatment accorded those least able to help themselves. The mentally ill were
outcasts, with patients locked ih cramped boxes that resembled large dog
kennels. The young fared no better. Visiting an orphanage, Wood found children
"covered with vermin .... Their heads were in many instances lousy, and the
dormitories were overrun with bedbugs. . . . In passing through the various
dormitories many of the beds were opened. The linen was found soiled with
excretions, and in many cases the pillows were well stained with dried pus from
affected eyes and ears. " 5
Cuba had been too long exploited by Spain and too ravaged by war, Wood
believed, to act as the agent of its own salvation. To shed its colonial past and
become a suitable partner for the future, Cuba needed help from the United
States. In the general's view, the Americans best suited to provide that help were
the military forces already on occupation duty. What Cuba needed, he wrote in
1899, was a "government of the people, for the people, and by the people, under
American military supervision. " 6 Soon after initiating this experiment in what a
friendly journalist labeled "benevolent despotism," Wood and Chaffee embarked upon a two-week inspection trip up and down the length of Cuba.
Traveling by boat, train, and horseback, Wood sought to assess personally the
conditions existing throughout the island. His itinerary included a stop at
Manzanillo and a visit to the headquarters of the Tenth Cavalry. As Wood
prepared to leave, McCoy was detailed to escort his party as far as its next
destination. This second encounter with the man he had last seen amidst the
gunfire of Kettle Hill proved to be a turning point in McCoy's life. 7
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Leonard Wood, foremost among McCoy's mentors. (Courtesy U.S. Army Military
History Institute)

To the disinterested observer, the burly, handsome, energetic Wood was a
bundle of contradictions. Yet few who actually knew Wood were capable of
appraising him disinterestedly. More than most figures prominent in public life,
he inspired the extremes of either intense animosity or enthusiastic devotion. To
his detractors, Wood was an arrogant and ambitious martinet, an insubordinate
demagogue, all the more suspect for the irregular pattern of his career: educated
not at West Point, but at Harvard; trained as a physician at Harvard Medical
School; apparently destined for obscurity as an army surgeon until the SpanishAmerican War and his wartime friendship with Theodore Roosevelt vaulted him
to a senior position in the line army. Wood's background and determination to
make the most of his suddenly transformed career combined to give him an
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outlook on the army's role in national affairs that departed substantially from the
narrow ethos of the old Indian-fighting army. Yet this outlook captured with
striking precision the military requirements of a nation struggling with the
implications of its seemingly inevitable rise to great-power status. Thus, within
the army's ranks, Wood represented something like the model for a new officer.
Many senior army leaders considered Wood to be an upstart. They either did
not comprehend or rejected out of hand his new model of officership. But for
young officers of McCoy's generation, Wood represented an approach to military
service that possessed enduring appeal. In comparison to more traditional
soldiers, Wood's approach was expansive, taking for granted a broader involvement of the army and individual officers in affairs of state. Wood's approach also
had an affirmative or creative aspect. He viewed the army not simply as an
instrument of destruction, but as an agency of positive political and social
change primarily abroad and to a lesser extent at home. The values that Wood
espoused struck a responsive chord among officers searching for their place in
the new empire they had helped win for the United States. They shared his
enormous confidence in the rightness of American values. They were drawn to his
idealistic vision of remaking societies rather than merely maintaining order
within them. They admired and sought to emulate the personal qualities that he
exemplified: rectitude, forthrightness, charisma, breadth of vision, a love of the
outdoors, and an insatiable appetite for adventure and strenuous activity. Those
who admired Wood tended either to be blind to his faults or to have an enormous
capacity to forgive them.
"So often I have been disappointed on close contact with big guns," McCoy
told his mother, but not so in this case. Wood was different. The former Rough
Rider had already established enviable credentials as a combat leader. Now,
however, it was Wood's stature as "a real statesman of high ideals and of great
doings" that impressed McCoy. To a subaltern whose view of the occupation
derived from patrolling back roads and chasing stray bandits, introduction to the
overall dimensions of American aims in Cuba was eye opening. "What a problem
this Cuban one is," McCoy wrote. Yet even brief contact with Wood convinced
McCoy that the governor could overcome any obstacle: To Wood, "all of the
quantities seemed to be a,b,c, [whereas) with most men they would have been
x,y,z.'' 8
For his part, McCoy made a similarly favorable impression on Wood. Observing
the young officer dash into an uncharted river to test its fordability, Chaffee
casually expressed interest in having McCoy on his staff. "I am sorry, General,"
replied Wood. "I have just made up my mind to have him myself." It was the sort
of opportunity that an intrepid junior officer could hardly resist. On April 21, 1900,
McCoy joined Wood's staff as an aide-de-camp and a member of the intimate circle
of subordinates assembled to assist W?od in fulfilling his mission. 9
As Wood's aide, McCoy accompanied his chief throughout his daily schedule
and found his wide-ranging activities invigorating. As he later recalled, "Wood's
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routine as Military Governor was no routine at all." The only predictable element
was the intense hour of jai-alai with which Wood and McCoy regularly began
their day. After breakfast, the governor seldom remained in his office, instead
seeking further firsthand information on existing conditions and personally
inspecting projects undertaken under American auspices. In McCoy's view, the
military government's earlier ineffectiveness resulted from Brooke's insistence
upon operating "by system and routine, rather than by personal intervention. He
did not visit the hospitals and prisons, and, therefore, he did not know of their
awful condition." In contrast, "Wood visited everything everywhere," from the
capital to the farthest reaches of rural Cuba, "and saw with his own eyes what had
to be done." In short, "Wood's was a personal form of government." 10
After accompanying his chief on inspection tours through most of the day,
McCoy faced an evening of socializing, attending functions sponsored by well-todo residents of Havana or helping Wood entertain dignitaries from the United
States. McCoy enjoyed these encounters with the social elite, although they tested
his uncertain mastery of Spanish. "The girls here talk away and we ... look
intelligent when we're groping hard at the beginning of the flow," he told his
parents. "But we try to laugh at the proper time." 11
Besides acting as Wood's aide and personal factotum, McCoy assumed specific
responsibility for government finances. A recurring theme of Wood' s administration was the progressive centralization of authority wielded by the military
governor. McCoy's role as Wood's agent in controlling the government's
disbursements and supervising its finances reflected this centralizing tendency.
McCoy's financial report for the year 1900, published as part of the military
governor's annual report, depicts his contribution to the efficient management of
Cuban finances. The effects of Spanish fiscal practices, according to McCoy, were
as dismal as the legacy of Spanish rule in general: "At the time of the
relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty the [Cuban] treasury was left bare of
money, and even many of the records concerning the administration of public
moneys were lost." The "vicious" Spanish provisions for compensating public
officials-designed, it seemed, to encourage corruption-excited McCoy's particular contempt. Graft became so widespread and pronounced that positions with
no salaries at all were the most eagerly sought. Essential facilities, such as banks,
were all but unknown. Colonial bookkeeping had ranged from sloppy to
nonexistent. Standard business practices were widely ignored and, where
practiced, were seldom understood or trusted. Among the common people, "a
corollary to the hostility to government in general was their lack of confidence in
all forms of paper." 12
Wood's ambitious plans to remake Cuba in the American image demanded
prompt eradication of corrupt and careless financial habits. Absent businesslike
and efficient means of monitoring the distribution of funds, Wood risked
throwing away the government's $20 million annual budget. Proper financial
management thus became a precondition for overall success. In McCoy's view-
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and doubtless in Wood's as well-"the loose philanthropic methods of the early
days of the American occupation" permitted the dubious practices of the
Spanish era to survive. Under Brooke, the occupation government's Department
of Finance each month provided lump sums to Cuba's six provinces, each of
which in turn distributed funds to individual municipalities based on requests
prepared by local officials. These alcaldes, who in McCoy's eyes had all "the
independence and faults of town bosses[,] . . . did not see the necessity of
accounting for their expenditures, nor for making them in accordance with the
specific allotments." In short, so long as requests for governmental funds were
generated by the provinces and disbursed according to the whim of the alcaldes,
the military governor in Havana could neither determine how occupation funds
would be spent nor prevent their misuse.1 3
The controls that McCoy devised corrected this situation by expanding the
role of the military governor at the expense of both provincial and local officials.
McCoy created eleven fiscal zones, each directly responsible to the Department
of Finance in Havana and hence to Wood. The chief of each fiscal zone was
charged with transferring funds from the national government to local agencies
and jurisdictions, thereby cutting the provinces out of the process altogether. In
addition, McCoy stripped the alcaldes of their authority for disbursing revenues
provided by the military government. Supplanting the alcaldes were officers of
the U.S. Army, appointed as bonded disbursing officers for public activities such
as hospitals, school systems, and penal institutions. Under this system, the
alcalde received funds to pay his local police force but little else. No longer were
lump sums transferred by the Department of Finance to the provinces for
distribution to local municipalities. The sums given to disbursing officers were
issued as checks for specified projects or activities already approved by Wood,
thus reducing the likelihood of funds being diverted to unauthorized uses. And
because Wood himself acted as the government's unrestricted approving authority and personally scrutinized the monthly estimates that McCoy assembled from
the fiscal zones, the new system assured the military governor for the first time
that resources were being used precisely as he intended. As McCoy commented,
"With this system it is possible to know the exact purpose for which every cent
has been allotted." 14
Supported by McCoy's reliable system for managing the military government's financial affairs, Wood proceeded with his plan for remaking Cuba. The
highhandedness and arrogance with which the general went about his task
stirred controversy in his own time, and historians since have debated his
underlying aims and the long-term effects of his tenure. Yet few dispute that
Wood succeeded in what he set out to do and that the Cuban people benefited
from the immediate fruits of that success. A hostile journalist classified the first
American intervention as "a model of fine trusteeship." And the historian Philip
Foner, otherwise an unrelenting critic of the American presence in Cuba,
admitted that Wood's administration had "many important achievements,
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especially in the areas of sanitation, education, and public works." Under Wood,
recounts Foner,
Havana and other cities were modernized; yellow fever was suppressed; the
judicial system was overhauled; municipal government reorganized; sanitary campaigns were pushed with vigor; roads were built, harbors dredged,
sewers installed, streets paved and telegraph lines strung. Finally, and
perhaps most important of all, public education became a reality in Cuba. 15
From 1899 to 1902, Cuba became a workshop for American progressivism.
Wood and his band of military reformers experimented with techniques that
civilian progressives later applied to the United States itself. As measured by the
desperately needed improvements made to everyday Cuban life, the experiment
was a great success. Vastly improved public services, schools, and administrative
efficiency improved the quality of Cuban life. As a result, the American
occupation of Cuba acquired a humanitarian reputation unique in the annals of
imperialism. Yet Wood's brand of progressivism was not as benign as the
circumstances existing in Cuba permitted it to appear. Unlike many domestic
progressives, Wood did not see reform as a vehicle for preserving-or, in Cuba's
case, creating-democracy. Wood cared little about whether Cuban politics were
undemocratic or not. What Wood did care about, and could not abide, was that
nothing in Cuba worked properly-not the schools, not the hospitals, not the
economy, and not the bureaucracy. Finding such chaos intolerable, he set out to
provide Cuba with a rational and efficient order. With the local populace too
exhausted by war to do anything but acquiesce, Wood enjoyed a remarkably free
hand. This situation permitted him to satisfy simultaneously the imperatives of
American control, societal efficiency, and the basic needs of the people. The
Cuban experience did not show-as Wood's subsequent assignment to the
Philippines would-how the army's progressives would react if forced to choose
among those imperatives. 16
From McCoy's perspective, whether the military government's policies did or
did not conform to the principles of the embryonic progressive movement
mattered little. McCoy viewed Wood's reforms less as a comprehensive plan to
determine Cuba's destiny than as a pragmatic, expedient response to a crisis of
monumental proportions. The conditions confronting Americans in Cuba were so
awful, he later told Hermann Hagedorn, that "it was no time for a theoretic
economy." Devastated by war and revolution, Cuba required immediate relief
effectively administered. This Wood delivered. 17
McCoy did recognize that in devising remedies for Cuba and in measuring
their effectiveness, the military government drew exclusively on American
practices and familiar American standards. Echoing sentiments expressed by his
chief, McCoy concluded his financial report for 1900 with assurances that the
military government's objectives were being secured "by the use of American
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methods and in conformity with American ideals." In McCoy's eyes, Americanization was not a device for fastening U.S. domination on Cuba but was simply
the logical medium for ameliorating the conditions that existed in the aftermath
of Spain's departure. Although later generations may find such a belief in
national superiority smug and unjustified, men of McCoy's upbringing and
experience considered it self-evident. Indeed, the officers who staffed the military
government would not have known where else to turn for guidance. What other
nation could match the achievement of the United States? To McCoy, American
success in Cuba only confirmed such predispositions. 18
At the same time, McCoy sensed that many Cubans disliked their liberators.
He knew that many of the original leaders of the Cuban revolution strenuously
opposed Wood (they were "jealous"}; he heard the charge that American policies
"were rapidly wiping out all of the old Spanish customs without regard to the
wishes of the people" (though the elimination of diversions such as cockfighting,
he claimed, "met with the full approval of all of the educated people"}; he
recognized that "the great mass of the Cubans don't know or care about the
money that has been put into public works, charities, hospitals and schools."
Inasmuch as everything had been "shoved down their throats," McCoy "never
blamed the Cubans for this apparent lack of appreciation or gratitude." He knew
that Cuban pride had been injured "by the way we talk about educating them
and cleaning them and their towns." As individuals, thought McCoy, Cubans
secretly harbored "that same suspicion that we so often express as to their ability
to govern themselves." They resented having the Americans accomplish so
swiftly a transformation of Cuba that they believed themselves incapable of
accomplishing. Given such a motivation, McCoy refused to take Cuban hostility
toward the military government seriously. 19
McCoy remained with Wood until the occupation ended in May 1902. Indeed,
his last official duty symbolized the end of American authority in Cuba. From
atop the palace in Havana's Plaza des Armes- residence of the military governor
since 1898- McCoy watched civilian officials, American troops, and thousands of
Cubans assemble on May 20 for ceremonies marking the establishment of the
new island republic. At noon, the harbor fortress of Cabana fired a forty-five gun
salute, following which McCoy lowered the American colors for what would
supposedly be the last time. "It was a hard thing to do," he reported to his
mother, "-and for the General to give me the orders too!-pulling down the
Stars and Stripes even in this very honorable manner. " 20
If ending the occupation-a step Wood considered premature- was more than
slightly bittersweet for McCoy, his role in the army's first venture in military
government profoundly influenced his life. Service in Cuba reinforced McCoy's
belief in the superiority of American methods and values and in their relevance
for other peoples. More important, McCoy's Cuban experiences provided an
invaluable apprenticeship in civil administration, convincing him, as it did
Wood's other disciples, that this was a field in which military men should play a
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leading role. As Maj. Hugh L. Scott, Chaffee's successor as Wood's chief of staff,
concluded, "A military government is the only kind fit to cope with such
conditions" as existed in Cuba. McCoy agreed wholeheartedly. As governor,
Wood addressed "a great many problems which he was confident the military
government could settle, but which a political government could never in the
world untangle."21
As a result of his Cuban service, too, McCoy established himself as an intimate
member of Wood's circle, an elite group that continued to expand in size and
influence after 1902. Indeed, by the time he boarded the U.S.S. Brooklyn in
Havana harbor to accompany Wood back to the United States, McCoy had
become the general's closest professional confidant and virtually a member of his
family. His relationship with Wood-the army's youngest general, a personal
friend of Theodore Roosevelt, and a man with connections throughout Washington-all but guaranteed McCoy's career. More important, through his service at
Wood's side, McCoy matured professionally. If the youthful subaltern spoiling for
a fight had not altogether disappeared, he had certainly broadened his appreciation of the purposes that the army might serve even in peacetime. Wood's imprint
on Cuba would fade; his impact on McCoy would endure.
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Pacifying the Moros

From Havana, Wood's entourage returned directly to Washington. McCoy's
patron, while winning nationwide acclaim (in the eyes of some, notoriety) for his
Cuban exploits, had also secured his integration into the regular army as a
brigadier genera[ Finding a new assignment suited to the abilities and ambitions
of such a controversial soldier presented the War Department and Wood's friend,
President Theodore Roosevelt, with no small difficulties. McCoy, now a first
lieutenant, and Scott, reduced to his prewar rank of captain, established an office
for Wood at 1812 H Street, N.W. "Good Old Scott," as he was known throughout
the officer corps, was a durable and steady if unimaginative West Pointer, class of
1876. He was stocky, tending even to stout; wire-rimmed spectacles gave him a
bookish appearance that was offset by a long, ragged mustache that recalled his
apprenticeship in the cavalry. During his years in the West, Scott won recognition
as a master of Indian lore and sign language. In the new American empire,
however, such expertise counted for naught. So, despite being senior to Wood in
years of service, Scott accepted recurring employment as one of Wood's key
subordinates. Standing in Wood's shadow never troubled the modest Scott;
indeed, he prospered there and revived his career, his subsequent advancement
to high rank surprising and delighting his many affectionate admirers. Despite
the gap between them in seniority, McCoy and Scott became fast friends, joined
by a mutual admiration for their general.
Having set up Wood's office, McCoy and Scott helped the former military
governor assemble his final report while addressing what his official stationery
termed "Business Pertaining to the Late Military Government of Cuba." Wood's
desultory stay in this official limbo soon received welcome interruption in the
form of an invitation to attend the Imperial German Army's autumn maneuvers.
The general accepted with alacrity and set out for Europe, with McCoy assigned
21
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to follow in the capacity of aide-de-camp. "Good Old Scott" stayed behind to tie
up the loose ends. 1 In mid-August, McCoy sailed from New York aboard the S.S.
Potsdam. His voyage was uneventful but pleasant, due largely to the presence on
board of Prof. Albert Bushnell Hart, the noted historian and, in McCoy's view,
"the all around man of the ship, . . . starter of games, getter up of concerts, and
the talker until further orders." Although the official purpose for McCoy's junket
was to observe the German maneuvers, both the young lieutenant and his chief
intended to exploit to the utmost a ready-made opportunity to see the rest of
Europe. As soon as he arrived in Rotterdam, McCoy "started off at a rapid gait to
do the old countries." After touring Holland, he joined General and Mrs. Wood
in Paris, at which time the pace immediately quickened to a "fast gallop."
Although it was still before daybreak when McCoy reached his hotel in the
French capital, he wrote, "before I was out of the tub the Chief was in my room
and we started off," visiting the Eiffel Tower, Notre Dame, the Louvre, and Les
Invalides in rapid succession. Wood "sees the sights as he works and plays,"
observed McCoy, "on the run." 2
As McCoy reported to his mother, both he and Wood realized keenly their
ignorance of the fine arts. The spare moments provided by their undemanding
three-month itinerary consequently found the two Americans-"determined to
absorb all we could in a short time"-tramping through museums and
undertaking pilgrimages to European cultural shrines. In addition to Paris and
Berlin, their stops included Switzerland, the chief cities of Italy, Monte Carlo,
southern France, and Great Britain. Reflecting on the effusive account of his
travels that he was sending back to Lewistown, McCoy wondered if some might
suspect that he and Wood had engaged in "little of the real soldier business"
since leaving the United States. Should that be his family's view, he told his
mother, "you are right." 3
The visit to England, at least, was not entirely without serious purpose. There
Wood hoped to assess a British army recently blooded by its experience against
the Boers. Because Wood's own accomplishments in Cuba attracted the admiration of the British establishment, the Americans received a cordial welcome.
When they arrived in London, a "pile" of invitations awaited. Besides the
obligatory call on the American ambassador and a visit to the British training
base at Aldershot, Wood and McCoy lunched with King Edward VII at
Buckingham Palace and dined with Prime Minister Arthur Balfour; Lord
Roberts, the army commander in chief; Lord Kitchener, the commander in chief
for India; and General Sir John French. 4
Despite such flattering attention by English cousins, the centerpiece of the trip
remained Germany itself. Arriving in Berlin in early September, the Americans
were whisked off to Frankfurt in the private railway car of Prince Henry. The
kaiser's brother greeted each of them with a hearty hand-shake and a cigar and
commented favorably-and accurately, thought McCoy-"about the great all
around resemblance" between the kaiser and the American president. In
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Frankfurt, Wood and McCoy attended a review of the Guards Corps and
afterward were presented to Wilhelm II and his empress. Riding up to the
imperial party in his turn, McCoy "got a handful of a Marshal's baton and the
family clasp" from the kaiser, accompanied by a rapid-fire series of questions:
"What branch of service do you belong to? Have you been serving in the West?
How did you like Cuba?" Other encounters with the imperial family followed
their return to Berlin: a "very jolly informal" dinner given by the kaiser
exclusively for the American and British observers and a more elaborate affair
the following evening for all foreign officers attending the maneuvers. Wood's
impressionable young aide found the surroundings, the company, and the
conversation dazzling.5
With the social amenities out of the way, the real business of the maneuvers
began. Throughout the exercise, the Americans accompanied the kaiser and his
party as they followed the clash of the Red and Blue forces. For McCoy, Wilhelm
himself was part of the show:

He looked his part ... , uniformed as a red Hussar and mounted upon a
splendid white Arab. There he stood upon a little knoll just as Napoleon
used to stand, with his brilliant staff, the heralds and the imperial standard:
like a picture of 1806. And we in our plain khaki had a little smile to
ourselves as we looked at the Emperor, his officers and army, in one way at
least as far behind the times as the picture he made.
Nonetheless, he warned, ''you make a bad mistake if you judge the Kaiser and his
army by this picture." The precision-drilled German war machine was a
formidable sight and made a deep impression. Wood's experience here, McCoy
believed, provided the inspiration for the general's preparedness campaign
preceding American entry into World War I. 6
The climax of the maneuvers came on the final day: an exhilarating cavalry
charge, 10,000 strong, led by the kaiser himself into the flank of the retreating
Blue forces. For McCoy, it was the greatest spectacle of all. He and Wood found
themselves wedged between regiments of Black Hussars on one side and Grand
Cuirassiers on the other and swept along by yelling, charging cavalry all around.
It was a wild, bracing moment: "For four or five miles it was a mad charge over
. . . plowed fields into a thick turnip patch, over a ditch and up and over and
down a railroad embankment, through an orchard." Whether either American
recognized the charge for the anachronism tl_1at it was, McCoy did not record. 7
On November 1, McCoy and Wood departed for home. McCoy's first
transatlantic visit and his introduction to many of Europe's leading political and
military figures provided yet another episode in the continuing education that he
was receiving at Wood's side. The German maneuvers offered the military
equivalent of finishing -school combined with a grand tour. Little further was
needed to cement his position within the American military elite. And what little
remained was soon accomplished.
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Back in Washington, while Wood awaited a decision on his next assignment,
McCoy was detailed as military aide to President Roosevelt, thereby entering the
"charmed circle of his friends and playmates." McCoy's White House duties
were not taxing. He reported to Roosevelt's office at 9:00 each morning to await
the chief executive and, upon his arrival, reviewed with Roosevelt the day's
schedule. McCoy also screened the enormous influx of books received at the
White House, selecting those of likely interest to the president. McCoy's most
important function lay in contributing to Roosevelt's regimen of strenuous
exercise. He served as one of the president's riding companions and refereed his
notorious fencing matches with Wood (substituting as a combatant when Wood
was unavailable). As McCoy wearily remarked, whenever the Rough Rider tired
of flailing about with wooden broadswords, "it was jiu jitsu and boxing."
Assignment to the White House even in a minor capacity opened the doors of
Washington's hostesses for an eligible, well-mannered bachelor. "I'm getting the
dining out habit bad," he complained halfheartedly to his mother. "Every night
last week there were doings.'' Thanks to his closeness to both Roosevelt and
Wood, McCoy gained the acquaintance of cabinet members and congressmen,
forging relationships that would someday pay dividends. 8
While McCoy was enjoying Washington social life, negotiations for Wood's
assignment were finally concluded. Roosevelt and Wood agreed that the latter
would become the senior American military official in the Far East, assuming
command of the Philippine Division in Manila. But because the current occupant
of that position, Maj. Gen. James F. Wade, was not scheduled to rotate for several
months, Wood accepted an interim assignment as commander of the Department
of Mindanao and governor of the newly created Moro Province. Inevitably, Wood
asked McCoy to join him as his personal aide. As always, the younger officer
found the prospect of a new assignment exciting: "Los Moros are worth
handling," he told his mother with misplaced confidence. 9
To study the handiwork of the world's other imperial powers and perhaps also
to compare it to his own efforts as a colonial administrator, Wood decided to tour
the principal European possessions in Asia on his way to the Philippines.
McCoy's first journey to Asia thus began in Boston on March 28, 1903, when he
joined Wood and Scott on board the S.S. Commonwealth bound for Gibraltar.
The Americans's route took them across southern Europe, from Vienna to
Constantinople on the Orient Express, and by sea again through the Suez to the
Far East. 10 Something akin to missionary fervor impelled the voyagers toward
the challenges awaiting them at their new station. Wood and Scott left their
families behind to follow later, so the three officers travelled unencumbered by
women or children. One senses that they preferred it that way: Nothing
distracted them from preparing for the job to come. During the journey, the
comradeship that Cuba inspired assumed quasi-monastic overtones. The long
voyage served as a rite of preparation that sharpened their shared sense of
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McCoy as aide to President Theodore Roosevelt. McCoy's admiration for Roosevelt
was second only to his devotion to Leonard Wood. (Courtesy U.S. Army Military
History Institute)
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purpose. The weeks spent at sea and inspecting European possessions completed
the conversion of Wood, Scott, and McCoy into single-minded zealots intolerant
of opposition to purposes that were in their eyes unimpeachably worthy. They
sailed to the Philippines determined to play a role in a historic undertakingconverting the islands into prosperous bastions of order and Western civilization.
Whatever the defects of their vision, never had more genuinely idealistic
American soldiers ever set sail for distant shores.
The trip itself reinforced McCoy's confidence in the superiority of Western
values and convinced him further of the need for colonial rule of backward
peoples. Societies lacking the enlightened guidance of the West elicited McCoy's
wholehearted contempt. Constantinople was "the filthiest, most evil-smelling city
since Santiago." It had been "500 years since the Turks burst into this beautiful
city, burning, destroying, and killing everything that was good, and it looks as
though they've been camping out on the ruins ever since." For American khaki
imperialists the compulsion to clean up such untidiness was great indeed. "I
believe in the crusades," McCoy wrote, "and feel like joining one myself against
the Turk and his dogs." 11
From Turkey, Wood's party proceeded to Egypt. From this point onward,
wrote McCoy, "everything has taken new interest; and much . . . may be of use to
us in time and occupations to come." As Wood and McCoy took turns reading a
biography of General Charles "Chinese" Gordon, their steamer made its way
from Egypt to Aden and on to "the writhing mass of Bombay." An extended stay
in India provided "a liberal education of the work among two hundred million
people." McCoy quickly adopted the prevailing attitudes of the raj. "This punka
business is rather worrying at first," he confessed. But with "natives" competing
for the privilege of pulling his punka rope to stir up a bit of breeze at a wage of 6
cents per day, he concluded that it must be considered good pay for light work.
And, having experienced the "keenest enjoyment of a cold bath poured over you
by a naked Hindu," McCoy decided that "it's necessary and I find I'm getting
hardened already." 12
"At first sight everybody in India looks hopeless," he observed. "Millions of
heathen coolies squat ... thick over the face of the earth . . . readier to rot than
to keep clean, bound down by caste, and without a ray of hope from their
religion." Western rule and Western religion alone provided an optimistic note.
"The only decent, clean people east of Suez are the native Christians and the
British native soldiers. The British flag stands for a lot more than one knows," he
commented, "and where it waves is government, good government of a kind, but
it only goes so far. The work of the missionary is the rest." Despite such
advances, India remained a daunting challenge. "It's a question of centuries and
the British know it, and are ready to wait," McCoy believed. Although the
Philippines were a small proposition in comparison, he worried lest Americans
become impatient if their Pacific possession were not thoroughly Americanized
overnight. 13
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From India, Wood and his companions made their way to the Dutch East
Indies. "This green isle," he reported from the residence of the Dutch governor
general in Batavia, "seems bright and happy and wholesome." At first, the
Americans were put off by the submissiveness of the locals. Observing the way
that they "went down on their heels on our approach, squatted ... in the most
servile, sickening way ... as the almighty white man went by," McCoy reported
that "it made us 'sick at the stomach.'" He noted approvingly Wood's hope that
the Filipinos "take to the woods occasionally and kill off a few of us, for their
rights and manliness [rather] than squat and cringe." 14
By the time his ten-day visit as a guest of the Dutch ended, however, McCoy's
views had changed. He now rated the Dutch system of colonial government as a
thoroughly good one, worthy of emulation. The power and energy of the Dutch
permeated the entire society. "Their civil service," thought McCoy, "is such as
we should build up for our colonies." An inspection of Dutch East Indian troops
provided ideas that would come in handy in the Philippines. The key to Dutch
success, McCoy believed, was their assumption that "the natives are the simplest
of children" and the governor general their father and protector. Having
accustomed himself to the servile, cringing behavior of the local people, McCoy
concluded that Java was "the richest, greenest, and happiest country we've
visited." 15 From Java, Wood and his party proceeded to Singapore. There they
dined with the exiled leader of the Philippine insurrection, Emilio Aguinaldo, to
whom McCoy and Wood took quite a liking. "He is very much a man," observed
McCoy. After Singapore, the three officers visited Hong Kong, stopped briefly at
Saigon, and at last, at the end of July 1903, reached Manila. 16

Viewed from Washington, assuming responsibility for a mere portion of the
Philippines after having reconstructed all of Cuba may have seemed a simple
task. In many respects, however, Wood's dual responsibilities as military
commander of the Department of Mindanao and first civil governor of the Moro
Province proved more demanding than anticipated. By far the largest in the
Philippines, the province encompassed not only Mindanao, itself larger than
Ireland, but also the islands of Basilan and Palawan, and the Sulu Archipelago, a
string of several hundred lesser islands. This vast territory consisted largely of
rugged mountains and uncharted jungle, penetrated by a few roads and edged by
a handful of ramshackle towns. Its habitants numbered about 400,000. Of the
total, perhaps 40,000 were Christian Filipinos, 275,000 were Muslims (Moros),
and the remainder other non-Christians, for the most part members of primitive
hill tribes. The Moros were a fiercely independent people who for centuries
frustrated Spanish efforts to establish more than nominal control over the
southern Philippines. That independence may also explain the Moros' inability
to achieve political unity among themselves. By the time that the United States
supplanted Spain, Moro society had evolved into innumerable separate tribes,
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each controlled by its own chief (variously called datto, panglima, or hadji) and
each inflamed by a warrior tradition that required periodic warfare against
believer and nonbeliever alike. I 7
From 1899 to 1903, the American administration tolerated this Moro penchant
for fighting, reflecting a policy that avoided any interference with Moro internal
economy and political administration. The motive for this apparent disinterest
was simple. During that period, American officials were preoccupied with
suppressing rebellious Filipino nationalists opposed to American occupation of
the islands. In comparison with the Philippine insurrection, the disposition of the
Moros was a minor question that the United States could safely defer until able to
give it full attention. IS
Despite the urgency of pacifying the northern islands, the United States took
the precaution of establishing at least theoretical claim over Moroland. Toward
that end, Brig. Gen. John C. Bates in 1899 initiated negotiations with the Sultan
of Sulu, the Moros' powerless titular leader. The resulting Bates Agreement
prescribed future relations between the United States and the Moro people. The
sultan recognized American sovereignty in exchange for promises to protect the
sultan's subjects, to pay him a personal annuity, and to respect his jurisdiction
over criminal matters involving only Moros. The United States also pledged that
Moro religious customs should be respected and implicitly recognized the Moro
practice of slavery. As McCoy later conceded, the Bates Agreement "was in the
nature of a modus vivendi until a better way of handling the Moro question could
be worked out." To the sultan, however, American negotiators made no attempt
to indicate its temporary nature.1 9
From the outset, American officers in Mindanao disliked the Bates Agreement,
complaining that it restricted their authority. By 1903, with the Philippine
insurrection crushed, such complaints gave added weight to the assertion that the
time had arrived to gain full control of the southern islands. On June 1, 1903, the
Philippine Commission, the central American authority in the islands, acted on
this conclusion by combining into one province all areas in which Moros
predominated. The commission designated a governor as chief executive of the
province and vested legislative authority in a provincial council composed of the
governor and his five principal assistants-none of whom in practice would be
Moros. In the words of the commission's senior member, William Howard Taft,
this provincial government was granted "a very large measure of discretion in
dealing with the Moros." The commission did insist that the provincial council
preserve "the customs of the Moros, the authority of the dattos, and a system of
justice in which Moros should take part." The commission also subdivided the
province into five districts-Zamboanga, Lanao, Cotabato, Davao, and Joloeach with its own administration subordinate to the provincial government. The
creation of this elaborate machinery did not mean that the Philippine Commission viewed the Moro problem as susceptible to a strictly administrative solution.
Noting that union of the civil and the military power seemed admirably adapted
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to the Moro Province, the commission directed that there, as nowhere else in the
Philippines, the civil governor and military commander were to be one and the
same. Indeed, soldiers dominated the civil administration from the provincial to
the district and municipal levels. 20
On August 8, 1903, Theodore Roosevelt nominated his friend Leonard Wood
for promotion to major general. Two days earlier, accompanied by McCoy and
Scott (now a major), Wood had planted his headquarters at Mindanao's southern
tip in the provincial capital of Zamboanga. Driven as always by enormous stores
of impatient energy, the new governor quickly immersed himself in his new
realm, grasping at the essence of the situation he confronted and establishing his
presence at its core. Within a week, he and McCoy were far from Zamboanga,
trekking through the interior of the province accompanied by a battalion of
infantry. Wood used the expedition to gauge conditions in the province and,
through persuasion or intimidation, to elicit pledges of fealty from local
chieftains. One of a series of operations mounted in succeeding months, it
permitted Wood to refine his pacification strategy while allowing McCoy to
develop his own perceptions of the Moro problem.
McCoy, a captain as of August 16, held a low opinion of the Moro. Clothed in
garish attire, sporting an arsenal of archaic weaponry, his visage stained with
betel nut, the Moro seemed a queer figure, at once eccentric, childlike, and
menacing. In McCoy's eyes, the Moros' cultural backwardness threatened to
defeat altruistic American efforts to redeem them. Given "their befogged and
supersticious [sic] brains," the Moros refused even to avail themselves of the
medical services offered by the American military. "You mention Cholera to
them and they throw up their hands with a fatalistic gesture. 'God has given and
God has taken away.' " Moro polygamy and slavery, their incessant warfare, and a
criminal justice system in which "the maximum punishment for murder is [a fine
of] 105 dollars" fascinated and appalled McCoy. Describing Moro customs to an
acquaintance in the War Department, he observed: "It is hard to realize that we
are living in the same century with you law abiding American citizens." And to a
friend from Cuban days he wrote: "Over here we are living in the midst of
feudalism and slavery, with pirates and bloody murder." Altogether, it was an
"opera bouffe performance.'' 21
In the early 1900s, the army's long-standing role as a frontier constabulary
loomed large in the memory of the officer corps. Not surprisingly, when officers in
the Philippines attempted to relate the Moro to something more akin to their own
experience, they described him as an oriental equivalent of the American Indian.
Indeed, authorities in Washington viewed the Moro in much the same way.
Secretary of War Elihu Root's initial guidance concerning the Moro instructed
the Philippine Commission to adopt the same course followed by Congress in
dealing with "the tribes of our own North American Indians.'' Soldiers serving
in the Philippines found the analogy a persuasive one. Despite limited
experience in the West, McCoy himself drew similar comparisons. Within
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Moro chieftain and warriors: primitive, fanatical, and fearless . (Courtesy National
Archives)

two months, he concluded that Americans could best pacify the Moros by
adopting the methods used in taming the Indians. The military problem in the
province, he wrote on September 25, "is not a hard one. The methods employed
are very much the same as in handling the Indians of the Plains"; he added that
the Moros were not nearly the fighting men of the Sioux and Cheyenne. 22
Nearly a half-century after his introduction to the Philippines, McCoy recalled
that it had been Rudyard Kipling "who opened up the whole Far East to the men
of my time." The remark was a revealing one. A product of Western culture, McCoy
thoroughly absorbed the prevailing fin de siecle assumptions of Anglo-Saxon
superiority.23 The racist preconceptions that informed the notion of the white
man's burden provided the foundation of American khaki imperialism whether in
Cuba or the Far East. Given such ethnocentrism, the American army's attitude
toward subject peoples had two faces-one benign and one harsh. For Cuba, too
exhausted by war to resist American occupation, military rule provided social uplift
and efficient, well-ordered government. If the army's manner in providing these
benefits was patronizing, they were still tangible improvements of no little value. In
contrast to the Cubans, the Moros in 1903 were unbroken, independent, and
disinclined to accept American domination. It remained for them to expose the
other face of American military imperialism. The military's easy identification of
Moros with Indians provided an early hint of what that face would reveal.
From the outset, Wood found the disorderly qualities of Moro tribal life and
their pretensions to autonomy intolerable. In his eyes, order and acceptance of
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American dominion were prerequisites to reorganizing Moro society along more
efficient lines. Hence, his immediate goal upon assuming office was to overcome
the Moros' penchant for looting, piracy, slave raids, and internecine warfare
while securing their unqualified recognition of American authority. In his first
annual report to the Philippine Commission, Wood defined his mission as one of
establishing "order out of the chaos existing among the savage peoples" and
bringing the province's "various and diverse elements ... under a similar form
of control." 24 McCoy agreed with Wood on the one language that would fix the
Moros' attention: force. McCoy noted that some observers of the Philippine
experiment speculated that Americans would become "the most popular white
men with Asiatics and may be able to convey to them ideas more acceptably than
any other." Personally, however, he believed that the United States would rule
only by force. Given the preponderance of American military power, Wood's
clique assumed that pacification would be easily achieved. From the American
point of view, Moro resistance would be irrational and foolhardy. Even before
arriving in Zamboanga, Wood predicted to the president that "one clean-cut
lesson will be quite sufficient for them." 25
But, if the objective of Mindanao's military commander was the straightforward one of imposing order, the aims of the governor of the Moro Province were
more ambitious. Confronted with the Moros' peculiarities, American military
imperialists embraced what they saw as an obligation to eliminate the uncivilized
and reprehensible aspects of Moro culture-the promised restraint of the Bates
Agreement notwithstanding. The Moros, fulminated Wood, were religious and
moral degenerates. Their laws were "utterly and absolutely undesirable from
every standpoint of decency and good government." Given that their native
languages were "crude, devoid of literature, and limited in range," Wood could
find no object whatever in attempting to preserve them. The Moro practice of
slavery attracted especially heated attention. Although engaged in imposing
colonial bondage on a people who had long enjoyed de facto autonomy, American
soldiers viewed involuntary servitude among the Moros as, in McCoy's words,
"beastly and repulsive beyond expression." 26 Predictably, such views led the
military to expand its purpose from simple pacification to an experiment in social
engineering aimed at elevating the Moro to American standards of behavior.
Topping Wood's agenda of essential social reforms was the abolition of slavery.
American officers stationed in Mindanao prior to Wood's arrival backed away
from proposals to tamper with Moro slavery. Although they did not approve of
the practice, these Americans considered noninterference with the institution of
slavery to be the only way to prevent a religious war over the issue. Wood refused
to accept such a "largely passive" approach that resulted in "little influence
[being] exercised upon the vicious practices of the Moros." He was determined to
confront the problem directly. Thus, on September 24, 1903, Wood engineered
approval by his legislative council of a measure abolishing slavery. McCoy
heartily approved. "The only reason I can give for our Generals permitting

DiplomatInKhaki

Page 31

06/11/20 3:18 PM

32

CHAPTER 3

slavery so long," he wrote shortly afterward, "is that they didn't ... see the
Moros enough to understand the conditions .... It has taken the General just
two months to feel sure of the right thing to do, and to do it with life." The
likelihood of Moro opposition to the law left McCoy unfazed. "It may cause
fighting," he observed, "but better fight hard and often than permit it [slavery]
longer. " 27
The abolition of slavery was only a first step. Wood's scheme for uplifting
the Moros required the complete abandonment of the approach signified by the
Bates Agreement. To gain the authority that he sought, Wood intended to
abrogate the agreement. The first major military action of his tenure provided
the needed pretext to do so. On November 6, Scott, by now district governor of
Jolo, notified Wood that a local chief, Panglima Hassan, was causing mischief
near the town of Jolo, most boldly by sniping at American survey teams working
in the field. To McCoy, accompanying Wood on an arduous expedition around
Lake Lanao in the interior of Mindanao, the tenor of Scott's report suggested a
conspiracy to take Jolo by treachery. To Wood, in all probability, the opportunity
to teach that one clean-cut lesson appeared to be at hand. 28
Acting with deliberation, Wood abandoned his trek around Lake Lanao. After
assembling several infantry battalions augmented by artillery and cavalry, he
landed on Jolo on November 12. According to Scott, Hassan had no intention of
running away, so the American forces might have waited a week to attack him.
But Wood was eager to press the action and immediately began sweeping the
area suspected of harboring Hassan. According to McCoy's account, this resulted
in sharp fighting that netted 100 Moro dead within two days. The Americans
easily destroyed Hassan's cotta (fortress), but the Moro chief himself eluded
capture. Qn November 14, having convinced Wood temporarily to suspend
operations, Scott personally tracked down Hassan in the jungle and persuaded
him to surrender. "It seemed that the bloody war was finished by the colonel's
fine bit of work," wrote McCoy. Later that day, however, Scott carelessly
permitted his prisoner to escape, sustaining gunshot wounds to both hands in the
process. "The General marched right back" continued McCoy, "captured the
cotta where the Colonel had been shot, and swept the big swamp ofrefuge clean."
The infantry swept over every part of it and in two days' fighting killed
about 300 Moros without the loss of a man. Then Mr. Andung's turn came
[another datto) and his cotta was taken by a pretty bit of work, with the loss
of one man killed and three wounded. The lesson will do for all time. In the
next few days the troops marched over various parts of the Island and found
the most friendly and subdued lot of people on record. 29
Wood estimated total Moro casualties at 1,000 to 1,200 killed in less than two
weeks. Having thus "pacified" Jolo with dispatch, he returned to Zamboanga
and immediately drafted his plea for abrogating the Bates Agreement. The Moros
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failed to keep their half of the bargain, Wood told Taft, citing as proof the recent
fighting on Jolo. What began, he wrote, as an armed plot to massacre the garrison
and inhabitants of Jolo culminated with an "attack on November 12 of between
2,000 and 3,000 armed Moros upon United States troops." Wood's description of
what he called "these acts of treachery and rebellion" was luridly inaccurate. Yet
the events on Jolo provided the necessary touch of plausibility to Wood's claim
that "serious disorder often amounting to anarchy" would exist so long as the
Bates Agreement remained in effect. On March 21, 1904, Wood received his wish.
By direction of the president, the United States unilaterally revoked the treaty. 30
Disavowal of the Bates Agreement, reminiscent of the cavalier American
attitude regarding Indian treaties throughout the previous century, symbolized
the shift in U.S. policy from accommodation to forcible reconstruction of Moro
society. Wood moved quickly to implement this change in policy, so much so that
the abrogation of the agreement in March merely indorsed a process that was by
then well under way. In addition to outlawing slavery, the legislative council
scrapped the Moro legal system in favor of one that conformed to American
standards. It severely restricted the use of alcohol and levied a tax-called the
cedula-of one peso on every adult male in the province. It created a school
system in which English was the primary language and for which it published
English-language textbooks. The council also launched a program of public
works and sought to co-opt selected local leaders by appointing them as
"headmen" to serve as the governor's deputies in each tribal ward. All of this the
legislative council accomplished while the Bates Agreement remained nominally
in effect.31
McCoy served on the council from late 1904 through early 1906, first as acting
secretary and later as provincial engineer. In the latter capacity, he supervised
the province's extensive public works program, with projects ranging from
building bridges and roads to constructing schools, government buildings, and
harbor facilities. Assessing the council from his perspective, he told his mother
that its members operated in perfect harmony. He claimed that "never yet has
there been a measure but what went through unanimously." Such unanimity
reflected a harmony stemming from Wood's domination of the council and his
ability to secure approval of whatever measures he put before it. Both the
provincial secretary and the engineer were always army officers, chosen like
McCoy for their loyalty to Wood. If ever the council deadlocked on a motion,
Wood's vote counted twice. The result guaranteed a majority for Wood at all
times, making opposition by the council's three civilians quixotic at best. In
practice, moreover, Wood seems to have encountered little difficulty in persuading the council's civilian representatives to defer to his views-the superintendent of education, Najeeb M. Saleeby, being an occasional exception. 32
Nor was there doubt in Wood's mind as to the ultimate aim of these reforms.
His objectives were precisely those that the Philippine Commission had earlier
enjoined him to avoid. As the prohibition of slavery showed, Wood intended to
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recast the Moros's culture into a version compatible with Western standards.
McCoy called it "educating them away from ... customs of which the American
mind disapproved." To accomplish this goal, Wood sought to undercut the
position of the datto, whose authority made him the linchpin of the old tribal
system. This objective found expression in Wood's plan to convert the Moros into
a nation of yeoman farmers integrated into a cash-crop economy. "Our policy,"
wrote Wood in Janaury 1904, "is to develop individualism among the people and
... [to] teach them to stand upon their own feet independent of petty chieftains."
Toward that end, Wood intended to distribute to the head of each Moro
household 40 acres of land for cultivation. To provide the Moros with models for
emulation and to stimulate their ambition for better surroundings, the American
governor also hoped to recruit "desirable immigrants" from Europe or the
United States. 33
Wood offered further encouragement to his would-be yeomen by guaranteeing
a market for their produce. He created government-supervised commodity
exchanges, first in Zamboanga and then elsewhere in the province. McCoy
viewed the exchanges as "a great thing." He termed them "the best sort of
charity, and really the only kind needed in the Philippines, ... teaching [the
Moros] to help themselves." More than mere social uplift was involved, however.
Wood believed that these exchanges would "exert a far-reaching influence in
building up trade relations with the Moros and other non-Christian peoples." Or,
as Scott commented succinctly, the exchange was "a great educator." By forging
ties of self-interest between the Moros and the market economy, loyalty to the
larger socioeconomic system would eclipse traditional tribal bonds. 34
The immediate effect of these attempts to alter their way of life was to stiffen
Moro resistance. The Moros would not obligingly abide by the prohibitions
against slavery and polygamy; they would refuse to pay taxes, however trivial;
and, above all, the dattos would not relinquish their privileged position. Thus,
the policies of Wood the reform governor added immeasurably to the difficulties
of Wood the military commander in maintaining order and respect for American
authority. One historian explains this seeming contradiction by suggesting that
the tenacity of Moro opposition surprised the Americans who did not "fully
grasp ... that virtually no aspect of Moro culture was unrelated to Islam (or the
Moro concept of it)." In other words, the Americans failed to see that their
civilizing reforms threatened deeply held beliefs that would permit no compromise.35
The evidence nevertheless suggests just the opposite: Americans understood
quite well the connection between their reforms, Moro beliefs, and the ensuing
violence. The Moros, wrote McCoy in November 1903, believed that the aim of
American policy was to Christianize them, "hence most of the trouble." Scott,
too, recognized the religious context in which the Moros viewed such requirements as the cedula, recalling that "the attempt to collect the tax was regarded
by the Moros as an attack upon Islam." Even those who overlooked the religious
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connotations of Moro resistance conceded its deep-seated character. Wood
himself implicitly acknowledged as much. The Moros, hitherto entirely free from
restraint, objected to paying the cedula, he said, because they saw it as a token of
submission to the government-as indeed it was. And Capt. Daniel B. Devore,
district governor of Lanao, sensibly observed that the difficulty lay in convincing
the Moros "that a government which taxes them without their having a voice in
the matter of taxation nor use of the funds is really the best sort of government
for them."
Wood's superiors on the Philippine Commission also understood that the
reforms threatened the Moro way of life. As Luke E. Wright, Taft's successor as
governor general, reported in 1904:
The new order of things [created by Wood] was distasteful [to the Moros]
in every respect .... They resented any interference with their customs or
habits of life . . . as an unwarranted and offensive intrusion. . . . The
promulgation of the law against slavery and the protection of escaped slaves
from recapture were regarded by their chiefs and headmen as an unwarranted invasion of their vested rights and was deeply resented. 36
Rather than failing to appreciate the depth of Moro opposition, the Americans
were determined to follow through on their civilizing mission despite that
opposition and-as events would show-no matter how great the cost.
As Moro resistance to Wood's policies stiffened, hostilities escalated into a fullfledged guerrilla war, though one largely shielded from public view. American
soldiers clashed with Moro fighters over one hundred times during the thirty-two
months that Wood served as governor. Like other conflicts rooted in assumptions of
the enemy's inherent inferiority, this one grew uglier the longer it endured.
American tactics emphasized the use of large, deliberate sweeps designed to flush
the Moros out of their jungle hiding places. The Americans succeeded in fixing
their opponents, usually within the cotta of some rebellious datto, and punished the
enemy with artillery fire before beginning a final assault. Given the superiority of
American firepower, the outcome of such encounters was seldom in doubt. 37
McCoy frequently accompanied these expeditions, operating with the advance
guard in his capacity as intelligence officer of the Department of Mindanao.
Describing one such operation into the Taraca Valley near Lake Lanao in April
1904, he explained to his family that "the General's idea was not to slaughter a
lot of people, but to thoroughly demoralize the chiefs, and to show them that we
could go any place ... without the slightest hesitation." Wood demanded that
each datto in the area permit troops to search his cotta for weapons. Should a
datto refuse, Wood shelled his fortress, an effective tactic, said McCoy, because
"the Moro cannot stand artillery fire." Afterwards, the cotta of the offending
chief was put to the torch. Resistance was apparently common; on this operation
alone, Wood's troops destroyed over one hundred Moro strongholds. 38

DiplomatInKhaki

Page 35

06/11/20 3:18 PM

36

CHAPTER 3

Typically, the Americans sustained only light casualties. In the Taraca Valley,
for example, only two were killed and eight wounded. Moro casualties are more
difficult to calc11l~•~. Although McCoy never included specific figures in his
letters home, the number of Moros killed was undoubtedly great, as a letter in
May 1905 suggests. Wood cornered a chief named Peruka Utic and demanded
his surrender. When the Moro leader replied from his cotta that he would
surrender to "no dog of an infidel," Wood battered the fortress for an hour and
then assaulted with the Twenty-second Infantry. The American battalion,
reported McCoy, "finished the business killing Utic and his whole outfit like
mad dogs. " 39
The Moros's persistent refusal to submit even when faced with overwhelming
odds exasperated the Americans. "It's harder to keep the people alive than to kill
them," McCoy complained at one point. And on the Taraca Valley expedition,
Wood observed, "It seems a pity that these people insist upon hostilities which
can only result in their destruction." Yet, however stubbornly the Moros might
resist, Wood had no intention of relenting. A few days later, he wrote:
The people of this valley have been so hostile and intractable for
generations that I have decided to go thoroughly over the whole valley,
destroying all warlike supplies, and dispersing and destroying every hostile
force, and also to destroy every cota [sic] where there is the slightest
resistance. While these measures may appear harsh it is the kindest thing to
do.4o
In short, Wood offered the Moros the alternatives of submission or extermination, a policy that bore fruit most notoriously in the so-called battle of Bud Dajo
in March 1906. Although well known, it bears recounting as the best-documented
illustration of the consequences of Wood's policies.
Bud Dajo was an extinct volcanic crater on the island of Jolo, several miles
from the district capital. With its conical shape, heavily overgrown slopes, and
2,100-foot summit, it was an ideal defensive position. In mid-1905, several
hundred Moros congregated at the top of this previously uninhabited mountain,
apparently intending to settle there permanently. Scott, the district governor,
viewed this development uneasily but promised that, if the Moros behaved
themselves and "did not set themselves up ... as being in defiance of the
American government, he would not attack them." In essence, Scott would
tolerate the Dajo settlement so long as the Moros did not force his hand. 41
Amicable relations prevailed until early in 1906 when Scott departed on home
leave and Capt. James H. Reeves became acting district governor. American
officials began to take a different view of the Moro presence on Dajo. Instances of
violence, theft, and arson in the local area were blamed on the Dajo Moros. The
Americans were soon attributing a broader significanr.e to the encampment.
On March l, Reeves reported to Capt. George T. Langhorne, the provincial
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secretary, that the Dajo Moros were boasting "that they have established . .. an
impregnable position, and that they are in open defiance of the American
authority, and that we . .. cannot force them off the hill and cannot make them
obey the laws." By claiming to be "patriots and semi-liberators of the Moro
people," he continued, "they had forfeited any right or claim that Colonel Scott
had promised them." Reeves saw only one solution: "This thing will continue
. . . until we finish the job and these people are whipped." Such a recommendation merely confirmed conclusions already reached by higher authorities. Three
weeks earlier, Langhorne told Wood that the Dajo Moros would probably have to
be exterminated. Wood agreed. Such a "ridiculous little affair" should be
brought to an end. He recommended that "a couple of columns should take the
place some night and clean it up." 42
Convinced that they had unearthed the embers of insurrection, the Americans
ruthlessly proceeded to snuff them out. Several battalions under the command of
Col. Joseph W. Duncan assembled at the base of Bud Dajo on March 5 and began
scaling its sides the next day. Wood at this time was nowhere near the battlefield.
Indeed, he was no longer governor of the province, having recently assumed his
long-delayed command of the Philippine Division. In the company of his
successor as provincial governor, Brig. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, Wood intended to
monitor the action at Dajo by reports cabled to Zamboanga. But when the cable
failed, Wood and Bliss, accompanied by McCoy, sailed for Jolo. They arrived at
daybreak on March 7, "just in time," wrote McCoy, "to see through our glasses
the khaki dots swarming over a cotta silhouetted against the sky." At about this
time, Wood was stricken with one of the seizures that plagued him throughout the
last twenty years of his life. Despite McCoy's efforts to hold him in the saddle, the
general collapsed to the ground. Wood quickly recovered but was obviously in no
condition to assume active command. He thus remained merely an observer
throughout the action. 43
Although the Americans secured a foothold on Dajo's crest that day, much
fighting remained. "The whole rim of the crater was .. . fortified with cottas and
trenches," wrote McCoy. Rather than engage in costly assaults against each
separate stronghold, the Americans laboriously dragged several light artillery
pieces up the side of the mountain to use in reducing the Moro fortifications, a
process that McCoy followed for the next twenty-four hours: "It was most
remarkable the fierce dying of the Moros. At every cotta efforts were made to get
them to surrender or to send out their women but for an answer a rush of
shrieking men and women would come cutting the air and dash amongst the
soldiers like mad dogs." The result was predictable: "The hostiles [were] wiped
out to a man," McCoy reported. "Only about twenty women and children were
saved." Approximately 600 Moros were slaughtered, including a sizable number
of women and children. American losses totaled 18 killed and 52 wounded. 44 A
brief outcry ensued in the United States when a low-ranking official in Manila
leaked reports of the battle to American newspapers. Press accounts stressed the
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The Battle of Bud Dajo, 1906: American soldiers contemplate the results of their
victory. (Courtesy National Archives)

number of noncombatants killed on Bud Dajo, and congressmen-principally
Democrats-hastened to demand an explanation. 45
For two and a half years, Wood's excursions against the Moros had gone
virtually unnoticed. Now, ironically, he was called to account for an operation in
which he played only a peripheral role. Of necessity, he publicly assumed "entire
responsibility for the action of the troops in every particular." But, while
admitting that "a considerable number of women and children were killed in the
fight," he strenuously denied that "any American soldier [had] wantonly killed"
a noncombatant. The fault lay with the tactics used by the Moros: The women
"were dressed and armed much like the men and charged with them." As for the
children, they were "used by the men as shields while charging troops." In short,
the Moros "apparently desired that none be saved." 46
Writing privately to Roosevelt, Wood did not attempt to blame the Moros for
their own massacre. He rejected the notion that the sex or comparative youth of
those killed on Dajo mattered. "No part of such an aggregation can be given any
protection or consideration from those who are ordered to destroy it.... Work of
this kind," he told the president, "has its disagreeable side, which is the
unavoidable killing of women and children; but it must be done, and disagreeable
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as it is, there is no way of avoiding it. " 47 Roosevelt, Taft, and the Republican
party rallied to Wood's defense. Within a month-amazingly, given the lingering
presence of other similar atrocities-the issue was forgotten. Wood emerged with
his career intact. It was, however, a sour note on which to end his stewardship and
one that McCoy-ever the defender of Wood's reputation-in later years was
hard pressed to justify.48

For McCoy, the high point of his first tour in the Philippines occurred several
months prior to Bud Dajo. While Wood was in the United States on medical leave
the previous autumn, McCoy conceived and commanded an operation that led to
the elimination of the most elusive of all Moro leaders, Datto Ali, thereby emerging
for the first time from his mentor's shadow. Ali, a prominent chief who dominated
the Cotabato Valley in the Lanao district, was the single most formidable opponent
of the American presence in the Moro Province. A shrewd and ruthless fighter, he
eluded the Americans longer than any other Moro leader. His talent for survival,
however, served to so incite army officers that getting Ali became an obsession, a
litmus test of Wood's ability to deny any exception to his authority.
Prior to Wood's arrival, the American authorities who avoided interfering with
Moro customs found Ali generally agreeable. Yet, as early as December 1903,
McCoy already identified the datto as chief among the opponents of the
American antislavery law and predicted that "he'll either be in prison or up in
arms against us before a great while." Wood sought assurances of Ali's
willingness to abide by the rules laid down by the new regime. When Ali refused
even to talk, Wood expected to play out the usual sequence of events-an attack
on his adversary's cotta, to be followed inevitably by submission on the part of
any survivors. Ali, however, refused to play the role of compliant victim. In early
March 1904, Wood assembled a multibattalion force to take Ali's fortress at
Saranaya. Showing unusual caution, Wood shelled the cotta for a full twenty-four
hours. When the infantry finally assaulted the ruins of the stronghold, they found
only a single wounded Moro. The remainder, including Ali, escaped during the
night. Gauging the enormous cotta to be capable of sheltering 6,000 warriors,
McCoy remarked that the evacuation "was the most astonishing piece of work for
any but a civilized people." Ali's tactical skills earned grudging respect. The
Moro chief, McCoy commented, was "a soldier and a gentleman.... I don't
blame him for fighting for his 'ancient customs.' " 49
Two months later, Ali retaliated. In May, he ambushed an infantry company in
the Rio Grande Valley and killed fifteen Americans without losing a man. Wood's
hastily mounted pursuit again came up empty-handed. As McCoy remarked after
a futile two-months' search-during which another American patrol was ambushed-Ali was "still chasing from one end of the valley to the other.''
Although U.S. troops doggedly clung to his trail, "it's just by accident when they
encounter" him. 50 Wood combined his pursuit of Ali with attempts to coax the
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Moro leader into surrendering. Ali refused such ploys. As he replied to one
proposal on July 14, 1904 (in a letter that McCoy translated): "Which is better for
you, to kill me or not? ... Until I die all the people will not submit to the
government, because I will try to kill all the people who are friends of the
Americans." Perhaps convinced by Ali's threat, Wood the following day posted a
reward of $500 for Ali's capture, dead or alive. 51
The new year brought no better luck. Ali, however, suspended his attacks on
American troops and withdrew to the rugged Cotabato Valley. Yet, if the Moro
chief no longer molested the Americans, his determination to remain free was
undiminished. He no longer wished to fight, but neither did he intend to
surrender-as fruitless negotiations by Saleeby and Halstead Dorey, McCoy's
classmate and another member of Wood's circle, showed. Despite Ali's inactivity,
the Americans still viewed him as an irritating symbol of Moro resistance. Thus,
Langhorne, as acting provincial governor in August 1905, commented, it was
necessary "to get entirely rid of a disturbing element like Ali" to guarantee that
he would not "be in a position to create further trouble in the future."
Langhorne opposed any further bargaining with Ali, arguing that "every
concession to an Asiatic ... is a mistake." 52
Shortly thereafter the prospects for getting Ali brightened when McCoy
extracted a key piece of information from two of Ali's rivals-Datto Piang and
Entu Enok. Ali, they revealed, had abandoned his usual hiding place and was now
camped along the Malala River near the Gulf of Davao. Brig. Gen. James A.
Buchanan, commanding the Department of Mindanao in Wood's absence,
decided to mount yet another expedition against the Moro leader. Buchanan's
inclination was to do as Wood had done in the past: to march a large force up the
Cotabato Valley, sealing off avenues of escape as it advanced. Yet such maneuvers
repeatedly failed to surprise Ali because, as McCoy commented, "every movement of troops there was known by him almost at once." McCoy proposed instead
to rely on a small body of troops that could move quickly and avoid notice while
approaching Ali's hide-out, not by the expected route up the valley but from the
rear. On an expedition in late 1904, McCoy explored such an indirect approach
into the area, and he believed that he could retrace his route. Impressed with
McCoy's alternative, Buchanan not only approved it but appointed the young
captain to lead the operation. 53
On October 16, at the head of a column of 100 American infantrymen, 140
Filipino bearers, and 10 scouts, McCoy went ashore at Digos on the Gulf of
Davao. Knowing that success depended on catching Ali unawares, McCoy moved
quickly into the interior, pushing his troops to the limit of their endurance. By
October 20, the bearers, the scouts, and several Americans were exhausted.
Refusing to ease up, McCoy left the lame behind to follow at leisure and with the
remaining 77 infantrymen, "stripped of all impedimenta, excepting one day's
cooked rations," pushed on. After marching for two more days and nights, the
party reached Ali's hide-out before dawn on October 22. 54
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McCoy divided his small force into three groups, deploying them around the
clearing that contained Ali's hut. As flanking elements skirted the edges of the
clearing to prevent any escape, the center, led by Lt. Philip Remington, burst into
the clearing to find Ali and two companions lounging in the doorway. Ali grabbed
a rifle and opened fire, killing Pvt. Llewellyn W. Bobb. Remington returned fire
and hit the Moro chief. A brief fire fight with other Moros still inside Ali's
quarters ensued. The outcome was never in doubt, and soon McCoy sounded a
ceasefire. Ali, his son, and ten followers lay dead. Some fifty others, many of them
women and children huddled inside the house, were captured. Of these, several
had sustained wounds that the Americans treated. McCoy immediately dispatched "messengers to surrounding rancherias [settlements] that since Ali's
death the hostile operations in the Rio Grande Valley were over." 55
From a tactical standpoint, McCoy's oper.ation succeeded brilliantly. Given the
enormous-perhaps exaggerated-importance attributed to Ali's elimination,
McCoy reaped substantial accolades. Besides official commendations from
Buchanan and Wood, there was a cherished letter from the White House that
conveyed congratulations "not merely as President but as an old personal
friend." McCoy's feat also won him a first heady taste of national publicity.
According to an enthusiastic correspondent in Collier's, Ali's death marked "the
last phase in that war of extermination which the American race has waged for
nearly three centuries against, first the red and then the brown race." With Bud
Dajo still to come, such a prediction was obviously premature. Still, the
momentary importance of McCoy's accomplishment permitted him to stand
alone for the first time. As such, this climactic event of his Philippine tour
inaugurated a new phase in his career. 56
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Schooled in Cuba, Europe, and the Far East, McCoy had established himself as
an able soldier whose competence extended well beyond strictly military matters.
Thanks to his highly visible position as Wood's aide, McCoy's reputation reached
beyond the army's ranks, bringing him to the attention of civilian officials-most
notably the president-who on occasion required the services of a discreet and
politically astute military officer. Over the next several years, this reputation
earned McCoy a series of assignments in which he functioned as the eyes and
ears of officials charged with deciding matters about which they lacked adequate
firsthand knowledge. 1
McCoy's first chance to engage in this new role came while he was still in the
Far East. In late 1905, the hero of the Ali expedition took a brief leave in Japan.
On his first holiday since arriving in the Philippines, McCoy welcomed the
chance to cut loose from all the ties of work and responsibility and to explore the
Japanese countryside. That Japan was fresh from its triumph over Russia only
added further interest. In Tokyo, McCoy called at the War Ministry, toured
Japanese military installations, and dined with the American charge d' affaires,
Francis Huntington Wilson, and with the military attache, Capt. John J.
Pershing-both old acquaintances. In early December, however, a cable from
Wood interrupted his vacation; it directed McCoy, without explanation, to
Canton. Confidential instructions explaining his mission would await his arrival
at the American consulate. 2
Canton in December 1905 was the lone holdout in a boycott against
American goods that since midyear had enveloped the principal cities of China.
Portions of an earlier version of this chapter appeared as "Family Matters: American Civilian and
Military Elites in the Progressive Era," Armed Forces and Society 8 (Spring 1982): 405-418.
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Although in a broad sense the movement reflected China's swelling nationalism,
the immediate provocation for the boycott lay elsewhere- specifically, in American exclusionist immigration policies and in the mistreatment of Chinese living
in the United States. After lengthy negotiations with a vocal anti-Chinese lobby at
home as well as with Chinese officials (who sympathized with but did not sponsor
the boycott), the Roosevelt administration partially defused the situation. Only
Canton stubbornly persisted. And with the murder of five American missionaries
near that city on October 29-the so-called Lienchow Massacre-the president
began to contemplate more drastic action. He ordered the army and navy to
prepare a punitive expedition against Canton. The soldiers who would actually
occupy the offending city would be 5,000 men from Leonard Wood's Philippine
Division. Wood himself looked forward to the prospect of action on the Asian
mainland. Yet the operations of his force once it embarked for Canton-how it
would land; what it would undertake to achieve; how it would sustain itself-were
cloudy. To answer such questions, Wood diverted McCoy to China. 3
McCoy arrived at Shanghai on December 20, two days after antiforeign riots
rocked the city, to find "marines and blue jackets patrolling the streets and
eleven war-ships lined up on the other side of the bund." He quickly sensed the
rapidly awakening national life of China, saw its connection to the boycott, and
predicted that the privileges of foreigners, merchant and missionary alike, would
be "fussed over and probably fought over sooner or later." Traveling to Canton,
he received his instructions from the American consul general, Julius Lay. For
the next several days, accompanied by an American naval lieutenant, Clark H.
Woodward, McCoy surveyed the city. He analyzed the local terrain, identified
obstacles and probable points of occupation, assessed the likelihood of serious
opposition to an American landing, and located potential sources of supplies. His
work completed, he hastened back to Manila shortly after New Year's to render
his report to Wood. To his delight, he arrived to find "the expeditionary force ...
all on board ship awaiting final orders from Washington to proceed. " 4 The final
orders never arrived. Having ostentatiously waved his big stick, Roosevelt now
withheld it. In the early months of 1906, he used less-drastic means to extract a
Chinese commitment to end antiforeign agitation. But the proposed strike
against Canton that McCoy helped prepare had been no bluff. Although in the
end Roosevelt had not deployed the expedition, he told Wood, "I wanted to be
sure that if it was needed we would not be unprepared." 5

In June 1906, McCoy again departed the islands, this time on leave to the United
States. Less than a decade out of West Point, he had accumulated about six years
of overseas service. However exciting and rewarding, that service had interfered
with McCoy's obligations to the family which as first-born son he nominally
headed. Although he had always been a faithful correspondent who shared his
adventures with his family, he decided that it was time to go home. After an
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extended visit in Lewistown, however, he fully intended to rejoin Wood. Yet no
sooner had McCoy arrived home than Roosevelt got wind of his presence in the
United States. The president requested that after his leave the army captain
return to the White House as senior military aide. Throughout his career, McCoy
treated any presidential request as tantamount to an order. Thus, Roosevelt's
action in this instance obliged McCoy to scrap his plan to return to Manila. 6

Another diplomatic crisis delayed the start of McCoy's White House detail-and
abruptly terminated his reunion with his family. Months of simmering unrest in
Cuba culminated by mid-1906 in insurrection. Stemming from the disputed
elections of December 1905, the troubles reflected the Liberal party's determination to oust from office President Tomas Estrada Palma and his Moderate party,
whose dominance the elections reaffirmed. In August 1906, a Constitutional Army
raised by Liberal leaders took to the field, vowing to overthrow the government.
Citing the provisions of the Platt Amendment, Estrada Palma requested American
troops to restore order and support his government. The insurgents also hoped for
American intervention, calculating that they would handily win the new elections
that they expected the United States to sponsor. Roosevelt at first resisted pressures
to interfere. Eventually, however, the danger that persistent disorder posed to
American interests and the coaching of Frank Steinhart, Wood's chief clerk during
the first intervention and now U.S. consul general in Havana, prodded the
president into more direct involvement. In September 1906, in a last-ditch effort to
forestall a full-scale American takeover, he decided to send Secretary of War
William Howard Taft and Assistant Secretary of State Robert Bacon to negotiate
an end to the revolt. 7 Unfortunately, neither of Roosevelt's two envoys could claim
more than passing familiarity with the situation. Writing to Secretary of State
Elihu Root, Taft confessed that he was so "lacking in knowledge of Cuba" that it
was "quite embarrassing" even to undertake the mission. Clearly, these senior
officials would require expert advice if they were to succeed.8
When it came to practical knowledge of Cuban affairs in American official
circles, the U.S. Army at this time enjoyed a near monopoly. Taft and Bacon did
not hesitate to exploit that expertise. When Roosevelt subsequently decided to
impose direct American control over Cuba, army officers filled key positions
throughout the provisional government. Even at the time of the Taft-Bacon
mission, when the president still hoped to avoid reoccupation, the military
provided information about Cuban politics and personalities and acted as a
liaison to the contending armies. Given McCoy's previous Cuban experience, his
ready availability, and the regard in which Roosevelt and Taft held him (having
known the secretary in the Philippines), the young officer was a logical candidate
to assist the mission. It was not too surprising, therefore, when Taft, after
conferring with the president at Oyster Bay on September 14, telegraphed McCoy
with orders to report without fail to the War Department the following day. 9

DiplomatInKhaki

Page 44

06/11/20 3:18 PM

AN AVAILABLE AGENT

45

For a junior officer to receive a direct and urgent summons from the secretary
of war more than compensated for the disappointment of having a leave
cancelled. McCoy responded with his usual alacrity and enthusiasm. Joining the
mission in Washington, he accompanied it by train to Tampa on September 16.
Along the way, he and Frank S. Cairns, another veteran of the first Cuban
occupation attached to the mission, provided Taft and Bacon with a cram course
on Cuban politics and the personalities they would encounter. After a brief
stopover in Tampa, the party embarked for Havana on the cruiser Des Moines. 10
A twofold problem awaited the mission in Cuba. To avert an American
takeover, Taft and Bacon had first to quell internal unrest. Then they had to
negotiate a political settlement acceptable to both Liberals and Moderates.
Progress had been made toward the first objective even before the mission
reached Havana. According to McCoy, each party convinced itself that arrival of
the American envoys promised to benefit its own cause. Therefore, a tacit
ceasefire took effect as soon as Roosevelt announced the mission. Yet even
though actual fighting had stopped, insurgent forces remained in the field, some
of them located ominously near Havana. These troops Taft and Bacon hoped to
disarm, thereby precluding the possibility of renewed violence. McCoy's first
assignment was to arrange a formal truce with Liberal commanders near Havana,
a task completed within days of the mission's arrival. With the truce established,
Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston began disarming the rebels. McCoy assisted there
as well. He and Bacon traveled through rebel lines to confiscate the weapons of
General Jose Ruman Montero' s brigade, totaling 174 small arms.1 1
In settling the larger political dispute, the mission enjoyed less success._McCoy
personally entertained a low opinion of the entire affair. "In a nut shell," he
reported to Wood, "it was a fight between the 'Ins' and 'Outs,' with no principle
at stake." Estrada Palma "tried to adopt the Porfirio Diaz scheme of running a
Latin-American Republic." Lacking the authority or prestige of the Mexican
dictator, however, the Cuban president "relied on the Platt Amendment, with its
backing of the United States," to prop up his position. 12 Despite his disdain for
Estrada Palma, McCoy believed that the United States should support the Cuban
government, using force to crush the insurrection if necessary. In his view, a
hard-line approach offered the best hope for ending Cuban political unrest. Taft,
who in McCoy's view sought peace at any price, rejected such a course. Still
hoping for a compromise, Taft and Bacon consulted with both parties as well as
with business leaders not directly connected with politics. Because, as Taft and
Bacon noted, McCoy "knew all the public men of the island," the army captain
played a key role in deciding who the American envoys should see and in briefing
them beforehand on each visitor. 13
For Estrada Palma's supporters, realization that the Americans had come not
to rescue the government but to negotiate with its enemies came as a dreadful
disappointment. Many of them thereafter "sulked in their tents," making
meaningful discussions impossible. Days of talks in late September produced
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nothing. McCoy credited the Liberals with being "shrewd enough to be most
reasonable" and blamed the Moderates for the lack of progress. "All the time
thinkin[g] of their sacred honor and dignity," government spokesmen refused to
make concessions. Preferring an American takeover to compromise with the
Liberals, Estrada Palma's cabinet brought matters to a head on September 28 by
resigning en masse, thereby throwing responsibility for governing Cuba into
Taft's spacious lap. With Roosevelt's concurrence, Taft issued a proclamation the
next day that established an American provisional government. 14
Now the thrust of McCoy's responsibilities shifted. The problem became one
of rapidly staffing the new government with qualified Americans. Here again, Taft
and Bacon turned to McCoy, consulting him on the personnel to be included in
the government. Yet the two senior American officials themselves had no
intention of remaining in Cuba indefinitely to oversee the new government.
Having failed to restore political harmony in Cuba and having reluctantly
assumed control to forestall chaos, the Taft-Bacon mission had exhausted its
charter. Another novice to Cuban affairs, Charles E. Magoon, succeeded Taft as
provisional governor on October 13, permitting the mission to depart. 15
Magoon appreciated only too well his lack of firsthand experience in Cuba. To
provide continuity between Taft's short-lived administration and its successor,
the secretary of war ordered McCoy to remain in Havana as the connecting link.
Taft told McCoy that his job was to "put [Magoon] in touch with all the people
whom you know, and ... give him the same benefit you extended to me."
Although this additional stay was intended to be brief, McCoy made himself so
valuable that Magoon repeatedly arranged for his extension. McCoy was soon

" El capitan Mac Koy " among the belles of Havana during the Taft-Bacon mission,
1906. (Courtesy Library of Congress)
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remarking unhappily that "it begins to look as though I might be with Governor
Magoon all winter." 16
McCoy's unwillingness to remain long in Havana reflected the limited purpose
of the provisional government, especially in comparison with that of Wood's
regime. The personal qualities that Magoon brought to his job hinted at those
limits: However likable, Judge Magoon was a dull bureaucrat who had found
shelter in the War Department's Bureau of Insular Affairs since the presidency of
William McKinley. He was the last person to look to for imaginative policy or
bold action. Although not presuming to criticize Magoon himself, McCoy
observed that the governor did not face "the same problem of reorganizing the
government and getting results as in the Military Intervention." Magoon's
assignment was merely to make peace "between the expectant Liberals and the
very disgruntled Moderates." For politicians and their squabbles, McCoy had no
use. He warned Roosevelt, Taft, and Magoon in succession regarding "the very
bad characters of every one of the leading lights of the Liberal Party," but
American officials still acted as if the Liberals represented the people of Cuba.
McCoy lamented that for Cuba, "universal suffrage will continue to be the root of
all evils." 17
Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, who stepped down as army chief of staff to
command the American troops in Cuba, told McCoy that Magoon could not
"expect to find your equal in the Army for the place you are filling. I have
repeatedly told him that there are not many McCoys and he must not expect to
find them." Notwithstanding such flattery, McCoy remained anxious to leave. As
soon as he found a replacement in November, he left Havana for home. 18
McCoy's contributions during this second American occupation of Cuba earned
the plaudits of Taft, Bacon, Magoon, and Bell. Unquestionably, participation in
the affair enhanced his reputation. Yet, overall, he came away from the
experience dissatisfied. Association with powerful officials even on a basis of trust
and intimacy no longer turned his head. The purposes for which those officials
labored impressed McCoy more than their personal prominence. However great
the influence he had exerted as an adviser, McCoy regretted the cramped and
timid goals of the cause he had served in Cuba. In comparison to what he had
come to expect at Wood's side, the vision of a Taft or Magoon possessed neither
scope nor grandeur. In the end, the second American occupation merely involved
McCoy in politics without a worthy goal.

Once back in Washington, McCoy rendered a personal report to Elihu Root and
to Taft, bringing each up-to-date on conditions in Cuba. He then reported to the
White House to assume his much delayed duties as the president's military aide.
As so often during his career, McCoy undertook his assignment at a propitious
moment. During the era of Theodore Roosevelt, Washington shed its reputation
for provincialism. The rising tide of progressivism and the lingering excitement
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of having recently become an active world power were causing important changes
in the nation's capital.1 9
Not least among the legacies of the Spanish-American War was the emergence
of a new breed of American public servant. The new frontier established by the
victories of 1898 stirred the popular imagination and, by bestowing upon the
United States weighty imperial obligations, generated heightened interest in
government as a worthwhile career. In one sense, the ensuing migration of able
and ambitious young men to Washington merely symbolized the overall shift of
the nation's attention from Wall Street, where it had rested throughout the
Gilded Age, to the seat of an increasingly powerful federal government. Bored by
the prospect of what William Phillips called a "pallid career" in business, sons
of the American upper classes-many of whom had impetuously followed
Roosevelt up San Juan Hill-now followed the Rough Rider to Washington. 20
This growing interest in federal service, especially pronounced during TR's
tenure in office, reflected the challenging ideals and boundless exuberance of the
president himself. Roosevelt, recalled Phillips, "turned men's thoughts from the
localities where they lived to the dignity of the nation and our national
problems." He fostered "a new conception of what the United States stood for
and of the responsibility involved [in] citizenship." Many others could agree with
this career diplomat that "it was T.R.'s call to youth which lured me to
Washington. " 21
This commitment to national service carried many of Phillips's contemporaries far beyond Washington to posts overseas. Just as domestic affairs in the
progressive era increasingly became the realm of the nonpartisan expert, so also
diplomacy-long the preserve of political hacks-seemed to require the attention
that only a corps of skilled professionals could provide. Thus, in the words of one
official of the period, there developed under Roosevelt's tutelage a new
generation of diplomatists "with their new American outlook on the world and
their vision of a new American position and influence in it. They took charge of
the new diplomacy wherein a man could hope to become one day a new kind of
proconsul or procurator in some tropical province or tetrarchate.'' Men such as
Phillips, former Rough Rider Henry Prather Fletcher, and Joseph Clark Grew,
who first commended himself to TR by shooting a tiger in China, "became the
elite or legendary 'inner circle' of the Department of State ... for the next
twenty years." 22
Before Roosevelt's second term ended, an informal expression of this inner
circle had appeared in the form of an exclusive bachelors' club. The seat oLthis
club was a stately Washington townhouse at 1718 H Street. Waldo Heinrichs
described this establishment-located next to the Metropolitan Club and a short
walk from the State Department-as a "club for the social elite of the Diplomatic
Service." According to Robert Schulzinger, the club's members-who called
themselves "the Family"-wielded so much influence that 1718 became "virtually
a second foreign office.'' For the military historian, this group holds a special
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interest. Despite its predominantly civilian character, the Family not only
included army officers as members but had actually been founded by soldiers in
the first place. Indeed, 1718 was the brainchild of Frank McCoy. 23
When he finally assumed his White House duties in the fall of 1906, McCoy
discovered that the demands of his assignment were strenuous and time
consuming. In addition to his formal duties, the army captain was among those
frequently enlisted by the robust chief executive to trek through Rock Creek
Park, take long horseback rides, or engage in any of the combative sports that
Roosevelt enjoyed. The Roosevelts even recruited McCoy to act as a companion
for their children. The need to secure quarters close to the president soon
persuaded McCoy (with two friends from the army general staff, Capt. Sherwood
Cheney and Capt. James Logan) to undertake the considerable expense of
renting the house at 1718 H Street, two blocks from the White House. 24
The three bachelors soon made 1718 a popular gathering place for many of the
capital's bright young career men. _T he house became, in the estimation of a
frequent female visitor, "the most delightful bachelor quarters in the world."
After years of overseas service that thrust him largely into the company of
military men, McCoy was delighted to discover how much soldiers shared with
their counterparts in the diplomatic service and the federal bureaucracy.
Recognizing the inevitability of being posted away from Washington but anxious
to sustain 1718 on a permanent footing, the three officers began inviting other
congenial spirits to take up residehce.25
The silk-stocking credentials of the Family's diplomatic members testify to the
group's unabashedly elitist character. William Phillips (Harvard, '00) and
Willard Straight (Cornell, '01) of Manchuria fame shared backgrounds of social
respectability, inherited wealth, and superb education. Other early members and
foreign service pioneers such as Basil Miles (Oxford), Leland H. Harrison (Eton
and Harvard, '07), and Frederick Sterling (Harvard, '98) fit the same pattern.
Eventually, the club's State Department contingent included such notables as
Fletcher, Grew, Joseph P. Cotton, James C. Dunn, Francis White, and Norman
Armour. The first three career diplomats to serve as undersecretary of state all
resided at 1718 at one time or another. Bound by intimate ties, these men
regularly corresponded, consulted, and advised one another about professional
as well as personal matters. Those at home cultivated the interests of those
abroad; the latter, in turn, kept 1718 informed with inside information on the
latest overseas developments.
Yet 1718 was more than an extension of the State Department. Family
membership, for example, was by no means restricted to foreign service officers
and soldiers. By 1914, the group already included men of such varied professional backgrounds as Benjamin Strong, governor of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Andrew J. Peters; and Arthur
Wilson Page, editor of the popular monthly The World's Work. 26 Overall, social
antecedents and vocations were less significant in uniting Family members than
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was a common outlook- one that zealously supported an expanded role for the
United States in world affairs and saw individual opportunity as concomitant with
that expansion. Seventeen-eighteen's habitues recognized the indivisibility of
power. The successful projection of American influence overseas required the
integration of economic, political, and military resources-the type of mutual
support that the Family's international bankers, diplomats, and soldiers regularly
provided for one another as individuals.
Like their mentor, these heirs of Roosevelt did not differentiate between
service in government or outside of it. What mattered was that Family members
were enlistees in a common cause, a status unaffected by any shift in base of
operations. In 1909, for instance, when Straight left the State Department for the
investment banking firm of J . P. Morgan & Company, he remained a trusted
member of the team. Thus, Fletcher's appointment as ambassador to Mexico in
early 1916 also carried with it implications of opportunity for Straight, the
diplomat-turned-banker. Foreseeing the possibility of American intervention
during Fletcher's tenure, "in which case your position will be more interesting
than ever before," Straight predicted that "Seventeen Eighteen will surely then
be very much in the front as always." Straight expected 1718' s Wall Street
branch to play an important role in making a success of Fletcher's mission
because "J. P. Morgan & Company and their associated groups will be the people
upon whom you will have principally to rely." To lay the basis for such
cooperation, he urged Fletcher before assuming office to share with Wall Street
"the benefit of your advice regarding the South American situation." 27
The group's influence, although difficult to measure with precision, was by no
means negligible. Even before 1920 when Family members occupied the second
or third tier of authority, typically as assistant secretaries or their diplomatic
equivalent, they enjoyed ready access to the upper echelons and often exercised
great latitude when assigned to the field. Strategically placed in government and
well connected with higher-ranking officials, the Family worked with persistence
and a minimum of publicity to put its own imprint on government policy. So
effective were its members that the British scholar Graham Wallas, after visiting
1718, announced the "quite astounding" discovery that the U.S. government was
"really run by a little group of young fellows mostly assistant secretaries who
really do the work and suggest most of the things to be done to their bosses." A
more recent view by William Appleman Williams described Miles, Phillips, and
Straight in 1917 as the nucleus of "a tightly knit team ... unknown to the
general public and tucked away safely beyond the reach of even an aroused
congressman" that was chiefly responsible for the anti-Bolshevik cast of State
Department policy.28
The Family's clout, although perhaps not as great as either Williams or Wallas
suggested, was especially evident when 1718 rallied to protect the fortunes of
fellow members. With the change of administration in 1913, for example,
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Portrait of self-assurance: The Family assembles at 1718 H Street. Top row from left:
James Logan and Henry P. Fletcher; second row: William Phillips and George Marvin;
third row: Basil Miles and Willard Straight; bottom row: McCoy and an unidentified
Family friend. (Courtesy U.S. Army Military History Institute)
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Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan's determination to replace all
Republican diplomatic appointees with "deserving Democrats" jeopardized
Fletcher's position as envoy to Chile. When McCoy picked up rumors in
Washington that Bryan sought Fletcher's post for some ·"long-haired apostle of
free silver," he immediately alerted Straight in New York. Straight later told
Fletcher that as soon as "we got the news that the wolves were after your job,"
1718 began lobbying in the latter's behalf. Straight arranged for a Family friend,
Daisy Harriman, to call on Secretary Bryan and then went himself to see Col.
Edward M. House. When House offered assurances, Straight cabled Santiago:
"EVERYTHING ALL RIGHT SITTITE [sic] SAY NOTHING PERIOD SILENCE EMPHATI·
CALLY EMPHASIZED." The Family campaign apparently succeeded, for Phillips
soon passed the word from inside the State Department that-in Straight's
words- "although the big noise [Bryan] wants to land your place for a friend, the
President will not stand for it and you'll be retained." 29
Seventeen-eighteen remained an important part of McCoy's life until it was
finally sold in the 1950s. After 1914, he lived at the house for only short periods.
Yet, in later years, he stayed there whenever his duties took him temporarily to
Washington. Although marriages reduced the number of permanent lodgers at
the house, McCoy made a point of keeping in touch with old Family friends. He
attended their weddings, stood up as godfather at their children's christenings,
shared their vacations, and joined the periodic reunions at 1718. He always
prized the camaraderie that the house signified. Yet, if McCoy appreciated the
Family primarily because of its fellowship, he could not have failed to recognize
how associations formed there would help advance his own career.

McCoy's routine in Washington was not merely social, nor was his relationship
with Roosevelt entirely recreational. Throughout his presidency, the commander
in chief showed a sharp interest in modernizing the armed forces. Roosevelt
found the army, in McCoy's words, "dead on its feet." In order to create a
climate conducive to military reform, the president "stirred up trouble, pacifists
and the old men trying to smother" any departure from tradition. Roosevelt
made himself accessible to innovators such as Wood and the navy's William S.
Sims, whom he discovered "more or less lost among the great mass of mediocre
men of both services." McCoy encouraged the president's interest in military
affairs by funneling impressions and ideas coming to him from the field. Wood in
particular called upon McCoy to reinforce his own ideas to the president.30
In the spring of 1908, McCoy interrupted his White House duties to return
again to Cuba at Taft's behest. His new mission grew out of a controversy over an
American public works concession that had become a bone of contention between
local politicians. In June 1906, officials in Cienfuegos, a city suffering from a
chronic water shortage, negotiated a $3 million contract with Hugh J. Reilly, an
American, to construct a new municipal water and sewage system. This initiative
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by the Moderate-controlled municipal council drew charges of fraud from the
Liberal opposition, including allegations that Reilly had promised to funnel a
portion of his profits to Moderate party loyalists. Thus, when control of the
council changed hands following the American intervention, the Liberals revoked
the contract. Reilly petitioned Magoon for assistance in reinstating the agreement, but the provisional governor rejected his appeal. With greater success,
Reilly next appealed to Taft. The secretary of war suggested to Magoon that it
would be more equitable as well as more expeditious to modify the Reilly
contract in a way that would make it acceptable to officials in Cienfuegos. Still,
Magoon hesitated. In a letter to Taft on April 8, 1908, he contended that too
much political animosity existed in Cienfuegos to gain acceptance of a contract
so laden with partisan feuding. The significance of this otherwise trivial dispute
lay in its political implications. In the midst of preparing for elections billed as a
prelude to American withdrawal, Magoon warned that "when the campaign gets
hot the danger of disturbance will be increased and it is impossible for anyone to
predict what will happen or what will cause it." The provisional governor feared
that the Cienfuegos problem, if mishandled, might ignite unrest that could delay
the American departure. 31
Reluctant either to overrule Magoon or to ignore Reilly, Taft asked McCoy to
obtain a firsthand view. So, by mid-April, Roosevelt's aide was off again for Cuba.
After brief stopovers in Havana and Santiago, McCoy reached Cienfuegos, where
he spent nearly a week interviewing "the representative men of every class, color,
and condition [while] purposely avoiding the politicians and interested parties."
Hoping to gauge the political danger by broadly sampling public opinion about
the Reilly contract, McCoy in practice gave disproportionate weight to the views
of the propertied interests and foreign residents of the city. Still his investigation
was a thorough one. Having completed it, he hastened to Washington to submit
his report. 32
McCoy agreed with Magoon that the Cienfuegos dispute revolved around
politics rather than principle. "It is simply a bitter factional fight for the control
of the City Government," he told Taft. The Liberals feared that restoring the
Reilly contract would give the Moderates control of enough jobs to determine the
outcome of the approaching elections. On the other hand, McCoy's survey of
local opinion indicated that, apart from the politicians themselves, the local
populace cared little about jockeying for partisan advantage. Although the
people evinced no particular interest in protecting Reilly's investment, few would
object if he resumed construction. "The people of Cienfuegos want a water and
sewage system,'' McCoy reported, and they did I\Ot especially care who did the
work so long as it was done. Concerning Magoon's fear of possible domestic
unrest, McCoy offered categorical assurances: "The idea of public disturbance if
the Reilly contractors were to proceed with the work was treated as a joke."
Conceding the difficulty of forcing the Liberals of Cienfuegos into any direct
dealings with Reilly, however, McCoy devised a new approach to break the
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stalemate-let the provisional government contract with Reilly to do the work.
The American authorities in Havana would furnish the funds to complete the
Cienfuegos project, thereby skirting partisan sensitivities. After the fact (and
long after the election), the municipality could reimburse the central government
for its investment.33
Reassured that there was little chance of disorder and persuaded by McCoy's
suggestions, Taft recommended to Roosevelt that the provisional government
negotiate a new contract with Reilly. Roosevelt concurred, as did the municipal
government of Cienfuegos itself, promising to reimburse the central government
for most of the cost. So this miniature crisis came to a satisfactory end. Magoon's
exaggerated fears inflated the problem completely out of proportion. In putting
such fears to rest and in solving the main issue, McCoy demonstrated again his
competence as a troubleshooter. That his assignment in this instance possessed
no military implications whatsoever suggests how far he had travelled on the road
to becoming a valued diplomatic operative.34

In the spring of 1908, the War Department directed all officers on detached
service for longer than four years to return to their regiments. The order applied
to the military aide of the president no less than to anyone else. Thus, the end of
that year found McCoy far from the White House and his H Street companions at
the remote, primitive cavalry garrison of Fort Wingate in eastern New Mexico. A
vestige of the Indian-fighting army, Wingate served as the home of Troops I and
M of the Third Squadron, Third Cavalry. Prior to McCoy's arrival, the garrison's
complement of officers totaled six, none of whom ranked above first lieutenant.
McCoy took up residence in an austere adobe structure that he found adequate
though "a bit draughty and inconvenient for women in winter," adding by way of
sardonic consolation that "as there are only two women on post all is well."
Other than trips to inspect national guard units throughout New Mexico, McCoy
remained at Fort Wingate for most of the next two years. With little to do but
devote himself to the basic military chores of training, housekeeping and caring
for horses, men, and equipment, McCoy was soon writing that "the experience I
need is coming in chunks." He even asserted that the routine at Wingate
provided "the life ... most to my taste." 35
McCoy meant what he said. He loved the peculiar joys of troop duty: the
intimate contact with soldiers; the freedom provided by the none-too-taxing daily
routine; the ample opportunities to ride, hunt, and fish. In his mid-thirties, the
captain of cavalry was wiry and fit and exuded a quiet self-confidence. His
military career had obliged him perforce to adopt a version of Roosevelt's
strenuous life, and he flourished in it. One doubts that the grudging surgeon who
pronounced McCoy marginally fit for commissioning out of West Point would
have recognized the same specimen a decade later. Only a receding hairline
foretold the passing of youth.
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That McCoy needed the tour at Fort Wingate to sharpen his skills in practical
soldiering is beyond question. Eight years had elapsed since his last assignment
to a troop unit. Not unexpectedly, McCoy's commander judged him "somewhat
rusty in line duties," although in tribute perhaps to McCoy's more recent
experience, he also described him as "one of the most courteous officers I have
ever known." 36

Having completed his requisite tour with troops-and having tasted something
of the isolation that military service implied for the average officer-McCoy
returned from idyllic exile early in 1911. His mentor, Leonard Wood, had become
army chief of staff and summoned McCoy to join him. Assignment to the general
staff brought McCoy into contact with Henry L. Stimson, secretary of war in the
Taft administration that was now in office. A principled Republican lawyerstatesman just beginning a long career as heir to the mantle of Elihu Root,
Stimson admired soldiers and the virtues they represented. Although he never
developed a popular following, Stimson's record as a shrewd attorney, patriot,
and outspoken advocate in diverse causes earned him respect throughout the
elite establishment. The army came to hold him in especially high regard. To
officers as far apart in temperament as Leonard Wood and George C. Marshall,
Stimson exemplified the ideal of a public servant. Frank McCoy shared that view.
Despite the disparity in their positions, he and the secretary were drawn to each
other as kindred spirits. From the time that McCoy escorted Wood and Stimson
on a relaxed and fondly recorded tour of army posts in the Southwest during the
autumn of 1911, he and the secretary became lifelong friends. Of all McCoy's
associations with civilian officials, Stimson's would be the one that he cherished
most and that would prove most valuable. in later years. 37
While on the general staff, McCoy became an ardent proponent of Wood's
crusade for military preparedness. In the years leading up to World War I, the
officer corps-its enthusiasm for colonialism spent-began to give increasing
attention to the prospect of all-out conflict with another great power. McCoy's
own views illustrate this trend. Without abandoning his interest in Asian or
Caribbean affairs, his correspondence began to reflect a new emphasis on
modernizing the army to improve its capacity for waging war on a massive scale.
Having endured the mismanagement of the Santiago campaign, having seen for
himself the armies of Europe, and having recently returned from a posting with
his own country's fragmented, irrationally deployed forces in the field, McCoy
entertained few illusions about the American army's ability to. conduct such a
war. He understood that other tasks had long preoccupied the army, but with
other forward-looking officers, McCoy now wanted his service to fasten its
attention on threats previously considered too distant to be taken seriously. As
McCoy commented to Felix Frankfurter, then a War Department official: "War is
still and must be the real reason for an Army and Navy. It may be a good war or
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Henry L. Stimson as secretary of war in the Taft administration. McCoy became first
Stimson's friend and later his confidant and collaborator. (Courtesy Library of
Congress)

a bad war, but the Army must always be ready." 38 In operational terms, readiness
translated into what McCoy characterized as "effective fighting power" immediately available and capable of prolonged sustainment. Yet stating the principle
was easy; transforming a tradition-bound institution into a responsive instrument
for waging wars presented a far more formidable challenge. If McCoy's
commitment to this task earned him a place in the army's reform tradition, his
contribution in truth was not an especially original one.
Neither as soldier nor as diplomatist did McCoy ever show much evidence of
creative thought. A man of his time, he possessed little capacity to see beyond its
confines. On the other hand, he was sensitive to the ongoing interplay of ideas in
the contemporary United States. And he paid particular attention to those ideas
that applied to his own pursuits. Thus, in describing the army that he hoped
would come into being, McCoy with other like-minded officers easily-perhaps
glibly-evoked the reigning concepts and language of American progressivism.
The hallmark of such an army, remarked McCoy, would necessarily be "constructive efficiency." Besides being effective in war, the army needed to be affordable
and politically acceptable. Mindful of those requirements, McCoy realized the

DiplomatInKhaki

Page 56

06/11/20 3:18 PM

AN AVAILABLE AGENT

57

drawbacks of relying upon a large standing army to provide that fighting power.
Economically and politically, the cost of such an establishment would be
prohibitive. "As business men and the country's representatives," McCoy
thought, military planners should seek alternatives that "will give efficiency with
the least cost." McCoy's solution-like Wood's-was to depend upon a mass
citizen army, well trained and well led but maintained in reserve until called
upon in an emergency. 39
While on the general staff, McCoy also acted as Wood's spymaster. He
assigned, paid, and collected reports from a network of agents in Cuba, Mexico,
the Far East, and even California and Hawaii during a period of anti-Japanese
agitation. McCoy's value to his clients stemmed from his access to Wood.
Intelligence provided to McCoy was funnelled directly to the army's senior
leadership. Directives from McCoy reflected the priorities and interests of the
army chief of staff himself. McCoy's proximity to Wood enabled him to solve the
problems confronting operatives in the field. One agent writing in May 1911, for
example, acknowledged receipt of $25,000 and called on McCoy to find out "what
Gen[ era!] Wood wants in Manchuria. I have got to let my man know as soon as I
can." Nor was McCoy's involvement in intelligence strictly administrative. On
one occasion, he became a covert agent himse!f. 40

By 1912, the Panama Canal, then two years short of completion, had become
the focal point of American defense planning. Any threat-however remote-to
the security of the canal or American control over the isthmus sent ripples of
concern through the War Department. A somewhat improbable threat surfacing
during Wood's term as chief of staff was the possibility of a competing
European canal along the so-called Atrato route in northern Colombia.
Informants in London claimed that a Chilean engineer, Luis Arturo Undurraga,
had acquired a concession for "an entirely new and feasible route, over which a
canal could be constructed at a fraction of the cost of the Panama Canal."
Furthermore, Undurraga was offering to resell his concession, and "certain
German bankers were negotiating to purchase it." This hint of German
involvement obliged Wood to examine the proposition's feasibility. Various
schemes for a canal along the Atrato River had surfaced in the past. Did there
exist a route, as Undurraga claimed? Or was this merely an attempt to
stampede the United States into purchasing a "concession" whose only value
was as a scheme to enrich its current holders? To answer these questions, Wood
dispatched McCoy and Sherwood Cheney, McCoy's classmate and a Family
member, to investigate. 41
To act as a guide through the jungles of Colombia, Father Henry Collins, a
Catholic missionary familiar with the area, was hired to accompany the
Americans. Concerned lest the expedition raise the suspicions of local authorities, Wood proposed that McCoy and Cheney imitate Father Collins and "go
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disguised as priests, tonsured, robed, and so on." Even more than Colombian.
officials, Wood saw Indians as a threat. As he noted privately, "They kill everyone
who has tried to get across." All in all, the chief of staff anticipated "an
extremely dangerous and hazardous trip." 42 Undaunted by Wood's melodramatic fears, McCoy and Cheney made their way absent tonsures and cassocks
from New Orleans to Panama and then by tug to Cupica Bay, Colombia, arriving
on January 6, 1912. Here, they encountered a Colombian official who was less
impressed by their claim to be British subjects on a missionary trip than by their
inability to produce any passports. The official ordered them to remain at Cupica
until higher authorities cleared them to proceed. He also posted a guard over the
American officers to insure their compliance. For two weeks, McCoy and Cheney
waited. Their hammocks strung from large trees next to the beach, they swam,
fished, loafed, and read the books and magazines that McCoy, with foresight, had
packed. Finally, on January 21, with Cheney complaining that they had
"generally exhausted the role of Lotus eaters," permission came for them to
move on. 43
The Atrato River flowed generally north-south with its mouth on the Atlantic
side of the isthmus at the Gulf of Uraba. Approximately 130 miles up the Atrato,
a tributary, the Napipi, sheared off to the west, entering the Pacific at Cu pica Bay.
The premise of the Undurraga claim was that shipping would navigate each of
these streams and easily pass from one to the other-a scheme that on a map
appeared at least plausible. But on January 22, as the Americans began moving
up the Napipi, they found it virtually unnavigable. Not Indians but nature
threatened their mission. Dragging their canoes over rocks, shoals, and fallen
trees, looking like the "victims of some fell disease" as a result of attacking
insects, the Americans advanced only 40 miles in three exhausting days. Dense
undergrowth crowded the small stream, making it difficult to gain any perspective on the surrounding terrain. Although the promoters of the route claimed that
nowhere did its height exceed 36 meters above sea level, McCoy and Cheney
estimated that they finally crossed the continental divide at an altitude of over
150 meters. After a brief rest at the entrance of the Napipi, the weary officers
started down the Atrato. It, too, showed little potential for ocean-going traffic.
Blocked by sandbars and silt deposits, the Atrato would require enormous effort
to prepare and maintain. 44
When the officers reached the Gulf of Uraba on February 2, they made no
attempt to conceal their relief. Recovering their strength as they returned to the
Canal Zone by steamer-"God bless the U[nited] F[ruit] C[ompany]," wrote
Cheney, "the only efficient thing in Central America"-the two Americans
prepared their report. Emphasizing the difficulty of crossing the divide and the
near impassability of the Napipi, they characterized the route as "impractical as
compared to that of Panama. [In short,] the government need not be concerned
over any scheme for rival canals from this river to the Pacific." With that, worry
about the Undurraga concession was put to rest. 45
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McCoy remained on the general staff until the end of Wood's term as its chief in
April 1914. He then accompanied Wood to his next assignment as commander of
the Eastern Department with headquarters at Governor's Island in New York
harbor-a strategic location from which Wood could carry on his preparedness
campaign. After several months in New York, however, McCoy and Wood again
parted ways. McCoy fell victim to the so-called Manchu law of August 1912, which
restricted the time that an officer could spend on detached duty and mandated
McCoy's return to his regiment by early 1915.
For McCoy, the years from 1906 to 1914 were eventful ones. With the
exception of his interlude at Fort Wingate, he remained close to the center of
power. Thanks to his background, reputation, and growing network of influential
friends, he received opportunities for service unavailable to most officers. In no
single instance had McCoy's role as yet assumed independent significance.
Cumulatively, however, his activities in the years preceding the outbreak of World
War I suggest the extent to which members of the political elite viewed their
military counterparts not as alien to mainstream American society but as valued
adjuncts in implementing national policy.
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the Approach of War

On March 4, 1913, Woodrow Wilson became president of the United States,
ending a decade throughout which McCoy had been personally acquainted with
his commander in chief. Although the new president's election was due
principally to his record as a reform governor in New Jersey-combined with a
fortuitous split in the Republican party-foreign crises time and again wrenched
Wilson's attention from domestic concerns to international affairs. The most
recurrent of these crises and, in Arthur S. Link's judgment, "the major cause of
perplexity, in both domestic and foreign affairs, for the Wilson administration"
during its first two years was the Mexican revolution. The president's willingness
to use military means to shape his response to that revolution insured that for the
American army, too, Mexico would become a great preoccupation. Even in the
years from 1915 to 1917, as war across the Atlantic relentlessly drew the United
States toward intervention, Mexico remained the focus of immediate concern for
soldiers such as McCoy.1
Taft, the outgoing president, bequeathed to Wilson a sticky situation. The
revolution that had begun in 1911 when Francisco Madero overthrew Mexico's
long-time dictator, Porfirio Diaz, had recently entered a new phase. The month
before Wilson's inauguration, General Victoriano Huerta, an ambitious and
unscrupulous freebooter, had overthrown Madero. Hoping to protect himself
from Diaz's fate, the usurper had Madero murdered. When Huerta called upon
Taft to recognize his new regime, the outgoing president cautiously deferred the
issue to his successor.2
After two months of inaction during which he sought the measure of both
Huerta and the Mexican revolution, Wilson initiated a policy aimed at eliminating
Huerta, whom he considered a vile butcher, and setting the revolution on a path
toward constitutional democracy. Over the course of the next year, a campaign of
60
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sharp and increasingly direct pressure enabled Wilson to achieve his first aim. In
the process, however, the American president alienated the revolutionary leaders
who sought to succeed Huerta, all of whom resented Wilson's meddling and none
of whom shared his vision of the revolution's purpose. By early 1915, as Frank
McCoy rejoined the Third Cavalry at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, a somewhat
chastened American president no longer saw himself as the ultimate arbiter of
Mexico's destiny. Yet, having once become involved in the revolution, Wilson
found that he could not easily disengage from it. 3
While still in Washington, McCoy had not shared the prevalent enthusiasm for
interfering with events in Mexico. He chided friends such as Gutzon Borglum for
their belligerence. Mocking the noted sculptor for "reek[ing] with fighting
blood," McCoy observed that "if it were not for us altruistic soldier missionaries,
you jingoes would have forced us into an unjust war against the poor,
downtrodden peons of Mexico." Writing to Hugh Scott, now a brigadier general,
McCoy commended Wilson's "watchful waiting policy" and foresaw little
likelihood of its changing. McCoy admitted that Mexico might have difficulty in
restoring political stability but added that "I don't see myself any need of there
ever being war over that." Moreover, he asserted, "the President certainly does
not anticipate any warlike intervention." Here McCoy underestimated Wilson's
determination to unseat Huerta: A month later, American forces occupied the
Mexican port of Veracruz. 4
Only after experiencing firsthand the spillover of the revolution along the
border did McCoy become more militant. His return to the Third Cavalry
coincided with a pronounced increase in tension throughout southern Texas.
January 1915 saw publication of the so-called Plan of San Diego, a scheme of
reputed Mexican origin that called for an uprising of Mexican-Americans to
secure the independence of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and
California. Whites living in the lower Rio Grande Valley reacted to the threat
posed by this fantastic scheme with utter seriousness and demanded federal
troops for their protection. 5
McCoy's regiment was among those tasked to respond to this call. On March l,
he led two cavalry troops out of Fort Sam Houston and headed for the border.
Two weeks later, after a demanding march of over 300 miles, his column
established a base at Mission, Texas, a small town near the Rio Grande, 60 miles
northwest of Brownsville. McCoy's detachment arrived to find that, although no
rebellion had occurred, the Plan of San Diego had left the valley awash with
racial animosity. McCoy's assignment to uphold order in the Mission Patrol
District translated into one of keeping Anglos from launching a race war against
Mexican-Americans. This, he soon realized, was best accomplished by establishing a military presence sufficiently visible to convince the white population that it
had nothing to fear. McCoy made the best of this hard and thankless task,
assuring Stimson that he felt "the enthusiasm of a youngster" about being back
with troops and urging the former secretary-whom he now addressed as
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Harry-to visit the border. Yet the daily grind of operations aimed at keeping
Americans from each other's throats strained even McCoy's usual equanimity. By
August, his appraisal of the situation betrayed a certain testiness:
The women all up and down the valley are hysterically afraid of shadows, the
men all pack arms, patrol with the troops, and shriek through their
representatives for more soldiers. I am still ... chasing rumors, and ... so
far there hasn't been an untoward happening in my district. And I don't
think there will be [because] the greasers are worse scared if possible than
the whites .... never again let me hear about the brave Texans, whipping
their weight in wildcats .... I feel so ashamed of this white livered lot. Not a
bit do I show it though .... We go barging out most every night, chase
down the rumor, let the.m see the soldiers and give them a sleep. 6
McCoy's sense of missing out on large events and his growing disenchantment
with Wilson did nothing to improve his mood. In the spring of 1915, while
McCoy pursued phantoms and calmed overwrought civilians, the German U-boat
campaign was threatening to involve the United States in the European war.
Meanwhile, from its headquarters in New York harbor, Leonard Wood's crusade
to rearm the United States was gaining momentum. Despite the appeal of serving
with troops, McCoy chafed at his exclusion from such developments: "All sorts of
wondrous things are going on in the great world and for the moment I seem very
out of them," he lamented. 7
The German sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915, with 124 Americans
among the nearly 1,200 fatalities, outraged McCoy. So, too, did Wilson's
subsequent refusal to combine his diplomatic efforts to solve the U-boat problem
with preparations for military contingencies. "The President's note was a fine
one of course, why shouldn't it be," he told his family on May 24. "But you and
the whole country have been jumping with relief over words .... Here we are on
the verge of war, on which brink we'll be balancing for years to come and this
idealistic wordmaking administration is not doing one solitary thing towards
preparing for its great and dangerous part." Wilson's greatest predecessors all
recognized the role of military power in resolving international disputes, McCoy
believed, yet "the President at a time like that of the Lusitania [says] 'We are too
proud to fight.' Bosh.'' 8
The Lusitania crisis turned McCoy against Wilson and planted him firmly in
the camp of Theodore Roosevelt, whose calls for a holy war against the Hun put
him far out in front of public opinion. "Don't feel badly over T.R.," McCoy told
his mother. "I love him for the mistakes he makes, for he speaks the truth and is
not afraid." During the summer of 1915, Roosevelt began laying plans for raising
a volunteer division of mounted riflemen that he hoped to lead either into Mexico
or to France, wherever the United States got in a fight first. The former Rough
Rider enlisted as key subordinates the bright lights of the officer corps: James G.
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Harbord, Henry T. Allen, Fox Connor, and Peyton March, among others. As
division chief of staff, "the most important position under me," Roosevelt
wanted McCoy. His former aide, disgruntled with the inactivity of his border
mission and angered by Wilson's caution, accepted with alacrity. Over the next
year, McCoy corresponded frequently with the former president and with Henry
Stimson, another Roosevelt Division recruit, in formulating plans for the unit.9
The Lusitania affair also increased McCoy's enthusiasm for Wood's preparedness drive. Through the summer of 1915, McCoy carefully followed the
experiment in voluntary military training at Plattsburg, New York, which he saw
as "the beginning of a great movement ... throughout the nation." Wood and
his aide, Gordon Johnston, kept McCoy up to date, as did those Family members
who endorsed Wood's campaign. A number of 1718's "civilians"-Willard
Straight, Basil Miles, and George Marvin, a Family journalist-trained alongside
other bluebloods under Wood's tutelage at Plattsburg. The Family's citizensoldiers provided McCoy with detailed training reports- "As a fellow soldier I
salute you," wrote Straight-and exchanged optimistic forecasts on the prospects of the preparedness movement. 10
Straight tried to cheer McCoy with predictions of armed intervention in
Mexico in the near future. To McCoy, although poised to participate in such an
operation, intervention seemed unlikely. To Straight, anxious to share in such an
adventure, only a suitable pretext was wanting. With such a need in mind,
Straight became a driving spirit behind the Red Cross's National Committee for
Mexican Relief, hoping that "somehow or other we are to be the parties
responsible for intervention in Mexico." Revealing a cynical understanding of
American antimilitarism, he explained to McCoy: "You will of course appreciate
that it is a very different thing to send the brutal and licentious soldiery across
the border to protect people handing out loaves of bread and dried fish to the
starving populace than it would be if said soldiery were to go over first and be
followed by a pack train of Angels of Mercy." 11
By September, the rumors that McCoy's troops had been pursuing for months
began to take on substance. No longer did Straight's prophecy of intervention
seem quite so improbable. No longer did his unit's presence on the border seem
quite so pointless. Parties of armed Mexicans launched a series of attacks
throughout the lower Rio Grande Valley, looting villages, holding up trains, and
ambushing isolated American patrols. Although the raiders depicted themselves
as advance agents of a revived Plan of San Diego, they probably pursued more
limited aims prescribed by Venustiano Carranza, first chief of the Constitutionalists, foremost among the factions vying for control of Mexico. 12
With his two cavalry troops deployed along a 32-mile stretch of river, McCoy
lacked the strength to prevent Mexican attacks, most of which took place at night.
Whenever local civilians reported an incident, McCoy could only mount a
reaction force and give chase-typically tracking down his quarry only after it
slipped back across the river. In at least one instance, he watched as Carrancista
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soldiers on the far side "welcomed back the looting band ... with open arms."
Although under orders not to initiate hostilities, McCoy's soldiers used the
slightest provocation as an excuse to fire across the river, venting their frustration
and inflicting occasional casualties on the defiant raiders. 13
Such skirmishing inspired journalistic predictions of war with Mexico. The
increased unrest stirred up further racial animosity. It also meant long days and
sleepless nights in the saddle for McCoy's soldiers-in his view the only ones who
"kept their heads, and tried to keep the peace without excitedly .. . shooting
greasers or giving encouragement to that pastime." September's raids also
persuaded senior commanders to bolster their forces. By November, 20,000
American troops were patrolling the border. Two more cavalry troops and a signal
company joined the contingent that McCoy commanded at Mission. With so
many detachments chasing bandits and generally patrolling disturbed neighborhoods, McCoy traded his horse for an automobile to keep track of his
command. When the level of activity thereafter subsided, McCoy reported
hopefully that "the border war of the Press is squashed for a few moments and
the excitement and fright of the neighbors of Hidalgo county allayed. Enough at
any rate to give us a few peaceful nights in bed, and to suspend the habit of
shooting stray greasers on sight." 14
Actually, McCoy had little confidence that beefed-up military forces alone
would guarantee harmony along the border. In September, Herbert Croly, editor
of the New Republic, the journal founded by Straight in 1914, asked for McCoy's
views of the situation for use without attribution. The probable result, entitled
"On the Mexican Border," appeared in the journal's issue of October 9. Like
McCoy, the anonymous author of this piece believed that the crux of the border
conflict was race: "The Mexican is as suspicious of the Gringo as the latter is
contemptuous of the Greaser," he wrote. Given the contrast between prosperity
north of the border and near starvation to the south, the temptation to raid the
American side would continue to be irresistible. Carranza's followers lacked the
authority to prevent such incursions and at times even sympathized with them.
Hence, looking to the future, "raiding is more likely to increase than to
diminish." 15 Within days, events proved this prediction correct as raiders again
struck in McCoy's district. A party of thirty attacked a small outpost at Ojo de
Agua, killing or wounding all but four of the American soldiers stationed there.
For once, McCoy and his relief column reached the scene when the fight was still
in progress. Surprised by the reinforcements, the enemy "scattered like quail in
the brush," leaving behind five dead. 16
Although .Mexican crossings again declined after the Ojo de Agua fight,
McCoy's outfit continued its patrols. To Wood, he boasted that his troops had
killed twenty-seven raiders since September 1. By the time his troopers were
pulled off the line in November 1915, they had assumed responsibility for fully 90
miles of river front with "every out-post linked up with wire-less, telephone, and
rockets and quick relief." In January 1916, McCoy-still a captain-assumed
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command of the entire Third Squadron, Third Cavalry. For the next several
months, he found no little satisfaction in leading the squadron as it rotated
between tours of border patrol and visits to the more hospitable environs of
Brownsville to refit and break in recruits. 17
Wilson's dispatch of the Punitive Expedition after Pancho Villa's raid of
March 9, 1916, on Columbus, New Mexico, increased tension along the lower Rio
Grande yet again. To reinforce the forces on the border, Wilson on May 9
activated the national guard of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. That same
month, Brig. Gen. James Parker arrived at Brownsville to assume command of all
units deployed in the lower valley. These included not only the Third Cavalry but
also four regiments of regular infantry, two regiments of Texas militia, and two
battalions of field artillery. "Galloping Jim" Parker, Medal of Honor winner and
the army's premier exponent of the horse, looked the part of a cavalry officer with
his luxuriant head of silver hair and well-groomed mustache. Noted more for
panache than for clear thinking, Parker was perfect for leading any would-be
charges into Mexico. But when it came to molding his conglomeration of diverse
units into a coherent force, Parker badly needed help. Whatever polish Parker
lacked, McCoy had. So when the general decided to form a provisional
headquarters to assist in controlling his growing command, he shrewdly turned
the job over to McCoy, appointing him to serve as his chief of staff. 18
The troop build-up and the advance of General John J. Pershing's expedition
into Mexico created a heightened sense of expectation along the border.
American tactics became more aggressive. The War Department authorized
Parker to cross the Rio Grande in hot pursuit, instructions that Parker
interpreted loosely. When Mexican irregulars on June 15 inflicted several
casualties on an American patrol at San Ignacio, he alerted a squadron of 400
cavalrymen, who splashed across the river-a full two days later-on June 17.
General Alfredo Ricaut, in charge of local Carrancista forces, demanded that the
Americans withdraw immediately. According to McCoy, when Parker responded
by threatening to "attack him with his whole force," the Mexican commander
backed down. The American squadron returned of its own volition a day later, but
the event seemed to set a precedent for similar operations on an even larger
scale. Wilson gave added credence to that view by mobilizing the rest of the
national guard on June 18. "We are all on [our] toes to cross over at the word,"
wrote McCoy. "Here's the gala ... long needed to clear and clean the
atmosphere. All Mexico ... is seemingly wild with anti-gringoism .... If only we
go in with a big and strong sweep." Yet McCoy's lack of confidence in Wilson
gave rise to second thoughts. "The air will be full of notes and compromises and
arbitration," he predicted. "I wish we were inspired and backed up by a civil
administration made for war, and not for highfalutin sentiments about humanity
in [the] abstract." 19
McCoy's premonition of compromise proved well-founded. Both nations drew
back from the brink of a war neither wanted. As a result, rather than launching
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boldly into Mexico, Parker's command found itself struggling to survive
inundation by the additional militiamen mobilized to meet the crisis and for
whose care the regulars now assumed responsibility. By July 31, 110,000 national
guardsmen had arrived on the border, over 30,000 of them in Parker's sector. By
summer's end, his command had swollen to include nineteen regiments of
infantry plus cavalry, artillery, and support units. 20 McCoy initially viewed the
arrival of these reinforcements as a mixed blessing. "We are practically
disorganizing our regulars to receive and train state troops," he wrote in early
July, "but if it were not done, they would be helpless." At the same time, for an
officer disappointed by his exclusion from Wood's preparedness campaign, here
was an ideal laboratory in which to test Wood's hypothesis-that a mass of
virtually untrained citizens could be quickly and efficiently transformed into a
competent military force.21
Much work needed to be done. To McCoy's eye, "the state troops came
pouring in ready for a picnic, not for war." Yet the regulars, believing that the
guard was joining them for a Mexican invasion of which the Punitive Expedition
represented only the first increment, embraced their new responsibilities
wholeheartedly. As McCoy reported in August: "Regular officers are with each
regiment-as guides, philosophers & friends, non-coms with the companies, our
cooks teaching their cooks, our horseshoers shoeing their horses, etc, etc, etc."
Training citizen-soldiers proved to be "a fine game," McCoy told Wood in
November. "If we are able to hold them a few months longer," he added, "[we]
will have accomplished much of the same sort of training and propaganda [sic] as
you have so successfully done at Plattsburg." 22
Remarkably, McCoy also found time during this period to compile his own
contribution to preparedness propaganda, Principles of Military Training,
published the following year as part of a series called the National Service
Library. McCoy's 381-page work covered such wide-ranging subjects as discipline, field hygiene, tactics, and training methods picked up over the course of
nearly twenty years of service. A book of no great originality, it was instead a
compendium of proven techniques and inherited wisdom ("an infantryman is
only as good as his feet"). McCoy asserted that a soldier's "mind is at least as
useful as his body and its training must not be forgotten." Toward that end, he
offered a list of suggested readings extending to over 200 titles, interesting as a
reflection of the thoroughness with which he himself had studied his profession
over the years. Starting with On War ("the most profound analysis and
description of war that has ever appeared in any language"), it included works by
Homer, Shakespeare, Francis Parkman, Helmuth von Moltke, Emory Upton, and
Leo Tolstoy, among others. In his introduction, McCoy observed that the war in
Europe demonstrated the importance of "training whole nations on the right
lines of progressive systems." Yet Americans had never developed the framework
of an adequate military policy. As a result, throughout th~ nation's history, "the
only consistent school of war in the United States [had] been war itself," a school
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in which the lessons were usually painful. Principles of Military Training
provided practical advice for citizens who aspired to create at last a progressive
military system suited to the United States.23
For the guardsmen assigned to Parker's tutelage, rigorous training throughout the summer and fall of 1916 climaxed in November with a nine-day tactical
maneuver. This exercise culminated with an impressive ceremony on November
25 when McCoy paraded two full national guard divisions in a massive review
before Parker. By now, McCoy was far more upbeat about the capabilities of his
citizen-soldiers. Although the enlisted soldiers as yet remained "far ahead of
their officers," he reported that five months of training had made the guardsmen
into "a wonderful body of men. " 24 Whatever the success of this experiment at
developing citizen-soldiers, McCoy could view his own role with satisfaction.
Completion of the guard's training program concluded that role and marked the
end of McCoy's border tour. In December, he left for a new assignment, a posting
directly attributable to Family connections.

In October 1915, President Wilson appointed Family member Henry P. Fletcher
ambassador to Mexico-a position vacant since July 1913-thereby providing
1718 H Street with a considerable opportunity. The events of 1916, especially the
presence of the Punitive Expedition on Mexican soil, delayed Fletcher's
departure for Mexico City. When he finally did take up his post in February 1917,
the staff accompanying him illustrated both the usefulness of Family connections
and the opportunities for military men to cross over into diplomacy. Two
diplomatic secretaries assisted Fletcher in Mexico: George T. Summerlin, a West
Point graduate of the class of 1896 and a resident of 1718, and Matthew Elting
Hanna, also a West Pointer and a classmate of McCoy's. A member of Leonard
Wood's clique, Hanna designed the Cuban public school system created during
the first occupation and had only recently left the army for a diplomatic career;
he also maintained close connections with 1718, although his marital status
precluded full membership. To fill the post of military attache, Assistant
Secretary of State William Phillips turned to the Family's military contingent
and recruited Frank McCoy. It was thus with some justification that McCoy
reported after arriving in Mexico City that the four-member mission bestowed
upon the reopened American embassy "a distinctive 1718 character." 25
The traditional function of a military attache is to report to his government on
military activities within the host nation. In Mexico, where the regime still
devoted most of its energies to eradicating insurgents like Villa and Emiliano
Zapata, the line separating civil and military affairs was ill-defined if not invisible.
With Mexican military leaders playing a large political role, McCoy's responsibil
ities assumed particular importance. For the Mexican revolution as a political
or social movement, McCoy-finally promoted to major-possessed neither
understanding nor sympathy. Analyzing the radical Mexican constitution
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of 1917 soon after his arrival, he reported that it contained "much social reform
stuff'' and "individual rights and States Rights carried to the extreme." McCoy
did not take such rhetoric seriously, contending that "as usual there won't be much
attention paid to it in practice." McCoy viewed the revolution as a fai;ade behind
which self-anointed generals who had spent their lives in utter obscurity competed
for power merely to exploit it for personal gain. "For the successful revolutionist,"
he wrote, "this is a great country for graft and topside opportunity." 26
The head of the War Ministry and hence the key official to whom McCoy
required access was General Alvaro Obregon, Carranza's best field commander.
On March 14, after the first of several meetings with Obregon, McCoy described
him as "a man of strong personality and a good deal of reserve force." Obregon
amused the American attache with his attempt "to play the Cincinnatus act."
Despite his protests "as to his pure patriotism and desire for the simple life of
yore," McCoy believed-correctly-that the general considered himself "a good
rival or successor to the Primer Jefe [Carranza]." McCoy boldly suggested to
Obregon that, as the only military attache accredited to the Mexican government,
he be given special consideration so as to get "the correct dope on what
happened in military affairs." But Obregon was no more impressed with this
pose than McCoy had been with the general's. 27
The reopening of the embassy in Mexico coincided with the final crisis over
German U-boat policy leading up to the American declaration of war. Once the
publication of the Zimmermann Telegram on March 1 thrust Mexico into the
middle of the German-American conflict, McCoy concentrated on determining
the extent to which local German activity threatened American security. No
matter how fanciful Zimmermann' s proposal that Mexico regain control of Texas,
New Mexico, and Arizona, German-Mexican collaboration was not altogether
implausible. In November 1916, Carranza had informed Germany of his nation's
sympathy for the Reich and expressed interest in some form of German-Mexican
cooperation. He even offered to permit the German navy to construct permanent
bases for U-boats in Mexico. 28
Through the spring of 1917, American consuls, customs officials, intelligence
agents, and private citizens deluged Washington with reports of sinister German
activity in Mexico. The cumulative impact of such information-usually overstated and unconfirmed-was to fuel heightened concern among responsible
American officials. The State Department counselor, Frank L. Polk, passed a
report to Fletcher claiming that Mexican leaders were "under the domination
and under the pay of Germans," who were "the real brains and initiative in
Mexico." From Arizona, Pershing passed along rumors that Carranza had
contracted with German officers to organize and train the Mexican army. Secretary
of State Robert Lansing informed Wilson that "the military party" controlling
Mexico was "intensely pro-German." He predicted that Mexico would deny the
United States access to American-owned oil fields in Mexico, an attempt that "may
result in an open declaration of war or in an ultimatum which will result in war." 29
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Reports of German operations in Mexico fell generally into three categories:
sabotage directed against American-owned oil fields; construction of submarine
bases on the Gulf coast; and establishment of wireless stations to coordinate Uboat operations. It now became an important part of McCoy's job to determine
the veracity of such reports. While still maintaining his contacts in the Mexican
War Ministry and accompanying Fletcher to the inevitable round of diplomatic
social events, McCoy began devoting the bulk of his attention to "keeping track
of German and Mexican intrigues and following the trail of 1001 rumors." 30
Through extensive contacts with American businessmen and consultations
with friendly diplomats, McCoy reached conclusions about the German threat at
variance with those emanating from Washington. He refused to equate antiAmericanism in Mexico with support for Germany. "Of course the Mexicans are
rather flattered by the international notice given them in the Zimmerman [sic]
note," he observed in April, and Carranza, "whose long suit is saying nothing
while sitting and taking notice," could be counted on "to try to keep everybody
guessing." Yet keeping in mind the precarious stability of the Constitutionalist
regime and its reliance upon American-supplied military equipment, McCoy
believed that the First Chief was "too canny to invite any break with us." McCoy
also discounted reports that Obregon, whom he saw as the real power in Mexico,
entertained a special fondness for the Germans. "I don't think he likes any
foreigners," McCoy observed of Obregon, "but is using them for his own
purposes. " 31
Further investigation confirmed these conclusions. McCoy fully expected
Germany to use Mexico as a base for espionage, and he agreed that it was of "the
utmost importance to keep discriminating watch" over such activities. Yet he
cautioned his superiors not to overreact. As he told Fletcher in May, American
newspapers were exaggerating the threat that such activity posed to American
interests. As time passed, Carranza's "absolute economic dependence" on the
United States and "the great and vigorous war policy outlined for America"
would weaken Mexican sympathy for Germany. In McCoy's view, Germans in
Mexico were too few and too weak to threaten the oil fields near Tampico.
American oil companies were "well able to look after themselves and their
interests." Concerning the rumored U-boat facilities along the Mexican coast,
McCoy was "unable to find any basis whatsoever." Although the German
legation had indeed established a wireless station in -Mexico City, it was "never
... in communication with Berlin, contrary reports notwithstanding." All in all,
McCoy did not see "German activities at present or future as a weighty menace,
provided the neutrality of Mexico be strict or friendly, which may safely be
assumed." 32
Whatever the fascination of running a large-scale intelligence operation, the
fact remained that American entry into the war in April transformed Mexico from
a diplomatic hotspot into a military backwater. Anxious to join the American
forces bound for France, McCoy sought to curtail his tour as attache. Turning
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first to his military contacts, he asked his old friend Hugh Scott, now the army
chief of staff, to secure his return. When Scott's request foundered on Secretary
of State Lansing's objection that the attache could not be spared, McCoy shifted
to Family channels. He persuaded Fletcher to write the State Department,
volunteering to release him, and also asked Assistant Secretary of State Phillips
to use his influence. This tactic proved much more successful, and on June 1,
1917-after only three months in Mexico-McCoy departed for home. Two weeks
later, after a hasty farewell at 1718 and a personal send-off by Straight in New
York harbor, McCoy was enroute to France for duty with the American
Expeditionary Forces (AEF). 33
McCoy's contact with the Mexican revolution-an event whose significance
quite exceeded his comprehension-had ended. Yet his dealings with Latin
America did not. Ten years after his departure from Mexico City, he returned to
the region at the head of yet another American mission created to sort out a
political tangle, this time in Nicaragua. McCoy's contempt for Latin American
politics and his belief that corruption and self-interest alone motivated Latin
American politicians-conclusions he reached during his service in Cuba and
Mexico-both colored his actions in this later episode and limited his effectiveness.
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World War
and Its Aftermath

In traditional military biography, campaigns and battles play a crucial part,
framing the narrative and often furnishing its climax. The protagonist's actions
over the course of a few days or weeks of combat define his historical significance.
But Frank Ross McCoy was no typical soldier. Not battlefield exploits but his
career's overall dimensions provide the measure of his importance. His signal
achievement in the decades before World War II lay in straddling the then
supposedly unrelated worlds of soldier and statesman, obliging us to revise our
notion of the military's role in that era. Although noted for his contributions as a
diplomat and colonial administrator, McCoy remained in his own eyes first and
foremost a military officer, "one of those lucky individuals who love to call
themselves 'poor soldiers.'" Nor was he an unblooded diplomat in uniform in
the mold of Generals Tasker Bliss and Enoch Crowder. To a greater extent than
other officers favored with opportunities for unconventional service, McCoy
succeeded in establishing impressive credentials in the strictly military realm as
well. 1
The pattern of McCoy's career prior to 1917, punctuated with assignments of
visibility and substance, established his reputation as one of the most promising
officers of his generation. He served in the right places for the right people and
performed well throughout. Yet the professional capital accrued over twenty years
would have amounted to little had McCoy not proved himself yet again in World
War I. In a profession in which shared experiences are key determinants of
individual status, active service in France became a critical rite of passage. To
remain in 1917-1918 on the wrong side of the Atlantic was not only embarrassing
personally but also seemed a fatal blow to a military career. Able soldiers such as
Dwight D. Eisenhower and Matthew B. Ridgway would overcome their lack of
combat experience in World War I. Yet even decades later, in memoirs written
71
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after they achieved high office, their disappointment and chagrin at being kept
from France still lingered. Unlike Eisenhower and Ridgway, McCoy had the
personal connections to preclude relegation to a stateside assignment. Indeed,
barely two weeks after the first contingent of the AEF reached France on June 13,
he arrived in Paris. 2
During their first year at war, Americans engaged in little actual fighting.
Instead, under the tutelage of General Pershing, the AEF progressively grew in
strength and prepared for combat. The instrument devised to assist Pershing in
transforming an untested American army into a battleworthy force was his
General Headquarters (GHQ), located originally in Paris, but after September
1917 at Chaumont. Assignment to GHQ became a mark of distinction. Not
surprisingly, many of the service's brightest officers gravitated to Pershing's staff:
James G. Harbord, Hugh Drum, William D. Conner, Fox Connor, George Van
Horn Mosely, Billy Mitchell, and John McCaulay Palmer, among others.
Collectively, they would become the "Chaumont circle" -envied and resented by
those less favored. For many among them, this identification with Pershing early
in the war became the first step toward continuing prominence in the army of the
interwar period. 3
Assigned to GHQ as soon as he arrived in France, McCoy felt no qualms about
joining such distinguished company. Members, like himself, of the elite of the
officer corps, their paths had often crossed his in the past. "Every one of them I
know well," he remarked, "and have served with before." Such common
background made for a personal compatibility that eased the process of melding
the staff into a team. It also added to the congeniality of life at GHQ. By the time
McCoy arrived, his friend James Logan had already established himself as
Pershing's personnel officer. Sharing a villa at Chaumont, the two Family
members dubbed their quarters "abri [dug-out] 1718" and made it a stopover for
old friends now in uniform, such as Henry L. Stimson and Willard Straight. (In
Straight's biased view, "Thanks to Logan and McCoy largely," the GHQ staff
was "running everything over here.") McCoy renewed his acquaintance with
Robert Bacon, the former secretary of state and ambassador to France who was
now a major on Pershing's staff. Beginning each day with a prebreakfast gallop
through the countryside around Chaumont, the two became close friends. Bacon
described McCoy as "a perfect corker," and told his wife, "I am crazy about
him." Of the old friendships McCoy now reclaimed, the most important was that
of James G. Harbord, Pershing's chief of staff and McCoy's immediate superior.
Bluff, influential, and highly respected, Harbord was GHQ's self-made man.
Failing to get into West Point, he enlisted and earned a commission from the
ranks in 1891. He made his name in the army during extended service with the
Philippine constabulary. The two officers had kept in touch since their days in the
Moro Province where Harbord had been another of Leonard Wood's admirers. In
his new job as secretary of the general staff, McCoy coordinated the administrative functioning of GHQ while serving as Harbord's key assistant. The chief of
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staff especially appreciated McCoy's buoyant sociability and his refusal to let the
pressures of Chaumont interfere with an occasional meal at a fine restaurant or
an outing away from the office. To his family, McCoy confided in September, "My
personal and official relations with Harbord . .. are closer than ever. " 4
Certainly, in the nearly two decades that had elapsed since he embarked for
Santiago de Cuba, McCoy had lost little of his enthusiasm for war. "The times
are great and glorious," he wrote in July. "We feel sorry for everybody before
and hereafter for missing [the war)." In October he commented in a similar vein:
"It is not done to confess it now-a-days I know, but I do love war and this war
beats the Dutch both figuratively and literally, and is the grandest performance
[there) ever was, and every day I'm thanking my lucky stars I'm all in it, and hope
to be to the bitter end." 5
Duty at GHQ was important, comfortable, and rewarding-promoted twice in
short succession, McCoy was soon a colonel-but it kept him far from the front.
As the AEF inched closer to actual combat, he became restive. Encountering his
friend in Paris in January 1918, Stimson found McCoy "hungry to get into the
line." The desperate German offensive begun in March 1918 that forced the
hasty commitment of American troops only added to his anxiety. To be a staff
officer at such a time, he reflected, was "not ... comforting to the soul." Hearing
of an opening in the First Infantry Division, he volunteered to give up his
colonel's eagles in return for command of a battalion. Although Harbord, himself
jockeying for a frontline billet, endorsed the proposal, Pershing rejected it.
Discouraged, McCoy could only comment: "Everything but the fighting seems
banal." 6
Finally, in late April, the American commander in chief relented. Interrupting
McCoy's plea for a friend seeking command of the 165th Infantry, Pershing
surprised his subordinate by abruptly announcing, "I have selected you myself
for that particular regiment." It was the opportunity for which McCoy had
waited. Better known as the Fighting Sixty-ninth, the 165th was one of four
regiments composing the Forty-second (Rainbow) Division. After a farewell given
by Stimson and Straight, McCoy hurriedly left Chaumont "full up with pride and
happiness" and reported to the division at Baccarat. 7
The 165th was a national guard outfit composed of equal parts tradition,
sentiment, and boisterousness. The regiment's two previous commanders "had
their heads cut off" for failing to restrain the Irish New Yorkers filling its ranks.
As a "rank outsider," McCoy judged it a "sporting proposition" to see whether .
or not he could succeed where his predecessors failed. Emphasizing his
identification with his troops, McCoy declared half seriously that overnight he
"changed from a canny Scot to a very hot hearted Irishman." More relevant to
his prospects for success was his relationship with Father Francis P. Duffy, the
regimental chaplain. Father Duffy-in McCoy's description, "a spicy and charming personality" -wielded great influence among the rank and file. His backing
was essential if McCoy were to establish more than nominal authority over his
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command. Fortunately, the two hit it off immediately. Father Duffy was taken by
his colonel's "dignity of bearing, charm of manner and ... alert and wideranging intelligence." For his part, the new regimental commander soon learned
to appreciate the value of a chaplain who "not only ... preach[ed] the gospel, but
expounded with much force the rules of military discipline." 8
Because the Baccarat sector was a quiet one, McCoy had the opportunity to
become acquainted with other key subordinates while putting the finishing
touches on the regiment's training. To judge from Father Duffy's account-one
admittedly generous in praising anyone associated with the 165th-the men of
the regiment soon held their new commander in high regard. "It is a delight to
go to our mess with McCoy's stimulating wit," the chaplain recorded in his diary,
and to discuss "the various aspects of war and life opened up by all sorts of
interesting people-Bishops, diplomats, soldiers, and correspondents who drift
in from afar, drawn by the magnetism of our colonel." McCoy's injunction to his
officers-"to enjoy this war-the only war most of them can hope to have" went well with the bellicose temper already existing in the regiment.9
The last spasms of the German spring offensive interrupted the 165th's stay at
Baccarat and brought it into the fight for the first time. As part of an effort to
reconstitute a reserve depleted by successive German attacks, the Forty-second
Division in early July was reassigned to the French XXI Corps. The division
assumed positions east of Rheims, on the shoulder of a salient that a German
drive six weeks earlier had pushed south to the Marne River. While the bulk of
the division remained in reserve, one of McCoy's three battalions occupied the
forward defensive line alongside two French divisions. By July 7, the French
determined that an attack toward Rheims, designed to widen the Marne salient,
was imminent. All indicators pointed to the night of July 14 as the probable time
of the assault. 10 Alerted to the prospects of a major action, McCoy confessed that
July 14 was "a very tense day." To ease that tension, he invited several Allied
officers to lunch in the regimental mess and broke out some vintage French wine.
By evening, the troops retired to their battle positions and McCoy to his
command post to wait. 11
General Henri Gourad, to whose Fourth Army the Forty-second Division was
assigned, had no intention of waiting passively for the Boche to strike. To disrupt
the offensive, Gourad unleashed an artillery barrage shortly before midnight
against German attack positions. The enemy responded in kind but with little
effect because his shells, in McCoy's words, were roaring over the regiment's
positions "like freight trains." An hour before dawn, the Germans emerged from
their trenches, and over the next six hours, the French 170th Division, with
McCoy's Second Battalion, beat off seven separate German assaults. Further
efforts to breach the Allied lines over the next two days were also repulsed.
Failing to achieve a breakthrough, the German high command on July 18
suspended the attack. Although most of McCoy's unit remained out of the fight,
his Second Battalion had been severely battered while fighting alongside the
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French. Sustaining most of the regiment's 269 casualties over the four-day battle,
the battalion won high praise from Gourad. 12
This baptism of fire was a mere prelude. Once the German offensive exhausted
itself, the Allies took the initiative. To reduce the Marne salient, the Allies
launched on July 18 a counteroffensive-the first in which the AEF figured
prominently. Two American divisions-one of them commanded by Harbordpierced the salient's western face toward Soissons. Their line of communications
threatened by the Allied thrust, the Germans withdrew their exposed units. By July
25, they had pulled back to strong positions on the high ground north of the Ourcq
River near Sergy. Units deployed along the southern tip of the salient, including
the U.S. I Corps, now received orders to pursue the retreating Germans. 13
Having rested briefly after the fight at Champagne, the Rainbow Division joined
U.S. I Corps, assigned to the French Sixth Army. On July 25, the division relieved
the Twenty-sixth (Yankee) Division and the French 167th Division and assumed the
corps mission of pursuing the Boche. As the Fighting Sixty-ninth began occupying
the sector previously held by the 167th, departing French officers informed McCoy
that the enemy was still retreating. McCoy passed this information to Col. Douglas
MacArthur, the division chief of staff. MacArthur replied that the Forty-second's
general officers were temporarily absent, which made McCoy the senior officer
present in the division. With that, McCoy announced that "the pursuit would be
pressed with everything I could find at the front." Throughout July 27, McCoy's
regiment advanced northward, delayed only by scattered German machine guns in
otherwise abandoned positions. By nightfall, the regiment reached the Ourcq,
where heavy shelling from the far bank and strafing German aircraft indicated that
the enemy intended to make a stand. 14
Anxious to keep pressure on an enemy it mistakenly believed was still
withdrawing, French Sixth Army headquarters ordered a hasty crossing of the
Ourcq to seize the heights overlooking the river. The pell-mell advance of the
previous two days left the Rainbow Division in no condition to mount a
coordinated attack, but the army commander was insistent. Still without support
on either flank and short of artillery, McCoy received orders to cross the river
before daybreak on July 28. Although the Ourcq itself did not present a major
obstacle, the well-prepared German positions stretching along the commanding
terrain on the far side made it a formidable challenge. McCoy questioned the
wisdom of such a hastily prepared operation, but was told that the attack would
be executed as planned and indeed that "if necessary, I must sacrifice my
command to the effort." 15
Thus, the Fighting Sixty-ninth "was made the spearhead of the entire army
and pushed forward by a most explicit order as a forlorn hope against a whole
German division." At 3:45 A.M. on July 28, supported only by a handful of
mortars, McCoy attacked with two battalions. His remaining unit, Maj. William J.
"Wild Bill" Donovan's First Battalion, stayed in reserve. The audacity of
assaulting across the river with a single regiment won some initial gains. As
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McCoy observed, "The attack was executed with such quickness and spirit that
the Germans were entirely surprised, the crossings forced, and their machine gun
company and defensive detachments captured with only a few casualties on our
side." Although pleased to have gained a precarious hold on the far bank, McCoy
knew that such an easy success merely signified the lull before the storm. In short
order, the Germans counterattacked, aiming to throw the Americans back across
the Ourcq. This began a bitter four-day sequence of attack and counterattack
that, in McCoy's words, "tried the Regiment from colonel to private." Though
alone initially, McCoy's regiment was soon reinforced. By midday on July 28, the
remainder of the Forty-second Division had joined the battle. Eventually,
elements of three other American divisions were thrown into the fight. 16
Like any good commander, McCoy positioned himself far forward on the
battlefield. With his command post exposed to enemy fire, several members of his
staff were killed or wounded, but McCoy himself remained unscathed. By the end
of the first day, he had established telephonic communications with brigade
headquarters and each of his battalions, giving him some control over the fight
for the first time. For the rest of the battle, he maneuvered his units, provided for
their logistical needs, inspired the downhearted (according to Father Duffy), and
above all coordinated fire support as more and more field artillery was committed
to the fight. Although surrounded at one point by most of the Fourth Prussian
Guards Division, the regiment held on and even expanded its foothold on the
north bank. Finally, American tenacity paid off. On the night of August 1-2, the
Germans abandoned their positions and broke contact. The battle of the Ourcq
was won. 17
At once, the high command pressed forward units in pursuit. Its ranks
decimated, its survivors exhausted, the 165th limped forward several miles
toward the Vesle River. Here, on August 3, the U.S. Fourth Division relieved the
Rainbow in the line. As his weary regiment moved toward the rear, McCoy halted
it to allow Father Duffy to deliver a "fiery and stirring sermon." Despite their
success, McCoy's soldiers might well have needed some cheering up. In this one
engagement, the 165th suffered nearly 2,000 casualties-about the same, McCoy
observed, as the entire army had sustained throughout the Santiago campaign of
1898. 18
The 165th settled near Bourmont for a much-needed refit. McCoy emerged
from the Aisne-Marne offensive, as it came to be known, with only a touch of
mustard gas, but the stress of combat showed in the twenty pounds that he had
lost. Envious friends who visited from GHQ reported that he was well but thin.
Despite the stress and recollection of the casualties that the regiment had
suffered, McCoy found combat command exhilarating. To his family he wrote:
"I'm having the time of my life." 19 Yet his days as a regimental commander were
numbered. As the combat of 1918 revealed the strengths and frailties of
American military leaders at every echelon, shifts in personnel became frequent.
Commanders found wanting were shunted off to less-demanding responsibilities.
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Those proving themselves in battle advanced rapidly. Thus, by the time that the
Rainbow Division prepared to return to the front in late August, McCoy was no
longer in its ranks. Instead, he was assuming command of the Sixty-third
Brigade, one of two brigades composing the Thirty-second (Red Arrow) Division.
It took McCoy fourteen years of service as a captain to win promotion to major in
early 1917. Now, barely a year and a half later, he pinned on the star of a
brigadier generaJ. 20
The Sixty-third Brigade comprised the 125th and 126th Infantry Regiments,
each formed from elements of the Michigan National Guard. McCoy took
command on August 29 with the Thirty-second Division in the midst of the OiseAisne offensive. Having been battered in recent fighting near Juvigny, his unit
spent several days in support of its sister brigade, the Sixty-fourth, which was
leading the attack. Even in reserve, McCoy's unit lay within range of enemy
artillery. According to one witness, however, McCoy "strolled about the area with
every· evidence of unconcern." He pointedly engaged in long conversations with
his subordinates, drawing them out of their dugouts "to stand in the open with
their brigade commander and set an example of steadiness." On September 2,
the division pulled out of the line and moved to Joinville to recuperate. Later that
month, the Red Arrow became part of the newly fo~med First U.S. Army and
moved to the vicinity of Verdun to prepare for the Allied counteroffensive
scheduled to begin on September 26. 21
At the beginning of the Meuse-Argonne offensive-the name given the
American portion of the overall Allied attack-the Thirty-second Division formed
the reserve of V Corps. On September 30, the Red Arrow relieved the Thirtyseventh Division near Nantillois and made contact with the enemy. On the
following day, the division attacked with the Sixty-third Brigade in the van-a
position it retained through the next nineteen days. McCoy's brigade advanced
methodically against a stubborn, entrenched foe and enjoyed considerable success.
One of his regiments, the 126th, captured nearly 500 Germans in a single day in the
Tranchee de la Mamelle. Similarly, the 125th mopped up 200 prisoners while
penetrating the Kriemhilde Stellung, part of the Hindenburg Line. McCoy's own
performance was superb. From the vantage point of GHQ, one of Pershing's aides
reported that "McCoy has done awfully well[;] ... he is winning fresh laurels
continually." Yet the brigade also sustained heavy casualties. In just under three
weeks of fighting, 585 of McCoy's men were killed and 1,780 wounded. 22
The armistice found the Sixty-third Brigade across the Meuse River pursuing a
crumbling German army. At the designated hour on November 11, McCoy
reported, "we gathered under a tree nearby, flung out the colors and gave our
heartiest cheer." The officer who earlier described the war as "great and
glorious" now admitted that he was "overwhelmed by Peace." 23 Although the
Sixty-third Brigade marched on to the Rhine as part of the Allied occupation
force, it did so without McCoy. James G. Harbord, now commanding general of
the Services of Supply (SOS), faced the complicated task of returning the AEF to

DiplomatInKhaki

Page 77

06/11/20 3:18 PM

78

CHAPTER 6

McCoy as brigade commander during World War I: The strain of combat has taken its
toll. (Courtesy U.S. Army Military History Institute)

the United States for demobilization. He needed help. Pulled out of division
command by Pershing in July to straighten out a deteriorating logistical
situation, Harbord discovered that his chief problem was a dearth of leadership.
The logistics command, he complained, was staffed by a "constant stream of
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misfits ... from the front. Every man tried out and discarded up there comes
back discredited and with a grouch." In his attempts to upgrade the SOS,
Harbord told McCoy in September, "I have been sorely tempted to howl for you
on several occasions .... You can take it as an extraordinary tribute to my
interest in your upward flight that I have not insisted to General Pershing that
you be sent back here to me." Once the fighting ended, such considerations no
longer carried much weight, so Harbord wasted no time in summoning McCoy to
his headquarters at Tours and appointing him director of the Army Transport
Service (ATS). Disappointed at losing his command literally at the moment of
victory, McCoy "gulped the bitter medicine" and did as he was told. 24
A problem of monumental proportions awaited him. As he wrote in late
November, with "124 ships in ports now, unloading 30,000 tons of cargo daily;
and 2000000 men etc. to go home, I foresee I shall be busy.'' Getting those troops
home quickly was an issue to which the American command attached considerable importance. Writing to Maj. Gen. James W. McAndrew, Pershing's chief of
staff, Harbord noted that any ill feeling that the AEF carried back to civilian life
would "have an influence on the future of the Regular Army and on any policy
for proper preparedness." He continued: "We of the Regular Army are tied up
together in this matter and it is our duty ... to send these two million men
homeward bound in a friendly mood toward a proper military policy." 25
McCoy measured up to the task. The ATS easily surpassed initial projections
that at most 250,000 troops could be sent home per month. In June 1919 alone,
400,000 doughboys completed the return passage to the United States. In all,
600,000 troops reached home well ahead of schedule. McCoy's work especially
impressed his immediate superior, Brig. Gen. William W. Atterbury, the vicepresident for operations of the Pennsylvania Railroad who had served as the
AEF's director general of transportation. Contemplating his imminent return to
mufti, Atterbury nominated McCoy to be his successor. 26
Along with new responsibilities, the end of the war brought new honors. In
January 1919, Marshal Henri-Philippe Petain decorated McCoy with the Legion
d'honneur and the Croix de guerre with palm. That same month, Pershing
personally awarded McCoy and nine other general officers the Distinguished
Service Medal. Perhaps the most meaningful tribute came from Father Duffy, who
reported from the Rhineland that, although the Fighting Sixty-ninth was now
serving under its seventh commander since entering federal service in 1917, "you
were our only colonel." 27 In January, McCoy became deputy director general of
transportation under Atterbury. "If constant travel makes a transportation man, I
am it," he reported. The pace of his activities after the armistice on top of the
campaigns of 1918 may well have increased his susceptibility to the influenza that
laid him out later that month. The influenza epidemic that was sweeping much of
Europe and the United States took the lives of thousands, including the
effervescent Willard Straight. Although ill enough to be hospitalized, McCoy
recovered. Released in mid-February, he left France on convalescent leave, which
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he spent m Rome and Sicily as a guest of Thomas Nelson Page, American
ambassador to Italy. Refreshed and reinvigorated by "the most leisurely
gentlemanly loaf I've ever had," he was back on the job in early March.28
From France, McCoy corresponded with Wood, cheering up his old mentor
and commenting on international developments, especially those pertaining to
the ongoing Paris Peace Conference. (Wilson and Pershing deprived Wood of the
wartime role that the latter believed ought to have been rightfully his. The most
distinguished American soldier of the previous decade and a half had spent the
war supervising trainees in Kansas.29) One such letter, written in March 1919,
revealed McCoy's support for the League of Nations- somewhat surprising given
his prewar impatience with Wilsonian idealism. His only reservation stemmed
from a concern that the United States enter the world organization on "a proper
and American basis." He applauded the debate over the League at home because
it guaranteed that "the American people are going to know what they are about
and are not going to accept . . . the probable surrender of certain sovereign
rights without a thorough thrashing out of the whole affair." As to the outcome
of that debate he had no doubt: "Whatever the result ... , the League of Nations
is here and America cannot stay out of it." In passing, McCoy also predicted that
the peace conference would grant the United States a mandate to provisionally
govern Armenia and possibly other parts of Turkey, telling Wood that with his
background in colonial affairs, the Wilson administration might see in such a new
responsibility "a good place to bury you and hide your light under a bushel for
some time to come. " 30
McCoy's expectation in early 1919 that the United States might accept a
mandate for Armenia was not as fantastic as it appears in retrospect. The
currents of Wilsonian idealism, American public opinion, Allied disagreement,
and rising nationalist aspirations in Asia Minor coincided briefly to make just
such an outcome appear possible. As used by the victors in Paris after World War
I, "Armenia" referred to the rugged, undeveloped area of the Ottoman Empire
bounded by present-day Iran on the south, the modern Soviet republics of
Georgia and Azerbaijan on the east, and the Black Sea on the north, with a
western edge along a line drawn from the southeastern tip of the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean near the city of Adana. The 3 million or so people inhabiting this
region divided into several ethnic groups. Most numerous were the Turks and
Kurds, both Moslem, and the Armenians themselves, who were Christian. In
tracing the establishment of their church to A.O. 301, the Armenians claimed that
theirs was the oldest of all national Christian churches.31
For reasons only partially rooted in religious differences, these people found it
impossible to live with one another in peace. Beginning in the late 1870s, their
long-standing antipathy erupted into genocidal atrocities directed against
Armenians. Attacks by Turks and Kurds escalated in scale and brutality,
culminating in 1915 when the Turkish government ordered the extinction of the
Armenian population remaining in the Ottoman Empire. This directive resulted
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in the massacre or starvation of from 600,000 to 1 million victims, with a further
half million pouring into neighboring countries as unwelcome refugees. Word of
these events received in the predominantly Christian United States provoked a
wave of revulsion against Turkey, already tainted by its wartime alliance with
Germany. Church groups and humanitarians mounted campaigns to provide
relief for the targets of Turkish persecution. Not surprisingly, the Armenians'
plight enlisted the sympathy of the humanitarian in the White House. Point 11 of
Wilson's Fourteen Points promised both "undoubted security of life" and "an
absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development" for nationalities currently under Turkish rule. Thus, for many Americans, Armenia by
1919 came to symbolize not merely a place name but a cause. 32
To Allied statesmen convened in Paris to negotiate the peace, Armenia was
never more than a peripheral issue, although one involving complicated political
as well as humanitarian considerations. During the war, Britain, France, Italy,
and czarist Russia agreed secretly to partition the Ottoman Empire into spheres
of influence-an arrangement whose implementation Wilson resolutely opposed.
The American president proposed instead that areas detached from Turkey
become mandates to be administered by disinterested powers with the welfare of
the local population uppermost in mind. Under such an arrangement, the
Armenians would establish a homeland carved out of remnants of the Ottoman
Empire, live for a time under the tutelage of a great power, and eventually gain
full independence. Wary of each other's ambitions in the Near East and therefore
unable to agree upon a division of spheres, the Allies reluctantly accepted
Wilson's alternative. On January 30, 1919, the Council of Ten adopted a draft
resolution that called for the creation of several mandates out of Turkish
territory, one of them to be set aside for the Armenians.33
With Britain and France checking one another's designs in the region, the
European powers looked to the United States as the logical candidate to
undertake the mandate for Armenia. In the European view, because the United
States lacked a tradition of imperial involvement in the Middle East, it could be
counted on to administer an Armenian mandate impartially. Having acquiesced
in the president's scheme, the Allies now pressed him to accept his country's
share of the responsibility. Notwithstanding the domestic clamor to do something
for Armenia, Wilson balked, citing the uncertainty of both popular and
congressional reaction to the reality of a mandate. In all likelihood, the president
decided to defer a decision on Armenia until the more important issue of
American membership in the League had been resolved. 34
Yet the issue could not be disposed of quite so neatly. Throughout the spring of
1919, reports from Armenia spoke of widespread famine among the survivors of
Turkish persecution. In addition, the Allied-supported Greek landings in Smyrna
in May-a development ostensibly unrelated to Armenia-incited Turkish
nationalists and raised fears that the Turks's desire for retribution against
Christian enemies could lead to a recurrence of the bloody events of 1915. The
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perception that the long-suffering Armenians were about to be engulfed by yet
another wave of terror evoked concern in the United States and increased the
pressure on Wilson to take some action in Armenia before returning home from
Paris. A cable sent to the president on June 22, 1919, illustrates the political
sensitivity of the Armenian question. "When the unspeakable Turks were
perpetrating their diabolical crimes [in 1915]," the message said, "American
hearts were stirred with impotent horror." American entry into the war ended that
impotence. With the war over, the United States needed to act. "Without regard to
party or creed the American people are deeply interested in the welfare of the
Armenian people and expect to see the restoration of the independence of
Armenia." The cable was signed by a bipartisan group of American leaders.
Heading the list were Elihu Root, elder statesman of the Republican party, Charles
Evans Hughes, Wilson's opponent in the campaign of 1916, and Henry Cabot
Lodge of Massachusetts, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 35
The president could not ignore the views of Republican leaders whose support
he sorely needed if the United States were to enter the League. Even before the
signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the opposition party signaled its dissatisfaction with the League Covenant, most tellingly with the famous Senate "Round
Robin" of March 1919. Wilson could ill-afford to give further offense over
Armenia. On the other hand, for the president to embrace the role of Armenia's
protector too enthusiastically could jeopardize ratification by giving credence to
fears that Wilsonian internationalism knew no bounds. The president needed to
satisfy the pleas of those calling for Armenia's rescue while avoiding any
irrevocable commitment that could provide ammunition to those skeptical of the
growing American role in world affairs. 36 The president's solution, urged upon
him by Henry Morgenthau and Herbert Hoover, was to dispatch a military
mission to assess conditions in Armenia. Such a mission would serve three
purposes: It would demonstrate Wilson's support of the pro-Armenia: lobby; as an
expression of official American interest in Armenia, the mission might deter
renewed attacks against the Christian minority; and the mission's findings would
provide information on which to base future policy, including a possible
American mandate. 37
While President Wilson was seeking a way to dispose of the Armenian issue,
Frank McCoy, his work as director general of transportation nearly complete,
prepared to assume command of the Second Brigade, First Infantry Division, the
last AEF unit to return home from France. But when Harbord received word on
August 2 of his appointment to head the Armenian mission, he told McCoy to
scrub his plans. Harbord needed someone to serve as his chief of staff, and he
drafted McCoy for the job. 38 McCoy's specific assignment makes it difficult to
analyze his contribution to the mission. A chief of staff serves as his commander's
alter ego. He must be loyal and self-effacing. Disagreements between a commander and his chief remain behind closed doors. Barring Harbord himself,
McCoy enjoyed more influence and authority than any member of the mission.
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Yet, because he consistently used that influence to support Harbord, differentiating between the views and roles of each is next to impossible. Given their
common background and long association, differences were probably rare. An
attempt, therefore, to isolate McCoy's personal contribution to the mission holds
little promise. A better approach is to accept the episode as Harbord's mission,
remembering that if McCoy's impact was seldom decisive, nowhere was it absent.
Harbord and McCoy spent most of August in Paris preparing for their
expedition. Gathering background information on Armenia-most of which was
biased or badly dated-took up much of McCoy's attention. He also assembled a
staff to accompany the mission and report on the various military, political, and
economic facets of the region. The team he recruited included regular officers,
citizen-soldiers awaiting discharge, and civilian academics. In the first category
was Brig. Gen. George Van Horn Mosely, like Harbord and McCoy, a veteran of
the Philippines and Chaumont. The second group included Capt. Stanley K.
Hornbeck, a political scientist from the University of Wisconsin and later a
prominent State Department official; Lt. Col. Jasper Brinton, a noted Philadelphia lawyer; and Lt. Col. John Price Jackson, former dean of the School of
Engineering at Pennsylvania State University. McCoy recruited Benjamin
Strong, governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and a member of the
Family, to assess economic conditions in Armenia. When ill health forced
Strong's withdrawal, William Wilson Cumberland, an economist at the Univer-

The American Military Mission to Armenia, 1919. In front, from left, are an intense
George Van Horn Mos ely, a jovial James G. Harbord, and McCoy. (Courtesy Library of
Congress)
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sity of Minnesota and adviser to the American mission at the peace conference,
agreed to fill in. Other members of the mission included former Harvard football
All-American Edward Bowditch, who spent several years as aide to the Philippine
governor general. No member of the mission, either military or civilian, had
previously visited Armenia. 39
Meetings with American officials in Paris gave Harbord and McCoy a more
detailed understanding of their assignment. General Tasker Bliss told Harbord that
the administration hoped to persuade Americans "that pending action by Congress
the President was doing all he could by sending someone for moral effect."
Harbord agreed that an expression of American interest in the region might
exercise some restraining influence, but he worried about the effect if such interest
was not followed up by action. 40 The American Mission in Paris also provided
Harbord with recent reports from Asia Minor, giving, in the words of one staff
member, "a terribly black, but I fear truthful picture of the region." Such a
characterization was appropriate. The situation was "fast approaching crisis,"
wrote American relief officials from Constantinople, and without prompt action,
Armenia would "succumb to starvation and aggressions of neighboring peoples."
An American diplomat who advocated a mandate predicted, "Unless prevented,
the Turks apparently intend the total extinction of [the] Armenian race." 41
Forewarned by such bleak predictions, the American Military Mission to
Armenia departed Brest on August 24. Their ship, the Martha Washington, was a
seedy, cockroach-infested ex-Austrian transport. The party consisted of fourteen
principals, a number of aides and enlisted men, and a French chef, Louis Lutard,
who purportedly cooked for Marshal Petain during the war. The ship stopped
briefly at Gibraltar where, recalled Cumberland, Harbord and McCoy "regaled
us by explaining how they felt sure they could capture the place." Proceeding to
Constantinople, the mission arrived on September 3. Harbord and McCoy
immediately set to work, spending the next few days calling on Allied representatives and local leaders. Harbord then divided the mission into two groups:
Personnel assigned to examine questions of trade, finance, and government
remained in Constantinople, the region's political and commercial center, while
the main body, including the three generals, mounted in motorcars and armed
with sawed-off shotguns, set off on a firsthand inspection of conditions in Turkish
Armenia and the Caucasus. 42
For the next five weeks, Harbord's party covered the length and breadth of
Asia Minor from Constantinople to Baku on the Caspian Sea. In all, according to
Mosely's log of the trip, the mission travelled 8,734 kilometers (5,415 miles) by
rail, automobile, and horseback, stopping at most of the region's major cities and
numerous villages. Conditions were miserable. Vehicles broke down or were hung
up on primitive roads; on one occasion, Kurds ambushed the caravan, wounding
two Americans. Worst of all, Monsieur Lutard's talents soon proved "unequal
to turning out bacon and fried onions" in quantity over an open campfire. 43
Despite such inconveniences, the mission took its responsibilities seriously.
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The Harbord mission in deepest Turkey, 1919. McCoy, second from left, is following
directly behind Harbord. (Courtesy Library of Congress)

According to Harbord, "We literally dreamed Armenia and massacres." Yet,
whatever their dreams, Harbord's party drew from their own observations and
from numerous interviews with missionaries, relief workers, and local officials a
picture that, although harsh, differed greatly from what they expected. "We
heard the sad tale of deportation and sad return," wrote McCoy from Adana on
September 11. "But I must say that now there is no sign of hunger or misery nor
present complaint." Ten days later, Harbord expressed a similar view: "Nothing
I have seen thus far indicates to me that any state of danger exists.'' Armenians
returning home were meeting with no violence. 44
In addition to concluding that the immediate plight of the Armenians had been
exaggerated, the mission's members developed two other general impressions that
informed their overall conclusions. The first concerned the Turks. Journalistic
opinion and diplomatic reports relentlessly portrayed them as the villains of the
Near East; that there was more to the story came as a revelation. As McCoy told a
British official in Constantinople near the end of the mission, "He had been
prepared to find that the Christians had suffered greatly, but not to discover that
the Turks had suffered quite as much or more." Indeed, he attributed the region's
surprising tranquility to the exhaustion of the Turkish people as a result of war.
Harbord estimated that not more than 20 percent of the men who went to war
returned. Typhus alone killed 600,000 Turkish soldiers. In the eyes of these
Americans, some manner of Turkish salvation was at hand in the nationalist
movement of Mustapha Kemal Ataturk. Harbord and McCoy had a lengthy
interview with Kemal on September 20 at Sivas in Turkish Armenia. Telling the
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Americans what they wanted to hear, Kemal made a favorable impression. He
pledged that there would be no new attacks against Armenians. Vowing to resist
any attempt to dismember Turkey, he persuaded Harbord that his aim was to
preserve "the integrity of the Ottoman Empire under the mandate of a
disinterested great power, preferably America." McCoy had the wit to recognize
that the sincerity of Kemal's "eulogy" of the United States was on a par with that
of "a Mexican ... talking face to face with an American." Yet he too was
impressed by the nationalists and believed that "the people are all solid for
Mustapha Kemal."45
The second matter requiring attention concerned the long-term prospects of
an independent Armenian state. Completing its tour of Turkish Armenia in late
September, the Harbord mission proceeded to Transcaucasia to visit Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and the Republic of Armenia. These small, struggling nations had
achieved a tenuous existence following the overthrow of the czar. Though created
from territory traditionally Russian, the new Armenian state declared its intent to
encompass Turkish Armenia as well, providing a single homeland for people of
Armenian origin. If the United States were to accept a mandate for Armenia, this
embryonic republic would constitute its basis. Thus, the outlook for its survival
demanded careful scrutiny. 46 In fact, conditions in these three states were dismal.
Russian Armenia still contained some 300,00 hungry refugees from Turkey, the
countryside lay in ruin, and, with no crops planted, starvation seemed imminent.
The vulnerability of the three republics ought to have inspired cooperation, but
their governments instead bickered about conflicting territorial claims. Each was
"corrupt, inefficient, [and) bankrupt," and all were surviving only on the
"salvage from [the) Russian collapse" and showed signs of Bolshevik influence.
As for the Armenian republic's expansionist aspirations, Harbord advised the
American Mission in Paris that the Armenians "cannot govern themselves much
less Turks ... who are in [the] actual majority." 47
By October 15, the mission reassembled on the Martha Washington for the
return to France. During this voyage, the members of the mission refined their
conclusions and prepared the report that Harbord had been ordered to present to
the president. The result was imposing: Harbord's portion ran to forty-three
pages of typescript, supplemented by eleven voluminous appendices. Yet,
however thorough, it was a perverse, even outlandish document. Apart from the
domestic political purposes it served, Woodrow Wilson had sent the mission to
Armenia to gain a realistic, dispassionate appraisal of conditions in the Near
East. Perhaps to avoid the hyperemotion that Armenia regularly evoked, the
mission had been explicitly organized as a military one-its leaders were
hardheaded soldiers, well-versed in the problems of ruling subject peoples. Yet
the florid rhetoric of the final product recalled nothing so much as a missionary
tract. And its conclusions_overreached any that the progenitor of "missionary
diplomacy" himself might have drawn.
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To the modern reader, the Harbord Report's most striking characteristic is its
sententious and melodramatic tone. Embroidering a brief historical narrative of
Armenia-a nation "evangelized by apostles fresh from the memory of our
Lord"-Harbord wrote, "mutilation, violation, torture and death have left their
haunting memories in a hundred beautiful Armenian valleys; and the traveller in
that region is seldom free from the evidence of this most colossal crime of all the
ages." Surely, he continued, "no faith has ever been put to .. . harder test or has
been cherished at greater cost." Turning to the current situation in the Near
East, Harbord decried "political conditions which shriek of misery, starvation,
ruin and all the melancholy aftermath .. . of beastial [sic] brutality unrestrained
by God or man.'' Conspicuous by their absence are references to the surprisingly
tranquil countryside or to Turkish suffering, views that Harbord and McCoy
earlier expressed through official channels. 48
The report envisioned only one possible remedy to this appalling situation: to
designate a disinterested power to control the area. Yet Harbord boldly proposed
not merely protection for Armenians but "a single mandatory for the Turkish
Empire and the Transcaucasus" stretching from Constantinople to the Caspian
Sea. Economic realities and political tensions dictated that the region be treated as
a unit. Harbord did not intend to understate the difficulty of such an undertaking-to accept such a responsibility would mean "facing a long period of tutelage
for possibly unappreciative and ungrateful pupils, much expense, probably
diplomatic embarrassment .. . , and little reward except the consciousness of
having contributed to the peace of the world and the rehabilitation of oppressed
humanity.' ' 49
What nation would accept such a mandate? Of necessity, it would be one
motivated by "a strong sense of altruism and international duty to the peace of the
world, [willing] to steadfastly carry out a continuity of policy for at least a
generation and to send only its most gifted sons to leadership in the work." What
nation in 1919 could claim such ideals? Describing Europe as "without pretensions
to altruism or too much devotion to ideals," Harbord discounted the likelihood
that one of the traditional Western powers would assume the mandate. If, on the
other hand, the United States were to accept the responsibility, Harbord observed
that other nations would "expect of America ... the same lofty standards shown in
Cuba and the Philippines-the development of peoples rather than material
resources and commerce." The mission concluded that Americans alone possessed
the capacity for such an undertaking and that others wished the United States to
take on the job. Harbord believed that the United States possessed advantages
"enjoyed by no other great power." Similarly, Hornbeck wrote that other nations
viewed the United States "as the one great power which can approach the local
problems with unbiased mind and without ulterior motives." 50
Indeed, Hornbeck believed that the job could be accomplished with comparative ease, a view with which others on the mission concurred. Harbord

DiplomatInKhaki

Page 87

06/11/20 3:18 PM

88

CHAPTER 6

estimated that an American mandate for the entire region would initially require
59,000 American troops and would cost $275 million in its first year. In his
appendix on military considerations, Mosely wrote that establishing the mandate
would require 69,450 troops supported by an air service and a dozen naval
vessels. Both the expense of administering the mandate and the size of the
garrison would decrease over time. According to Harbord's projections, the total
costs over the first five years would be $756,014,000. 51
But should the United States actually commit itself to accept such an
obligation? Here, Harbord became coy. "This mission has not felt that it is
expected to submit a recommendation," he wrote. The reason for this reticence is
not entirely clear. One possibility is that opposition to a mandate existed within
the mission itself. Cumberland later recalled that an attempt to poll the members
on the question produced seven votes in favor of a mandate and seven opposed.
Or perhaps Harbord received oral instructions not to state an opinion. Whatever
the reason, Harbord concluded his report with an ostensibly objective cataloging
of those factors favoring an American mandate and those against. Although not
including an outright recommendation, this exercise effectively signalled Harbord' s clear support of a mandate. 52
Harbord listed thirteen reasons militating against an American mandate.
Generally, these cited the need to husband American resources for problems
closer to home and the undesirability of involvement in an area of marginal
strategic importance. Couched in understated terms, they suggested an attitude
of prudent realism. With little subtlety, the report also provided President
Wilson with fourteen points in favor of a mandate. The significance of that
number can hardly have been lost on either Harbord or his intended reader. In
discussing the reasons favoring a mandate, Harbord reverted to his previous
grandiloquence and emphasized moral responsibility, divine mission, and the
capacity of American idealism. The Near East was the "greatest humanitarian
opportunity of the age"; the United States was Armenia's "only hope"; a
mandate would provide Americans with an "outlet to a vast amount of spirit and
energy." Reason 13 quoted Cain's question to God: "Am I my brother's
keeper?" And reason 14-the only one not balanced against a corresponding
drawback-stated: "Here is a man's job .... America can afford the money; she
has the men; no duty to her own people would suffer.... Shall it be said that our
country lacks the courage to take up new and different duties?" 53
Mosely, for one, supported Harbord's conclusions. "From a disinterested,
humanitarian point of view," he argued, the mission had "convinced [him] it is
our duty to step in and take over the task entirely." "If the American people
could witness what we have witnessed," he added, "I do not believe they would
hesitate for a moment to accept the task, gigantic though it is. No nation has ever
been offered such an opportunity." As for McCoy's views, the evidence is sparse.
He never committed himself on paper to a particular position. But Cumberland
recalled years later that McCoy viewed the prospect of a mandate skeptically
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because he "saw America wedged in between Russia[n] . .. and British interests
. . . without its own communications, thousands of miles from the United States
and utterly indefensible." Although such considerations argued against a
mandate restricted to the Transcaucasia, they were less relevant to the mandate
for the Turkish empire outlined in the Harbord Report. Moreover, Harbord's
correspondence with McCoy after the mission suggests that he considered
McCoy an ally regarding Armenia. 54
Delivering its report to the American Mission in Paris in late October, the
American Military Mission to Armenia ceased to exist. In large measure, it
accomplished its short-term objectives. By sending Harbord to the Near East,
Wilson placated those calling for American action in behalf of Armenia. And
certainly, so long as the mission remained in Armenia, the renewed violence that
many observers feared did not occur. Indeed, the mission discovered that such
fears had been largely misplaced. Yet events occurring during the life of the
mission ended any possibility that the mission's report would be useful as a brief
in favor of an American mandate. Whatever the prospects for a mandate during
the summer of 1919, by autumn they had evaporated. Even before the mission's
departure, the New York Times, itself favoring a mandate, noted the nation's
shifting mood. "The American people are eager to save Armenia," the paper
commented, but only "if it can be done without any trouble or inconvenience to
us." Wilson's own recognition of the country's changing attitude regarding the
role of the United States in world affairs inspired his decision in September to
take his case for the League directly to the people. The subsequent train of
events-Wilson's stroke and incapacity, the Senate' s partisan debate of the
League, and ultimately the rejection of the Versailles Treaty on November 19,
1919-buried the idea of an American mandate for Armenia once and for all. 55
A month before, Secretary of State Robert Lansing ordered the American
Mission in Paris to forward Harbord's findings as soon as possible, saying that
they were urgently desired for a Senate subcommittee. By the time the report
became available, such urgency no longer existed. It is doubtful that the
president ever read the report. Had he done so, he would have found little use for
it. The report's crusading spirit and the breadth of its conclusions ran directly
counter to the emerging postwar temper of the country. If rejection of the
Versailles Treaty obviated efforts to secure a mandate for Armenia, publication of
the Harbord Report would only have hindered efforts to resuscitate the League.56
Only after the Senate's second and final rejection of the League in March 1920
did the Harbord Report briefly resurface-and then for partisan rather than
substantive reasons. In a gesture designed to signify its interest in Armenia,
Congress petitioned Wilson to release Harbord's findings. On April 3, Wilson
honored the request, sending the report to the Senate, in the words of the New York
Times, "several months after it had ceased to have any practical value." The report
did retain value as political ammunition for use against Wilson himself. The
following month in a quixotic gesture probably intended to embarrass Congress by
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exposing the shallowness of its concern for Armenia, Wilson formally proposed
that the United States accept a mandate. Rejection of the proposal was a foregone
conclusion. In the brief debate that preceded final congressional action,
opponents of a mandate repeatedly cited data from the Harbord Report to
support their views. The religiosity and idealistic rhetoric that characterized the
report retained no more cogency in the late spring of 1920 than did Wilson's own
Fourteen Points. Yet Harbord's projections of 1/foops to be deployed and dollars
to be spent possessed concrete meaning. According to the New Republic,
"General Harbord's report ... has been quoted by half the editorial writers in
the United States to combat our acceptance of a mandate." During congressional
debate, speaker after speaker cited facts and figures from the Harbord Report to
substantiate his opposition to an Armenian mandate. As expected, on May 31, by
a margin of fifty-two to twenty-three, the Senate denied President Wilson the
authority to accept a mandate. Similar action by the House soon followed. 57
The congressional action sealed the demise of a cause whose decline began the
previous summer. For Harbord, however, the lack of support for his position was
difficult to accept. In a futile effort to drum up interest in Armenia, he published
a series of articles that called attention to Armenia's plight and to the work of his
mission. Even after formal congressional rejection of the mandate, Harbord
insisted that the issue was not dead. ''The American conscience will not stand for
more than a certain amount more of Armenian atrocities," he told McCoy. He
disputed the conventional wisdom on the public's fading interest, arguing that it
"underestimated the number of church people of all denominations who wish
America to do something for Armenia besides lend or give her money." He
predicted that there would be a revival of the question in Congress. 58 With
greater realism-and evident regret-McCoy accepted Congress's action as final.
He placed the real blame for the abandonment of Armenia on Britain and France.
Although many "fine Britons are in sympathy with their government," he told
James L. Barton of Near East Relief, "these men talk one thing and their
government does another." Until European policies changed, "no individual
American would be safe in touching" any scheme to assist Armenia. 59
The American Military Mission to Armenia illustrated again the involvement
of soldiers in foreign policy. Although the principal product of the mission, the
Harbord Report, was overtaken by events before its completion, it is not entirely
without interest. The report vividly illustrates the military's support for expanding American global presence-even into an area of marginal strategic and
economic importance to the United States. Officers who twenty years before
enthusiastically civilized Cuba and the Philippines welcomed a similar opportunity in the Near East. Only the rationale had changed: The ideals of Wilson
superseded those of Kipling. The report also shows how completely the mission
misread public opinion. As a brief in favor of American assistance to Armenia,
the Harbord Report was irrelevant. Only as a source document for those
opposing a mandate did it achieve a brief, ironic usefulness.

DiplomatInKhaki

Page 90

06/11/20 3:18 PM

7
Return to the Philippines

Earthquakes in Japan, revolution in China, and
bunk from Manila, are mere incidents
in the cycles and centuries of these old countries.

FRANK ROSS McCOY TO ELIOT WADSWORTH 1

The army that awaited McCoy once the Harbord mission disbanded bore scant
resemblance to the self-assured establishment that existed just a year earlier.
Headlong demobilization coupled with an emergent antimilitary mood across
much of the United States all but wrecked the army as a usable instrument of
policy. Many soldiers who endured this period became profoundly disillusioned
about what their wartime sacrifices had achieved. Those who saw the AEF as
culminating the rise of the United States to great-power status now witnessed
their country walk petulantly off the world stage. Officers for whom victory in
France had vindicated years in the wilderness felt betrayed and humiliated as the
nation rewarded its returning regulars with neglect. Although unavoidable,
reductions in the army were exacted brutally and without any sense of a phased,
orderly process. Congress slashed the army's strength to less than 10 percent of
what it had been in 1918. Surviving units were undermanned. The purchase of
new equipment came to an end. Morale plummeted. Drawn to glittering civilian
alternatives, officers in large numbers resigned their commissions. Even Harbord
left, trading his uniform for the presidency of RCA. 2
Returning from Europe in January 1920, McCoy assumed command of an
amorphous entity known as the Arizona District. Given the circumstances, he
could hardly have contemplated with much optimism his immediate future as a
soldier. If he retained any illusions in this regard, the War Department's action
91

DiplomatInKhaki

Page 91

06/11/20 3:18 PM

92

CHAPTER 7

in abruptly reducing him to his prewar rank of major destroyed them. From the
narrow perspective of his own advancement, the war might never have occurred.
McCoy could easily have followed Harbord in joining the exodus of those leaving
the service. Given his civilian connections, challenging and lucrative opportunities
were his for the asking. Yet he never seriously considered resignation; indeed, he
seems hardly to have given the matter much thought. A forty-five-year-old bachelor
without fortune or fame, McCoy willingly-e¥en happily-soldiered on. He loved
army life, especially the invigorating physical routine that marked the soldier's
existence in that day. The peremptory transfer from one duty station to the nextso upsetting to some officers-always excited him as a harbinger of some new
experience. And however outsiders might view a military career, McCoy judged his
service to have been worthwhile and rewarding. Above all, as a source of day-to-day
gratification, he rejoiced in the varied and colorful people encountered along the
way. McCoy's gift for making friends was prodigious. Acquaintances made in the
course of accomplishing his duties routinely remained friends for life.

McCoy's stay in Arizona proved to be a brief one. As a mere major, he was now too
junior to head a district. Yet, if McCoy regretted giving up his command, the
prospect of his next assignment brightened his outlook considerably. In late March,
he joined the staff of an old friend who not only commanded the Central
Department at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, but was also the front-runner for the
Republican presidential nomination. 3 Campaigning vigorously for the presidency
while still on active duty, Leonard Wood had long since abandoned any notions
about the desirability of an apolitical soldiery. In the weeks preceding that
summer's Republican national convention, McCoy himself edged closer to partisan
politics. With whiffs of yet more trouble with Mexico in the air, McCoy took the
incumbent commander in chief to task in a lengthy analysis that he provided to
Wood. "Mr. Wilson [had] practically repudiated the time honored duty of
protecting American lives and property," McCoy wrote. He recommended that
Wood stand for a get-tough policy. The United States should demand assurances of
Mexican protection for American interests. In the event of further attacks on
American lives and property, Washington should reply with punitive measures
leading to a Cuban-style military occupation. Among Wood's supporters, Stimson
for one did not hesitate to call on McCoy to take a direct hand in the campaign.
The former secretary of war worried that Wood's candidacy would suffer if the
general appeared to neglect his military responsibilities. Stimson wanted someone
close to Wood to advise him on the political implications inherent in his official
military actions. "You must be the real information center," he told McCoy. 4
Wood's attempt to assume Theodore Roosevelt's mantle as leader of the
Republican party's progressive wing eventually foundered on the ineptness of his
campaign and even more on the country's changing temper. His advocacy of
military preparedness no longer generated enthusiasm. Hoping to capitalize on
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the nativist, antiradical fervor of 1919, Wood proclaimed himself the candidate of
100-percent Americanism. That cause also fizzled before the year was out. Wood
arrived at the Chicago convention in June bearing only his reputation as an
intimate friend of TR, as a successful colonial administrator, and as a soldier who
received shabby treatment at Wilson's hands during the war. None of these was
potent enough to win the nomination. Although in the early balloting Wood
enjoyed a substantial lead over Gov. Frank L. Lowden of Illinois and Sen. Hiram
W. Johnson of California, he lacked the strength to gain a majority. To avert a
deadlock, the party's professionals-who disliked Wood's amateurism and feared
his maverick tendencies-settled on a compromise candidate of agreeable
temperament: Sen. Warren G. Harding of Ohio. To McCoy fell the unenviable
task of informing Wood of Harding's triumph on the tenth ballot. Listening to
McCoy report that "so far as he was concerned, the thing was over," Wood burst
into a rage. "Like a lion at bay," Gordon Johnston recalled, he angrily vowed "to
tell the delegates the theft that had been committed." Only by physically
restraining his chief could McCoy dissuade him from marching into the
convention hall. 5 Although the convention squelched Wood's presidential prospects, it did not end his political aspirations. As a leading Republican, he would
be a contender for a cabinet post-logically that of secretary of war-if Harding
won in November. So Wood swallowed his bitterness and supported the party
ticket. Still on active duty, he publicly endorsed Harding, declaring that in the
upcoming election, ''the one great issue is the success of the Republican Party.' ' 6
--,Motivated more by loyalty than ambition, McCoy remained with his chief. On
July 1, 1920, he was restored to the grade of colonel and thus no longer
confronted the limited horizons of the junior field grade officer. New opportunities presented themselves. From the American legation in Warsaw, Hugh
Gibson, a career diplomat and Family friend, tried to cajole McCoy into
becoming military attache in Poland. With "the military questions ... so mixed
up with the political," Gibson promised an interesting assignment. The offer was
an attractive one, but when Wood asked that he stay on, McCoy turned it down. 7
McCoy's future was again tied to his general's. But Harding's landslide victory in
November yielded disappointing results for Wood. Their candidate elected, GOP
kingmakers no longer needed to court Wood's favor. Indeed, the general's
unreliability as a team player persuaded the incoming administration to keep
Wood at arm's length. Appointment to the War Department was out of the
question. Nor was any other cabinet post available. Still, a man of his prominence
could scarcely be ignored altogether. As Theodore Roosevelt discovered in 1902,
finding a niche suitable for Wood posed a delicate problem. Like Roosevelt,
Harding found his solution in the western Pacific.8

In his last annual message to Congress on December 7, 1920, Woodrow Wilson
recommended an immediate grant of independence to the Philippines. Although
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the proposal evoked little support among the Republican majority, it represented
a logical culmination of Democratic actions over the previous eight years. The
cornerstone of Wilson's Philippine policy was the Jones Act of 1916. This
measure committed the United States to freeing its largest possession as soon as
Filipinos demonstrated their ability to maintain a stable government. The
provisions of the Jones Act meshed nicely with the antiimperialist predisposition
of Wilson's appointee as governor general, Francis Burton Harrison. From 1913
to 1921, Harrison pursued a policy of "filipinization," designed to provide the
islands with de facto autonomy even before a formal grant of independence.
Chief among the beneficiaries of this policy were Manuel Quezon and Sergio
Osmena, leaders of the Philippine legislature who built their careers on the cause
of Philippine nationalism. With Harrison's acquiescence, these two politicians
effectively eclipsed the governor general as the ultimate authorities in the
islands. Privately, Quezon and Osmena retained serious doubts about the ability
of the Philippines to survive a grant of outright independence. They recognized
all too well their country's military vulnerability and the fragile nature of its
economy. The dynamics of Philippine politics, however, demanded the commitment of all politicians to immediate independence, whatever their personal
feelings. 9
Republicans followed these developments with a mixture of skepticism and
outright disapproval. Harding, former chairman of the Senate Committee on the
Philippines, doubted that the islands were ready to go it alone. Yet Democratic
policies imparted a momentum to the independence movement that the new
administration had to reckon with. As a prelude to constructing a new
Republican policy, Harding decided to send a mission to investigate conditions in
the islands. He saw in Leonard Wood the man he needed to lead such a mission. 10
Even before the inauguration, Wood turned down an offer to become Philippine
governor general, viewing it as a transparent attempt to send him into political
exile. Deprived of any chance to exercise real power in Washington, he
considered leaving the army to accept an appointment as provost of the
University of Pennsylvania. Yet, when Harding asked Wood to head a mission to
provide recommendations on Philippine policy, he accepted-overriding objections by McCoy, who thought the appointment beneath his dignity. In Wood's
eyes, the job promised to be an interesting one. The position at Penn could await
his return. 11
Complicating the picture was the fact that Harding had already invited W.
Cameron Forbes, governor general during the Taft administration, to lead the
proposed mission. Fortunately, the gregarious and agreeable Forbes consented
that he and Wood act as coequals. (In fact, Forbes ended up playing a secondary
role.) In choosing personnel to assist them, Wood and Forbes turned to the
army's old Philippine hands. McCoy's intimacy with Wood and long acquaintance with Forbes made him the obvious choice to be chief of staff. Other recruits
were McCoy's old friends Col. Gordon Johnston and Maj. Edward Bowditch.

DiplomatInKhaki

Page 94

06/11/20 3:18 PM

RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

95

Johnston left Princeton in 1898 to enlist with the Rough Riders, won the Medal of
Honor at Bud Dajo, and served as Wood's aide during the preparedness
campaign. Bowditch, known as Peter, had been Forbes's personal secretary in the
Philippines and later served in the Moro Province. More recently, he accompanied McCoy on the mission to Armenia. To provide a semblance of balance,
several outsiders were added: Ray Atherton, first secretary of the American
legation in Peking; H. Otley Beyer, an ethnologist at the University of the
Philippines; and Lt. Comdr. Stewart F. Bryant. No Filipino served on the mission
in any capacity. 12 In late March, McCoy traveled to Washington to coordinate
administrative details and draft the mission's letter of instructions. That
document, signed by Secretary of War John W. Weeks, instructed Wood to render
judgment on the conflicting testimony concerning the readiness of the Philippines for independence. Weeks specifically asked the mission to examine
Philippine economic conditions and prospects for political stability, as well as
such matters as health, education, and public works. 13
The Wood-Forbes mission sailed from Seattle on April 9. After a brief layover
in Japan, it arrived at Manila on May 4 and set to work immediately. As with any
project undertaken by Wood, the mission pursued its goal with thoroughness and
frenetic energy. Over the course of the next four months, its members traveled
some 15,000 miles by sea, rail, automobile, and horseback, visiting all but one of
the forty-nine provinces and conferring with leaders in 449 municipalities.
Frequently, the mission divided in two groups, each led by one of the principal
investigators. As a rule, McCoy accompanied Wood. On occasion, however, he
operated separately as the nucleus of a third element. The mission's method
upon sweeping into some provincial village was to see as much as possible as
rapidly as possible. As McCoy described it, Wood held court and was entertained
with luncheons, speeches, and testimonials while his subordinates dug beneath
the surface, "Gordon taking schools and Constabulary, while I sized up General
Administration, and set in with Treasurers, collectors of Customs, Judges,
Fiscals, Engineers, padres, missionaries, merchants, and heard complaints from
downtrodden citizens." 14 In the end, the complaints of the downtrodden
informed the conclusions of the mission less than did the views of the well-to-do
that the mission made a point of soliciting. McCoy devised a confidential
questionnaire sent to prominent Filipinos not involved in politics, asking for
their views on political conditions in the islands and on the issue of independence. Members of the American business and commercial community .did not
wait for a questionnaire. They told the mission that conditions in the Philippines
under Harrison had steadily deteriorated, that politicos such as Quezon and
Osmena were untrustworthy, and that independence would be a disaster. 15
Military officials in the Philippines agreed with the business community.
American officers gave short shrift to the narrow question of an independent
Philippine state's ability to defend itself. Instead, the military advocated
retention of the Philippines by fashioning a wide-ranging argument that touched
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The Wood-Forbes mission, 1921: Wood and McCoy return to Zamboanga. (Courtesy
U.S. Army Military History Institute)

on economics, strategy, and race. Col. Charles D. Rhodes, chief of staff of the
Philippine Department, started from the premise that the United States stood
"on the threshold of an era of marked commercial development." To adapt itself
to this new era, he believed, "our country must insist on equal opportunity for
our merchants, the 'open door,' in markets of the Far East." Exploiting that
open door required a series of stepping stones for American shipping. Rhodes
believed that the Philippines were the most vital element in that series. Maj. Gen.
Francis J. Kernan, the department's commander, described the Philippines as a
way station but also saw them in their own right as a field for the investment of
surplus capital and a source of raw materials. Both officers echoed the views of
Adm. Joseph Straus, commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, who worried that
Japan, with "her lust for national wealth and power," would fall on the
Philippines if the United States withdrew. Straus predicted that "if the
Philippines are granted their absolute independence now or in the near future
... [they would] fall into the hands of the Japanese in a short time." The
Japanese maintained "a burning desire for the Philippines," alleged Kernan.
Filipino incapacity for resisting such foreign incursions was self-evident.
American officers viewed the Philippine people as inferior. In a memorandum on
psychological characteristics, Maj. John P. Smith, Kernan's intelligence officer,
described Filipinos as "generally helpless, indolent in the extreme, [and
possessing] no moral sense." The people's enthusiasm for independence was not
authentic, reflecting instead the rabble rousing of demogogic politicos whom the
military mistrusted. "It would manifestly be a crime against humanity,'' wrote
Kernan, "to withdraw our protecting supervision and leave these people prey to
the small oligarchy now in power." Furnishing that note of missionary zeal
favored by military imperialists, he added: "Our moral duty to persevere in the
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work of leading this backward people to a higher plane of civilization cannot be
shirked [without] shame to ourselves." 16
In addition to consulting the resident military, the mission interviewed
numerous officials and private citizens and was swamped by petitions both for
and against independence. "We are absorbing much," McCoy reported, "and
interpreting things to ourselves and to each other in a way that will easily
crystallize ideas into opinions." By July, that process was well under way. Wood
and his assistants identified a series of deficiencies that rendered the Philippines,
in their view, unfit for independence. Moreover, the mission believed that it had
isolated the specific causes of Filipino ills and had settled on a remedy that would
form the basis of a new American policy. 17
Assessing the conditions that had evolved by the end of the Harrison regime
required some basis of comparison. Inevitably, the mission's members turned to
the years prior to 1913 for their standard. During that period, many of them had
figured prominently in governing the islands. Naturally, the mission claimed high
marks for the administration of that earlier period. Up to 1913, wrote McCoy in a
memorandum summarizing his views, the islands made "remarkably rapid
progress ... due to the tutelage of American officials who, despite Kipling, did
hustle the East." Until Harrison became governor general, "effective supervision by Americans with a high sense of duty and the burning spirit of
crusaders" -men who acted "without a thought of political partisanship" secured advances in all aspects of Philippine life. The filipinization policy-a
"leap into the dark" by inexperienced men ignorant of conditions in the
islands-ended all that. Permitting Filipino control without careful American
supervision allowed the quality of government to deteriorate. Indeed, "the
deterioration seems to have kept pace with the Filipinization of the services.''
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The controversy over Philippine independence: McCoy solicits the views of Filipino
villagers, 1921. (Courtesy National Archives)
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The "infection of politics" replaced the high-mindedness of American administrators, bringing with it bloated job rolls, graft, spoilsmanship, and general
inefficiency. 18
McCoy's views, including his concern for the "infection of politics," pervaded
the final report prepared by Wood and Forbes. 19 The report described in detail
the decline suffered under Harrison. In 1913, "honest, highly efficient"
Philippine government "set a high standard of energy and morality." Eight
years later, the Wood-Forbes mission found an administration "top-heavy in
personnel and enmeshed in red tape"; a politicized and demoralized civil service
and constabulary; a system of justice in which politics and family carried undue
weight; prisons that were unsanitary and overcrowded; and schools staffed by
incompetent teachers. The incidence of preventable diseases such as typhoid,
malaria, and beriberi had risen steadily. 20
Worse yet were existing economic conditions and the government's economic
policies. Relying heavily on the export of sugar, hemp, coconut oil, and tobacco,
the Philippine economy suffered tremendously from the postwar collapse of
commodity prices. The islands' usually favorable trade balance reversed itself
dramatically. As the mission noted, "the country is suffering from the general
world-wide depression at the present time." Yet the Wood-Forbes Report did not
dwell on the islands' dependence on commodity exports as a possible root of
their difficulties. Nor did it see the need for structural remedies to salvage the
economy. (On the contrary, the report argued that without free trade with the
United States, the islands' principal commercial partner, economic conditions
would have been still worse.) Instead, as a scapegoat for economic failures, the
report took aim again at the Harrison administration. The mission especially
criticized government enterprises that competed with the private sector. Ventures
such as the state-owned Manila Railroad and the National Coal Company were
regularly losing money, straining the government's already precarious finances.
Above all, the mission singled out the virtual insolvency of the Philippine
National Bank as proof of Philippine incompetence and of the unwisdom of
thrusting government into areas better left to private enterprise. 21
What caused conditions to reach such a state? McCoy's answer was twofold:
race and politics. The Philippine people had not yet developed the capacity for
self-government. Given adequate direction, the Filipino was a good worker, but
"as yet, in most cases, he is unable to direct." As public servants, McCoy
believed, Filipinos were lacking in initiative, constructive spirit, and energy. They
compared unfavorably to Cubans-in McCoy's eyes, hardly a lofty standard.
With the people naive and malleable-in the words of the final report, "free from
worries ... , light-hearted and inclined to be improvident" -they were easy
marks for manipulative politicians like Quezon and Osmena. This was Harrison's
greatest crime: By providing only shadowy and fitful supervision of his charges,
he encouraged the "interference and tacit usurpation by the [Philippine] political
leaders of the general supervision and control of ... the government granted
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by law to the Governor-General." Introducing politics into such a society
inevitably brought in its train corruption, inefficiency, and an end to
progress. 22
Such findings provided all the support needed for a recommendation that the
United States retain the Philippines. Yet, despite this emphasis on unsatisfactory
internal conditions as a rationale for retention, the mission also asserted positive
reasons for opposing independence. The mission entertained its own vision of a
Japanese-American rivalry as well as hopes for commercial advantage. Although
it would have been impolitic to include such factors in the final report, in remarks
made on July 2 to the American Chamber of Commerce in Manila, McCoy
succinctly described the breadth of the mission's viewpoint:
We must remain here for the benefit of ourselves, for the benefit of the
Filipino and for the benefit of every people whose countries are washed by the
waters of the Pacific. If we leave the Philippine Islands the Far East becomes a
Japanese province. We are not imperialists.. . . But America must remain the
sovereign nation. Either that or we must get out absolutely, not only out of the
Philippines, but out of the Orient, and we may as well burn up our shipping. 23
If independence was out of the question, what was to be done to clear away the
debris of the Harrison years? To McCoy, the answer was clear: Re-establish the
sovereignty of the United States by a determined exercise of the governor general's
powers; get the government out of big business as soon as possible; restore
nonpartisan, in other words, American, supervision to the various departments,
thereby upgrading their efficiency; increase the role of the army and navy in
governing the Philippines by making senior commanders ex-officio members of the
advisory council of state; and provide "consistent and proper encouragement" for
"American capital to play its important part in the development of the Islands." 24
Once again, McCoy's recommendation to liquidate the government's "ill
advised experiments in state socialism" appeared in the Wood-Forbes Report. His
belief that stronger apolitical supervision would increase government efficiency
recurred throughout that document. But the final report softened McCoy's
recommendation that the governor general assert his powers to the fullest,
remarking ambiguously that the executive should "have authority commensurate
with the responsibilities of his position." An open proposal to increase American
power at the expense of local leaders would needlessly inflame Philippine opinion.
Yet, while muted in the final report, this appeal for a reinvigorated governor
generalship, along with interest in expanding the American presence in the islands,
became the hallmarks of U.S. policy for the next several years. 25

With the mission's final report on its way to Washington, Wood and McCoy
embarked upon a tour of the Far East, stopping at Hong Kong, Shanghai, Peking,
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Manchuria, Korea, and Japan. McCoy's first visit to China since 1906 gave him a
fresh appreciation of the continuing turmoil of the revolution. An audience with
the empress of Japan provided the trip's other highlight. McCoy compared the
formalities involved in meeting that august personage to "one of Walter Camp's
bending and stretching exercises." 26 In Washington, meanwhile, Harding had
already decided to reverse the Wilsonian drift toward Philippine independence.
Instead of serving as the basis for a reexamination of existing policy, the WoodForbes Report served to justify changes that were already under way. Yet
questions remained as to how the United States would persuade Filipinos to
accept indefinite American retention of the islands. Closely related was the
question of who would act as Harding's agent in this delicate undertaking. The
administration once again concluded that only Wood possessed the stature and
experience needed for the job. Once again, Harding asked him to accept
appointment as governor general. At first, Wood resisted, but repeated urging
from Washington wore him down. By the time he and McCoy returned to Manila
in October, Wood had acceded to the president's request, although with certain
conditions attached. Still intending to accept the position at Pennsylvania, he
insisted that his term as governor general be for one year only. And to assist him in
governing the Philippines, he persuaded the War Department to permit McCoy,
Johnston, and Bowditch to stay on as personal assistants. 27
Wood did not really expect to eliminate the problems identified by the WoodForbes mission in a single year. He hoped to persuade Harding to appoint McCoy
as vice-governor and ''to have him take over the Governorship as soon as the
machine is once more moving forward," thereby freeing himself to return home.
Because McCoy shared "the basic principles which I have always employed in all
work of this kind," Wood could count on him to carry on the right policies.
Throughout the late summer and fall of 1921, Wood campaigned for McCoy's
appointment. Back in the United States, Forbes also worked in McCoy's behalf.
Their efforts failed, due in part to a reluctance to have military men fill both of
the leading offices in the Philippine administration. Some in Washington may
also have realized that depriving Wood of control over his successor could keep
him in the Philippines. 28
Although denied the vice-governorship, McCoy remained in Manila until 1925
as the leading figure in Wood's "cavalry" or "khaki" cabinet. Though without
official status or statutory authority, the soldiers on the governor general's staff
emerged as influential and eventually controversial figures in the Wood
administration. McCoy and his fellow officers at the Malacanan Palace drafted
legislation to sort out the islands' tangled finances. They headed investigatory
missions into remote areas. They represented Wood at meetings with Filipino
officials or at civic functions, in the opinion of one Manila resident, "too
consciously bearing 'the white man's burden.'" In effect, they protected an
aging chief executive whose health eroded the longer he stayed in Manila. They
served as a buffer in his uneasy relations with Filipino leaders. If need be, they
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Khaki cabinet: McCoy and Gordon Johnston in Manila, 1921. (Courtesy U.S. Army
Military History Institute)

talked him out of impetuous decisions, especially McCoy, "from General Wood's
point of view the only man essential to him." Perhaps most important to one
whose ambitions had been thwarted (he believed) by unworthy opponents, they
gave unstinting loyalty and affection. They were Wood's proteges come of age:
Unlike others, they would not betray him. 29
For an influential member of the governor general's household, duty was not
without its rewards. Even for an old Far East hand, the varied attractions of the
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The Malacanan Palace: Wood and McCoy entertain a guest on the veranda. (Courtesy
U.S. Army Military History Institute)

Philippine capital retained fascination. Although tame by comparison, the ArmyNavy Club overlooking Manila Bay provided well-appointed surroundings for
socializing with other Americans. To stay fit, McCoy played polo regularly,
becoming president of the exclusive Manila Polo Club. In the countryside, game
was plentiful, and the Apo, the governor general's dispatch boat, could be
commandeered for fishing nearby waters. Moreover, whenever the coastal heat
became oppressive, McCoy joined Wood's family at their mountain retreat in
Baguio.
Still, these comfortable remnants of privilege could not disguise the aura of
imperial twilight engulfing Wood's administration. In retrospect, the premises
from which Wood operated seem unreal. Certainly, his hopes for the Philippines
appear hardly relevant to the reality taking shape beyond the gates of Malacanan.
McCoy described the administration's goal as "bringing order out of chaos."
Yet, however ruinous, the social and economic disarray of the Philippines in the
aftermath of World War I did not compare in significance to the irrevocable
political transformation then under way. The conditions existing in the decade
after 1902 when American power in the Philippines reached its zenith no longer
pertained, having been undermined by Harrison's passivity and growing Filipino
assertiveness. Neither Wood nor McCoy, however, could accept that fact. 30
The near absence of serious American interest in the Philippines further
complicated the Wood administration's problem. A decade before, guiding the
islands toward maturity had been , recognized as an important American
responsibility. By the 1920s, true believers in the American mission to uplift the
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Philippines had become few in number, either within government or outside it.
The miniscule size of the American community in the islands-fewer than 7,000
U.S. citizens resided there-suggests the extent to which Americans had lost
interest in their great Pacific possession. Even Harding paid scant attention to
the Philippines. Having made the political point of reversing Woodrow Wilson's
Philippine policy, the Republicans by and large were willing to let Wood work out
the specifics of the policy replacing it. Thus, in embarking on his crusade, Wood
could expect little help from Washington. In the event, he received little help from
anyone other than his intimates in the khaki cabinet, all of whom shared his views.
Historians have yet to give the Wood administration the detailed scrutiny that
it deserves. Beginning in 1921, Wood and his advisers sought to repeat his Cuban
successes on a grander scale. With 11 million Filipinos scattered among 3,000
islands, divided further among themselves by religious and ethnic rivalries, their
task was not ea,sy. While Americans at home busied themselves with the fruits of
normalcy, these army officers labored to create in the Philippines an efficient,
humane capitalist order reminscent of the now-faded ideals of American
progressivism. Opposed by local nationalists far more interested in power for
Filipinos than in imported ideals, they failed. 31
Wood outlined his goals in his inaugural address of October 15, 1921. Economy,
efficiency, and true progress were the broad objectives that his administration
would pursue. Its hallmarks would be honesty, morality, and an appreciation that
public office is a public trust. Yet he would not slight human needs. Citing as a
"frightening indictment of our sanitary and health conditions" the fact that nearly
one out of three Filipino children died in infancy, he called for improvements in
medical care, public works, and treatment of the chronically ill. Education, too,
needed to be improved and extended; Wood proposed that English be taught as a
common language to unify the diverse population. In education as well as in other
aspects of Philippine life, he told his listeners, "your women must be given equal
opportunity with your men." Regarding economic policy, he vowed to encourage,
not discourage, private enterprise. Toward this end, he would disengage the
government from such ventures as railroad ownership and cement production
while working to attract foreign capital.32 Wood and his inner circle were
uncompromising in their support of private enterprise as the vehicle for economic
development. Yet they were no mere conservative defenders of business interests.
Their advocacy of a positive state committed to human welfare, of women's rights,
and of education to achieve cultural homogenization put them squarely in the
tradition of American progressivism. What marked them above all else as
progressives was their constant refrain of efficiency as the highest attribute of
government performance. 33
In their own eyes, these military progressives were qualified to serve as the
agents of humane, efficient rule because of their expertise and nonpartisanship,
both of which further emphasize their links to domestic progressivism. They had
already demonstrated their administrative skills as colonial administrators, and
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they expressed confidence in their ability to transfer their previous experience to
a new situation. "It seems like the old Cuban game," McCoy remarked within a
month of Wood's taking office. Only those already well versed in the game could
lay claim to play it. Indeed, intrusion by novices drew their contempt. As McCoy
commented later concerning an attack on American policy in the Philippines,
"Like ... other theoretical friends of the Filipinos," the authors of the critique
had "never sweat[ed] nor suffered with them nor taken the trouble to go see them
with their own eyes.'' Having done their share of sweating, these soldiers
believed that they possessed the expertise needed to rule. 34
Beyond technical competence, progressive leadership required breadth of
vision. As Robert H. Wiebe comments, although the ideal progressive leader
could "comprehend the details of a modern specialized government, he was
much more than an expert among experts. His vision encompassed the entire
nation, his impartiality freed him from all prejudices, and his detached wisdom
enabled him to devise an equitable and progressive policy for the whole society."
Partisan politics, which inevitably involved conflicts between interest groups,
compromise, and the promotion of parochial interests, obscured the common
good. According to Samuel P. Hayes, progressives sought as leaders "experts
[who] could transcend the 'petty' bickerings of political strife, rise above a welter
of grassroots interests, and produce the greatest good for society as a whole."
Ignoring their own recent involvement in a presidential campaign, Wood and his
circle believed that the military's traditional nonpartisanship uniquely fitted
them to provide rational, disinterested administration best suited to the interests
of all Filipinos. 35
On the surface, the military's authoritarian style appears at odds with
progressivism's democratic leanings. This contradiction was more apparent than
real. Although progressives at home professed support for democratizing
reforms, in practice they enfranchised only those deemed capable of responsible
political behavior. This standard excluded blacks, Asian-Americans, or immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. When applied to the Philippines,
where Americans viewed the entire population as inferior, this rule of thumb
logically absolved progressivism of its democratic component entirely. With the
people incapable of self-rule, enlightened American military administrators
would rule for them. 36
Thus, reasserting the governor general's authority became a prerequisite to
the application of progressive principles in the Philippines. Yet, given the rein
that Harrison permitted Philippine leaders, any threat to their prerogatives
would invite resistance. Wood and his disciples recognized that circumstances in
the Philippines were not precisely those of Cuba twenty years before. As a result
of American rule, Filipinos had become less malleable. "We have made them
energetic and have made them work and have [made] them ambitious," McCoy
told Katherine Mayo, a sympathetic journalist. "In the accomplishment of this,
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we have made them bumptious and half-baked and unpleasant in many cases."
"Bumptious" political leaders like Quezon and Osmena would not automatically
do the governor general's bidding, yet Wood fully expected that in a test of
strength, he would prevail. 37
Initially , the new governor general enjoyed surprising support from Filipino
leaders. The legislature saw utility in certain aspects of Wood's program,
especially those aimed at salvaging the country's finances. Less-agreeable
proposals could simply be deferred until the governor general's one-year term
expired. Thus, at the end of the legislative session of 1922, McCoy reported to
George Van Horn Mosely that the financial program that he and Bowditch
prepared for Wood passed "without being altered or punctured in a vital spot."
The legislature approved measures floating new bond issues, reorganizing the
Philippine National Bank, and providing financial assistance for the ailing
government-owned Manila Railroad. "The spirit of the legislature," reported
Wood in his annual report for 1922, "has been one of cooperation." 38
The administration devoted the preponderance of its energies not to drafting
legislation but to devising ways to replace sloppiness with order and efficiency.
Wood reduced government expenditures, arguing that the heavy losses sustained
by the national bank "necessitated the most rigid economy in the administration
of government"; public works absorbed the brunt of these cuts. Wood examined
ways to consolidate provinces and municipalities to trim the number of
government employees, and he launched vigorous campaigns against gambling
and prostitution. He financed improvements to the leper colony at Culion (a
project to which he devoted great personal attention) and also expanded public
health programs-for example, increasing smallpox vaccinations from 25,000 in
1921 to 1,744,000 in 1922. 39
In Wood's view, 1922 was a year of significant progress. Yet, even with
spending cuts, the budget remained in deficit. The government failed to divest
itself of its commercial enterprises, whose poor condition rendered them
unsalable. The national bank was operating at an annual loss of 600,000 pesos.
Wood's efforts to infuse Americans into the Philippine constabulary and the
ranks of teachers languished for want of qualified volunteers. Attempts to attract
American capital enjoyed little success. Much, therefore, remained to be done.
Failing to get McCoy designated as heir apparent, Wood concluded that he alone
could carry on the work. Abandoning the idea of a quiet retirement to academia,
he told Washington that he would stay in Manila indefinitely.40
Unfortunately, the harmony of Wood's relations with the legislature in 1922
was deceptive. Bowditch, for one, observed the governor general's uneasiness
with Philippine leaders. "One thing you can be sure of," he wrote Forbes,
"General Wood and his family will never get into . . . close touch with the
filipinos. . . . Their race prejudice is too strong and too apparent." Wood's
imperious manner too often ruffled the feathers of those with whom he dealt: "To
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him a good Filipino is one who agrees with him, [whereas] one who has his own
mind .. . is disloyal and dangerous." Given the delicacy of the political situation,
remarked Bowditch, McCoy provided the administration's "anchor of safety and
hope." 41
Wood's decision to continue as governor general triggered the eruption that
Bowditch feared. Viewing Wood's presence as an obstacle to their aspirations
and knowing that he would not permit even the level of autonomy permitted by
Harrison, Filipino leaders orchestrated a political clash to discredit the governor
general. 42 Criticism of Wood, growing through the first half of 1923, followed two
lines. Filipino leaders accused the governor general of exceeding his authority by
insisting that the cabinet, all but one of whose members were Filipino, was
responsible directly to him. This reversed the Harrison administration's practice
of permitting the cabinet to report to the legislature-in effect, to Quezon and
Osmena. In addition, they said, Wood abused his veto power by refusing to sign
bills concerned purely with local issues rather than restricting its use to matters
relating to American sovereignty or international obligations. Harrison rarely
used the veto. The frequency with which Wood did so reflected his own broader
conception of the governor general's role. 43
Discord between Wood and the Philippine leaders reached a climax in July
1923. The incident bringing events to a head was a trivial one, involving Wood's
intervention in behalf of an American named Ray Conley, a member of the
Manila police vice squad, whom Filipino authorities accused of misconduct. Yet
Wood's action in restoring Conley to duty symbolized the growing reach of his
authority that nationalists so resented. On July 17, the council of state (less its
single American member), comprising the cabinet, the president of the senate
(Quezon), and the speaker of the house (Manuel Roxas), marched into Wood's
office and quit in protest over his handling of the Conley affair. Denouncing the
action as "an organized and preconcerted attack" on his authority and "as a
challenge and a threat," Wood nonetheless accepted their resignations. As the
Philippine leadership filed out of the governor general's office, they left Wood's
plans for reconstructing the islands in a shambles. 44

Wood's lack of political dexterity, his petulant treatment of Filipinos, and his own
physical decline produced a reaction that played into the hands of his opponents.
They now had a cause-cast in nationalist hues-that they would exploit as long
as he remained in office. No one had been able to save the old general from
himself. Recounting these events in a letter to Mosely, Harbord commented,
My theory has always been that General Wood got into trouble when McCoy
was away from him, and that he never got into trouble when McCoy was
around. . . . I have heard several times that General Wood was getting
rather forgetful, and that McCoy is really the key man in the whole situation
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out there. Admire [Wood] as we will, ... the bald facts are that the lameness
of his is in his head and not in his leg.
Unfortunately for Wood, during the troubled summer of 1923, McCoy was not
around. Instead, he was home on leave, celebrating his recent promotion to
brigadier general. McCoy left Manila in April, intending to return by late
summer. 45 Had he done so, McCoy might have been able to save Wood from
himself. But other events intervened to prolong his absence.
The end of August found McCoy in Japan enroute back to the Philippines. As
his ship, the President Pierce, was leaving Kobe on September 1, he felt a slight
tremor. Only when he reached Shanghai did he learn that the tremor had been a
disastrous earthquake that leveled much of Yokohama and Tokyo. Judging
himself "the nearest and freest American official" who could offer assistance, he
immediately reboarded the Pierce and sailed for Yokohama.46 He arrived on
September 7 to find a scene of "awe-inspiring destruction and desolation."
Yokohama had been "obliterated, leaving behind nothing but smoking ashes and
heaps of ruins." Nothing he had seen in France compared to the devastation.
Fires burned out of control for two days, wreaking even greater damage than the
quake itself. Eighty percent of the buildings in Yokohama .vere destroyed. In
Tokyo, fires gutted 300,000 residences. Thirty-three thousand people died in
Yokohama; authorities in Tokyo estimated their losses at 120,000 dead or missing,
another 35,000 injured, and 2.5 million left homeless. 47
Having cabled both the secretary of war and Wood of his return to Japan, McCoy
received orders putting him in charge of American relief efforts. His responsibility
was to coordinate the transfer of supplies being rushed from Manila and the United
States and to do it without treading on local sensibilities. Although the Japanese
welcomed short-term assistance, they would resent any meddling that implied an
inability to manage their own affairs. To maximize the humanitarian and
diplomatic value of American contributions, it was essential to conduct the
operation in the proper spirit. 48

The Japanese earthquake of 1923: the smoldering ruins of Yokohama. (Courtesy Osaka
Mainichi)
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The earthquake had destroyed the American embassy, so McCoy set up
headquarters in the Imperial Hotel, designed by Frank Lloyd Wright and one of
the few structures to survive intact. He spent the next six weeks assisting
Americans and Filipinos stranded by the earthquake, supervising the unloading
of supplies in Yokohama bay, arranging the construction of the field hospitals
that were the centerpieces of the American contribution, and coordinating with
Japanese officials the transfer of relief materiel. Typhoons, aftershocks, and red
tape in Washington and Tokyo slowed operations, but, in all, $16 million of aid
was turned over to the Japanese. Included in this sum were three hospitals
erected by American troops and staffed temporarily by seventy American doctors
and nurses. 49
Within weeks, McCoy saw signs of recovery. "Like all Orientals," he
remarked, the Japanese were "most adaptable to what to us would be impossible
. . . conditions." Wary of overstaying his welcome, McCoy decided to terminate
relief operations by mid-October. Before departing, he escorted the prince
regent, the future emperor Hirohito, on a tour of the American-donated hospitals
and called on the Japanese war minister to receive the thanks of the Japanese
government. The two generals expressed their mutual hopes that the American
reaction to Japan's distress would mark the beginning of improved relations
between the two countries. McCoy believed that such an outcome was genuinely
possible. In his final report, he pointed to a new cordiality observable toward
Americans in Japan. He detected "a distinctly new attitude toward all Americans
on the part of all classes of the Japanese." Perhaps, for the moment, such a new
attitude did exist. A newspaperman long resident in Japan reported that because
of the American response, "there never has been a time when the feeling
throughout the country . .. has been so sincerely friendly toward the United
States." With calculations of national interest inevitably erasing the memory of
past good will, however, such affection proved short-lived. 50

However transitory McCoy's contribution to Japanese-American friendship, his
success there far exceeded any he would achieve in mending the fortunes of the
Wood administration. Returning to the political wars of Manila in November,
McCoy warned his family that "most of that appearing in your newspapers [about
the Philippine situation] is bunk.'' Protective of his chief, McCoy was determined
to be optimistic. In truth, by the time McCoy rejoined Wood, relations between
the governor general and the Philippine leaders had been shattered beyond
repair. The crisis that began in July sputtered along for the rest of Wood's tenure,
sapping the energies of his administration. 51
On one level, the dispute was a constitutional one, a disagreement between the
governor general and the legislature over how much authority each was
permitted under the Jones Act of 1916. Philippine leaders, citing Harrison as
their model, argued that the governor general's role was to symbolize American
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Earthquake relief The future emperor Hirohito inspects American-donated field
hospitals in Tokyo, 1923. (Courtesy National Archives)

sovereignty while exercising little real authority. They depicted Wood's efforts to
assert broad powers as the actions of an autocrat. They accused Wood of creating
his khaki cabinet to supplant local political leaders, reducing their own role to that
of ineffectual observers. Wood and his defenders-of whom McCoy remained
always the foremost-claimed that Harrison perverted the Jones Act by failing to
fulfill the obligations of his office. Wood was merely attempting to restore the
balance between the executive and legislative branches that the framers of the
Jones Act had intended. Seen in this light, the legislature was the usurper. As
McCoy told a New York Times correspondent, Filipino politicians sought "to
diminish our control without diminishing our responsibility, and to gain control of
the government by intrigue and misleading interpretations of the [Jones] Act....
The attitude of the Governor-General has been to keep the flag at the top of the
pole where Congress has placed it, until Congress decides to the contrary." 52
Yet such legalistic arguments concealed the true substance of the disagreement. The underlying reasons for the clash were more visceral and thus less
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subject to compromise. For at least a decade, the pursuit of immediate independence had dominated Philippine politics. Independence became a cause no
less fraught with emotion than slavery had been to Americans on the eve of the
Civil War. Out of principle and a prudent concern for his own career, no
Philippine politician could regard the expansion of American authority as
anything other than illegitimate and unacceptable. The purpose for which that
authority might be used was irrelevant. As Quezon notoriously remarked, he
would prefer a "government run like hell by Filipinos to one run like heaven by
Americans." What Philippine leaders demanded of Wood was not a compromise
interpretation of the Jones Act that could smooth over their differences with him,
but abandonment of the concept of Philippine-American relations that he and the
Republican party represented. 53
Likewise, for the soldiers at Malacanan, the legal issue was only secondary.
Their commitment to the governor general's authority and their opposition to
nationalist aspirations flowed not from devotion to the Jones Act but from
conviction. Upbringing and experience convinced them that nonwhites were
incapable of self-government. Only generations of comprehensive supervision
could possibly prepare the Philippines for independence. Publicly, McCoy stated
that the administration's opposition to freeing the Philippines rested on their
unpreparedness "either economically or from the standpoint of defense." Yet his
real reservation- and Wood's as well-concerned the people themselves. Of
necessity, he had to argue that the Filipinos had made progress over the course of
a quarter-century of American tutelage. But, as he told Katherine Mayo,
the only point that is doubtful in my mind is whether it has gone far enough.
Those things are part of the important imponderables ... that are habits of
mind and customs that have grown up after years, and in many cases
generations, of thinking ... on certain lines, and I doubt whether we have
been here long enough to create that habit as against the primitive habit of
going out and killing a landlord.
American withdrawal would jeopardize whatever advances had been achieved. "If
American control were entirely removed at present," he told Mayo, "there would
be an easy slipping-back" into primitive habits. 54
The Americans acknowledged the racist assumptions underlying their position. According to McCoy, "the root and branch" of Philippine-American
differences was "a racial thing." The well-to-do, educated Filipino, he said,
"feels the racial superiority bearing down on him. There is not a day in the week
that it is not impressed on these fellows in some way, and they resent the
Americans here.'' The clamor for independence stemmed in part from a desire of
the upper class to be freed of reminders of their inferiority. McCoy thought it
perfectly natural that race should play such a role in determining both politics
and interpersonal relations. As he explained to Katherine Mayo: "I don't have
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any physical repugnance for the Malay. I do for the Negro. But I have watched
the thing and I can detect no physical repugnance in myself for a Malay or an
American Indian. If I were surrounded by them and had to associate with them
closely, it would probably come. You just can't get away from it under certain
conditions." Racial differences created racial tension and that, in turn, spawned
nationalism. The sequence was '' a normal thing, sure to happen under like
conditions with any people," said McCoy. "It was marked in Cuba, where the
Cubans were white people. And the conditions here . .. have been consistently
normal right from the start-the desire to get rid of the white man." Bowditch
shared this view. "Did we consider the Filipino our equal socially," he remarked
to McCoy, "our problem would be fairly simple. But taint [sic] so and won't be so
while we live anyway. " 55
Somewhat inconsistently, the Wood administration also argued that the entire
independence movement was contrived and insincere. The Americans contended
that cynical politicians had manufactured the movement by using their naive
countrymen for selfish ends. Wood termed the issue a "purely local and artificial
agitation produced by a small group fanning the very natural desire of the people
for independence, but absolutely failing to enlighten them as to . .. the costs or
responsibilities which independence involves." The discrepancy between the
politicians' public and private views only confirmed the disdain that the
Americans in Manila felt for the likes of Quezon and Osmena. "In private and
practically without exception," McCoy said, "they say very frankly that they are
not ready for independence and will not be for years to come, but that for local
and political reasons they are obliged to continue to talk and advocate on their
line of ultimate aspirations." Such hypocrisy shocked military progressives, who
expected public officials to subordinate partisan or selfish concerns to the
common good. To indorse such conniving would be unconscionable.56
The net effect of this political dispute was to create an insurmountable
impediment to the fulfillment of Wood's plans for the Philippines. Attacking the
governor general and his khaki cabinet preoccupied the legislature. Replying to
such charges became the chief concern of the governor general and his household.
McCoy even felt obliged to provide the War Department with a brief refuting
Filipino attempts to depict Wood's assistants as a "brutal and licentious soldiery
[of] Boche-like appearance." McCoy portrayed Wood as a man of great forbearance,
patiently withstanding the slings of his opponents. The governor general put up
with abuse "that would have driven most other white men crazy," said McCoy. "He
has never as yet allowed his temper to show with these people. I know that he has a
terrific temper. He wouldn't stand this from white people. He would knock them
down probably." To Forbes, McCoy reported that Wood "stood the gaff without a
sign of weakness. It was a fine Anglo-Saxon performance as against . . . the
meanness of Orientals, egged on by American politicians." 57
Yet no defense of Wood could conceal the fact that the goals of the military
progressives remained unfulfilled. The cabinet crisis of 1923 ended Wood's
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chances of gaining passage of significant legislation. The government never
succeeded in shedding its business interests. The bank kept "barging along,"
wrote McCoy, "hopeless in the long run" but propped up for the moment by
rebounding sugar prices. Higher commodity prices also enabled Wood to balance
the budget from 1923 onward, taking the edge off the financial crisis that existed
in 1921. Yet the teaching corps and the constabulary remained without their
American leaven, and efforts to attract new capital to the islands collided with
Filipino fears of foreign exploitation. Even McCoy's attempts to call on business
friends such as Harbord produced negligible results. So long as Philippine
agitation made independence a possibility, few American businessmen would risk
long-term investment in the islands.58
Granted, under Wood the legislature no longer dominated the Philippine
government as it had during the Harrison years. Yet it retained enough power to
deny Wood the latitude that he had exercised in Cuba or the Moro Province. As a
result, his imprint was less far-reaching. "I should suggest," he told Katherine
Mayo in 1924, "that during the next twenty-five years there . .. be no discussion
of [freeing] the Philippines . ... There would be a sigh of relief. In twenty-five
years, . .. the question [could] be opened again." To his chagrin, Philippine
nationalism could not be wished away so easily. 59 By 1925, McCoy was claiming
victory-Wood had "beaten the politicos at every turn," he asserted. But this
was pure bluster. Even Gordon Johnston admitted that the Filipino leaders had
defeated Wood. "They played with him as a sportsman plays with a trout," he
said. Wood had "put up with all manner of indignities, believing always that he
could persuade these men to work harmoniously with him." 60 Not least among
the blows that Wood suffered was the loss of McCoy himself. As part of their
attack on Wood's khaki cabinet, Filipino representatives in Washington challenged the legality of assigning military officers as civil advisers to the governor
general. In ruling on the matter, the comptroller general of the United States
affirmed the Philippine position. Despite outraged cries from Wood and attempts
by the secretary of war to circumvent the ruling, McCoy was ordered home. On
April 17, 1925, he left the Philippines-and Wood-for the last time. 61
Wood stayed on for two more years. The strain of governing the Philippines in
the face of concerted opposition by the local political establishment took its toll.
The gimpy leg and periodic seizures-symptoms that had twice been relieved by
surgery to remove brain tumors-recurred with greater severity. Even before his
own departure, McCoy urged his chief to return home for another operation.
Wood refused to give his opponents the satisfaction of driving him from the
islands, telling McCoy, "I am going to fight this thing through and die in
harness." 62 In the end, the American attempt to revive the governor general's
authority foundered on the opposition of a handful of Filipino leaders whose
political agenda consisted of a single issue: independence. These men would not
acquiesce in a return to an era of near-total American control. During the
Harrison years, they acquired the clout and the savvy to prove more than a match
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for Wood. Once ruptured in 1923, relations between the governor general and the
legislature would not recover so long as Wood remained in the Malacanan Palace.
Wood's stubborn determination only sealed the failure of Republican policy in
the islands.
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McCoy did not return alone from the Philippines in 1925. Developments toward
the end of his tour in Manila effected a fundamental change in his life. Even in
his correspondence with his family, McCoy was reticent in discussing his personal
affairs. Certainly he enjoyed the company of women. But in his gentlemanly way,
he refrained from recording the details of his relationships with them. Although
there had been romances, the sparse surviving evidence makes it difficult to
evaluate their seriousness. To be sure, McCoy's papers contain numerous letters
from a Texas schoolteacher, E. Bliss Baldridge, whom he met during his tour on
the Mexican border. She was smitten, but how McCoy responded is unclear.
Similarly, there are hints of a romantic attachment between McCoy and Daisy
Harriman, the worldly, attractive, and politically active widow who was a Family
friend and had followed the AEF to France. 1 In the overall context of McCoy's
life, however, the importance of such episodes was negligible. Since leaving West
Point, he had subordinated the needs of his private life to the demands of his
profession. Among other things, this priority led McCoy to value highly his
independence. To preserve that independence, it made sense to avoid long-term
relationships with the opposite sex. Always on the move, surrounded by male
associates, McCoy appears to have been quite content with the arrangement.
By the time McCoy returned to the Philippines in 1921, however, he had grown
weary of bachelorhood. For a time, he shared quarters with Peter Bowditch in
Manila and thus had someone's company while off duty. But in 1922, Bowditch
went home, and McCoy thereafter lived alone. To his family, he remarked glumly,
An earlier version of this chapter appeared as "The American Electoral Mission in Nicaragua,
1927-1928," Diplomatic History 4 (Summer 1980): 241-261.
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"If it were my habit, I think I should cast about to find someone to marry,"
adding quickly, "but it isn't so don't be alarmed. " 2 A year and a half later,
without having given the slightest inkling of what was afoot, he addressed the
subject of matrimony a second time. "Dearest Mother," he wrote,
I was married yesterday to Frances Judson after some weeks of stress and
strain, for though I had been proposing daily and determinedly, Frances did
not want to be married and did want to go home to Mother, sailing ... on
the 28th. That was more than I could bear, so yesterday morning while
driving her about ... and in a moment of weakness, of sympathy for my
evident distress, she allowed herself to become engaged, and before she
knew it I had ... the Bishop ready, telephoned for the General and Mrs.
Wood ... and [we) were married at 12:30.... We drove back to Malacanan
for lunch, and drove off right after to Baugio where the General has given us
the house for our honeymoon. We are very happy and always will be.3
By all accounts they were. The twenty-eight-year-old bride from New York City
was spirited, outspoken, and accustomed to living her own life. Having made her
decision, however, she became an ideal companion for McCoy, willingly adopting
his itinerant life, sharing his interests, and making his friends her own. In
appearance, according to her husband, she was a "tall, slim, red head, lovely in
face and figure. " 4 Beyond her attractive personal qualities and charm, Frances
was an intriguing choice as a bride for McCoy. Although he told Cameron Forbes
that "falling in love was the last thing I anticipated," McCoy's decision to marry
was not as impulsive as it appeared. Twenty-one years her senior, he had known
Frances since she was a young girl; she was in fact a favorite niece of Wood and
his wife-almost another daughter. Indeed, one of her periodic visits with the
governor general's family provided the occasion for McCoy to fall in love and to
court her. Thus, marrying Frances in effect formalized what had been heretofore
an unofficial claim to membership in Wood's immediate family. Long McCoy's
mentor, role model, and chief, Leonard Wood became something like McCoy's
father as well. If binding himself more closely to Wood's family gratified McCoy,
Wood no doubt returned the feeling. His own sons, Osborne and Leonard, Jr.,
repeatedly disappointed him. Now the man whom above all others the governor
general would have chosen for his son symbolically became just that.5
The McCoys used their return to the United States as an excuse for a
European honeymoon. In Rome, they visited Fletcher and Summerlin, Family
friends who were both assigned to the American embassy. The couple continued
on to Venice, Florence, and Paris where they stayed with William Phillips and
James Logan. In July, the McCoys finally reached New York. They spent the rest
of the summer calling on relatives, first in Lewistown and then in Newport,
Rhode Island, where Frances's family was living. When McCoy completed his
vacation, he was slated to assume command of an infantry brigade at Fort Sam
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Frances Judson before her marriage: independent, outspoken, and, for McCoy,
irresistible. (Courtesy U.S. Army Military History Institute)

Houston, Texas. Yet, even before leaving for his new assignment, orders from the
War Department diverted him to Washington.6
McCoy had been tapped to serve on the court-martial panel that would try Col.
William Mitchell, an old friend from Pershing's staff in France. Mitchell, of
course, was the great publicist for the concept of air power. Frustrated by the lack
of support for his ideas in the War Department, Mitchell devised a bold plan to
generate interest in his cause. Determined to bring his dispute with official
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Washington before the public, Mitchell called a press conference on September
5, 1925, and read a lengthy statement denouncing the War and Navy departments
for "incompetency, criminal negligence, and almost treasonable administration"
in running their air services. As Mitchell had anticipated, such insubordination
left the War Department with no choice but to bring charges against him. 7 The
court-martial itself, beginning on October 28, greatly inconvenienced McCoy and
his wife. They took up temporary quarters at 1718 H Street and then lived for
awhile with friends assigned to Washington. When "the Mitchell court-martial
began to look like the length of a deep sea cable rather than a piece of string,"
they rented a house on I Street. 8
McCoy approached the trial with ambivalence. On the one hand, he understood and to a degree sympathized with Mitchell's motives. While waiting for the
trial to begin, McCoy predicted to Wood that the Philippines would become a
topic of much discussion in the near future. He went on to remark that he
considered such discussion "good as a matter of education-pretty much like the
air investigation and Billy Mitchell-good for everybody but Billy." 9 With this in
mind, McCoy kept his sense of humor throughout the presentation of the
airman's long, combative defense. Mitchell's attorneys, McCoy admitted, handled the case so adroitly that "to the public, the War Dept. is on trial instead of
the festive Bill." McCoy found himself cast as one of the villains of the piece
while the accused had contrived to become "the town and national hero." Only
the trial's duration evoked any expressions of discontent. "The court-martial
keeps me sitting as I never sat before," he told Cameron Forbes in November.
McCoy complained of feeling "like Mrs. Page's darky 'sometimes setting and
thinking, and sometimes just setting.' And the end is not in sight.'' 10
When the end did come on December 17, the court found the defendent guilty.
McCoy's correspondence contains nothing to suggest that he dissented from the
majority. Indeed, for a man who placed discretion and obedience high on his own
scale of professional traits, it would have been out of character for him to have
done so, whatever his sympathy for Mitchell's views. Yet McCoy valued personal
loyalty as well. Thus, his friendship with Mitchell survived the court-martial
intact. The following spring found Mitchell, since resigned from the service,
enjoying a long visit as McCoy's guest at Fort Sam Houston. (McCoy confided to
Wood that Mitchell had "allowed [that] he never would have had to break the
china had you been in the W[ar] D[epartment].") McCoy later became godfather
for one of Mitchell's children, and at Mitchell's funeral in 1936 he served as a
pallbearer-the only former court member to do so. 11
In early 1926, McCoy assumed command of the Third Infantry Brigade,
Second Division, at Fort Sam Houston. He remained there for more than a year,
until May 1927 when he was reassigned to command the First Artillery Brigade at
Fort Hoyle, Maryland. This return to troop duty provided a quiet interlude in an
otherwise hectic career. Besides troop training and garrison duties, McCoy
supported Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and Citizens' Military
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Training Camp (CMTC) activities and participated in infrequent maneuvers with
the rest of the division. The schedule provided adequate time for leisure, a
situation of which McCoy strongly approved. He told his officers that each of
them "should have some avocation or sideline of interest that will ... distract his
mind occasionally from, and refresh him for, the labors of his chosen profession.''
McCoy insured that those labors would not be excessive. In a memo that captures
the flavor of the army of the 1920s, he directed that "the policy of this brigade
will be so far as possible to leave the afternoons and evenings to the discretion of
the individual officer." The brigade commander set the example in his own
activities. Polishing up his tennis game, McCoy entered the Corps Area Tennis
Tournament and "was too successful for my age and condition," reaching the
semifinals in the singles competition and the finals in the men's doubles.
Evenings were spent with Frances, frequently at the movies. As a result of his
years overseas, McCoy told his family, he was "very much behind on all the
famous pictures" and so was "enjoying even those which seem old to the rest of
you."12
The summer of 1927 reunited McCoy briefly with Leonard Wood when the
governor general returned to the United States. Yet even unmistakable signs
that Wood was ailing did not prepare McCoy for the news of his mentor's death
on August 7. Vacationing in the Adirondacks with Henry Stimson, McCoy
received word that Wood had died on the operating table during a third attempt
to relieve the painful and debilitating effects of a brain tumor. McCoy rushed
back to Washington, took charge of the funeral arrangements, and served as a
pallbearer during the ceremony. Wood's death left McCoy with a sense of
irreplaceable loss. '' I shall always miss him,'' he told Mrs. Wood a year later.
"My whole life and work were wrapped up in him, much of the savor of life has
gone with him." 13
Wood's death set off a flurry of speculation that McCoy might become
governor general. Even before Wood's funeral, the New York Times touted
McCoy as a leading candidate for the job. A bit later, the New York American
reported "a steady stream of letters ... pouring into the White House from all
over the United States and the Philippines" in McCoy's behalf. In the
Philippines, too, McCoy picked up the endorsement of papers such as the
Mindanao Herald, which lauded "his suaveness, his facility for making friends,
his gracious demeanor ... , and the courteous manner with which ... he can
administer a rebuke and make the patient feel like a dog, but like it." McCoy
remained silent as to his own preferences in the matter, promising only that
should an offer from the president materialize, "I shall be ready with a
decision." 14 In all likelihood, McCoy would have accepted an appointment to
serve as governor general. But whatever his final decision might have been, he
never had reason to reveal it. A presidential call for his services did come in the
fall of 1927, but instead of returning McCoy to the Far East, it set him off on a
new tack-to Nicaragua.
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Back in the United States for surgery in 1927, an ailing Wood visits McCoy for the last
time. (Courtesy U.S. Army Military History Institute)

U.S. military involvement in Nicaragua began in 1912 when U.S. Marines landed
in the midst of civil war to restore order and protect American lives and property.
Although the occupation was not intended to be a long one, an American garrison
remained for over a decade, propping up the increasingly unpopular regime that

DiplomatInKhaki

Page 119

06/11/20 3:18 PM

CHAPTER 8

120

had invited the United States to intervene. Once the ill effects of this extended
military presence became evident-particularly its corrosive impact on relations
with the rest of Latin America-Washington committed itself to terminating the
occupation at the first suitable opportunity. When Calvin Coolidge finally
ordered the last troops home in August 1925, Americans believed that their
Central American military ventures had ended once and for all. Such hopes,
however, proved illusory. 15
The stability that permitted the withdrawal collapsed immediately, with civil
war erupting within a month. By March 1926, the Nicaraguan president had
resigned, the vice-president had fled the country, and Emiliano Chamorro, the
unscrupulous but charismatic leader of the Conservative party, had installed
himself as chief executive. The State Department, citing the unconstitutionality
of Chamorro's actions, denied him diplomatic recognition, thereby effectively
declaring open season on the new regime. Internal order-briefly reestablished
by the Conservative strong man-again disintegrated. Although Chamorro
struggled to consolidate his position, in October 1926-bankrupt, harried by a
Liberal party insurgency, and frustrated by American nonrecognition-he
resigned the presidency. Turning to the problem of designating a successor, the
State Department threw its support behind Adolfo Diaz, a pliant Conservative
and former president who had welcomed the intervention of 1912. When
vigorous lobbying in the Nicaraguan Congress secured his election on Armistice
Day of 1926, American recognition followed.
Unfortunately, the ouster of Chamorro did not end the episode. No happier
with the new American-sponsored president than they had been with his
predecessor, the Liberals continued their "revolution" without pause. As Diaz's
position deteriorated in the face of Liberal pressure, the American commitment
to his survival increased. To prevent the outright collapse of the Diaz government, on Christmas Eve of 1926 U.S. Marines began returning to Nicaragua on
an unprecedented scale; by February 1927, the number of American military
personnel stationed in Nicaragua or enroute had swollen to nearly 5,500. 16 On
the surface, this second intervention, following hard on the heels of the previous
year's long-awaited withdrawal, seemed inexplicable. More than mere loyalty to
Diaz had triggered the sudden reversal. Other hemispheric developments
(specifically, the erratic course of the Mexican revolution) altered the State
Department's perception of the real issues being contested in the Nicaraguan
civil war-and of the real contestants.
By 1926, relations with Mexico had fallen to another low, the ostensible bone of
contention being President Plutarco Calles's determination to reclaim Mexican
oil properties controlled by American investors. Yet American concern extended
far beyond simply protecting the holdings of a few Yankee oil barons. Mexican
nationalism potentially threatened American political hegemony, the acceptance
of American economic ground rules, and the universality of the American model
of national development. 17 To a suspicious State Department, Mexican radi-
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calism lurked behind the uprising in Nicaragua. In December 1926, Mexico
audaciously recognized the "government" of former Vice-President Juan B.
Sacasa, the leading Liberal claimant to the Nicaraguan presidency. Accusations
soon followed that Calles was covertly providing the insurgents with arms and
ammunition as well. To officials in Calvin Coolidge's administration, this alleged
support of the revolution in Nicaragua posed a direct challenge to the United
States. Mexico's actions, they argued, transformed Nicaragua into a critical "test
case" of American prestige and influence throughout the Caribbean and hence
required a forceful and determined response. 18
Yet the mere presence of American troops would not suffice to contain this
supposed spread of radicalism. Liberal resistance showed no signs of wilting just
because the marines had landed. Coolidge attempted to forestall a further
widening of American involvement by sending Henry L. Stimson to Managua to
mediate a solution. But the resulting Tipitapa Agreement of May 1927 that
Stimson engineered was only a partial success at best. Although the Liberal
military commander, General Jose M. Moncada, agreed to disarm in exchange for
an American pledge to supervise the 1928 Nicaraguan election, many insurgents
rejected out of hand any settlement underwritten by the Yankees. 19 They vowed
to continue the struggle and rallied to the leadership of a hitherto obscure
Liberal general, Cesar Augusto Sandino. Within weeks, the Nicaraguan countryside was again in turmoil. As the American minister in Managua reported to
the State Department, Sandino "preached communism, Mexican brotherly love
and cooperation, and death to the Americans until the rabble ... joined him in
his plan to massacre Americans .. . and to set up his own government. " 20
Abandoning any pretense of neutrality, the Marine Corps confidently launched
a full-scale pursuit of the remaining rebels. Although ill-equipped and outnumbered, the Sandinistas proved aggravatingly elusive. In classic guerrilla fashion,
they capitalized on their familiarity with the rugged local terrain and on the
sympathy of the Nicaraguan people._ Inaccurate intelligence, a sparse road
network, and dependence on the cumbersome logistic train all conspired to
hamper marine effectiveness. Sandino shrewdly encouraged the Americans to
expend themselves on grueling, futile expeditions into the mountainous interior
and then pestered his exhausted adversaries with hit-and-run ambushes and
raids. In July 1927, a spectacular siege of an isolated marine garrison in the
village of Ocotal convinced many that the struggle in Nicaragua had settled into
a frustrating stalemate. 21
Support for American policy at home, never great, evaporated as the military
failed to make good on its optimistic predictions. By mid-1927, criticism of the
administration-much of it from the president's own party-had become intense.22 Privately, the administration was as unhappy as its detractors. By the end
of 1927, even the most enthusiastic proponent of reintervention recognized the
policy for what it was: a blunder of the first order. Panicked by the phantom of
Mexican radicalism, the United States plunged headlong into a sticky guerrilla
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war that threatened to drag on for months or even years. Diplomatic attempts to
untangle the situation not only failed to resolve the military problem but actually
deepened the American commitment by pledging supervision of the Nicaraguan
election of 1928. The ensuing marine campaign to destroy the Sandinistas failed.
At home, efforts to rally public support misfired completely. Abroad, the
reintervention damaged U.S. diplomatic relations throughout Latin America and
in much of Europe. Noting the gap between his preaching and the marines'
practice, some Europeans even began questioning the seriousness of Secretary of
State Frank B. Kellogg's advocacy of a worldwide treaty to outlaw war. 23 Thus, an
early end to the American presence became a matter of vital importance. The
administration disagreed with its critics only on the manner in which the
withdrawal should be accomplished. The wreckage of the previous year notwithstanding, any disengagement needed to take place amidst the trappings of
political and diplomatic success. Neither the Republican party nor the United
States could tolerate even the suggestion of humiliation. Acting on Stimson's
advice, President Coolidge turned to McCoy to salvage his Nicaraguan policy.
The mission to Nicaragua inaugurated a new phase in McCoy's career as a
military diplomatist. Coming into his own as heir to Leonard Wood, he no longer
would stand off-stage as someone else's aide, assistant, or chief of staff.
Henceforth McCoy would gain diplomatic employment as a principal in his own
right. For McCoy personally, however, growing prominence provided less
gratification than did the opportunity to carry on his mentor's work. As he
confessed to a friend, "General Wood's death has distressed and shocked me
even more than I would imagine." As a device to help McCoy overcome his sense
of loss, the timing of the Nicaraguan mission was fortuitous. That the enterprise
itself would surely have won Wood's endorsement was a source of added
consolation. 24
On June 26, 1927, Kellogg handed McCoy his commission as personal
representative of the president. Formally, his mission was simply to carry out the
promise made by Stimson a month earlier to supervise the Nicaraguan
presidential election of 1928, thereby expediting the withdrawal of American
forces. Such a withdrawal required that McCoy first restore domestic harmony,
reduce the level of political corruption, and administer an election of such
procedural correctness as to gain the support of Nicaraguans of all political
persuasions. In addition, McCoy was to advise the American government on
matters pertaining to Nicaragua and to "do everything possible to assist the
Nicaraguan Government in electoral and military matters." 25
The administration's commitment to the mission's overt purpose was not
insincere. Credible evidence of evenhandedness would restore some luster to the
tarnished American image as sponsor of democracy in Latin America and, by
mollifying domestic critics, might prevent Nicaragua from being a source of
further Republican distress. Yet, beyond staging a graceful exit for U.S.
occupation forces, the Coolidge administration also viewed the mission as a
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vehicle for achieving a more substantial goal, namely, upholding American regional
hegemony. Here, success hinged on different requirements: the liquidation of
Sandino, a symbol and potential model for other anti-American movements in the
region; installation of a pro-American regime; and the creation of instruments of
power capable of sustaining that regime after the marines departed.
After a month spent preparing for his assignment, McCoy departed New York
on August 10 to assess the situation in Nicaragua at first hand. Arriving in
Managua on August 27, McCoy _spent the following month investigating local
conditions. To his eyes, Nicaragua recalled "Santiago de Cuba in '98 and '99."
Although a backward country, it had "stirring possibilities if we can help out for
some time." Deprived of American support, he predicted that Nicaragua would
"go forward like a crab." With the countryside in disarray due to continuing
attacks by Sandino and other bands of chronic outlaws and violent political
partisanship rife among the people, restoring order and preventing renewed
flare-ups of political violence would demand a firm hand. In an interim report,
McCoy cautioned Kellogg to defer plans to reduce the marine garrison and urged
the administration to augment Nicaragua's embryonic national police force-the
Guardia Nacional-with more American officers and increased financial aid. 26
Returning to Washington in October to report on his findings, McCoy began
assembling a staff, for the most part choosing old army acquaintances, with "a
few civilians to take the blight of militarism off the affair. " 27 At the same time, he
mapped out his overall strategy. Guaranteeing an orderly campaign with an
agreeable outcome required that McCoy exercise absolute control over Nicaragua's electoral machinery. Armed with such authority, he could block the
candidacy of any Nicaraguan unacceptable to the United States and discredit
political elements inclined to question the election's legitimacy. In addition,
convincing American guarantees of the election's honesty would conceivably
persuade the losing side to accept the outcome of what had been presumably a
fair fight. Mindful of these requirements, McCoy and Harold W. Dodds, a
political scientist who served as his chief technical adviser, soon drafted an
election law defining the prerogatives of the electoral mission. This law,
according to Kellogg, was the sine qua non of the American effort. It created, as
the New York Times reported, "an American dictatorship over the coming
elections," giving McCoy, as president of the National Electoral Board, virtually
unlimited authority. 28
Developments in Managua during McCoy's absence, however, threatened the
mission's success virtually before it began. As soon as the United States
committed itself to supervising the elections, Emiliano Chamorro petitioned the
State Department to permit him to run for president. His plea met with little
sympathy. Because of Chamorro's systematic oppression of political enemies in
the past, the Liberal party would never accept him as president. Given that his
election in 1928 would be a disaster, in all likelihood rekindling the civil war, the
State Department staunchly opposed his candidacy.29 Although informed of this
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verdict in late October, Chamorro refused to accept it. Hoping to extort a change
in the American attitude toward him, he mobilized his influence within the
Conservative party to bottle up the American-designed election law (la ley
McCoy) in the Nicaraguan Congress. Simultaneously, he began undermining
Diaz's position by criticizing the president's submissiveness to American
demands. Deprived of la ley McCoy and the incumbent president's cooperation,
McCoy's mission would be seriously jeopardized.
By mid-January 1928, as McCoy again sailed from New York, Chamorro's
intrigues culminated in a full-fledged crisis. La ley McCoy passed the Nicaraguan
Senate but appeared irretrievably stalled in the Chamber of Deputies. Caught
between Chamorro's insistent attacks and pressure from the American legation,
Diaz announced his intention to resign. Apprised of this news during a layover in
Panama, McCoy cabled Dana G. Munro, the charge in Managua, to do whatever
was necessary to "prevent or retard" the resignation of the president. 30 He then
scrapped his own itinerary and seized upon the fastest available transportation, a
navy ammunition ship, to hasten his arrival in Nicaragua.
McCoy reached Managua on January 22 and plunged into a series of
conferences with Diaz, Moncada, and Chamorro. For the moment at least, Munro
had allayed the president's anxieties. Expressing his absolute confidence in Diaz,
McCoy bolstered the wavering president's commitment to remain in office.
Efforts to persuade Chamorro to allow passage of la ley McCoy proved less
successful. Chamorro remained adamant in his opposition, arguing that it was
unconstitutional to surrender control of Nicaragua's internal affairs to a
foreigner. The Nicaraguan's pose as an "apostle of the constitution" struck
McCoy as ludicrous. The real motive behind the former dictator's ploy was
unvarnished personal ambition. Whatever his purpose, such obstructionism irked
McCoy: "My carefully laid plans are all awry," he grumbled privately. 31
The stumbling block of greatest immediate concern was the Nicaraguan
Congress's adjournment, scheduled for March 13. Failure to gain favorable
congressional action by that date would require drastic measures to enact la ley
McCoy. Unfortunately, the prospects for weakening Chamorro's grip on the
legislature were poor unless pressure could be brought to bear on obstructive
deputies. McCoy's hopes that Diaz would apply that pressure on his Conservative
colleagues were disappointed. Although Diaz was outwardly cooperative, McCoy
cabled Kellogg, the president's real attitude remained open to question.
Certainly, he was doing less than his utmost to break the congressional log jam. 32
As adjournment neared, McCoy himself began twisting the arms of recalcitrant
Conservative deputies. The manner in which he did so, however, suggests that he
had already reconciled himself to proceeding without congressional consent.
Meeting with groups of Chamorrista deputies on March 12, McCoy demanded a
yes or no vote on the measure. Yet whether or not the law was enacted, he warned,
the United States had no intention of reneging on its commitment to supervise
the election. 33
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Adolfo Dfaz, president of Nicaragua, 1928 (left). His timid look parallels his approach
to matters of policy. Emiliano Chamorro, 1928 (right): a shrewd and conniving
adversary. (Courtesy National Archives)

Chamorro, in fact, overestimated the importance that the Americans attributed
to having Nicaraguan legislators enact la ley McCoy. Although congressional
endorsement would lend legitimacy to the electoral mission, such legal niceties
were not essential to its success. Above all, the State Department and McCoy as
its chief agent were determined to adhere to the original American planwithout Chamorro for certain, and without the Nicaraguan Congress if necessary.
Already in mid-February, Munro was insisting that the United States inform the
Nicaraguan Congress "very strongly and very specifically that we are going to go
ahead with or without a law." The State Department concurred, stating that the
United States would not be thwarted "by any man or group of men in Nicaragua
playing the game of party politics with purely selfish motives." If the Nicaraguan
Congress refused to act, McCoy could persuade Diaz "to arrogate to himself
practically dictatorial powers," implementing la ley McCoy by executive decree.
Failing that, "the only remaining course would be for the United States to take
matters into its own hands and give General McCoy full powers. " 34
On March 13, McCoy got his vote. The lower house decisively rejected the
American election law and adjourned shortly thereafter. As elated Chamorristas
converged on Managua's cathedral and rang the bells, tolling in honor of the
death of McCoy's law, the man after whom the measure was named began
prodding Diaz to enact the election law on his own authority. Although admitting
that the legality of such a decree might be questioned, McCoy maintained that
its "strictly legal status" was of "distinctly secondary importance." After all,
the Nicaraguan constitution, representing "abstract statements of political
theory rather than practical and effective guides for governmental action," was
hardly sacrosanct. And although executive decrees were "not in accord with
Anglo-American custom," they had long been common features of Latin
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American politics. More to the point, la ley McCoy was critical to the electoral
mission's success, and implementation by presidential order was preferable to
the only other practical course, namely, for McCoy to issue the law on his own
authority. 35 Whatever the merits of McCoy's arguments, Diaz quickly assented, if
only to avoid having the Americans arbitrarily seize complete control of the
country-as they were clearly prepared to do.36 A member of McCoy's staff
drafted the proclamation, and, after some minor haggling, Diaz enacted it on
March 21, 1928. 37
The decree vested authority for supervising the 1928 election in a National
Electoral Board. It recognized McCoy as president of the board and Ramon
Castillo and Enoc Aguado, representing the two major parties, as members. In
practice, the Nicaraguai;is played a largely decorative role: The board could not
meet without the president in attendance; no action by the board was valid
without his concurrence; and in an emergency-as defined by the board's
president-he could act alone to take whatever actions he deemed "indispensable to the conduct of a free and fair election." The decree also gaye McCoy
authority over the Guardia Nacional. 38
Having, in the words of the Washington Herald, "been made the Mussolini of
Nicaragua," McCoy at last possessed the authority to get on with the business at
hand. 39 The one problem demanding attention above all others was Sandino. By
the spring of 1928, the rebel leader had attained international stature, with an
especially warm following among critics of American policy in the United States.
Support for Sandino reached even the floor of the U.S. Senate, where Burton K.
Wheeler of Montana applauded the Nicaraguan's struggle for "the same
principles of liberty and free government for which our forefathers fought in
1776. " 40 Admiration for Sandino grew the longer he mocked the military' s
claims that his demise was imminent.
Members of the electoral mission in Nicaragua did not share that admiration.
According to Capt. Matthew B. Ridgway, one of McCoy's trusted subordinates,
exposure to Mexican radicalism had infected Sandino with "the bolshevism that
aims at [the] brotherhood of all men and control by the present laborers." Having
absorbed a "fanaticism that wants to make the world over in a day by destroying
all that opposes it," the guerrilla leader was "eager to grasp the opportunity to
establish bolshevism in Nicaragua." Yet, as McCoy emphasized, it was not
ideology alone that made Sandino the object of concern, but his emergence as
"the symbol of opposition to United States policy throughout Latin America and
at home, a useful figure to those who desire to attack us." For those inveighing
against American domination of the Caribbean, Sandino was the subversive
archetype of the patriot fighting for his native land against the United States as
oppressor. 41
On March 3, Kellogg requested McCoy's personal assessment of the military
situation in Nicaragua. The secretary of state voiced the fear that the insurgency
would go on indefinitely with a continuing sacrifice of American lives and
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without concrete results. The optimistic reports regularly issuing from the
Navy Department satisfied him no more than they did the administration's
critics. "People cannot understand why the job cannot be done," he complained, "and frankly I do not understand myself." 42 McCoy shared Kellogg's
concern about the lack of progress being made against Sandino. Yet he was
sensitive to the "extreme delicacy" of his position in regard to strictly military
measures-a polite way of saying that the marines would resent outsiders
prying into their affairs. 43 Although mindful of the need to reinvigorate the
sagging American military effort, McCoy had waited for a suitable opportunity-one such as Kellogg's query provided. Not surprisingly, within fortyeight hours, he cabled a detailed reply.
In general, McCoy reported, the military outlook was dismal. Recent successes
had so enhanced Sandino's prestige that he threatened to "greatly embarrass our
electoral program." Yet the Sandinista problem, he admitted, posed more than
ordinary difficulties. The advantages that Sandino enjoyed were not to be
underestimated: superior mobility, knowledge of the local terrain and language,
genuine popular support, and the ability to fight largely at times and places of his
own selection. Nevertheless, McCoy found severe deficiencies in the marines'
performance, particularly their inability to collect accurate intelligence and their
"failure to maintain continuous contact with Sandino forces once they have been
located." The root of the problem, in McCoy's view, was leadership, especially the
lackluster performance of the marine commander, Brig. Gen. Logan Feland. 44
In the weeks following this report, McCoy began concerning himself more
directly with marine operations. The weekly conferences of senior officials over
which he presided at the American legation became increasingly acrimonious
whenever military issues arose. Aceording to Rear Adm. David F. Sellers,
Feland's immediate superior as commander of the Special Service Squadron
offshore, McCoy galled the marine commander with his searching inquiries about
what the marines were doing or intended to do about Sandino. Sellers himself,
already resentful that a one-star general should be his temporary superior,
complained loudly when McCoy assigned his principal deputy, Col. Frank Le Jau
Parker, to investigate marine operations for the State Department. That an army
colonel should be reporting on the command of a rear admiral was almost
unbearable. 45
Yet polite efforts to spur Feland and Sellers had no noticeable effect. In a letter
to Stimson in April, McCoy complained that "Sandino still flies around like a
mosquito .... There seems to be no chance of getting him except by a stroke of
good luck.'' Exasperated, McCoy provoked a showdown at a legation conference
on April 18. "Where is Sandino?" the captor of Datto Ali demanded of Feland.
"You don't know. Your intelligence service is a failure and we stand just where
we did six months ago." He accused Feland of having lost touch with the
situation by remaining in Managua instead of taking to the field. Finally, he
delivered his ultimatum. "I am the Special Representative of the President," he
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Rear Adm. David F. Sellers, USN (on left), and Brig. Gen. Logan Feland, USMC, in
Nicaragua, 1928. Duty there was rarely amusing. (Courtesy National Archives)

reminded the marine commander. "If you haven't gotten Sandino in a month from
now . .. you will have failed and I shall so report to the State Department." 46
The shock waves of this encounter, passing through Sellers back to the chief of
naval operations, did little to endear McCoy to the Navy Department. Whether or
not the attempt to intimidate Feland was itself beneficial beyond establishing the
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primacy of McCoy's own authority, the overall American military effort did
improve thereafter. For one thing, McCoy asked for and received reinforcements,
1,000 more marines in mid-March and an equal number in June. Employing
these forces with greater aggressiveness, the American command stepped up the
pressure on Sandino, soon forcing him to seek refuge outside Nicaragua. 47
When aerial reconnaissance into neighboring Honduras located a concentration of Sandinistas, apparently secure in the belief that they were beyond
American reach, McCoy asked the American minister in Tegucigalpa, George T.
Summerlin, to secure permission for the marines to strike across the border.
Summerlin was unresponsive-he had not "really grapsed [sic] that this was our
war in Nicaragua and that getting Sandino was a matter of vital importance" -so
McCoy dispatched Munro to confer with the Honduran leaders. Munro quickly
cajoled President Miguel Paz Barona into permitting American forces to pursue
Sandino into Honduras and even to attack him from the air- "with the
understanding however that the matter be kept absolutely quiet." Not even the
Honduran foreign minister was informed. 48 The marines' ability to disregard this
international boundary undoubtedly made it more difficult for Sandino to
maintain a secure base from which to launch attacks back into Nicaragua.
As part of this revitalized campaign against Sandino, McCoy accelerated the
development of the Guardia Nacional. The State Department had emphasized
that the Guardia was "the most vital feature of the entire [American] program"
because it would constitute "the cornerstone of stability for the whole country
long after the election. " 49 During the period of the electoral mission, the
Guardia tripled in size and made considerable strides toward improved training
and effectiveness. Although McCoy gave Feland operational control of elements
pursuing Sandino in the field, he did not surrender his overall responsibility for
the Guardia. Through its jefe director, Brig. Gen. Elias R. Beadle, he took daily
interest in its activities and progress. Whereas Feland viewed the Guardia as a
conventional military force that should help the marines by taking a more active
and larger part of the campaign against Sandino, McCoy envisioned it primarily
as a constabulary devoted to preserving order and enforcing the law. Realistically, the Guardia lacked the competence to render more than marginal
assistance against Sandino. With an eye on the election, moreover, McCoy was
anxious to replace the local police, who "have been used as an instrument of
oppression, a source of graft, and often a cause of disorder," with a national
police force free of corruption. To make the American presence less intrusive,
meanwhile, the marines would refrain from the "exercise [of] civil police
functions if it can be avoided." In short, McCoy believed that "it was much more
important for the success of the elections, to have the guardia police the cities,
small villages, and districts in which the elections were actually taking place,
leaving to the marines the job of keeping Sandino covered." 50 Beadle agreed
with McCoy. Consequently, the Guardia adhered to the orientation that they,
rather than Feland, thought appropriate. The improvement in police and military
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capabilities orchestrated by McCoy paid dividends. During the summer of 1928,
over 1,600 guerrillas surrendered. By autumn, the level of Sandinista activity had
fallen dramatically. Marine and Guardia casualties declined. By late October,
McCoy could claim that Sandino had been effectively eliminated as a factor in the
election. 51 And yet-much to McCoy's annoyance-Sandino himself eluded
capture.
Hopeful that the threat posed by Sandino was being reduced, McCoy returned
to Washington in May for consultations. The purpose of his visit was twofold. On
the one hand, it provided an opportunity to neutralize domestic opponents of the
intervention who remained wary of the McCoy mission. Back in the capital,
McCoy participated in a series of briefings for journalists, congressmen, and
prominent businessmen. 52 Such proselytizing formed only a part of a larger
public relations offensive. To the administration, mustering support for the
electoral mission was no small matter. McCoy later recalled that, in first sending
him to Managua, Coolidge had been "very definite in directing me to change the
public opinion" regarding Nicaragua. Stimson believed that the best way to
convert the administration's critics was to "invite the sunlight of publicity as an
antiseptic [to] all this backdoor gossip" about the intervention. He even proposed
that representatives from the Pan-American Conference, then meeting in Havana,
be invited to observe the election. But McCoy demurred. Outsiders would be
receptive to anti-American propaganda, he argued. Their mere presence "would
probably result in complicating very seriously our supervision. " 53
McCoy was less interested in inviting outside scrutiny than in reshaping the
image of the American role in Nicaragua that was being projected back to the
United States. His intention was to manage carefully the type of information
provided for public consumption. As a first step toward properly informing the
public back home, he added to his staff a full-time public relations adviser, Walter
Wilgus, an old friend and former editor of the Manila Times. Next, McCoy, in an
effort to gain the support of key opinion makers, bombarded a long list of
prominent Americans with carefully constructed explanations of what his mission
was doing and why. The targets of the campaign included such diverse figures as
Walter Lippmann, Frank Knox, Felix Frankfurter, William Howard Taft, and the
president of Standard Oil of New York. The flattering attention that McCoy paid
these men, many of them acquaintances, proved surprisingly effective. "There
was gladness when I read that you were put in charge of America's honor and
good sense in Nicaragua," wrote Frankfurter in reply, adding that "it seemed
like an old family party that you should succeed Stimson in the task." And the
old progressive Newton D. Baker responded: "I do not know where the white
man's burden begins and ends and I have no clear conviction as to whether we
have a manifest destiny in the election you are supervising ... but I dismiss all
these questions because you are there." 54 Had the marines continued to sustain a
high level of casualties, of course, public relations techniques alone would have
been ineffective. Combined with improved conditions in the field, however, they
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helped defuse much of the unfavorable attention Nicaragua aroused throughout
the previous year. By the fall of 1928, success was virtually complete: Americans
had lost interest in Nicaraguan politics-a situation most gratifying to a
Republican party preparing for a presidential election.
The second purpose of McCoy's Washington visit was to discuss the steps to be
taken after the election to insure a stable pro-American Nicaragua. McCoy
himself urged that the United States " guard against the unduly optimistic belief
that a fair election is a panacea for Nicaragua's troubles." Rather, he said, "the
election itself is but one detail of the country's general problem." Having seen
firsthand in Nicaragua the same awful backwardness that he had encountered in
Cuba and elsewhere, McCoy recognized that arranging an orderly political
succession of itself would accomplish little. He went on to outline an ambitious
program of internal development reminiscent of the reforms sponsored by
American proconsuls in the Philippines and Cuba in years past. To build a stable
and progressive Nicaragua, he called for "the preservation of order, the
development of communications, ... the elimination of widespread corruption
of the government, the improvement of health conditions and the extension and
modernization of schools." 55
Implementing such a reform package would require money-inevitably, American money. To McCoy and most other American officials in Managua, a made-toorder vehicle for generating that money already existed in the Cumberland Plan, a
State Department-sponsored survey of Nicaragua whose outlines were familiar
through much of the Caribbean. In return for a sizable loan, an Americancontrolled commission would direct key areas of the Nicaraguan economycustoms, currency, governmental expenditures-creating a new climate of expansion, with political order as a by-product. McCoy argued for the plan to both
Kellogg and "the terrible Wall Street bankers who are strangling poor Nicaragua." The secretary of state, however, feared that the proposal would provide a
powerful weapon to critics who were charging that Americans were "taking
advantage of a so-called military occupation of Nicaragua to impose upon it a
permanent economic domination." When he refused to associate the American
government with the loan, Wall Street backed away from the proposal. The demise
of the Cumberland Plan, despite McCoy's assertions of its importance, emphasizes
Kellogg's reluctance to extend American involvement in Nicaragua beyond the life
of the electoral mission. Kellogg's timidity, contrasting sharply with his earlier
rashness, frustrated McCoy, who saw himself charged with establishing a new order
in Nicaragua while denied the wherewithal to do so. 56
Although disappointed by the lack of enthusiasm for Nicaraguan development,
McCoy could spare little time worrying about the setback. In Managua, further
political problems awaited his return. An election providing a satisfactory
outcome to the United States required from the outset two "acceptable"
candidates. The identity of the Liberal nominee was a foregone conclusion: The
accommodating General Moncada received his party's endorsement even before
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the decree of la ley McCoy. Finding an equally agreeable leader for the
Conservative ticket proved more difficult. Chamorro still refused to count himself
out.
As Munro noted, Chamorro remained still the real leader of the Conservatives, exercising full control of the official party machinery. 57 The Nicaraguan
made no secret of his intention to parlay this influence into the nomination of a
Conservative candidate personally loyal to him. Diaz, for once willing to stand
up to Chamorro, was equally determined that as president he should designate
the party's nominee. When attempts to nominate a candidate in May 1928
resulted in a deadlocked convention, the party divided into two factions and
rump sessions nominated separate tickets. Each then petitioned the National
Electoral Board for recognition as sole legitimate representative of the
Conservative party.
At about the same time, two other factions, identified with neither traditional
party, began to coalesce, insisting that a free and fair election would grant them a
place on the ballot in November. These new splinter parties, called LiberalRepublican and Conservative-Republican, along with the split in the Conservative party, raised the possibility that no candidate would receive an absolute
majority of the vote, thereby throwing the contest into the Nicaraguan Congress
beyond McCoy's control. It was incumbent upon the National Electoral Board,
therefore, to thin out the suddenly crowded ranks of Nicaraguan party politics.
Later McCoy would recall that he had sidestepped the recognition of any third
party. In fact, his action was much more direct. Ignoring existing Nicaraguan
statutes that would have recognized the two new splinter parties, McCoy denied
their viability, flatly declaring in each instance that no bona fide party existed. 58
There would be no new parties in the 1928 election.
The problem posed by the split in the Conservative party was less easily solved.
Recognition of a Conservative representative was necessary to avoid the farce of
a noncompetitive election. Nonetheless, the prospect of choosing between the
Conservative claimants based strictly upon the credentials that each could muster
was an unattractive one. A decision made in strict accordance with a "technical
legal determination of the issues," Parker told McCoy, would oblige the board to
side with that faction whose actual head had openly stated his purpose of
obstructing the electoral plan-Chamorro. Such a rebuff to President Diaz
''might result in the withdrawal of his financial and other cooperation and even
in his resignation." On the other hand, to ignore the Chamorristas would expose
American claims of impartiality as hypocritical. 59
Although McCoy disavowed any intention of acting privately as an arbiter to
resolve the Conservative squabble, he had no intention of remaining passive. On
July 23, McCoy opened a session of the board by reading a draft resolution
"giving [the] Conservative Party til 25 July at noon to get together." Beyond that
deadline, the board would refuse to consider the application of any additional
candidates. Failure to agree on a unified ticket, in other words, would exclude the
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Conservative party from the election altogether. Castillo, the board's Conservative member, stated his opposition to the proposal in the strongest terms. The
effect of its passage "would be liquidation of [the] Conservative Party and his
own resignation." Chamorro, he insisted, was the sole obstacle to party unity:
"Had it not been for him, an agreement already would have been made." To
permit a final attempt to resolve the situation, McCoy temporarily tabled his
resolution, providing Castillo with a copy for Chamorro "in order to make him
realize what will happen unless action is taken soon to get [the] party together. " 60
Armed with this ultimatum, Castillo brought his party to heel. McCoy, he
warned, was prepared to declare that "the historic Conservative party had ceased
to exist.'' Facing the prospect of political extinction and lacking the nerve to call
McCoy's bluff, the party leadership capitulated. Both factions abandoned their
candidates and, on July 27, nominated a compromise figure, Adolfo Benard,
acceptable not only to Chamorro and Diaz but to the United States as well.
McCoy had forced the Conservative party to heal its split, reported the New York
Times. 61 The assessment was a fair one. His stratagem secured the party's
participation in the election while avoiding the pitfalls of either recognizing
Chamorro or disaffecting Diaz.
By August 1928, McCoy could finally turn his attention to the details of voter
registration and the actual balloting. To insure order at the polls and minimize
procedural irregularities, McCoy intended to saturate Nicaragua's electoral
machinery with Americans. Each of Nicaragua's thirteen departments received
its own electoral board, headed with one exception by U.S. Army officers.
Grouped under each department were district boards for each of the 352
precincts-enough, remarked McCoy, that "no blooming native will have far to
go to vote." 62 American military personnel headed these boards as well. Voter
registration, scheduled for five days in late September and early October,
provided the first test of the American scheme. The outcome was encouraging.
Only two incidents of violence marred the otherwise uneventful period. In all,
some 150,000 Nicaraguans registered, 25 percent above the 1924 totals; the
increase persuaded some observers that many would-be voters had been recorded
on the rolls more than once. McCoy defended the totals as accurate and credited
the increase to the success of marine and Guardia efforts to protect citizens from
intimidation by their political opponents.63
The election on November 4 went even more smoothly. As during the
registration period, marine ground and air units deterred any intrusion by
Sandino. To counter expected allegations of an inflated final tally, McCoy devised
a method of discouraging "repeaters." Before casting his ballot, each voter
dipped his thumb into Mercurochrome-a gimmick sufficiently novel to attract
favorable editorial notice. Predictions of widespread violence on election day
proved completely unfounded. An obviously pleased McCoy informed Kellogg
that "the only case of disorder reported [was] ... the death of a steer which ran
amuck ... and was shot by a marine"-an incident culminating in nothing more
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American marines load out to supervise the election of a Nicaraguan president, 1928.
(Courtesy National Archives)

ominous than an impromptu barbecue. 64 The large turnout-88 percent of those
registered-resulted in an unequivocal Liberal victory. More important, the
defeated Conservatives professed their willingness to abide by this outcome. A
Conservative spokesman, calling the election both fair and honorable, laconically
explained the results with the simple admission that "our party lost." Indeed,
both parties were so pleased with the supervision of the campaign that, even
before election day, Moncada and Benard publicly called upon the Americans to
supervise succeeding presidential contests.65
To most observers; the mission achieved an impressive success. With few
exceptions, the press enthusiastically commended the U.S. supervision and
especially the role played by McCoy. But, even in the midst of continuing
accolades-the Managua city council entertained a resolution to erect a statue of
McCoy in the city plaza-unresolved questions began to intrude. 66 The overt
premise of American strategy had been that supervision of an "honest" election
would allow the United States to pull out. Although McCoy delivered that
election, he recognized that little of substance had changed. "This election is a
good step in the right direction," he told Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., "but .. . it is
neither the first nor the last"; "until we ... take some permanent steps to
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establish peace and order," he added, "we have not finished the job. " 67 Yet any
serious attempt to address the fundamental problems that perennially convulsed
Nicaragua (and tangentially raised doubts about the effectiveness of American
power) would require a prolonged presence of the very type that McCoy had been
commissioned to avert. Not surprisingly, McCoy's superiors showed little interest
in his proposals for a sustained commitment to Nicaraguan development. They
refused to see Nicaragua as a latter-day Cuba, with McCoy in the role of Leonard
Wood.
Nonetheless, his awareness of the mission's cosmetic accomplishments and of
the limited headway made toward achieving its larger goals nagged at McCoy.
What nagged above all was the knowledge that however reduced the scope of the
Sandinista movement, McCoy's efforts to destroy the insurgency and Sandino
himself had failed. "Strictly speaking," McCoy acknowledged after the elections,
"the obligations of the United States have been carried out." But a second
implicit requirement-the elimination of Sandino and other bandit leaders-was
essential to any stable peace in Nicaragua. 68 That obligation remained all too
clearly unfulfilled. In an angry encounter with Feland and Sellers, McCoy
betrayed his obsession with Sandino. Shortly after the election, the naval and
marine commanders drafted a dispatch to the Navy Department recommending
an immediate reduction of American forces in Nicaragua. Given the election's
ostensible success, the step seemed logical enough. But the proposal infuriated
McCoy. After reading the dispatch, he "threw it on the table and stated
emphatically that he did not agree at all." Then, according to Sellers, McCoy
"started on a tirade." The proposed reduction showed once again that the navy
and marines had never fully grasped the situation in Nicaragua. McCoy
personally had never had the slightest concern over his ability to hold a
successful election. The principal problem, he said, had been to catch Sandino,
who had successfully defied the authority of the United States. Indeed, "until
Sandino . .. had been killed, captured, or run out of the country the Marines had
signally failed in their mission." Sandino's forced inactivity of recent months was
not enough. "All of the armed forces of the U.S. in Nic[aragua) have been
organized into an expeditionary force with the announced purpose of getting
Sandino." Mere survival against such an onslaught evoked plaudits throughout
Latin America. 69
McCoy was convinced that a premature troop withdrawal would jeopardize the
meager progress toward stability that his mission had achieved. On November 14,
he cabled Kellogg to urge that the marines remain "at full strength . .. until
Sandino and the major armed groups of bandits have been eliminated or the
Guardia [is) sufficiently developed to handle the situation." The next months
would be "critical with regard to our friendly efforts here," he emphasized. "Any
changes ... should be made with great caution." 70 By calling for the retention of
American troops in Nicaragua, McCoy tacitly conceded his mission's failure. He
had been unable to demonstrate the futility of challenging the United
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Our man in Managua, 1928: Sandino eluded his grasp, and Washington rejected his
strategy. (Courtesy National Archives)
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States in Central America. Nonetheless, as McCoy embarked for home in midDecember 1928, few recognized the limited nature of the mission's accomplishments. Observers in the United States for whom the election of a Nicaraguan
president without bloodshed seemed success enough gave the returning emissary
an impressive reception. Touting McCoy to succeed Stimson as Philippine
governor general, the New York Times bestowed on the general its supreme
absolution, declaring him "free from the characteristics which are usually held to
the disadvantage of army officers in civilian posts. " 71 More substantively, due
largely to his services in Nicaragua, McCoy was promoted to major general and
became the first American officer to receive a second award of the Distinguished
Service Medal.
Such laurels notwithstanding, Sandino had bested McCoy. He had set out to
wreck the American plan for the election of 1928. In the end, because the
insurgent remained at large, McCoy felt compelled to ask the administration to
scrap its hopes for disengaging from Nicaragua as soon as the balloting was
complete. However wary of the sweeping commitment implicit in McCoy's
admonition about Sandino, the new administration of Herbert Hoover could not
ignore his warning altogether. Although the strength of the marine brigade
gradually declined during 1929, substantial forces remained. By January 1931,
the American garrison had stabilized at approximately 1,400 marines. For the
United States, this middle course produced the worst of both worlds: an
occupation force too feeble to deal with a resurgent Sandino but large enough to
insure that Nicaragua remained an embarrassment. 72 Thus, despite its trappings
of success, the McCoy mission was doubly disappointing. It failed either to
demonstrate beyond question the strength of American dominion or to terminate
decisively an intervention that virtually everyone conceded had been a mistake in
the first place. For the United States, the legacy of the mission was merely to
prolong an error. For Nicaragua, the consequences would be tragic: The
American-created Guardia ultimately became an instrument of oppression and
the base of power for the Somoza tyranny.
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Within days of McCoy's return from Nicaragua, the State Department drafted
him for yet another mission. This time the problem concerned fears that a
dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Chaco Boreal region would soon
lead to war. The episode is worth examining, not only because it further
illustrates the military's role in foreign policy, but also because it outlines the
geographic limits of American hegemony in Latin America. Washington's
reaction to the Chaco question differed markedly from its response to Nicaraguan unrest the previous year. That difference defines in a rough way the State
Department's views on what was and was not important in the western
hemisphere.
Equivalent in size to the state of North Dakota, the Chaco Boreal was a
parched and largely unsettled region wedged between four republics of lower
South America. Its inhospitable character may account for the lack of interest
that Argentina and Brazil showed in the area. The other two contiguous nations,
Bolivia and Paraguay, were too poor to disdain even such a dubious treasure.
Each of them had asserted claims to the Chaco since the collapse of Spain's empire
a century before. Developments in the early twentieth century-including reports
of oil deposits in the Chaco, Bolivia's need for an outlet to the sea, and rising
national chauvinism-bred a mutual determination to resolve the issue once and
for all. By the 1920s, this determination had resulted in an arms build-up, the
planting of rival occupation forces, and, ultimately, open hostilities. On December
5, 1928, Paraguayan forces overran the small Bolivian installation of Vanguardia,
killing or capturing numerous members of the garrison and putting the rest to
flight. Bolivia retaliated by attacking two of Paraguay's outposts. Amid a clamor for
revenge and the redemption of national honor, the two governments severed
diplomatic relations. By the end of December, they stood on the brink of war.1
138
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That same month, coincidentally, the International Conference of American
States on Conciliation and Arbitration convened in Washington under the
auspices of the United States. All of the hemisphere's republics except Argentina
sent representatives. With the objective of adding substance to the idea of PanAmericanism, this gathering, with Secretary Kellogg as chairman, sought to
devise mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of hemispheric conflicts. This
effort produced two agreements. The first called for the submission of interAmerican disputes to commissons of inquiry and conciliation. The second treaty
required signatories · to submit disagreements of a juridical nature to binding
arbitration. Of course, subsequent application alone would determine the
practical value of such accords, if any. Recognizing the skirmishing between two
of its conferees as an opportunity to validate the conference's work, Kellogg
called for an investigation into the Chaco affair. 2 His initiative gave birth on
Janaury 3, 1929, to a protocol creating the Commission of Inquiry and
Conciliation, Bolivia and Paraguay. Mexico, Cuba, Uruguay, Colombia, and the
United States-collectively known as the "neutrals" -each provided a delegate
to this body. Both contending parties, meanwhile, were entitled to two representatives. The commission's charter assigned it ambitious goals while severely
restricting its prerogatives. On the one hand, the commission was to investigate
the incident of December 1928, settle the incident amicably, and thus restore the
conditions that existed prior to the outbreak of fighting. On the other hand, the
commission would expire six months after it first convened, regardless of the
situation existing at the time. The charter also forbade the commission to address
the underlying territorial dispute regarding ownership of the Chaco. Worst of all,
in McCoy's view, the commission could act only by unanimous vote, a stipulation
that, combined with the presence of both protagonists as voting members,
"almost wrecked the Commission's work." 3
Fresh from Nicaragua and awaiting reassignment, McCoy seemed well suited
to serve as the American delegate. Personally, he preferred to return to military
duties, but when Kellogg asked him on January 5 to accept the assignment,
McCoy dutifully agreed. Though the State Department nominated McCoy to
serve on the commission, the panel's status as an international body meant that
the American delegate operated "entirely at liberty and unhampered by
instructions." In practice, however, McCoy enjoyed less freedom of action than
his nominal status implied. As in Nicaragua, his real role was to serve as an agent
rather than a maker of foreign policy. Toward this end, he kept the State
Department regularly informed about the commission's progress, a habit that
became all the more natural once his friend Stimson became secretary of state in
the incoming Hoover administration. More importantly, McCoy sought to
coordinate the commission's work with the broader outlines of American policy. 4
Shaping the character of policy toward the hemisphere's southern cone was the
scantiness of perceived American interests there. In contrast to the Caribbean,
where vital interests produced a policy of uncompromising domination, the
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importance of southern Latin America was slight. American interests in the
Chaco Boreal itself were virtually nil. Although Bolivia had granted concessions
to Standard Oil of New Jersey, the overall economic stakes were so meager as to
play no discernible part in determining the U.S. position in the dispute.
Nonetheless, American efforts to avert war between Bolivia and Paraguay cannot
be ascribed merely to humanitarianism. Conflict between any American republics jeopardized the edifice of Pan-Americanism that the United States had
erected to keep order in its half of the world-especially in those remote corners
where the direct projection of power was undesirable. Success by the Commission
of Inquiry and Conciliation would show that Pan-Americanism worked. 5
Kellogg personally convened the commission's opening session at the PanAmerican Union in Washington on March 13, 1929, and remained long enough
to see McCoy elected as the panel's chairman. With the American delegate thus
situated to guide its activities, the commission plunged into the investigative
phase of its work. Throughout April and May, the delegates heard testimony from
the contending parties, usually bombastic memorials blaming the other side for
the skirmishing in December and proclaiming the justice of its own claim to the
Chaco. Despite such protests of innocence, the neutral delegates soon agreed that
Bolivia and Paraguay shared in the culpability for December's fighting. To spare
national sensibilities and preserve an environment conducive to meaningful
negotiations, however, the commission withheld its findings. On a more practical
tack, the delegates sought to arrange a prisoner exchange as a preliminary to an
overall settlement. The successful conclusion of this effort in mid-May yielded the
first positive fruits of the commission's work. 6
McCoy hoped that the agreement on prisoners would lead to the evacuation of
captured fortifications and the renewal of diplomatic ties. Instead, resolution of
the prisoner issue left the talks stalled. By late June, McCoy admitted that the
commission's work "had been going badly for several weeks." The problem, he
concluded, lay with the group's charter. To expect the commission to resolve the
conflict while ignoring the question of who owned the Chaco was hopelessly
unrealistic. Given the privately expressed willingness of both Bolivia and
Paraguay to permit the commission to address this so-called basic question, the
restriction was also unnecessary. McCoy knew full well that "under the protocol
we were forbidden to take up the fundamental question of settling the boundary
between the countries concerned." Nonetheless, at his urging, from July onward
the commission attempted to do just that. 7
With the territorial question at the top of its agenda, the commission at least
was taking aim at the real issue. In itself, this did not guarantee success.
Although closed-door negotiations continued throughout July and August,
progress was slow. In Washington's sweltering heat, tempers grew short. Halfhumorously comparing himself to Grant at the Wilderness, McCoy promised to
have "determination enough to last if 'it takes all summer.'" He rejected
suggestions of impatient neutrals that he simply call upon overwhelming
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American power to force a settlement, replying that in such a "Pan-American
undertaking" the proper role for his country was simply a "position of international equality." Indeed, McCoy intentionally stayed in the background during the
negotiation's early stages, asking Cuba and Mexico to take the lead in determining
the disputants' minimal demands. Such cooperative tactics contrast strikingly with
the highhanded unilateralism that McCoy practiced in Nicaragua. Yet he was not
being disingenuous in appraising the intended American role as one of equality.
McCoy's less coercive approach reflected not a change of heart since the previous
year but the comparatively trivial American stakes in the Chaco. 8
From the outset, several factors militated against the commission's efforts to
resolve the basic question. Most fundamental was the complexity of the dispute
itself-the layers of claims and counterclaims and of past proposals accepted by
one side but not by the other that had built up over the previous century. Adding
to the difficulty of the negotiations was the rigidity of the Bolivian and
Paraguayan governments, which hesitated to make any concessions that might
offend nationalists at home and undermine their own legitimacy. Third, and most
frustrating to McCoy personally, was the conduct of his fellow delegates. For
some, a lack of authority necessitated consultation with their governments even
on the most trivial matters. In the case of Uruguay's delegate, delay amounted to
outright obstructionism. Such behavior resulted in negotiations that were
awkward, time-consuming, and inefficient. 9
In the end, McCoy's attempt to divide the Chaco Boreal on some historical
basis foundered when the nonnegotiable demands on each side collided. On
August 26, the commission abandoned any hope for a directly negotiated
settlement and began considering schemes for submitting the dispute to formal
arbitration. This effort produced a draft treaty that McCoy presented to Bolivia
and Paraguay on August 31, two weeks before the commission's scheduled
adjournment sine die. McCoy's proposal provided for a five-member court to rule
on the claims of the two countries, with the court's decision to be binding. But
the plan also attempted to protect interests vital to each country. It awarded
outright to Bolivia the port of Bahia Negra on the Paraguay River, thus giving
Bolivians their long-sought access to the sea. Conversely, it removed from the
court's purview that portion of the Chaco awarded to Paraguay in 1878 by
President Rutherford B. Hayes in defining Paraguay's border with Argentina.
McCoy's proposal also extended the commission's life until such time as the
court assumed its responsibilities. 10
Throughout the next week, McCoy lobbied to persuade the Bolivian and
Paraguayan delegates to commend the proposal to their governments. Eventually, he extracted promises of unqualified support from each. At the same time,
working through the American ministers in La Paz and Asuncion, Stimson
undertook a similar effort aimed directly at the contending governments. Despite
encouraging signs in Washington, the responses received from the two Latin
American capitals were disappointing. Although both countries professed sup-
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port for arbitration in principle, each rejected McCoy's specific proposal. Neither
side would accept the territorial guarantees that the plan provided to its rival.
Each objected to that aspect of the plan permitting the court to define the overall
limits of the territory to be arbitrated. Such authority, announced the Bolivian
delegate, was "destructive of the right of sovereignty since it does not place any
limitation whatever on any claims which Paraguay may wish to make to the
territory of Bolivia." 11 With the expiration of the commission's charter fast
approaching, McCoy made a final effort to salvage arbitration. He deleted from
the draft treaty those provisions guaranteeing Bahia Negra to Bolivia and the
Hayes award to Paraguay. To provide further reassurance that arbitration would
not jeopardize vital interests, McCoy proposed that the court's decision be
nonbinding. These changes met the chief objections to the original proposal.
Although Paraguay showed interest in the revised draft, Bolivia still insisted
upon prior definition of the arbitral zone as an absolute requirement. Bolivia, it
was now evident, opposed arbitration in any form. 12
Anticipating the rejection of arbitration but determined to have something to
show for his efforts, McCoy turned his attention during the commission's final
days to the more limited objective of conciliation. With the exchange of prisoners
now completed, he presented a protocol calling for "mutual forgiveness of the
offenses and injuries caused by each of the Republics to each other," evacuation
of captured fortifications, and the restoration of diplomatic relations. Anxious to
hurry the commission out of existence and realizing that such an agreement
would not compromise its freedom of action, Bolivia quickly agreed. Paraguay,
still hoping for arbitration, attempted to force a prolongation of the commission's
life by delaying its answer to the proposal for conciliation. Recognizing, however,
that refusal to sign such an innocuous document would place Paraguay in a bad
light, its delegation eventually agreed to the protocol in the waning hours of the
commission's existence. 13 Thus, the commission did succeed in bringing about
the diplomatic reconciliation of Bolivia and Paraguay, providing a token
testimonial to the efficacy of Pan-Americanism.
Yet McCoy knew that his accomplishment was superficial. Without a solution
to the territorial issue, war would follow, exposing Pan-Americanism as a sham.
Bolivia promised to continue negotiations through direct bilateral talks. McCoy
believed that without the participation of the commission's neutrals "to watch
over and guide the negotiations," such talks could not succeed. With this in
mind, McCoy proposed at the commission's closing session on September 13 that
the five neutrals extend their collective good offices to Bolivia and Paraguay to
keep alive their efforts to resolve the Chaco dispute. At McCoy's urging,
moreover, Stimson · pressured both Bolivia and Paraguay to reconstitute the
commission. 14 Stimson's efforts ran up against Bolivian determination to prevent
the commission's revival. The Bolivian minister in Washington indicated politely
that, because "spectacular conferences have the inconvenience of exciting [the]
national spirit," his country preferred to rely on private bilateral talks. When the
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United States insisted on a direct role in the negotiations, Bolivian representatives began justifying their opposition to the commission by accusing McCoy of
bias against their claims. The State Department refuted such accusations-which
had never been made during the commission's life-and recognized them for
what they were: an attempt to exclude the United States from an affair that
Bolivia concluded it could best handle itself. 15
American attempts to revive the commission continued sporadically through
the end of the year. In October, McCoy was assigned as commanding general of
the IV Corps Area with headquarters at Fort McPherson, Georgia. During the fall
of 1929, he returned to Washington several times to assist in drafting notes that
attempted without success to pry Bolivia away from its uncompromising stand.
McCoy attributed the failure of these efforts and of his commission's work to two
sources. The first was domestic politics. He told former Secretary Kellogg that
Bolivia's "backing and filling" illustrated the impact of "local politics influencing a very weak government." To another correspondent he wrote: "It was
perfectly evident that both Governments wanted to reach a reasonable arrangement which our Commission proposed to them, but [tentative agreements were]
later on cancelled due to popular clamor against both Governments which were
weak and could not withstand the nationalistic opposition." Such views both
reflected and reaffirmed McCoy's low opinion of politicians as a class.1 6
The second reason that McCoy cited related to the limited power wielded by
the United States. In his confidential final report, McCoy lamented that "no
means by which our Government could exert direct pressure on the parties to the
dispute was obvious or even discernible." More accurately, although means were
at hand, the game was not worth their application. Far and away the hemisphere's
most powerful nation, the United States possessed a range of diplomatic,
economic, and military levers that it could employ, either directly or through
third parties. McCoy knew that, but he was also sufficiently realistic to realize
that the modest character of American interests in the southern cone limited him
to accepted diplomatic practices. Bombing Sandinistas could be justified by
virtue of American vital interests in Nicaragua, but similar action against Bolivia
was inconceivable-a point that goes far in explaining the relative equanimity
with which the United States accepted Bolivian defiance of its peacekeeping
efforts. 17

The Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation was only the first of several
instances in which McCoy assisted his friend the secretary of state. Stimson's
confidence that McCoy shared his viewpoint, combined with the army general's
tact as a negotiator and his experience in Latin American and East Asian affairs,
led the secretary repeatedly to call on his friend's services. Yet care must be
taken not to exaggerate McCoy's influence-he remained an army officer, not a
State Department official. Despite frequent trips from Fort McPherson to
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Washington, he did not participate regularly m policymaking. Rather, he
functioned as a consultant, called in periodically to consider problems falling
within his particular area of competence. The secretary himself acknowledged
the limits of McCoy's role in an entry in his diary in February 1931. Temporarily
short-handed due to the illness of Joseph Cotton, the undersecretary of state,
Stimson called up McCoy at Atlanta,
to see whether he would be available for an emergency, in other words
whether he would give up military work to come into the Department and
help me temporarily in Cotton's absence, which would seem to be long.
Like the good friend and soldier that he is, he said that he was ready to
obey orders and do whatever would help me. We both see the dangers and
difficulties of bringing a military man into the Department, but he has such
a level head and has been so helpful in everything that I have ever consulted
him in, that I am very strongly tempted to do it. 18
McCoy's work for Stimson ranged from the sensitive to the comic. As indicated
above, his involvement in the Chaco dispute continued beyond his service on the
commission. McCoy also advised Stimson in Nicaragua, and he figured frequently
in issues relating to Philippine-American relations-for example, in the abortive
appointment of Nicholas Roosevelt to be vice-governor general in 1930.1 9
A member of the New York Times editorial board, Roosevelt was notorious
among Filipinos as the author of an influential book critical of their aspirations
for independence. President Hoover's announcement of his appointment in July
1930 evoked anger in the islands. Filipino leaders denounced Roosevelt and
sponsored rallies in which copies of his book were ceremoniously burned or
dumped into Manila Bay. Reacting to this criticism, the Senate Insular Affairs
Committee refused to recommend Roosevelt for confirmation, leaving both the
president and his appointee dangling in considerable embarrassment. 20
Strictly speaking, neither the president nor the Senate was obliged to consider
Filipino preferences in appointing top officers in Manila. Yet it was soon evident
that forcing Roosevelt onto the islands would rekindle the sort of animosity in
Philippine-American relations that had lain dormant since the end of Leonard
Wood's rule. Prudence, therefore, demanded that the administration disengage
itself from such a potentially dangerous situation. To McCoy, Stimson assigned
the delicate task of persuading Roosevelt to withdraw voluntarily. Along with
Brig. Gen. Frank Parker, chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, McCoy held a
series of conversations with Roosevelt, out of which emerged a solution. In return
for eating humble pie for the administration's sake, McCoy told Stimson,
Roosevelt wanted a position in the State Department. Acceptable to all parties,
this proposal culminated on September 24 in Roosevelt's request to have his
name withdrawn from consideration to be vice-governor general and in his
simultaneous appointment by Stimson as minister to Hungary. 21
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Hoover's inability to appoint his own man to be vice-governor general
indicated the drift of Philippine-American relations by 1930. Advocates of
continued colonial status for the islands found themselves increasingly on the
defensive. Filipino opposition to the Roosevelt appointment should have surprised no one. Certainly the momentum of the Philippine independence
movement had not slackened in the years since McCoy left Manila in 1925. What
had changed, however, was domestic opinion in the United States. To ailing
American economic interests, the islands had come to represent a liability. The
sugar, dairy, and cottonseed oil industries, all struggling as a result of the Great
Depression and resenting supposed Filipino competition, joined organized labor
in a noisy coalition that campaigned to get rid of the Philippines. This
independence lobby generated enough support in Congress to make some
change in the islands' status all but inevitable. 22
Hoover, Stimson, and Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley, whose department
administered insular possessions, were dead set against freeing the Philippines.
The islands were simply not ready for independence, they believed. Moreover, to
set them adrift would affect adversely the strategic balance in the western Pacific
by reducing the American presence there just as concern over Japanese
intentions was increasing. Although the administration's leaders in public
remained uncompromising in their insistence upon maintaining the status quo,
privately they recognized the need to strike a bargain with independence forces.
The only question was whether long-frustrated Philippine nationalists would be
content with anything less than full independence. 23
Next to Stimson, who followed Wood as governor general, and W. Cameron
Forbes, Hoover's ambassador to Japan, McCoy was the best known of the old
Philippine hands still in public life. His participation in the final disposition of
the Philippines came as a matter of course. In fact, Stimson invited McCoy's
participation both in an executive and an advisory capacity. Before and after the
Nicholas Roosevelt affair, he sought McCoy's return to the Philippines as
governor general. In June 1930, he asked McCoy to accept an appointment as
vice-governor general with the prospect of elevation to chief executive within a
year. Hoover, Stimson said, would be guided by his own and Hurley's recommendations. But McCoy was uninterested. In October, Hoover himself suggested
McCoy as a replacement for Roosevelt, again with the idea of being subsequently
promoted. Stimson replied that McCoy preferred to go as governor general, but
"would of course do what the President wanted." It remained only to determine
whether McCoy would be acceptable to the Filipino leadership. In his diary,
Stimson noted that "it would be an error of the first importance to rush the
McCoy appointment rudely or roughly on the Filipino people." He cautioned
Hoover to clear the nomination with Quezon before making it public.24
Unfortunately, word of the consideration being given McCoy reached Manila
before the necessary groundwork had been laid. John M. Switzer, a friend of
Hoover's and president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Manila, leaked
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word of McCoy's pending appointment among leading Filipinos. Stimson
believed that Switzer and his associates were attempting "to pose as kingmakers
in regard to the appointment of [the next] governor general and to trade on the
influence they were supposed to have." Yet, as the secretary observed, nothing
would incite Philippine opposition with greater certainty than to have the
appointment attributed in any way to the members of the American Chamber of
Commerce, an organization long in the vanguard of opposition to Philippine
independence. Thus, as a result of "Switzer's butting into this affair," Stimson
felt obliged to shelve McCoy's appointment for the time being. 25
Within months, however, Stimson revived the idea of sending his friend to
Manila. In a conversation with McCoy on May 19, 1931, the secretary of state
remarked that he and the president were "afraid Congress had made up its mind
to do some irresponsible thing" concerning the Philippines. In that event, they
both "wanted McCoy out there .. . in the thankless task of holding the bag while
we were getting out." Despite such pessimism, Stimson's subsequent instructions indicated that he had not given up hope of making a deal with Filipino
leaders that would satisfy their aspirations without severing the islands' links to
the United States. In 1929, Quezon told then Governor General Stimson of his
willingness to accept some form of dominion status in return for promises of
continued free trade with the United States. The secretary of state asked McCoy
to sit down with Quezon, currently in the United States, to explore ways of
working out such an arrangement. 26
As a result, the summer of 1931 once again found McCoy temporarily
quartered at 1718 H Street. Throughout the first two weeks of June, he conferred
with Quezon, bringing Stimson up to date when they met for golf at Burning Tree
Country Club. McCoy's assignment was a thorny one. He knew that Quezon's
public enthusiasm for independence was matched by serious reservations about
the viability of the Philippines if deprived of American protection and access to
American markets. McCoy also understood the rules of Philippine politics.
Quezon had risen on the political ladder by putting himself at the head of the
independence movement. Any sign of infidelity to that cause could destroy his
career. 27 The concept that McCoy presented to Quezon was a simple one: In
return for greater autonomy, Filipinos would accept the indefinite extension of
American sovereignty as well as the preservation of certain American prerogatives reserved for emergencies. It was a proposal that Quezon approached
with utmost wariness. To protect his rear, he insisted that McCoy make it clear to
Stimson and Hurley that the conversations did not mean that he had changed his
well-known stand on independence. Yet he went on to stipulate his hope of
gaining from the negotiations "a more liberal government under the present
Organic Act [the Jones Act]" while "settling the Philippine question in a manner
that will satisfy the aspirations of the Filipinos [and] protect their economic
interests." The last reference reflected his determination to preserve Philippine
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exclusion from American tariff barriers, a privilege that would be jeopardized if
Congress granted the islands independence. 28
Notwithstanding Quezon's gingerly approach to the subject, McCoy succeeded
in striking an apparent bargain with the Filipino leader. By June 18, they had
agreed to a proposal that McCoy presented to Hurley in a lengthy memorandum.
While acknowledging a moral commitment before the world to grant the islands
eventual independence, McCoy argued that to do so now or in the near future
would be disastrous for both Philippine and American interests. Moreover, he
argued that the Jones Act was inadequate to prepare the Philippines for freedom
because it lacked "sufficient flexibility to permit gradual evolution by trial and
error." Yet, whatever the islands' prospects for survival and the liabilities of the
Jones Act, popular demand for self-rule-a "product of racial self-consciousness" -was so strong that, unless satisfied, insurrection could occur. To
avert such a calamity, McCoy proposed a British imperial solution of converting
the Philippines into a dominion. The office of governor general, an offending
symbol of American authority, would be abolished, and the islands would enjoy
broad political autonomy. The American presence would remain only in the form
of a high commissioner who would refrain from involvement in day-to-day
matters of state but would be "clothed with explicit reserve powers to protect the
interests of the United States.'' Thus, Filipinos would govern their own affairs
while still enjoying a measure of American protection, both military and
commercial. The Hnited States would maintain the status quo in the western
Pacific while defusing Philippine political agitation. It was a compromise that
would meet the needs of both sides. 29
Although Stimson judged the plan very good indeed, Hoover was unenthusiastic. Ultimately, however, its fate was contingent less on American
support than on its acceptability to Filipino leaders. Could Quezon persuade his
colleagues to take a realistic view of the future and accept something less than
absolute independence? Quezon told Hurley that he would attempt to do so. Even
after returning to Manila in the autumn of 1931, he continued privately to
profess his support for the dominion plan. Quezon may even have convinced
Osmena and Manuel Roxas of its benefits. Yet in the end, political expediency
won out. The partisan advantage to be accrued from letting Quezon alone
sponsor the dominion plan-and then attacking him as a lackey of the
Americans:.._was too great for his rivals to pass up. Quezon recognized this
danger, and when Osmena and Roxas refused to support the proposal publicly,
he, too, abandoned it in favor of the old cry for complete independence. In the
end, McCoy's plan for a Philippine dominion came to nothing. Yet the plan
possessed real merit and its rejection resulted less from its own shortcomings
than from the shortsightedness of Filipino politicians. 30
Not all of McCoy's assistance to the Hoover administration was quite so
weighty as seeking the orderly liquidation of the American empire. In one
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instance, his role did not involve external affairs at all-unless the U.S. Marine
Corps and the Navy Department can be considered rival sovereignties. Credit for
McCoy's assignment in early 1931 to umpire a dispute between these two
institutions belongs first of all to Maj. Gen. Smedley D. Butler, USMC. "Old
Gimlet Eye," the most colorful marine officer of his day, won fame and two
Medals of Honor during a career that took him from China to the Caribbean. He
was best known, however, for his undisciplined tongue, a weakness that
repeatedly attracted the wrath of his civilian superiors.3 1 Butler supplemented his
marine pay by travelling the lecture circuit, charging a $250 fee for each
appearance. Showman enough to understand what it took to fill a hall with cash
customers and vain enough to enjoy their attention, Butler delighted audiences
by skewering senior administration officials, especially over U.S. policy in the
Caribbean. Characterizing his own service in the region as dishonest and
pernicious, he lent credibility to the most extreme criticism of American foreign
policy. 32
Butler's insubordinate grandstanding did not endear him to the strait-laced
Hoover and Stimson. When newspapers quoted Butler describing American
policy in the Caribbean as "hypocritical and oppressive . .. a policy imposed by
force and fraud," the administration decided it had had enough. Secretary of the
Navy Charles Francis Adams officially reprimanded Butler and directed him to
refrain from public comment on controversial subjects. For a brief period, Butler
complied. The Marine Corps was about to get a new commandant, and Butler
naively hoped that with a demonstration of good behavior he might win the job.
When another officer was chosen instead, the bonds restraining Smedley Butler
fell away. 33 In January 1931, Butler returned to the headlines in typical fashion as
a result of a speech in Philadelphia. Expressing his opinion that "mad dogs"
among Europe's leaders made the prospects for peace appear bleak, Butler
proceeded to illustrate his point by recounting an anecdote that portrayed Benito
Mussolini, Italy's premier, as a callous hit-and-run murderer of little children.
Word of the remarks leaked out and a diplomatic flap ensued. When the Italian
ambassador protested the insult to 11 Duce's good name, the State Department
apologized for Butler's "discourteous and unwarranted utterances." But the
incident did not end there. Hoover and Stimson wanted Butler court-martialed.
Stimson was particularly adamant, complaining in his diary of the "shillyshallying" of Secretary of the Navy Adams, who doubted the wisdom of bringing
charges against Butler. In the face of Stimson's insistence, however, Adams had
no choice but to give in. 34
When Adams ordered Butler relieved as commander of the marine base at
Quantico, Virginia, and placed under house arrest, the ensuing outcry suggested
that the navy secretary's reservations had been well founded. Marine leaders were
outraged at what they believed was unjustified persecution of a brother officer.
Veterans' groups and congressmen rose to Butler's defense. Franklin D.
Roosevelt, the governor of New York, and former navy secretary Josephus
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Daniels both volunteered to testify in Butler's behalf. The affair was ideally
designed to distract, however briefly, an economically depressed nation, many of
whose citizens found in hating the Hoover administration one of life's remaining
pleasures. The New York Times reported that newsreel footage of Butler was
drawing cheers in movie houses, while pictures of Stimson "met with signs of
disapprobation." A Times correspondent in Washington noted, "The case
occupies first rank in public interest here." The Butler affair "sizzles . ..
satirically, on editorial pages," reported the Literary Digest in its survey of press
opinion, "at times sputtering into a chortle of ridicule." 35 Highly sensitive to
criticism, Hoover soon regretted the court-martial decision. By February 4,
concerned that Butler's defense counsel would further embarrass the State
Department by airing the remarks about Mussolini in court, Stimson reached the
same conclusion. He now told Secretary Adams that administrative rather than
judicial proceedings against Butler would suffice. But Adams, having ordered a
court-martial only at Hoover and Stimson's prodding, now saw no way of
withdrawing from that position without looking like a fool. The initiative had now
become Butler's: What price would he demand in return for letting the affair
drop?36
After a cabinet meeting on February 6, Hoover suggested that Stimson recruit
McCoy to act as an emissary to the Butler camp. While noting the anomaly of
appointing an army officer to arbitrate a matter that was essentially internal to
the Navy Department, Stimson agreed with the president that McCoy's "wisdom
and tact" were well suited for the task. McCoy was already in Washington
consulting with the State Department on Nicaraguan matters, so Stimson was
able to brief him on his mission that same day. 37 With instructions giving him
"practically carte blanche" so long as he squelched the court-martial, McCoy
went quickly to work. First, he called on Adams to get the navy's viewpoint. He
then met with Butler's chief counsel, Maj . Henry Leonard, to solicit Butler's
terms. Over the next two days, McCoy continued these negotiations, first with one
side and then with the other, eventually hammering out a formula acceptable to
both. On Sunday morning, February 8, Leonard delivered to McCoy at 1718 H
Street a letter in which Butler apologized to Adams for having "caused
embarrassment to the Government." That same afternoon, McCoy met with
Adams and secured the secretary's signature to a reprimand that spent as much
time commending Butler for his record of distinguished service as it did
chastising him for his recent misbehavior. The mildness of the reprimand is not
really surprising: Leonard drafted it himself. Yet Butler had admitted culpability,
however slight, thus providing the administration with a shield to deflect further
criticism of its handling of the matter. In return for his admission, charges
against Butler were dropped and he was restored to command without prejudice.
The "court-martial" of Smedley Butler sank mercifully into oblivion. 38
Unquestionably, the affair had been a silly one. Yet, as Hoover recognized,
there existed the real chance that Butler's court-martial "would make a great
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mess" such as his administration could ill-afford. By arranging what Stimson
thought was "a very good and satisfactory ending of a very disagreeable matter,"
McCoy averted that mess. In so doing, McCoy again proved his usefulness to the
administration. Certainly, Stimson was in his debt; the secretary of state repaid
his friend in short order by assigning him to represent the United States in one of
the century's pivotal diplomatic crises. 39
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The Lytton Commission

For those who seek to understand (or assign blame for) the origins of World War
II, the Asian city of Mukden holds special significance. On the night of
September 18, 1931, an explosion near Mukden tore a gap in the tracks of the
South Manchurian Railway. No one was injured and damage was so slight that a
southbound express passed by unhindered a short while later. Yet, for the
Kwantung Army, protector of Japanese strategic and economic interests in
Manchuria, the incident triggered a systematic offensive against the remnants of
Chinese sovereignty over the region. Within weeks, the Japanese established
themselves as the new masters of Manchuria. These occurrences, writes one
historian in a recent study, "initiated a chain of events leading directly to world
war." 1 Although others have cautioned against attempts to draw a straight and
unbroken line from Mukden to Pearl Harbor, such views have long enjoyed wide
credence.. Certainly, contemporary observers considered the Japanese conquest
of Manchuria to be a watershed in post-World War I international relations.
Scholarly interest in the incident has scarcely diminished since. The result has
been a copious body of literature that has variously traced the course of the
Japanese ''conspiracy,'' examined the role of the League of Nations, and assessed
the parts played by individual nations or leaders. 2 This study will not duplicate
efforts of other scholars who have produced detailed analyses of this complex
episode. To do so would result in a book altogether different from this one in
structure and focus. Instead, this chapter will limit itself to three issues: first, the
relationship of the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry on Manchuria to
the overall Asian policy formulated by Secretary of State Stimson; second,
McCoy's success in coordinating the commission's findings with Stimson's
requirements; and third, the results of this collaboration between McCoy and the
secretary of state.
151
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Neither American resistance to Japanese expansion after Pearl Harbor nor the
Sino-American partnership necessitated by the Pacific war should obscure the
ambivalence and circumspection of the initial American response to the
Manchurian crisis. In the face of raw Japanese aggression, several factors
interposed to temper the American reaction. For example, despite sympathy
among missionaries and admirers of China's ostensibly republican revolution,
few Americans (among the minority who thought about such things) held the
Middle Kingdom in high regard. Perennial domestic turmoil, an alien culture,
and, above all, a seeming inability to master the essentials of Western methods
created in the United States an image of Chinese backwardness and inferiority.
Few Americans believed that the Chinese could exploit Manchuria's economic
potential to best advantage. Many doubted that China deserved the region at all. 3
In contrast, although many Americans shared McCoy's wariness of the Japanese
as the most aggressive of the "yellow races," they also admired Japan's
spectacular modernization over the previous half-century, a feat attributed to that
nation's facility for imitating the West. Moreover, Japan by 1931 had become
easily the most important U.S. trading partner in the Far East as well as an
attractive field for investment, which only added to American reluctance to
criticize Japan too hastily over Manchuria.4
Prevailing domestic conditions compounded American wariness of becoming
involved in Asia. In 1931, the United States had yet to reach the bottom of the
Great Depression. The overriding importance of checking the economic slide
seemed to dictate a foreign policy that would husband American energies and
resources for urgent problems at home. Surging congressional interest in cutting
loose the Philippines typified the isolationism that gripped the country. Ev~~ had
the nation been willing to support a forceful response against Japan in 1931,
American military forces-most notably the navy-were under strength and ill
prepared to face any respectable opponent. 5
Not surprisingly then, the secretary of state reacted cautiously to the events
unfolding in Manchuria. Convinced that Japanese actions constituted "the first
major blow at the new system of war limitation and prevention" created since the
World War, Stimson could hardly pretend that American interests were uninvolved. Yet he recognized the constraints that limited the American role and
hoped initially that the Japanese themselves would resolve the crisis. Stimson
based this hope on the belief that responsibility for the events subsequent to
Mukden rested with renegade military officers who were acting in defiance of
"liberal" civilian leaders. According to this view, the interests of the United
States and other Western countries would be best served by permitting political
leaders such as Foreign Minister Kijuro Shidehara the opportunity to reassert
control over the military and return Japanese policy to a more pacific course.
Interested observers, Stimson believed, should tread lightly to avoid aggravating Japanese nationalism. Any attempt to coerce Japan would undercut the
position of those Japanese who opposed expansionism. Above all, Stimson
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intended to avoid any action that threatened to arouse Japanese ill will against
the United States. 6
At the headquarters of the League of Nations in Geneva, Stimson's counsel to
leave Japan alone reinforced the prevailing mood among the European powers.
Preoccupied like the United States with problems that were much closer to home,
these nations had no inclination either to rescue China or to antagonize Japan.
The unfavorable American opinion of China and respect (not liking) for the
Japanese was, if anything, even more pronounced in Europe. Although China
would not permit the League to overlook completely the fact that two of its
members were engaged in open hostilities, no action beyond solemn discussions
and high-sounding pronouncements was likely to be forthcoming from the world
organization. Indeed; when some of the League's lesser members boldly
suggested in late September that a commission of inquiry be dispatched to
Manchuria, Stimson ordered American diplomats to scotch the idea. The ease
with which they did so showed the importance that the League's members
attached to American support. It also exposed the timidity of the organization's
leading members. The withholding of American support became a facile
justification for inaction. 7 Unfortunately, the premise underlying this wait-and-see
policy proved invalid. Events in October and November demonstrated that there
existed no significant disagreement within Japan about the importance of
controlling Manchuria. Despite Japanese pledges of an early troop withdrawal,
the fighting steadily expanded in range and intensity.
Japan's bombing on October 8 of Chinchow, far from Mukden, jolted Stimson
from his policy of conciliation. Though not abandoning altogether the hope that
enlightened civilian leaders would salvage the situation nor forgetting the danger
of arousing Japanese nationalism, the secretary of state embarked on a course
intended to align the United States with an international effort to reproach
Japanese misbehavior. Surely, he believed, a great demonstration of solidarity by
the West in condemning the events in Manchuria would awaken Japan to the
error of its ways. In the absence of any spontaneous international gesture,
Stimson was willing to orchestrate the rebuke himself. 8 This shifi in tactics
brought in its trail a series of initiatives: the unprecedented decision in October
to permit an American diplomat to participate in League discussions on
Manchuria; the Stimson doctrine of nonrecognition in January 1932; and the
letter to Sen. William E. Borah the following month affirming the U.S.
commitment to the Washington treaties as inseparable adjuncts of the traditional
Open Door policy. Stimson designed each of these measures to rally "the united
moral disapprobation of the world" against Japan's wanton disregard of its treaty
obligations. 9
American support for what came to be know as the Lytton Commission can
best be understood in the context of this policy of moral coercion. Indeed, in
Stimson's mind, the commission represented his best hope for success. Unlike
the nonrecognition doctrine and the Borah letter, whose unilateral character left
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the United States exposed and unsupported, the Lytton Commission was a joint
effort that originated in the League Council and even had Japanese endorsement.
The risks involved in supporting such an undertaking thus appeared to be
minimal, whereas the potential benefits in terms of rallying international opinion
promised to be correspondingly great. As Stimson told Sen. David Reed of
Pennsylvania, a unanimous report holding the Japanese responsible for the
events since September 1931 would provide the basis for condemnation of Japan
by the League Assembly. The weight of such an adverse judgement would make it
almost certain that the Japanese "would listen to reason . .. and it would prevent
Japan from raising any outside financial support." Despite all the discussion of
Manchuria, the League had thus far reached no real conclusions. Stimson
believed that
We cannot discuss punishment until there has been a judgment.... If they
make that judgment we can then discuss punishment and tell them we will go
along with them [the League's members] as far as a universal declaration of
non-recognition of any treaties, etc .. . . The President thinks that this would
have enormous and controlling effect upon an Oriental nation like Japan. 10
In Stimson's view, Frank McCoy was "the best man in America" to represent
the United States on the Lytton Commission. The secretary of state had no
trouble persuading his friend to accept the position-although doing so required
McCoy to forego an assignment to become superintendent of West Point. When
Stimson telephoned with the offer on December 22, McCoy "said that all he
wanted to know was that the President and I would like him to go, and in that
case he would." McCoy told Stimson that he had no illusions about the
undertaking and fully expected that "it would be a hell of a job." 11 The League
showed less enthusiasm at McCoy's appointment than did Stimson. Aristide
Briand, France's foreign minister, objected to McCoy's nomination on two
counts. First, McCoy was an army general and the commission already had one of
those in the French representative. Second, Briand feared that McCoy's recent
service in Nicaragua would reduce the willingness of the League's Latin
American members to support the commission's efforts. 12 Stimson bluntly
rejected Briand's objections. The Lytton Commission "would be a success only if
we do not try to fill it with trades or professions, but with men," he told the
French ambassador in Washington. Because McCoy was the best man for the job,
"it didn't make any difference whether he was a general or not." As for
Nicaragua, Stimson contended that inasmuch as McCoy had "transform[ed] an
imperialistic policy into a truly great reform," Latin America would not take
exception to his appointment. Whether or not Briand was much persuaded by
such arguments is problematic. Given Stimson's insistence and the League's
determination that the commission include an American, the French leader was
obliged to concede to the secretary's preference.13
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Later, Stimson asserted that McCoy served on the Lytton Commission "solely
because he had been appointed as such by the League. We had no right to
participate as a government in the inquiry. [As a result,] in what he did, General
McCoy was responsible to the League, not to us." Such an explanation overlooks
not only Stimson's role in imposing McCoy on the League but also McCoy's
consultations with Stimson prior to the mission. In January and February 1932,
McCoy and Stimson met on at least four occasions to discuss Manchuria: twice at
Woodley, Stimson's home in Washington; once at the State Department; and once
at the White House with President Hoover. The atmosphere of the conversations
was intimate and low key. After dinner at Woodley, the secretary and his friend
would enjoy "a good old-fashioned talk together over the fire," permitting
Stimson to explain his views in detail. Stimson's contention that McCoy
represented only himself on the Lytton Commission may have been strictly
correct. Yet unofficially McCoy was performing his familiar role as a responsible
agent of his government, charged in this instance with insuring that the
commission's findings complemented the American policy of mobilizing world
opinion to restrain Japan. As he had in Nicaragua, McCoy enjoyed broad freedom
of action; yet in practice, he adhered to the overall goals prescribed by the
secretary of state.14

The League of Nations Commission of Inquiry that McCoy joined in New York on
February 9, 1932, after its voyage from Le Havre was an august body to which
each of Europe's principal powers contributed. Great Britain provided the
commission's chairman, Victor Allen George Robert Bulwer-Lytton. A product of
Eton and Cambridge, the Earl of Lytton had served as first lord of the admirality,
undersecretary of state for India, governor of Bengal, and briefly as viceroy of
India. The French representative was General Henri Claude!, like McCoy a
professional soldier with broad experience in colonial matters. During World War
I, Claude! served as a corps commander and an army group chief of staff. Albert
Schnee, the German representative, was a career diplomat whose primary
expertise lay in colonial affairs. He was a former director of the colonial ministry
in Berlin and from 1912 to 1919 served as governor of German East Africa. Italy,
too, was represented by a career diplomat: Count Luigi Aldrovandi-Marescotti.
Aldrovandi's background included assignments as secretary general of the
Italian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference and, more recently, as Rome's
ambassador to Buenos Aires and Berlin. 15 A small staff was provided to assist the
commissioners in their work. Of its members, the most important to McCoy was
another American, George H. Blakeslee. A well-known professor of international
relations at Clark University, Blakeslee in effect acted as McCoy's political
adviser. 16
After adding McCoy to their number, the commissioners traveled by rail to San
Francisco where they embarked on February 13 aboard the S.S. President
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Coolidge. Upon arrival in Yokohama on February 29, the group proceeded to
Tokyo and set to work, interviewing diplomats, businessmen, and senior
government officials, both civilian and military. As he would throughout the
mission, McCoy immediately began maintaining close contact with U.S. government agents, among them his old friend W. Cameron Forbes, the American
ambassador. The Japanese made a rather obvious play for McCoy's support
through elaborate expressions of appreciation for his assistance at the time of the
earthquake of 1923. Of greater importance in shaping McCoy's attitude, however,
was the assassination on March 5 of Baron Takuma Dan, a leading Japanese
industrialist. McCoy had become well acquainted with Dan in 1923 and called on
him the day before he was murdered by right-wing militants. 17
In a series of meetings with the commission, officials in Tokyo presented their
version of events in Manchuria. The Japanese claimed that it was "their national
mission to maintain peace and order in the Orient" against the threat of Chinese
irresponsibility and Bolshevik expansionism. If given a free hand, Japan
promised to maintain order in Asia without violating the concept of the Open
Door, which promised developed nations equal opportunity in China. Lt. Gen.
Araki Sadao, the minister of war, assured the commission of Japan's desire for "a
world without restrictions and frontiers." 18 Although Japanese promises to honor
the Open Door did not persuade McCoy, the American representative did share
Japanese concern about the Soviet Union. Interviewing Yoshizawa Kenkichi,
Shidehara's successor, McCoy remarked that "we have to consider the existence
of Russia as a shadow in the background of this problem." The Japanese foreign
minister responded to this opening by citing his government's concern about
Soviet penetration into Manchuria. "If Manchuria were Bolshevized," he said,
"Korea would be exposed to great danger." Japanese interest in limiting the
spread of Soviet influence struck a responsive chord with both McCoy and
Lytton. 19 Despite such appeals, McCoy left Tokyo with a distinctly negative
opinion of Japan's leaders and of the course on which they had set their country.
A party of "youth, irresponsibility, and fanaticism" had come to power, intent on
redeeming Japan from the influences that contact with the outside world and
rapid Westernization had brought about. Although army officers occupied the
forefront of the movement, "the term 'Military Party' ... was a misnomer"
because its support extended far beyond the military establishment. The triumph
of this reactionary nationalism accounted for "the course of events in Manchuria,
the anti-American agitation, and other examples of unfriendliness and lack of
rational control."20
One day after McCoy and his colleagues left Tokyo on March 8, the birth of
Manchukuo was announced to the world. The creation of this transparent
Japanese puppet state was surprising only in its timing, which seemed a
calculated expression of contempt for the Lytton Commission. Despite this
further evidence of Japan's unwillingness to compromise over Manchuria, the
commission proceeded undaunted to China. At Shanghai, the next stop on its
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itinerary, further complications awaited. In late January, Japanese naval units and
marines landed there in retaliation for a Chinese boycott of Japanese goods.
Fighting erupted and continued until early March. Japanese air attacks and
artillery devastated Chapei, the Chinese quarter of the city. Such disregard for
civilian life outraged the West-Stimson likening its impact on public opinion to
that of Germany's invasion of Belgium in 1914. The fighting also frightened
Shanghai's International Settlement, the quarter controlled by Western nations
including the United States. Although a fragile ceasefire existed by the time the
commission arrived on March 14, the city remained an armed camp. 21
Sir Eric Drummond, the League's secretary general, warned against the
commission becoming bogged down in a peripheral matter such as Shanghai.
Similarly, the State Department informed McCoy that it wanted the commission
to steer clear of the affair. Nonetheless, some attention to the events of the
previous months was unavoidable. With the exception of the Japanese, Shanghai's multinational community welcomed the commission with hopeful anticipation. Japanese aggressiveness so flustered and intimidated Western officials,
remarked McCoy, that "all their complications were passed to us, and we had to
struggle against being lost in an Oriental jungle." 22 Although the commission
did not attempt to arrange for a disengagement of the forces at Shanghai, it
remained in the city for thirteen days, hoping through its show of concern "to
create a propitious atmosphere" for negotiations. Other than the refugees
camped in public buildings and the large number of soldiers in the streets,
McCoy and his colleagues found little evidence of recent fighting in central
Shanghai. Chapei, however, was another matter. After inspecting that ravaged
part of the city, McCoy remarked that it was as if "the Bronx [had] been
destroyed without Manhattan, Brooklyn and Jersey City showing signs of war." 23
While in Shanghai, the commission established the routine to which it adhered
throughout its subsequent travels in China and Manchuria. In their quest for
information, the commissioners availed themselves to the views of virtually any
group with an opinion on Sino-Japanese relations. Given that few of these groups
made even a pretense of disinterest, sorting out fact from propaganda was no
easy task. For McCoy and his colleagues, each day became a continuous round of
interviews and conferences with local officials, diplomats, businessmen, bankers,
journalists, civic groups, educators, and missionaries. The commission interrupted its routine only for luncheons and dinners, "which were also loaded [with]
propaganda." Those moments when the commissioners were freed from their
collective responsibilities found McCoy consulting with local American representatives such as Nelson T. Johnson, the minister to China, and Adm. Montgomery
M. Taylor, commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet.24 From Shanghai, the commission proceeded to Nanking, seat of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government.
Over the course of several meetings with the commission, Chiang and his
ministers made a favorable impression. "They are a brilliant lot of revolutionaries," McCoy told his family, "and Chiang, much the best of the lot, a
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The Manchurian crisis, 1932: McCoy and Lord Lytton search purposefully for a
solution. (Courtesy U.S. Army Military History Institute)

Cromwellian character." A new generation of Chinese leaders was emerging,
McCoy believed, "a change from the older mandarin type to the young
revolutionist," schooled by missionaries and frequently graduates of American
universities. 25
From Nanking, the commission proceeded to Peking, arriving on April 9. Here
the commissioners met with officials of Manchuria's deposed Chinese administration, including the warlord Chang Hsueh-liang. Although McCoy and his
colleagues intended to stop only briefly in Peking, their departure was delayed by
Japanese obstructionism that henceforth hindered their attempts to gain a
comprehensive picture of conditions in Manchuria. The League Council had
authorized Japan and China each to designate an "assessor" to assist the Lytton
Commission in its work. A Japanese assessor escorted the commission throughout
Japan, and his Chinese counterpart, Wellington Koo, joined the party in
Shanghai. Now in Peking, Japanese officials informed Lytton that they would not
permit Koo, a close associate of Chiang Kai-shek, to enter Manchukuo. When the
commissioners insisted that Koo accompany them, a brief impasse ensued.
Eventually, on April 19, the Japanese relented, and the commission resumed its
travels. Seven months after the incident at Mukden, the League of Nations
Commission of Inquiry arrived at its destination. 26
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"When the commission went into Manchuria," recalled Professor Blakeslee,
"the outstanding fact was the protection which was given to the party." He went
on to explain:
On nearly every railroad an armored train went ahead of us about ten
minutes .... On the commission's special train sometimes as many as two
cars were filled with soldiers and every car had both platforms guarded with
from one to four soldiers or police armed with rifles .. .. Nearly everywhere
we went the track was guarded. For hundreds of miles Manchokuo [sic]
troops, coolies in uniforms they looked like, were guarding the track; they
were stationed every few hundred yards ... fac[ing] away from the track
pointing their rifles toward the horizon.
Actually, as the commissioners soon recognized, the Japanese made such
elaborate provisions less to protect the commission than to isolate it. The new
lords of Manchuria were determined to prevent the commission from unearthing
any evidence of opposition to the Japanese occupation. 27
Foremost among the commission's many stops in Manchuria was Mukden
itself. McCoy described the city as "a drab place [of] howling winds and
impalpable dust." Security in Mukden, as throughout Manchuria, was tight.
"This place is worse than Russia," McCoy told his family, "in the air of
suspicion, and the number of police and S[ecret] S[ervice]." Japanese security
officers sealed off the Oriental Hotel to prevent Koo from having any contact with
the populace. Chinese brave enough to attempt to see the commissioners were
harassed and often arrested. Guards outside of local post offices intercepted
letters intended for McCoy and his colleagues. Japanese agents rifled any mail
that did reach the commission and, according to Blakeslee, "they opened our
trunks in the hotel at night when they thought we were not around." Japanese
surveillance was so all-encompassing that, when one commissioner complained
privately in a letter to his wife of a broken radiator in his room, repairmen
appeared unbidden the following morning to fix it. 28
Like their nominal superiors in Tokyo, Japanese army officers in Manchuria
emphasized the threat of Soviet expansionism. "We feel that we are on the
frontier line for the protection of Western culture and civilization," said Lt. Gen.
Honjo Shigeru, commander of the Kwantung Army. The Red propaganda of the
Third Internationale failed in Europe, so the Soviets now directed their attention
to the East. If Japan left Manchuria, China would be bolshevized. Other officers
warned the commission that, without Japan's presence as "a barrier against the
penetration of red influence," foreign investments and interests throughout the
region would be endangered. Soviet influence would mean that the door would be
closed to foreign investments. These Japanese soldiers predicted that Communist
infiltration would not stop in China but could well "reach down to Inda-China,
India, and the Philippine lslands." 29
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These elaborately staged efforts were unavailing. In the commissioner's eyes,
Japan remained unalterably oriental, and hence the image of Japan as a bulwark
of Western civilization was literally incredible. Likewise, dire warnings about the
Soviet threat to the Open Door rang hollow in the face of a deliberate Japanese
campaign to eject Western economic interests from Manchuria. Even the rigid
security measures designed to deny the commissioners access to contrary opinion
succeeded only in antagonizing them. Despite Japanese efforts, McCoy and his
colleagues obtained convincing testimony from consular officials, businessmen,
and missionaries that Manchukuo was a sham. McCoy's secret meeting in Harbin
with a leader of Chinese guerrilla forces still resisting the Japanese occupation
reinforced this view. As McCoy noted, even the Chinese who spoke in support of
Manchukuo "informed us indirectly, later, that what they had said in public did not
represent their true feelings-quite the contrary!"; "of course, the coolies do not
care," McCoy added, "but the representative Chinese are almost unanimously
against the new government which they regard as the puppet of Japan." 30
The commission spent six weeks in Manchuria, visiting such cities as Harbin,
Dairen, Port Arthur, and Chinchow and conscientiously interviewing interested
parties and officials up to Henry Pu Yi, the last emperor of China, now installed
by Japan as nominal ruler of Manchukuo. In early June, the commission returned
to Peking, and McCoy and his colleagues began to compose their final report, a
task that commanded their attention for the rest of the summer. Only once did
they interrupt their labors. In early July, the commission again visited Tokyo,
ostensibly seeking the views of the newly formed cabinet of Viscount Saito
Makoto. In fact, the investigators by this time had passed beyond the point of
seeking information: The visit actually combined a final appeal for Japanese
concessions with a forewarning of what the commission's findings would be.
Although the visit elicited no positive response from Japan, it did provide McCoy
the opportunity to communicate his own conclusions to Japanese officials and to
Joseph C. Grew, the new American ambassador in Tokyo. 31
McCoy never challenged Japanese assertions of Japan's pre-eminent interests
in Manchuria. Nor did he dispute Japanese grievances against the Chinese.
McCoy sympathized with the Japanese, he told Grew. "The Chinese are devils to
work with. They have not played the game with the Japanese [and] have had a
most irritating policy in Manchuria." China had undermined the privileges to
which Japan was entitled by treaty. Contemplating the disorder that existed in
Manchuria and the corruption and lethargy of the Chinese bureaucracy, McCoy
conceded that "it was enough to drive anyone crazy." Yet McCoy also believed
that Chinese "pin-pricking ... posed no immediate danger to Japan's vital
interests." He rejected the idea that Japan seized Manchuria out of self-defense.
"If Japan were to tell the League that it merely acted in self-defense," he told
Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya on July 14, "it would be the duty of the
Commission to say that there had been no immediate threat to her vital interests
but there had merely been the culmination of a long series of irritations." 32
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The Lytton Commission confers with Henry Pu Yi, titular ruler of Manchukuo, 1932. To
Pu Yi's right are Lytton and McCoy; to his left are Count Luigi Aldrovandi-Marescotti,
Dr. Albert Schnee, and General Henri Claudel. (Courtesy National Archives)

To justify their actions in Manchuria, the Japanese cited the analogy of U.S.
intervention in Latin America. This infuriated McCoy. "They are always bringing
up the Nicaraguan case," he told Grew. "But the cases are not parallel." Why
not? "First, our interference took place some years ago," he explained, ignoring
the continued presence of American marines in Nicaragua. Second, "we were not
committed not to do it" through treaties promising nonintervention; "we were
rather committed to do it" under the terms of the Roosevelt Corollary to the
Monroe Doctrine. "Also we were always asked by both sides to the dispute to
intervene and we always got out when the job was finished. Japan was not asked
to do what she did." At root, McCoy objected less to Japan's purpose than to its
methods. "Times have changed," he told Grew, implying that the heavy-handed
interventionism that had once been acceptable no longer was. "The Japanese
[had] had a good case [in Manchuria] but they went about it the wrong way. " 33
McCoy not only objected to the propriety of Japanese methods in Manchuria
but also doubted their efficacy. The dispute over who should control Manchuria,
he told the Japanese foreign minister, could not be solved unilaterally. Although
weak, China would never relinquish its claim to the contested region. Viewing
Manchuria as "unalterably Chinese," the government of China remained
serenely confident "that eventually, in a hundred or five hundred years, the
matter would be straightened out, to China's advantage. Time ... was no object in
the dispute." In McCoy's eyes, this determination, combined with Japan's "fanatic
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patriotic fetish" to control Manchuria, would pose an ongoing threat to Asian
stability. Japan would insist that China recognize its claims. Although China's
army was ineffectual and corrupt, McCoy reminded Grew that "the Chinese have
tremendous powers of passive resistance." He went on to predict: "If the
Japanese tried to invade China, they would run up against the same thing that
invaders of Russia have always found. They could take the ports but could not get
into the interior." In short, Manchuria would become "like Alsace-Lorraine, a
festering sore," the basis not of a new Japanese order but of ever-widening
confli~t. 34 Such arguments left Japanese leaders unmoved. As Foreign Minister
Uchida told the commissioners, for his countrymen, Manchuria was "a question
of life and death." Just as other nations acted without consulting Japan on issues
they considered vital, so the Japanese considered themselves justified in proceeding unilaterally in this instance. The League's hopes for stability in Asia would be
fulfilled only "if Japan were given [a] free hand to deal with China alone." 35
Uchida's revelation of Japan's projected diplomatic recognition of Manchukuo
evoked the full measure of the commission's disapproval. McCoy made no
attempt to sugarcoat his objections. "In the eyes of other countries," he told
Uchida, "the recognition of Manchukuo would be regarded as a violation of the
Covenant of the League, the Nine Power Treaty, and the Kellogg Pact." In taking
such a step, the Japanese would "ignore the well-considered opinion of the rest of
the world." McCoy hoped that Japan would realize the implications of that fact.
What were those implications? McCoy did not even pretend that the West would
do more than simply state its disapproval. As he told Uchida, "There was of
course no question of other countries taking up threatening attitudes. They knew
it was a complicated action and that Japan's vital interests were involved." It was
merely "from the moral sense that Japan would find the opinion of the world
against her." 36 Coming from an authoritative source, such remarks must have
eased Japanese fears about the likelihood of the League or the United States
resorting to military or economic sanctions. McCoy had assured the Japanese
that they had to contend only with world opinion-anything else was bluff.
The Japanese did not fear moral condemnation. If anything, the reverse was
true. Uchida took pains to explain that Japan would proceed on its course in
Manchuria despite an adverse report by the commission and unfavorable
reaction in the West. Yet McCoy departed Tokyo hoping that the commission's
warning to Uchida would have a salutary effect on the Japanese leaders.
Discussing the popular support for the Japanese army's hard-line position
regarding Manchuria, McCoy predicted to Grew that a change in sentiment was
likely. Cabinet members supposedly hinted that there was some chance of a
compromise. Once back in China, McCoy went so far as to tell Nelson T. Johnson
that Uchida had been "quite shaken by the arguments which Lytton and the
other members of the Commission had put up . .. . There were even intimations
. . . that the Commission should delay any action in order to give Japan an
opportunity to think things over." As a last resort, McCoy, too, was betting on the
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reassertion of enlightened, that is, Westernized opinion: "Staunch liberals," he
told Johnson, " had more than intimated that a delay on the part of the League in
taking action .. . would strengthen the hands of liberals in Japan who hoped to
influence actions by the Government." However illusory these hopes appear in
retrospect, they constituted in 1932 the framework of Stimson's Asian policy: the
importance attributed to moral positions, the avoidance of coercion, the belief
that Japanese leaders were susceptible to world opinion, and the confidence that
liberalism would ultimately eclipse militarism in Japan. 37
The Lytton Commission's return to Peking on July 20 found McCoy confident
that its members had reached conclusions indistinguishable from those guiding
American policy in the Far East. On July 22, McCoy passed the good news to
Stimson: "There will be no blinking the facts, and no minority report," he
assured the secretary of state. Furthermore, McCoy wrote, the commission's
"report will be in harmony with American policy, and ... it may strengthen
it." 38 For the rest of July and all of August, the commission worked hard at
finishing its report. With the investigative phase of the commission's work
complete, Frances arrived from the United States to join her husband. The
couple settled into a comfortable villa in Peking, for McCoy a welcome respite
after weeks spent in Pullman sleepers and hotels and countless meals in
restaurants and banquet halls. Before he could get too comfortable, however,
unexpected difficulties arose. The harmony to which McCoy had confidently
alluded came precariously close to unraveling. Earlier, McCoy reported that he
and his colleagues "live[d] and work[ed] together like warm friends." Now, as
their mission drew to a close, the friends quarreled. 39
In Peking, Lytton fell seriously ill and was hospitalized for six weeks. Despite
severe pain and a fever, he continued to work intensely and continuously on the
report. Lytton's illness also affected him emotionally, leaving him, in Blakeslee's
words, pathologically irritable and stubborn. Because the report would carry his
name into history, Lytton was adamant that it bear his personal imprint. He
intended to write the document himself in his hospital room; the others were
welcome to call there, inspect Lytton's work, and give their assent. Such
procedures were totally unacceptable to the remaining commissioners, who
began to feel "as if Lord Lytton regarded them as assistants rather than his
colleagues." They insisted upon having a direct hand in drafting the report. But
when the remaining commissioners convened outside of the confines of Lytton's
hospital room, they succeeded only in provoking their chairman's ire. As McCoy
remarked with characteristic understatement, the commission's "work and range
[had] been very much cramped by the illness of Lord Lytton." 40
The disagreement between Lytton and his colleagues involved substance as
well as ego. McCoy, Schnee, and Aldrovandi objected to the sarcasm and
vituperation that Lytton directed at Japan in his draft. They did not disagree with
Lytton's thesis, which found no justification for Japan's actions in Manchuria;
however, the three commissioners wished to avoid indicting Japan outright and,

DiplomatInKhaki

Page 163

06/11/20 3:18 PM

McCoy and Frances share a quiet moment in China, 1932. (Courtesy U.S. Army
Military History Institute)
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The long summer of 1932 in Peking: McCoy passes time with a friend. (Courtesy U.S.
Army Military History Institute)

hence, preferred a subdued, unemotional style. General Claudel, on the other
hand, wished to purge the report of the least hint of anti-Japanese bias. The
French representative was wholly unsympathetic to the idea of restoring
Manchuria to Chinese control and wanted to avoid a report that favored China
even by implication. Although he did not accept Japan's description of
Manchukuo as a spontaneous creation of the Manchurian people, he believed it
foolhardy to pretend that the new state did not exist. Any report that took such
a view, according to Claudel, would be idealistic and largely impractical.
Claudel called for a pragmatic approach: What the commission "had to deal
with was an illegitimate child," and, in the final analysis, "their problem was
the legitimizing of this child." He believed, in short, that any resolution of the
Sino-Japanese dispute would necessarily use the existing government of
Manchukuo as the basis of settlement. 41 The other commissioners rejected this
view categorically. To recognize Manchukuo would be to indorse Japanese
violations of the League Covenant, the Nine-Power Treaty, and the Kellogg
Pact. In his intolerant mood, Lytton had little patience for Claudel's opinions.
He and the French general were soon at odds. When Claudel threatened in late
August to attach "reservations" to the report as a precondition for signing it,

DiplomatInKhaki

Page 165

06/11/20 3:18 PM

CHAPTER 10

166

Lytton told him to "write your own report." At that moment, prospects for
unanimity appeared bleak. 42
McCoy believed, as did Stimson, that only a report indorsed by all the Western
powers could possibly have the impact that the secretary of state sought. With
that support in jeopardy, McCoy intervened to prevent the two extremes on the
commission from getting too far apart. His task compared to what it had been in
Manila during Wood's term as governor general: working behind the scenes to
prevent the self-destruction of a prominent figure whose judgment was clouded
by illness. Closer personally to Lytton than any of the other commissioners,
McCoy capitalized on his relationship with the chairman to chide him for being
too abrupt with his colleagues and to remind him of the importance of unanimity
if the report were to carry the weight that Lytton hoped. McCoy also arranged for
a three-member committee to draft the report. While Lytton participated as one
member, Blakeslee and Robert Haas, the commission's secretary-general, insured that other opinions (not least of all McCoy's) received consideration as well.
The other members no longer complained that Lytton monopolized the drafting
process. In addition, McCoy mustered his reserves of tact and patience to nudge
General Claude! into taking a position less at odds with that of the other
commissioners. It was McCoy who devised the formula whereby Aldrovandi-the
nearest thing to a bridge between Claude! and the rest of the group-redrafted
key segments of the report to merge aspects of the Frenchman's position with
that of the majority. Recounting these events, Blakeslee wrote: "To General
McCoy . . . probably more than to any other man, the Commission owes its
unanimous report.'' 43
"As in all commissions," McCoy reported to his family, "there was a terrible
jam the last two weeks, but we finally reach[ed] unanimity, and finished our report
after midnight sittings" on September 4. The result was a remarkable document:
comprehensive in scope, evenhanded in tone, calibrated to expose Japanese
transgressions while refraining from naming a transgressor. It carefully noted
that "the issues involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are often
represented to be." Acknowledging the exceptional character of Japan's interests
in Manchuria, the report cited the validity of certain Japanese grievances. Japan,
it said, suffered more than any other power from the lawless conditions existing
in China. At the same time, the Lytton Report refused to accept Japan's claim
that its actions following the explosion at Mukden were measures of legitimate
self-defense. The subsequent creation of Manchukuo, the report said, resulted
not from a genuine and spontaneous independence movement but from intrigues
conceived, organized, and carried through by Japanese officials. The report
stopped short of accusing Japan of violating its various treaty obligations, but by
declaring Manchuria an integral part of China, it said as much by implication. 44
The report agreed that Japan's security was irrevocably linked to its Manchurian "life-line." But it suggested that Japan could protect its interests in ways
"more in keeping with the principles on which rests the present peace
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organization of the world." Specifically, the report proposed a ten-point formula
to guarantee Japan's Manchurian interests without granting it the right to
control the country either economically or politically. Key points were the
demilitarization of Manchuria in conjunction with the creation of an internationally supervised constabulary to maintain order in the region; Chinese
acceptance of the free participation of Japan in the economic development of
Manchuria; and the negotiation of Sino-Japanese commercial and nonaggression
treaties. The proposed commercial agreement would forbid Chinese boycotts of
Japanese goods. In return, Japan would dismantle Manchukuo and recognize the
autonomy of Manchuria under Chinese sovereignty. In return for acknowledging
that Manchuria was inalienably Chinese, Japan was promised first claim in the
economic exploitation of the region. If implemented, the Lytton Report's authors
believed, such an arrangement would not only resolve the dispute immediately at
hand but could become the starting point of a new era of close understanding
and political cooperation between Japan and China. 45
McCoy was delighted with the finished report. The commission stated its
findings so dispassionately, he believed, that even the Japanese would be pleased
with the tone of the report. He predicted to Nelson T. Johnson that the way the
facts had been set forth might influence the Japanese to ameliorate their attitude.
Yet, he warned, "if the present fanatical leaders of the [Japanese] Army continued
[in] control of the situation anything was possible," even an eventual JapaneseAmerican war. 46 Whatever the report's ultimate effect, McCoy delivered what
Stimson wanted: a unanimous report that found against Japan but refrained from
direct criticism. As McCoy accompanied the commission back to Geneva to
deliver the report to the League, Blakeslee assured Stanley Hornbeck at the State
Department that the commission's findings and recommendations would "be
gratifying to the Secretary of State and your own good self.'' Hornbeck passed on
Blakeslee's digest of the report to Stimson, who found it a fascinating paper, so
much so that "it kept me so wide awake that I didn't sleep much during the night
afterwards." Emphasizing the unanimity of the commissioners and the fact that
the report found against the Japanese on all important issues, Stimson predicted
that it would be "an epoch making document." He was especially pleased to note
that "the paper cannot help but justify the position I have taken right along." It
was, of course, in hopes of such justification that he agreed to American
representation on the commission in the first place. 47
Having received the report on October 1, the League released it the following
day. Reaction to the document in the United States was favorable. Like Stimson,
most American commentators interpreted the report's conclusions as a vindication of American policy. An article in the Boston Herald typified editorial
opinion: "While the Lytton Commission did not represent this government, its
findings strongly support our government's position on the Manchurian question." Of far greater importance, however, was the reaction of Japan. On
September 15, as Uchida had warned the commission, Tokyo recognized
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Manchukuo, thereby offering further proof of its truculence over Manchuria.
By taking this action before the League even received the Lytton Report, the
Japanese not only signaled in unmistakable terms their unhappiness with its
contents but also showed their disdain for the League's peacekeeping efforts as
a whole. 48 Despite Japan's action, the League persisted, treating the report as if
it held the key to resolving the crisis. For six weeks, the League's members
studied the contents of the document-and delayed its consideration by the
council in hopes that Japan's anticipated reaction would soften. But the
Japanese remained obdurate and so intimidated the council that, when its
members addressed themselves to the report on November 21, they only
referred the matter to the League Assembly. The assembly convened in early
December. Despite strong sentiment among many of the League's members to
adopt the report along with a resolution of nonrecognition, the uncertainty of
the great powers led to more delay and the creation of a Committee of Nineteen
to study the report further. 49
The United States deliberately kept its distance from these developments. In
Stimson's view, the Lytton Commission pointed the League in the proper
direction, one aligned with American policy. Now it was up to the League to find
the courage to move decisively, thereby confronting Japan with a united
opposition. It was imperative that the initiative for such a move come from the
League collectively rather than from any single state. Stimson wished especially
to avoid the appearance that the United States was pushing the League in an antiJapanese direction. Thus, when Hugh Wilson and Norman Davis, American
diplomatic observers at Geneva, suggested that McCoy sit on the Committee of
Nineteen, the idea was rejected. Indeed, although McCoy remained in Switzerland until December, he played no role in the debate over the report, remaining
outside of Geneva, aloof from the League's deliberations. 50
In reality, no amount of resolution on the League's part would deflect Japan
from its policy in Manchuria. Japanese representatives in Geneva made that point
as clearly as had Japanese officials in Tokyo in their conversations with the Lytton
Commission. As did many others, McCoy refused to accept Japan's stated
position at face value. Instead, he remained hopeful that a united expression of
Western opinion would bring Japan to its senses, as Stimson had predicted. In a
conversation with Hugh Wilson and Norman Davis before leaving Geneva,
McCoy summed up his views. As Wilson reported to Stimson,
McCoy believes that the Japanese have discounted a nonrecognition
declaration and that thus we need not fear that the issue of such a
declaration [by the League] will cause further irritation with the resulting
stiffening of their attitude. [Furthermore,] if the Japanese expect such a
declaration and it does not come they will feel that there is a disunion ... on
the part of the ... members of the League and will not feel the necessity for
compromise as they would if they faced concerted action.
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McCoy's views thus remained consistent with those of the secretary of state. Like
Stimson, he was dead wrong. 51
On December 31, nearly eleven months after his departure, McCoy returned to
Washington. He received Stimson's congratulations for a job well done and
briefed the secretary on the impressions garnered during his travels. McCoy
bolstered Stimson's confidence in the correctness of his policy. In his diary that
night, Stimson recorded with satisfaction McCoy's assurances "that Japan could
not get away with it in Manchuria." And, during a golf outing with Stimson two
weeks later, McCoy reiterated that "the policy of careful non-irritating resistance
in lining up the Powers against Japan is the one that is going to win out. ... The
moral pressure upon Japan is really more effective than the economic pressure
which she is up against in having bitten off more than she can chew." In sum,
McCoy assured Stimson that his efforts to mobilize world opinion against Japan
still promised to yield favorable results. 52
With his return to Washington, McCoy's connection with the crisis in the Far
East ended. Yet the crisis itself ground on, exposing in short order the false
premises of American policy. In February 1933, the Committee of Nineteen
concluded its deliberations, indorsing the Lytton Commission's conclusions. The
League Assembly proceeded to approve the Lytton Report and refused to
recognize any change in the Asian status quo occurring at the expense of China's
territorial integrity. However oblique the language, Japan stood condemned as an
aggressor by the community of nations. Stimson's policy, based upon the sanctity
of international agreements and the presumed efficacy of world opinion, was now
the League's as well. Yet Japan knew, as did the nations who stood in judgment,
that beyond the words of censure stood a void. As McCoy had admitted to Uchida,
neither the League nor the United States would employ military force or
economic sanctions. The West lacked the will and perhaps the means to enforce
its wishes . in such a distant quarter. Thus assured, the Japanese defiantly
abandoned the League, more than ever determined to pursue their vital interests
in Manchuria. Japan stood alone against the West, resentful at being branded an
international outlaw.s3
Months before, an assistant U.S. military attache in Tokyo speculated on the
consequences of the Lytton Report. Lt. Thomas G. Cranford already anticipated in July 1932 the report's essentially anti-Japanese character. "This will
make Japan withdraw from the League and defy the whole world," he
predicted. But, he added, "the worst of it is that they will blame the United
States more than anyone else." Cranford, of course, proved correct. Stimson's
belief in Japanese sensitivity to world opinion was utterly misplaced. Moreover,
his attempt to use the Lytton Commission to camouflage the role of the United
States in leading the opposition to Japan failed completely. The Japanese now
identified the United States as their principal foe. Despite the patent American
unwillingness to do anything substantive to check Japan, this perception of
hostility cast an ineradicable pall over Japanese-American relations. 54
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McCoy performed his role as the American representative on the Lytton
Commission with considerable skill. But it had been a creditable performance in
support of a flawed policy. Some months later, McCoy expressed to Lytton his
hope that their work would yet "point the way for the nations involved as it has
already done for the League." Lytton dourly replied that, with no settlement in
sight, "it looks very much .. . as if our work has been wasted." Certainly,
Lytton's was the more realistic appreciation. Whatever its intent, the Lytton
Report brought the Far East no nearer peace and pushed Japan farther along the
road to war. 55
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New Directions

Blaming Herbert Hoover for the Great Depression, the electorate in November
1932 repudiated both the president and his party, thereby ending the Republican
era that began in 1920. When McCoy returned to the United States several weeks
after the election, he discovered a nation waiting expectantly for President-elect
Franklin D. Roosevelt to fulfill his pledge to restore economic prosperity.
Meanwhile, the GOP's discredited leaders were bracing themselves for what
promised to be a long political exile. For an army officer who had enjoyed ties
with every Republican administration since Theodore Roosevelt's, the change in
power did not lack personal significance. Notwithstanding the American military's supposedly apolitical character, McCoy's intimacy with such men as Wood
and Stimson and his services to Coolidge and Hoover marked him indelibly as a
Republican general. Although acquainted with the incoming president, McCoy
could hardly expect to play in a Democratic administration the role that he
performed for Franklin Roosevelt's predecessors. For McCoy, too, an exile of
sorts seemed in the offing.
The general returned home to take command of the First Cavalry Division, the
largest formation in the depleted army of the Great Depression. General Douglas
MacArthur, the army chief of staff, had promised McCoy the division, describing
it with typical flourish as "a magnificant [sic] unit now at the apex of its splendid
efficiency." Although others might have characterized horse cavalry as then
approaching the apex of obsolescence, the officer corps viewed the command as a
plum assignment. Geographically, it left something to be desired. The First
Cavalry was garrisoned at Fort Bliss, located alongside El Paso in the farthest
reaches of western Texas. Commanding even a prestigious unit in such a remote
locale promised to limit McCoy's access to the centers of national influence to a
171
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greater extent than had any assignment since the last time a Democrat occupied
the White House. 1
Gracefully accepting his fate, McCoy looked forward to serving again with
troops. He told Stimson that he was eager to get out of Washington before the
Democrats took power. He did not intend to provide the sensitive MacArthur with
any pretext to claim that McCoy was ingratiating himself at the chief of staff's
expense by "pulling wires with Franklin Roosevelt." On March 2, two days
before the inauguration, McCoy made a final call on Stimson at the State
Department. Perhaps fearing that Roosevelt's inauguration marked the close of
his own career of government service, Stimson recorded his friend's leave-taking
in valedictory tones. "It was rather sad," wrote the outgoing secretary of state in
his diary, "to think that this was our last official intercourse." Yet, he added, "it
was encouraging and cheerful to think that there was a man in the world like
McCoy, and that he is on such terms with me. We have been comrades in so many,
many things together." Recalling the high points of their association, Stimson
praised McCoy as "a man with a broad vision" who had come to be "recognized
as the most unique soldier in the United States." 2

For McCoy, commanding a division turned out to be "a real picnic." His
responsibilities for training the unit and administering an installation as large as
Fort Bliss did not tax him unduly. The commanding general found time to ride
and hunt, and at age fifty-nine he still played polo occasionally. He and Frances
entertained guests such as the Stimsons, who spent two weeks at Fort Bliss in the
spring of 1933 in order to recuperate from the strains of public life. The New
Deal enlivened McCoy's official routine by assigning to his supervision some
sixty Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camps scattered throughout Texas,
Arizona, and New Mexico. Inspection tours of CCC camps provided a handy
excuse for visiting the Southwest's scenic attractions along the way and touring
old historical sites. All in all, the division commander's lot was a pleasant one. 3
To McCoy's regret, the picnic proved to be short-lived. In October 1933, the War
Department reassigned him to command the Seventh Corps Area with headquarters at Omaha, Nebraska. According to the organizational charts, the move was a
step up, but McCoy accepted the job with more resignation than enthusiasm. The
Seventh Corps commander's responsibilities encompassed army activities within
a seven-state region, including not only a number of regular, reserve, and
national guard units but also ROTC detachments and over 150 CCC camps. In
practice, however, his duties tended to be of a broad supervisory nature. McCoy
noted that his new routine did "not have the keen pleasure for me that the actual
command of troops has had." 4
Occasionally his duties did depart from the ordinary. In the spring of 1934, for
example, MacArthur worked himself into a lather over a proposal by the FarmerLabor party of Minnesota to convert ROTC at the state university from a

DiplomatInKhaki

Page 172

06/11/20 3:18 PM

NEW DIRECTIONS

173

mandatory to an optional student activity. Ever wary of conspiracy, MacArthur
suspected that, far from being an isolated matter of little consequence, the
attempt to deemphasize military training at Minnesota "synchronizes with the
drive throughout the country against the R.O.T.C. movement." The chief of staff
ordered McCoy to look into the matter. 5 As a result, in April 1934, McCoy spent a
week in Minneapolis and St. Paul. There he met Farmer-Labor chief Floyd B.
Olson, then Minnesota's "very radical Governor," and Lotus D. Coffman, the
university's "very conservative President," as well as others "in that mixed up
state." McCoy soon concluded that MacArthur's fears were greatly exaggerated.
Coffman and a majority of the Board of Regents steadfastly supported the
retention of compulsory military training at the university. Although Governor
Olson opposed mandatory ROTC, he assured McCoy that he had no intention of
making a public issue of the matter. The real opposition to ROTC centered in the
Committee on Militarism in Education, led by a small number of "so-called
Liberals and intelligentsia" whom McCoy dismissed as ineffectual. All in all, he
reported to MacArthur, "there is no immediate cause for concern." ROTC would
weather the crisis. 6
A less-interesting but regular part of McCoy's job was to keep the army and its
needs before the public. As the army's senior spokesman in the Great Plains,
McCoy was called to address numerous civilian groups. To the students of Kansas
State College, for example, he extolled the soldier's opportunities for public service
in peacetime, using the career of a Kansas State alumnus, James G. Harbord, as an
illustration. In an April 1934 Army Day address to the Kansas City Chamber of
Commerce, he reviewed recent army contributions to the civilian community such
as CCC camps, engineering projects, and air mail delivery. Speaking engagements
formed part of the routine of senior officers throughout the army; however
mundane the occasion or banal the sentiments expressed, such efforts were part of
the army's efforts to keep in touch with the people. 7
Nineteen-thirty-five brought McCoy yet another new assignment, this time as
commanding general of the Second Army in Chicago. Here McCoy's duties
remained largely unchanged: the supervision of maneuvers, unit inspections,
visits to CCC camps, and speaking engagements, all now on a grander scale.
Chicago lay closer to mainstream American society than did El Paso or Omaha.
Describing visits by Eleanor Roosevelt and Secretary of War George Dern,
McCoy remarked, "This busy place has me in its grip, and keeps me going too
fast." McCoy's neighbor in Chicago was a friend from World War I-Col. George
Catlett Marshall. Currently the senior instructor with the Illinois National Guard,
Marshall's career seemed to have reached a dead end. According to Marshall's
biographer, McCoy was instrumental in salvaging Marshall's fortunes. McCoy
arranged the interview for his friend with Secretary Dern during which Marshall
made the impression that secured his first star. 8
In the fall of 1935, Douglas MacArthur's term as army chief of staff expired.
Although an oft-mentioned contender for the post, McCoy was not selected, an
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outcome in which partisan considerations may have figured. A friend at the War
Department told McCoy that, although "it appears that you are the President's
real choice . . . , the question seems to have become largely a political one." He
warned that "some politicians are pointing out your long connections with
Republicans and the Republican Party." Whatever the reason, Maj. Gen. Malin
Craig ultimately succeeded MacArthur. 9
Although McCoy did not become chief of staff, realignment at the top rippled
through the general officer ranks and soon had him on the move again. In the
spring of 1936, the War Department shifted McCoy to command of the Second
Corps. With headquarters on Governor's Island in New York harbor, this
assignment was the most prestigious of the army's area commands. In a short
time, while remaining at Governor's Island, he took on the added responsibility
of commanding the First Army, encompassing the entire eastern seaboard as well
as Puerto Rico. 10 This move to the east coast brought few changes in McCoy's
military duties. By placing him in the intellectual and financial center of the
nation, however, it provided the opportunity to renew his involvement in public
affairs. The changes in the world situation by the mid-1930s-German rearmament under Adolf Hitler, continuing tension in the Far East, and the beginnings
of an intense foreign policy debate at home-provided further incentive for
McCoy to participate in public discussions of international affairs. During earlier
visits to New York, he accompanied Stimson to occasional meetings of the
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the hub of the east coast foreign policy
establishment. Now residing in New York, he accepted an invitation to join that
influential institution. Nor was his membership purely honorific. McCoy participated actively in the council's affairs. In the autumn of 1936, he chaired a council
study group that examined Japanese competition in international trade. The
following spring he presided at a CFR gathering to discuss American policy in
the Far East. In December 1937, with such luminaries as James T. Shotwell and
Allen W. Dulles sharing the dais, he presided at a council dinner held to consider
ways of staying out of war. Six months later, following the German annexation of
Austria, he joined the CFR research project on the mobilization of American
resources in time of war. 11
Thus, command of the First Army offered its own unique compensations. But
here, too, McCoy's stay was brief. Reaching the mandatory retirement age of
sixty-four, he ended his forty-one years of commissioned service on October 31,
1938. An impressive array of honors marked his departure from active duty. The
New York Times, chief organ of the establishment, reviewed McCoy's career as
"the army's pacificator and clean-up man" and cited achievements that made
him "the complete embodiment of the American soldier-diplomat ... as ready
and resourceful in peace as in war." That same month, Washington and Jefferson
College awarded McCoy the first of several honorary degrees that he would
receive. Over the next four years, Princeton, Brown, Clark, Columbia, and Yale
followed with similar honors. And, in 1939, the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial
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Association awarded its annual medal for distinguished national service to
McCoy, along with George Washington Carver and Carl Sandburg. 12
Often, of course, such tributes are merely tokens contrived to console once
important figures confronting the end of their prominence. Fulsome editorials,
honorary degrees, and medals are the gold watches of the elite. McCoy was lucky.
Continued deterioration of the international situation saved him from obscurity.
By the winter of 1935/36, Italy had overrun Ethiopia. The following spring,
Germany remilitarized the Rhineland. In July 1937, Japan invaded China proper.
German and Italian forces fought alongside Franco's Fascists in the Spanish
Civil War. In March 1938, Germany annexed Austria, and just prior to McCoy's
retirement, Great Britain and France surrendered to Hitler's demands that
Czechoslovakia yield the Sudetenland to the Third Reich. To McCoy as to many
others, these events heralded the coming of another world war that would
inevitably involve the United States.
After leaving the army, the McCoys settled in Lewistown. As he told Cameron
Forbes, "The old veteran has returned home after 45 years of being most
everywhere else." Yet the move was not as final as the remark implied. In the face
of what he saw as a growing crisis, he had no intention of slipping into silent
idleness. So McCoy continued to contribute to discussions of world affairs,
attempting like Leonard Wood a generation before to build support for increased
military preparedness. In an article in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch shortly after
his retirement, for example, he warned that respect for international law and the
treaty system that formed the basis for postwar stability had now "gone by the
board." In Asia, "the 'open door' has been shut in our faces," leaving vital
American interests at risk. Because the nation's "standard of living and habits of
life have become directly dependent on the sale of surplus products overseas, as
well as on the secure flow of imports," it must be American policy not only "to
defend our territories and people [but) to protect our world wide commerce, and
to insure respect for our peaceful policies of open and equal opportunity." Given
this definition of the national interest, McCoy assessed existing American
defenses as entirely inadequate. As he told his audience at the New York HeraldTribune's annual public affairs forum, the army since 1920 had "lived on its wartime fat." Making do with obsolete weapons would no longer suffice. "What,
then, is the best insurance against war?" he asked. "There can be only one
answer to this-adequate preparedness." For McCoy, preparedness meant not
only improving the size and quality of the military services but also streamlining
the nation's ability to employ force. Chief among his recommendations in this
regard was the "elimination of the unnecessary hampering restrictions which
bind the hands of the [chief] executive." As he explained to the Council on
Foreign Relations in January 1939, "I don't want to suggest that we turn our
Commander-in-Chief into a dictator, but I do want to find some way that he can
exercise his war powers without his being hampered and hindered by either the
people or Congress." McCoy reiterated this theme in a paper read to the
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Academy of Political Science in May 1939. To provide greater freedom of action
on the part of the president, he called upon Congress to study its war powers and
how it could best support the commander in chief, the State Department, and the
army and navy. 13
In public forums and in private institutions such as the Council on Foreign
Relations, McCoy participated in the controversy over national policy that
became increasingly heated in the late 1930s. His was not a decisive voice nor an
especially original one. Rather, it was but one of many contributing to a complex
and emotional debate that encompassed foreign policy, military preparedness,
and domestic priorities. Yet McCoy's involvement in that debate and the
acceptance of the propriety of his doing so are themselves important. Consider
the standard view of the officer corps in the 1930s as expressed by Russell F.
Weigley. The historic tradition of the officer corps, writes Professor Weigley, "was
one of isolated military professionalism that carefully abstained from involvement in the turmoils of civilian life and the vicissitudes of national policy
making." The Great Depression only exacerbated these tendencies, so that "by
the 1930s (the military's] passivity had come to seem an unbreakable tradition."
According to Professor Weigley, the army played virtually no role in shaping
American foreign policy in the 1930s-"nor did it seek to do so." As a result,
Weigley assigns partial responsibility for the coming of World War II to the
officer corps for "failing to perform consistently its duty to acquaint the civil
government with the military dimensions of national policy." 14
Although not entirely without merit, Weigley's view is incomplete. It fails to
recognize the existence of a second, activist tradition within the officer corpsthe tradition of Emory Upton, Leonard Wood, Billy Mitchell, and others,
including a generation later, Matthew B. Ridgway and James M. Gavin. Although
these men differed from one another in many ways, they shared this belief: Each
refused to accept a parochial definition of his responsibilities as an officer. Rather
than shunning the vicissitudes of national policymaking, they attempted to
influence its formulation. McCoy's public statements on the eve of World War II,
which together constituted a modest attempt to "acquaint the civil government
with the military dimensions of national policy," confirmed his place in this
activist tradition.

In the summer of 1939, McCoy acquired an institutional base that permitted him
to expand his efforts to influence, at least indirectly, the formulation of foreign
policy. In the process, he gained an opportunity to remedy a problem that he had
discussed years before with Stimson. Summarizing his views on the quality of
American public opinion, McCoy had complained that "there is generally too
much of a sectional feeling, too little broad concern about the nation, and outside
of a handpicked few, practically complete oblivion to international issues and
their particular effect on economic life." This lack of interest suggested a need to
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educate Americans as to their stake in world affairs and to provide them with the
information needed to consider foreign policy issues intelligently. 15
Since the end of World War I, there existed in the United States one
organization devoted exclusively to the twin objectives of improving public
understanding of foreign policy and circulating information on world affairs-the
Foreign Policy Association (FPA). The FPA was second only to the Council on
Foreign Relations among institutions devoted to international relations, yet to
equate the organizations would be misleading. As one journalist remarked in
comparing the two, "The difference is like that between the New York phone
book and Who's Who in America." The council, distinctly the more prestigious
and influential, is an exclusive guild in which prominent business, academic, and
political leaders gather privately to discuss international issues. The FPA, on the
other hand, exists to encourage the average citizen to take an interest in world
affairs. With membership open to anyone, the association devotes itself to the
widest possible dissemination of information about foreign policy issues of
interest to the United States. This difference in focus has obviated the need for
any competition between the association and the council. Indeed, between them,
a symbiotic relationship has flourished. The wealthy New Yorkers who have
financed the FPA have been closely linked to the council. In addition, council
members have frequently served as directors of the Foreign Policy Association.
For its part, the association has often provided a forum wherein leading figures of
the council could air their views to the public at large. 16
The Foreign Policy Association forms part of the legacy of the progressive era.
Near the end of World War I, a group of New York intellectuals and journalists of
progressive bent formed the League of Free Nations Association. The organization's founders-men such as Herbert Croly, Charles A. Beard, John Dewey, and
Walter Weyl-intended it as a vehicle to advocate a more active and constructive
role for the United States in the postwar world, specifically through membership
in some form of international peacekeeping organization. By 1919, the association was devoting its energies to supporting American entry into the League of
Nations. The Senate's rejection of the Versailles Treaty and the subsequent
elevation of Warren G. Harding to the presidency represented sharp defeats for
the American internationalist movement. As a result, by 1921 the association
found that both its audience and its access to the checkbooks of wealthy liberals
were dwindling. The association's leaders remained committed to internationalism but recognized that their struggle would be a protracted one. To enable
their creation to survive for the duration, they gave it a new identity. The
association renounced its earlier support for American membership in the
League and declared that henceforth it would avoid taking any particular
position on specific issues. Rather, it would concentrate on disseminating
objective, nonpartisan information on a broad range of foreign policy questions.
To symbolize this shift from advocacy to education, the organization chose a
bland, uncontroversial name: the Foreign Policy Association. 17
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The organizational metamorphosis succeeded. Throughout the 1920s and
1930s, public support for the FPA's programs grew steadily, as did the
organization's reputation. The association sponsored important research into
such topics as disarmament, war debts and reparations, and the World Court. It
administered the Bok Prize, which offered $100,000 for the best plan to secure
world peace, and it gave monetary awards for the year's best article on foreign
policy. Well-known speakers at FPA luncheons and meetings discussed world
affairs, with their addresses often broadcast to a larger audience. Most important,
the organization produced a wide variety of publications-the Foreign Policy
Bulletin, Foreign Policy Reports, and the Headlines series of pamphlets. 18 By
and large, the Foreign Policy Association honored its pledge of nonpartisanship.
At the same time, the organization remained faithful to its internationalist
origins, for the premise underlying virtually all of the association's activitiesthat Americans could no longer afford to ignore world affairs-itself had partisan
implications. The FPA sought to wean Americans from the belief that the nation
could remain apart from the world. As one historian wrote, the association was
thus attempting throughout the interwar era "to keep alive the Wilsonian vision
of an international world." Or, as the New York Times succinctly put it in the
headline of a recent anniversary assessment, the history of the Foreign Policy
Association has amounted to "60 Years of Wrestling with Isolationism." 19
Responding to a recommendation by Henry Stimson, the FPA' s board of
directors chose McCoy in the summer of 1939 to succeed Raymond Leslie Buell
as the association's president. In September, with German panzers rolling across
Poland and most Americans hoping to stay out of this new European war, McCoy
took office. At that time the FPA's rolls listed 14,600 total members distributed
among seventeen branches, most of which were located in the Northeast.
Unquestionably, McCoy's appointment enhanced his stature within the foreign
affairs community. Whereas previously his views represented the opinion of a
single, retired officer, they now reflected the views of a large and respected
institution. Yet, paradoxically, his new position obliged McCoy to become less
outspoken. Although he continued to speak through 1939 and 1940 on such
topics as national defense and "the British Empire under fire," he avoided
controversy. In October 1939, for example, when McCoy inaugurated a series of
FPA broadcasts on network radio with a speech entitled "Democracy and Foreign
Policy," he confined his remarks to considering the importance of accurate
information as a precondition for understanding foreign affairs. It was, in other
words, simply a plug for the FPA. 20
The reason for McCoy's reticence at a time when he was enjoying greater
prominence is clear. The need to preserve the FPA's reputation for nonpartisanship imposed real limits on the president's prerogatives to engage in public
debate. To entangle the association in such issues as rearmament, intervention,
and the virtues of neutrality would undermine the credibility of the organization's educational activities, activities that remained the heart of the FPA
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program. McCoy's own sensitivity to this problem is evident in his directive to
FPA members that use of the organization's name in connection with any
circular, protest, or petition was entirely unauthorized. Such actions, he warned,
endangered the association's status as an entirely nonpartisan educational
group.21
McCoy's role was to manage the affairs of a going concern, not to strike out in
any radically new direction. Given the requirement that the FPA's president set
the example of nonpartisanship, his interests revolved largely around fund
raising, administration, internal governance, and liaison with other institutions
such as the Council on Foreign Relations and the State Department. The FPA
suffered from chronic budgetary problems and depended heavily on support
~
from the affiuent to maintain its operations. A major responsibility of the
president was to solicit contributions from potential patrons who might make
sizable donations. Moreover, in meetings of the FPA's board of directors, McCoy
played a leading role in determining how the association would expend its
resources. The outbreak of another world war and especially U.S. entry into it in
December 1941 confronted the American people with a host of new foreign policy
issues. An understanding of world affairs was becoming more important than
ever before. The war, therefore, demanded a redoubling of FPA programs. With
considerable success, McCoy sought to broaden the reach of the association's
activities. FPA membership steadily increased; by 1945, his last full year as
president, it had more than doubled to 31,000. To capitalize on the influence of
radio, McCoy persuaded the National Broadcasting Company to present a series
of FPA-sponsored Sunday afternoon foreign affairs programs. He also expanded
the association's publications program, introducing a major new periodical, the
Pan American News. By the FPA's own standards, the flood of pamphlets and
newsletters produced during McCoy's tenure remained nonpartisan. That they
also retained a unifying theme is suggested by these titles of Headlines series
pamphlets: "The Struggle for World Order" (1941), "Unity Today for Tomorrow" (1942), and "On the Threshold of World Order" (1944).22
To the FPA's directors, World War II signaled the imminent demise of
American isolationism. Convinced that the nation and all mankind would benefit
from a postwar era of cooperative internationalism, the FPA leadership believed
that advocating such an idea could hardly be deemed partisan. The association
staked out its wartime role in unmistakable terms in December 1941 with a
pledge to "endeavor in every way to assist in the task of rebuilding world order."
The Foreign Policy Bulletin added that Americans would contribute to this new
world order only "by abandoning once and for all the illusion that we can ever
again isolate ourselves from the rest of humanity." Mrs. Bayard James, an FPA
director, elaborated on the association's position at a board meeting in January
1943: Given the FPA's "commit[ment] to an anti-isolationist policy," she said,
"we have an interest in world cooperation.... Our program should, therefore,
try to educate the public to that state of mind." The association's resolute pose of
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disinterest reflected the lessons of experience rather than any uncertainty as to
its position. The singlemindedness of the League of Nations Association in
pursuit of American entry into the League had proved counterproductive; the
FPA learned from its parent's failure that the effective lobby was the one that
avoided the lobbyist's identity. As another board member commented in
indorsing Mrs. James's view, the association learned to recognize that "it [is]
easier to educate people if they are not antagonized from the start by too strong a
position." To this, McCoy added that, after all, "our aim ... was to help promote
sound opinion on foreign affairs." To the FPA in the early 1940s, the promotion
of sound opinion meant propagating the gospel of internationalism. 23
What impact did the FPA' s efforts on behalf of internationlism have during the
war? The triumph of internationalism by the end of World War II proves nothing.
Various groups recognized the war as Wilsonianism's "second chance" and threw
themselves into making the most of the opportunity. 24 The conversion of the
American people to internationlism by 1945 derived from a number of other factors
as well, among them the decline of the traditional European powers, the
prominence of the American contribution to victory, and the support given the idea
by President Roosevelt. The relative influence of each factor is problematic. Yet,
given the FPA's reputation as an authoritative source of information about foreign
affairs as well as the vitality of its wartime programs, the association's contribution
· to changing the climate of public opinion was probably considerable.
Thus, the war became the pivotal episode in the FPA's institutional life, the
moment for which it had been created. That fact adds interest to the association's
selection of McCoy to lead it through the war years. When McCoy accepted the
FPA presidency in 1939, the demise of isolationism was by no means certain.
Indeed, at that moment, a vigorous amalgam of isolationist and antiwar
sentiment animated a large part of public opinion. Given that the FPA was
anxious to preserve its reputation of remaining above the partisan battle, one
might have expected the organization to shun any identification with soldiers
whose background supposedly stamped them collectively as warmongers and
interventionists. The association would not have engaged McCoy if such an
appointment risked saddling the FPA with the image of being led by an American
Colonel Blimp. The FPA clearly expected that McCoy's reputation would
enhance its own stature. McCoy's partnership with the FPA further illustrates
American willingness to permit soldiers a broad field of participation in foreign
affairs.

On several occasions, the war interrupted McCoy's routine as FPA president.
Although of little consequence individually, brief mention of these instances will
provide an appreciation of the scope of his wartime activities. Beginning in
December 1939, McCoy participated in the CFR's War and Peace Studies
Project. Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and including leaders such as
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John Foster Dulles, A. Whitney Griswold, William Langer, James Shotwell, and
Hanson Baldwin, the project undertook studies intended to provide the State
Department with long-term projections on issues stemming from the war.25
Early 1941 found McCoy on a 28,000-mile junket around Latin America,
entirely by air. This expedition had two sponsors: the State Department's
coordinator of commercial and cultural relations between the American republics, Nelson A. Rockefeller; and the Inter-American Escadrille, a private group
promoting the expansion of aviation in Latin America. The escadrille's directors
included Allen W. Dulles, Laurence S. Rockefeller, James P. Warburg, and James
R. Angell, president emeritus of Yale. Nelson Rockefeller's office defrayed the
expedition's operating expenses; his brother Laurence provided the twin-engine
amphibious aircraft that McCoy used.
The rationale for the trip, which carried McCoy to the principal capitals of
Central and South America, combined economics and security. One objective was
to improve the access of U.S. airlines and aircraft manufacturers to Latin
America. As McCoy noted upon his return, "At the end of the war the United
States will have a vast airplane productive capacity ... [and] an almost unlimited
supply of trained operating, maintenance, and manufacturing personnel." Full
use of that capacity would require new peacetime markets. McCoy's survey
convinced him that the postwar development of private and commercial flying in
South America would be enormous. It only remained to insure that the main
direction and impetus for that development were from the United States rather
than from Europe. By publicizing American technology in talks with aviation
ministry officials and businessmen, McCoy's mission was a step in that direction.
Yet his careful coordination with American military attaches in embassies and
legations along with the interest he expressed throughout the trip in airfield
construction suggests a second objective as well. By 1941, the United States had
become increasingly concerned about the Axis threat to South America. A
prerequisite for American assistance in the event of an attack on Latin America
would be air facilities available for rapid conversion to military use. McCoy's
mission assessed conditions relating to that problem as well. 26
In 1940, in a gesture of bipartisanship, President Roosevelt recalled Henry L.
Stimson to governmental service as secretary of war. George C. Marshall, now the
army chief of staff, immediately telephoned McCoy for advice on how to get along
with the new secretary. Once back in office, Stimson revived his practice of calling
on McCoy for counsel. During the war years, the secretary consulted McCoy on
matters such as the promotion of general officers, the suitability of Joseph W.
Stilwell to command American forces in China, and the type of military
government that the United States should establish in occupied territories. He
also tried to bring McCoy into the War Department on a full-time basis as
director of the draft. This attempt failed when FDR appointed Lewis B. Hershey
instead. Despite this setback, McCoy's connections in the War Department did
provide other opportunities for service. 27
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The first such opportunity followed the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941. Hoping to pre-empt any prolonged controversy over responsibility for the disaster, President Roosevelt in mid-December established a
commission to investigate the attack. Known as the Roberts Commission after its
chairman, Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, the group was predominantly
a military body composed of four senior officers: Adm. William H. Standley and
Adm. Joseph M. Reeves, both retired; Brig. Gen. Joseph M. McN arney of the
Army Air Corps; and McCoy. Although the commission's members were well
known as men of integrity and professional competence, they were hardly the sort
to dig too deeply into the conduct of their superiors, especially when there was a
war to be won. It was natural for McCoy, for example, to be more concerned with
supporting his friends Stimson and Marshall than with second-guessing their
conduct at such a crucial time. There is no evidence to suggest that the Roberts
Commission was told in advance what verdict to deliver, but its members
undoubtedly realized that a large part of their role was to demonstrate
appropriately decisive corrective action as a way of limiting any political damage
that Pearl Harbor may have caused. Certainly, the administration was expecting
such a report. It was also counting on the personal credentials of the
commission's members to win acceptance of their findings and thereby prevent
questions about Pearl Harbor from undermining either the nation's commitment
to the war effort or its confidence in the administration. 28 However much they
might try to approach their task with an open mind, Roberts and his military
colleagues did not undertake the investigation without some opinions already
formed. Certainly this was true in McCoy's case. The day after the Pearl Harbor
attack he told a friend that responsibility for the tragedy was "not even a
debatable question, that the Navy [had] failed to make good and must shoulder
the blame." McCoy's professional training inclined him to look to the commander in the field as the one obliged to bear the brunt of responsibility for
defeat.29
Beginning its work in Washington on December 18, the commission initially
took nonverbatim, unsworn testimony from senior Navy and War Department
officers, McCoy's friends Stimson and Marshall among them. Having completed
these interviews, the commission immediately departed for the west coast and
Hawaii. By December 22, Roberts and his associates had established themselves
at Honolulu's Royal Hawaiian Hotel. They remained there for two-and-a-half
weeks, diligently conducting their inquiry. With instructions to confine its
investigation to negligence on the part of military personnel directly involved,
the commission focused its attention on errors made in Hawaii rather than any
that may have been made in the nation's capital. In the process, the commissioners examined some 3,000 pages of documents and interviewed 127 witnesses
who generated 1,887 typewritten pages of testimony. On January 9, the last witness
stepped down. A day later, the commission took off for San Francisco, eventually
arriving back in Washington on January 15. After recalling several officials for
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additional testimony, the five commissioners signed the finished report on
January 23. Justice Roberts presented it to President Roosevelt the next day. 30
The report that FDR received and soon released to the public reached precisely
the conclusions for which the administration had hoped. It explicitly exonerated
senior officials in Washington; the commission assigned the onus of responsibility
for the tragedy to the commanders on the scene. In particular, the Roberts
Report cited Adm. Husband E. Kimmel and Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short-both
already relieved-for dereliction of duty.
Initial public reaction to the commission's findings was quite favorable. As
Stimson remarked with satisfaction, although "Congress and the press are
showing signs of going through a ghost hunt . . . and the isolationists are
beginning to take up that cry in Congress, ... the report met virtually all such
trails." Administration leaders took particular encouragement from the favorable editorial treatment that the report received. The New York Sun applauded it
as "masterly in form and lucid in its findings." The New York Times
complimented the investigators on a "remarkably candid, thorough and able
document." Yet the Times also registered a significant reservation, wondering
whether Roberts and his coauthors may not have been "too sweeping in
exculpating their superiors in Washington from blame." 31 Despite the general
approval that initially greeted the commission's efforts, doubt soon spread.
Acceptance of the Roberts Report as the authoritative explanation of the Pearl
Harbor disaster was short-lived. Of more immediate interest to the administration, the political value of the report in deflecting attention from its own
responsibility for Pearl Harbor soon declined. Unresolved questions of cause and
culpability dogged the administration throughout the war. 32
McCoy's next foray into government service was more successful. It began on
June 27, 1942, when J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), announced the capture of eight Nazi saboteurs along the
Florida and Long Island coasts. Acting on a Justice Department recommendation, President Roosevelt directed the army to determine the fate of the captives.
On July 2, the president signed an order creating a military commission of eight
general officers to try the prisoners. Roosevelt recalled McCoy to active duty to
preside as the commission's president. 33 No one doubted the outcome of the
proceedings. The elaborate preparations for the trial reflected the administration's desire to maintain even in wartime the appearance of due process. As the
government candidly noted, given that "enemies caught behind the lines without
uniform need not be tried at all,'' the proceedings of the military commission
were "merely a matter of grace ... , in recognition of our own respect for
democratic procedures." Similarly, Stimson noted in his diary that the trial was
designed to demonstrate that "there is no railroading of the defendants to their
death and no star chamber." 34
Less agreement existed with regard to how McCoy would carry out his charge.
Attorney General Francis Biddle, who headed the government's team of
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The military commission presiding at the trial of the Nazi saboteurs, 1942. To
McCoy's left is Maj. Gen. Blanton Winship; to his right are Maj. Gen. Walter G.
Grant, Maj. Gen. L. Gasser, and Brig. Gen. John T. Lewis. (Courtesy U.S. Army
Military History Institute)

prosecutors, wanted maximum publicity given to the proceedings. Likewise, J.
Edgar Hoover, who planned to attend the trial to "assist" Biddle, hoped to
exploit the saboteurs to garner publicity for the FBI. Allied with Biddle and
Hoover was the chief of the Office of War Information (OWi), Elmer Davis. As
head of the federal government's domestic propaganda agency, Davis intended to
use the trial to give Americans a minor but welcome success against Germany. In
contrast, the War Department's concern was to insure that the proceedings
revealed no information that could adversely affect national security. Stimson,
therefore, asked McCoy to minimize the publicity given the trial. To the distress
of the press and the OWi, McCoy responded to Stimson's guidance by barring
from the courtroom all but the actual participants in the trial. 35
McCoy's decision touched off a brief bureaucratic skirmish. Davis complained
to the president, who called Stimson over to the White House to confer on the
matter. At FDR's urging, Stimson promised that McCoy would at least issue
periodic communiques describing the progress made in the courtroom. But
Davis's victory was a hollow one. Although McCoy began releasing statements to
the press, they were so enigmatic that, according to one newspaper, they "barely
went beyond the admission that the trial was being held." For all practical
purposes, the commission carried on in virtual secrecy, much to the irritation of
Biddle, Hoover, and Davis. 36
The results of the trial were foreordained. Permitting a standard of evidence
that McCoy acknowledged was "far more flexible ... than prevails in ordinary
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criminal trials or in courts-martial," the commission found the eight defendants
guilty. Stimson was pleased with the outcome and praised McCoy for setting an
important precedent for the "protection of the national interests against
dangerous and subversive attacks." Although in a letter to Col. Robert
McCormick, publisher of the Chicago Tribune, McCoy commented on "the more
or less star chamber" character of the trial, he was speaking in terms of
peacetime standards. In war, of necessity, results outweighed methods in such
matters, and McCoy delivered the desired results. Two of the convicted saboteurs
received long prison terms; the remaining six, whom McCoy sentenced to death,
were electrocuted on August 8, 1942. A rough sort of justice had been done. 37
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The Far Eastern
Commission

To contemporary observers, the Axis collapse of 1945 marked the beginning of a
new historical epoch. World War II destroyed the prewar balance of power. The
struggle that laid waste to Germany and Japan also exhausted Great Britain,
France, and China among the nominal victors. Although the Soviet Union's vast
resources left it in somewhat better shape, that nation, too, faced the long and
arduous task of repairing the devastation suffered at the hands of the Third
Reich. Only the United States emerged from the war intact. Indeed, the war
enhanced American power many times over. American economic and military
supremacy-the latter resting largely on a monopoly of atomic weaponsappeared unassailable. This realization of American potential at the expense of
the declining traditional powers had important diplomatic consequences. The
end of the war offered the United States that second chance for which groups
such as the Foreign Policy Association had labored. As George F. Kennan
remarked, it now seemed inevitable that the American people would shoulder
"the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly
intended them to bear." To many Americans, the opportunity to reclaim the
legacy of Woodrow Wilson and create a new world order seemed theirs for the
asking. In short, Henry Luce's promised American Century was at hand. 1
With the destiny of mankind thus apparently in the balance, the United States
in 1945 set out to incorporate American notions of how the world should operate
into a new structure of international relations. The results of this effort-the
United Nations, the Bretton Woods Agreement, and the various allied diplomatic
councils and occupation authorities-were intended to blend distinctly American
political and economic values with the Wilsonian ideal of international cooperation. A brand of leadership that prescribed specific norms while simultaneously
inviting cooperative multilateral control promised to be difficult at best. As
186
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events would show, few Americans were inclined to concede that the interests of
other nations might legitimately differ from those of the United States. When
differences arose, Americans typically attributed them to obstinacy, wrongheadedness, or the willful desire to undermine world peace. Reluctant to see its
vision of a better world frustrated, the United States replied to such opposition
by resorting to unilateral action-all without dropping a syllable of its professed
devotion to international cooperation. In this way, in the late 1940s, the United
States usually achieved its ends, but at a cost of damaging any hope for genuine
international harmony.
We most often associate the demise of postwar harmony with the rise of SovietAmerican hostility and the onset of the Cold War. For the past forty years, no
other phenomenon has approached the Cold War in its overriding significance
for world affairs. But the Soviet Union was not the only nation that bridled at the
U.S. assertion of global leadership. Nor does the Cold War provide the sole
example of how the American response to such opposition contributed to
international disharmony. In the Far East, for example, World War II left in its
wake widespread economic dislocation, surging nationalism, and renewed civil
war in China. Of greater importance than any of these to the United States,
however, was Japan and the policies to be pursued in occupying, reforming, and
rehabilitating this former enemy. Given its predominant contribution to victory
in the Pacific, the United States expected to assume primary direction of
occupation policies in Japan. Yet the other nations that had fought Japan-China,
Great Britain, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, in particular-also
insisted upon a voice in the occupation. The professed American commitment to
international cooperation made it difficult for the United States to ignore these
claims altogether. But combining American control with allied participation in
occupied Japan would prove workable only so long as allied interests coincided
with those of the United States. In practice, such an identity of interests never
existed. The subsequent American response to allied independence regarding
Japan illustrates an important contradiction of postwar U.S. policy. From his
vantage point at the nexus of that contradiction, Frank McCoy labored for four
years to find some common ground between the United States and allied
positions regarding Japan. His failure provided a frustrating and in some ways
ignominious denouement to his career.

Preliminary jockeying for control of postwar Japan began during the war;
however, not until August 1945 did the allies seriously attempt to reach an
agreement on the issue. At that time, the United States proposed to the other
members of the Big Four that the nations actively engaged in hostilities against
Japan should form a Far Eastern Advisory Commission (FEAC) to oversee the
occupation. With this device, the United States hoped to satisfy its allies by
offering them an honorific role in the occupation while retaining real control for
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itself. The operative word in the commission's title was Advisory. Charged with
making recommendations regarding the policies and principles that would guide
the occupation, the FEAC would exercise no real authority. Given the commission's purely advisory character, the American proposal received a cool reception. Among the great powers, only China offered unequivocal support. Britain
applauded the concept of an allied commission for Japan but objected to the
limited powers envisioned for it by the United States. The Soviets, too,
anticipated that the FEAC would be impotent and refused to join. The lesser
allies-Australia, Canada, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the
Philippines-accepted invitations to sit on the commission. Yet they, too,
objected not only to the weakness of its charter but also to the Big Four's failure
to consult them in formulating the commission. 2
Frank McCoy's connection with these events began with a telephone call from
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes on October 9, 1945. Byrnes said that President
Harry S Truman wanted to know if McCoy was available to represent the United
States on the FEAC. Accepting the position would require McCoy to give up his
post as president of the Foreign Policy Association and leave the comfortable life
that he and Frances enjoyed in New York. Still, the offer was an attractive one:
Neither hungry for power nor craving a return to the limelight, McCoy yearned at
seventy-one to contribute to this new age of international relations. Disqualified
by age from active service in the war just ended, he remained in spirit young
enough-in his way, idealistic enough-to be excited by even a modest role in
shaping the postwar world. The scope of the task at hand-the expectation that
the United States would lead its allies toward a global order based on the values
for which they had fought-gave the prospect added appeal. Nor was McCoy
inclined to renounce his long-standing principle of acceding to presidential
requests for his services. Without hesitation, he accepted. 3
McCoy took up his new duties in time to attend the FEAC's opening session in
Washington on October 30, where he listened to Byrnes reiterate the American
promise of cooperation and joint action in dealings with other nations. With the
lesser powers feeling slighted, the British rejecting the commission's terms of
reference, and the Soviets absent altogether, the FEAC seemed ill-suited to
redeem the secretary's pledge.4 At the commission's second meeting, the
delegates unanimously chose McCoy to serve as permanent chairman, an
acknowledgment of American primacy in the Far East. From the beginning of his
tenure, however, McCoy found himself caught between the conflicting views of
the commission's role held by his own government and by the other member
nations. The commission's effectiveness would depend largely on McCoy's ability
to align the two views. 5
From the outset, McCoy recognized the deficiencies of the FEAC. The United
States would be naive to expect its allies long to support arrangements that
bestowed the appearance of collective indorsement upon actions stemming in
fact from unilateral American decisions. Soviet refusal to join the FEAC
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constituted a second, equally serious flaw. The commission's deliberations,
remarked McCoy to a friend, were like "a play without Hamlet when Russia is
absent from the table." So, to his own government, McCoy advocated a policy of
broadening allied participation in the occupation, thereby giving substance to
American promises of international cooperation. In a memorandum written prior
to the FEAC's first meeting, McCoy cautioned Secretary Byrnes that "unless
further steps are taken to meet the desires of our Allies there is serious doubt as
to whether the commission will be able to function satisfactorily." To remedy the
FEAC's inadequacies, he proposed that the commission be given power to
formulate policies, principles, and standards to govern the occupation of Japan
instead of merely making recommendations. In conjunction with this change of
responsibilities, McCoy suggested that the word Advisory in the title of the
commission be omitted. And, not least of all, he called for elimination of the veto
that the FEAC charter granted to the Big Four powers. 6
In commission proceedings, however, McCoy found himself obliged to defend
the existing FEAC to delegates who soon felt restless and irrelevant. On
November 7, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, just back from Japan,
bluntly informed the commission that "Gen[eral Douglas] MacArthur had
expressed the view that the FEAC was no concern of his." Given such an attitude
on the part of the supreme commander for the allied powers (SCAP), the
delegates had difficulty imagining just what any advisory body could accomplish.
To make matters worse, the commission found itself unable to get to work due to
continuing disagreement over its terms of reference. The allies recognized, of
course, that while the FEAC dawdled, the actual occupation was proceeding apace
under SCAP's control. The Australian ambassador to the FEAC and to the
United States, Herbert V. Evatt, complained that while the commission talked,
policy was being put into effect every day. He warned that "the time would come
... when no Government could remain on such a Commission." In reply, McCoy
could only observe that Japan's hasty surrender had required the United States to
exercise a certain amount of initiative. He promised that once the FEAC got on
its feet, American policies would revert to a more cooperative plane. 7
Dissatisfaction was thus so great that, virtually as soon as the FEAC came into
existence, the allies launched a concerted effort to change it. Two distinct
approaches to strengthening the allied character of the occupation soon emerged.
The Soviets challenged the practicality of relying on a body located in
Washington to supervise events in Tokyo. They advocated the formation of an
Allied Control Council in Japan to complement the FEAC by' monitoring the dayto-day business of the occupation. Great Britain supported the concept of a
Washington-based commission but wanted to provide it with real authority-the
British wanted a commission empowered to determine rather than merely
recommend occupation policy. Soviet and British unhappiness with existing
arrangements undoubtedly carried greater weight in American government
circles than did McCoy's own critique. Although loath to see its authority
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diminished, the United States recognized the need to compromise if it hoped to
preserve a semblance of allied unity in Japan. 8
Negotiations among the three powers produced a solution in time for the
December meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow. At first
glance, the agreement seemed to contain generous American concessions. In
exchange for Soviet membership on the commission in Washington, the United
States agreed to the creation in Tokyo of an Allied Council, consisting of
representatives from the United States, the USSR, China, and the British
Commonwealth. Responding to British criticism, the United States also accepted
several changes in the FEAC's terms of reference. Indicative of the commission's
new role was a new name-the Far Eastern Commission (FEC). As McCoy
suggested, the word Advisory was dropped. Furthermore, the foremost prerogative of this new FEC was the authority to formulate the policies, principles,
and standards for the conduct of the occupation. 9 Yet upon closer examination,
the American concessions lose much of their apparent significance. The Soviet
victory in gaining acceptance of an Allied Council in Tokyo was a hollow one.
Deletion of the word control from the original Soviet proposal signified more
than a semantic detail. The Moscow agreement strictly limited the Allied Council
to consulting with and advising the supreme commander. The council possessed
no authority to overrule or restrain MacArthur, who in any event served as the
body's chairman. The council's terms of reference stated explicitly that the
supreme commander remained "the sole executive authority for the Allied
Powers in Japan." Although it was hoped that MacArthur would consult with the
council when "the exigencies of the situation permitt[ed]," he alone would
determine whether or not such consultation was appropriate. According to the
council's charter, SCAP's decisions upon these matters would be controlling. 10
Similarly, even though the Council of Foreign Ministers had apparently vested
in the FEC ultimate responsibility for making occupation policy, the United
States was counting on certain provisions of the Moscow agreement to minimize
any real loss of American authority in Japan. First, by requiring the FEC to use
the existing chain of command from Washington to Tokyo, the revised terms of
reference inserted several layers of American bureaucracy between the commission and MacArthur. Second, the new FEC charter prohibited the commission
from issuing instructions directly to SCAP. Rather, the commission was expected
to forward its policy decisions to the U.S. government, which would draft and
transmit specific implementing directives to MacArthur. Third, the commission
could take no action without the approval of the United States because FEC
decisions required unanimous American, British, Chinese, and Soviet concurrence. And last, should urgent matters arise not covered by policies already
formulated by the commission, the United States unilaterally could issue interim
directives with the force of policy. Thus, the United States could circumvent the
commission by finding that "urgent matters" existed requiring immediate
action. 11 These safeguards preserved the substance of American power in Japan.
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Yet in allied eyes, the Moscow agreement created expectations that the FEC
would function as a policymaking body. The revised terms of reference seemed to
reaffirm the American promise to include the allies in the occupation in a
meaningful way. Any subsequent attempt to hamstring the commission by
exploiting the loopholes in the FEC charter would appear to be a breach of good
faith. As one member of the commission remarked, in such an event, the allies
would feel as though they had "been invited to dinner [by the United States] and
then given nothing to eat." 12

Revision of the FEC's charter formed just one part of the effort to salvage allied
cooperation in Japan. A cooperative occupation under U.S. control required the
support not only of the other Pacific allies but also of the American potentate
currently installed in Tokyo. Douglas MacArthur, however, hotly opposed allied
involvement in Japan, so, while Byrnes met in Moscow with his British and Soviet
counterparts, the FEAC dispatched emissaries to Tokyo to mend fences with
SCAP. Accompanied by representatives from each FEAC member nation, McCoy
with Frances flew from Washington to Hawaii on December 26, 1945. 13 At Pearl
Harbor, the party boarded the U.S.S. Mount McKinley for the voyage to Japan,
arriving on January 10. McCoy and his colleagues remained in Japan for three
weeks, where they met with Japanese officials and "were lectured by General
MacArthur and all the members of the occupation staff.'' According to George H.
Blakeslee, serving as he had in Manchuria as McCoy's political adviser, the
FEAC's members generally liked what they saw in Japan, though with important
reservations. Conceding that "the Occupation authorities are the real government of Japan," the allies still believed that SCAP should make an effort to
"consult the Japanese before the issuance of directives." Several commission
members also objected to the high priority that MacArthur assigned to political
issues at the expense of economic ones. As Blakeslee summarized the commission's views: "The immediate problem is economic. A sane democracy cannot
rest on an empty stomach." Failure to meet the essential needs of a jobless and
hungry people invited political extremism. Yet, even as it called for attention to
Japan's economic problems, the commission insisted that the issue of war
reparations be resolved first. Stated simply, a final determination of the resources
and facilities that Japan would forfeit seemed necessary before full use could
begin of those that the Japanese would retain. Given that several FEAC nations
were counting on spoils from Japan to facilitate their own recovery, the allied
emphasis on economic issues generally, and reparations specifically, was hardly
disinterested. 14
Allied reservations regarding SCAP were eased by the surprisingly warm
reception that MacArthur gave to the commission. In an audience granted on
Janaury 30, the general employed his considerable charm to convince McCoy's
party that he now "looked upon the relationship between himself ... and the
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The Far Eastern Advisory Commission arrives in Japan to consult with SCAP, January
1946. Facing McCoy is Sir Carl Berendsen of New Zealand. (Courtesy National
Archives)

Commission as a relationship of a team." MacArthur "spoke feelingly about the
international character of his mission" and indicated that he "was deeply
conscious of his responsibility to each and every nation participating in the
occupation." The supreme commander even expressed enthusiasm for adding
allied officers to his staff. Indeed, he promised that "any personnel that might be
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offered would be more than welcome to him and to his organization." Quite
unexpectedly, a sound relationship between SCAP and the commission seemed
possible. 15
In mid-February, the commission returned to Washington, prepared at last to
begin catching up with an occupation that began months before. The adoption of
revised terms of reference, the addition of a Soviet member, and the opening of
new headquarters at the former Japanese embassy on Massachusetts Avenue
appeared to herald a real chance for success. Secretary Byrnes reinforced the
prevailing sense of optimism at the opening session of the officially redesignated
FEC on February 26 by affirming that the United States had "always desired that
the control of Japan should become an Allied responsibility." The secretary of
state described the commission's conversion to a policymaking group as one of
the major accomplishments of the Moscow conference. He told the assembled
delegates that "the Terms of Reference agreed to .. . in Moscow placed the final
and ultimate responsibility for formulating the policies and principles upon
which the peace and security of the Pacific may well be based, in your hands." 16
Yet, by the end ·of 1946, American policies had destroyed the FEC as an effective
body. MacArthur's pledge of cooperation proved meaningless, and the State and
War departments chose to take advantage of flaws in the Moscow agreement to
paralyze the commission. Although examples abound of how the United States
undercut the FEC's position, the issue that was most important in the
commission's eyes-the drafting and ratification of a Japanese constitutionprovides the best illustration.

The FEC considered its claim of responsibility for constitutional reform to be
unassailable. Commission members, including McCoy, believed that in giving the
FEC authority to establish basic occupation policies, the Moscow agreement had
placed constitutional matters well within the commission' s purview. Statements
by American officials lent support to that view. In Tokyo, MacArthur told the
commission that "the question of constitutional reform ... had been taken out
of his hands by the Moscow Agreement." And in a press conference on March 12,
Byrnes promised that "before the Constitution becomes constitutionally effective, it will in some way or other come before the Far Eastern Commission." 17
Despite such assurances, American officials consistently excluded the FEC from
constitutional matters. Concerned lest a mature FEC someday impair his own
authority, MacArthur concluded that pre-empting the FEC's claim to constitutional reform would ·enable him to bludgeon the still-frail commission into
submission before it acquired real strength. Within five days of his meeting with
McCoy and the FEC in Tokyo, MacArthur without fanfare directed his staff to
begin writing a new constitution. By early March, senior Japanese officials had
approved SCAP's draft. MacArthur immediately and brashly announced that
adoption of the draft constitution-which had his full approval-would proceed
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forthwith. Toward that end, SCAP scheduled the election of a new Japanese Diet
on April 10. A top priority of this Diet would be to ratify SCAP' s handiwork. 18
MacArthur's announcement caught the FEC by surprise. Recognizing that
SCAP's action threatened to present it with a fait accompli, the commission
reacted vigorously. Objections to SCAP's initiative dominated FEC meetings
throughout March. Allied members attacked the draft as fundamentally defective. Sir Frederic Eggleston of Australia characterized it as "one of the most
sketchy documents that has ever been put forward." The British representative
described it as "rather idiotic." The allied members voiced particular criticism
of MacArthur's public indorsement of the draft. They feared that SCAP's
approval foreclosed the possibility of giving equal consideration to any alternative-such as one the FEC itself might devise. Last, McCoy's colleagues
objected to the date set for electing a new Diet. They argued for postponement
on two counts: first, to allow the participation of Japanese soldiers still returning
from overseas; and second, to permit more time for the Japanese people to
assimilate democratic principles. To those who argued-as McCoy was obliged to
do-that details such as scheduling elections lay beyond the FEC's competence,
Sir Carl Berendsen of New Zealand replied: "I defy anybody confidently to
construe the order of reference of this Commission-that remarkable document,
that remarkably ambiguous document, that remarkably ill-drafted document.
[But] if there is one thing that is clear it is that any matter of policy is within the
purview of this commission." He concluded that there could be no matter of
policy more important than one relating to providing liberal government for
Japan. More was at stake than simply Japan's future political structure. If the
FEC permitted SCAP to wrest responsibility for constitutional reform away from
the commission, the prospects for any real allied participation in the occupation
would fade. 19
McCoy loyally tried to support SCAP. He defended MacArthur's indorsement
of the constitution as personal rather than official. He told Berendsen that the
FEC was too far removed from events in Japan to concern itself with election
dates. Moreover, he suggested, whatever its imperfections, a new Diet would
surely be preferable to the one currently sitting-its members had been in office
since 1942. Above all, McCoy tried to convince his colleagues that the FEC's
prerogatives were secure. "In any case," he promised them, "no Diet can adopt
the constitution without [it] being passed on by this commission." 20 McCoy's
assurances failed to placate the allies. They insisted upon some collective
expression of their displeasure with MacArthur. In addition, they wanted the
commission to affirm that "the Far Eastern Commission must be given an
opportunity to pass upon the final draft of the Constitution ... before it is finally
approved by the Diet and becomes legally valid." Convinced that such an
assertion was within the commission's prerogatives, McCoy supported a motion
containing that language. On March 20, the motion passed unanimously. McCoy
also concurred with a suggestion to SCAP that he delay the election of the new
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Diet. McCoy asked only that he be permitted to draft the message himself to
avoid getting MacArthur's "back hair up." 21
Although respectful to a fault, McCoy's message infuriated the supreme
commander. The FEC's impudence in presuming to tell him how to run the
occupation was intolerable. MacArthur's reply was abrupt and arrogant. Backhandedly dismissing the FEC, MacArthur began by defining the basis of
occupational policy as "the utilization of the Japanese Government to the fullest
extent under SCAP supervision and control." Notwithstanding the fact that the
election of a new Diet had already been twice delayed, he warned that any
postponement would have a profoundly adverse reaction. As for the constitution,
MacArthur disclaimed responsibility for that document. He chided the FEC for
"laboring under a confusion of thought" in believing that the draft represented
the views of any single individual. The supreme commander defended the draft
as the work of men from many different groups and many different affiliations.
Therefore, he concluded, "my own approval of it will have no slightest effect in
any way." In sum, MacArthur rejected the commission's concerns out of hand
and would proceed as he had planned. 22
MacArthur's reply did little to mollify the FEC. The Soviet delegate, Mikolay
V. Novikov, termed the response evasive and with Berendsen called for FEC
action to suspend the elections. McCoy answered that for the FEC to begin
"intervening at every point ... captiously" would be wrong, especially if doing
so might endanger the progress already achieved in Japan. If the FEC had
intended to make an issue of the election, it should have done so during its visit
to Japan. With the balloting now less than two weeks away, any action was likely
to be ill-considered. Reluctantly, the allies went along with McCoy. In fact, they
had no alternative. After all, the commission lacked the authority to override
MacArthur. The FEC's charter prohibited it from issuing orders, and SCAP
proved serenely immune to polite suggestions. The commission's members
recognized that their chances of winning a direct confrontation with MacArthur
were poor. Certainly the general's nominal superiors in Washington evidenced
no inclination to rally behind the FEC. So the commission acquiesced in the
election as scheduled. 23
Despite having lost the skirmish, the FEC did not give up on the issue of
constitutional reform. The commission's hopes for effectiveness hinged on its
ability to establish a relationship with SCAP based on mutual respect. On one
level, general accord existed. None of McCoy's colleagues disagreed with his
assertion on March 27 that "ours ... is a problem of [formulating] broad policy."
Nor did they dispute his comment that "General MacArthur is charged with the
daily dozen" -that is, with day-to-day implementation. But, in practice, no clearcut line existed between policy formulation and policy implementationespecially because SCAP had habitually exercised both functions in the months
before the FEC's creation. McCoy believed that the commission needed to jump
ahead in the policy formulation process by addressing issues as yet untouched by
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SCAP. "The only way we can function and do what our terms of reference had
given us the power to do," he said, "is to get together on some problems for the
future." Concerning relations with MacArthur, McCoy concluded, "We can't
expect him to follow our ideas ... until we lay down some broad policy." Yet
McCoy's colleagues believed that MacArthur's action in drafting a constitutionafter claiming that the matter was no concern of his-had denied them the
chance that was rightfully theirs to make policy in an area of fundamental
importance. 24 So the commission resolved to seek a new accord with MacArthur.
In early April, the allied members requested McCoy to communicate their
concerns to SCAP. The result was two FEC messages sent to MacArthur on April
12, each suggesting ways to improve communications between SCAP and the
commission. In a separate personal message to MacArthur, McCoy discussed
allied unhappiness more candidly. He outlined the role that the allies expected to
play in constitutional reform and concluded that "unless [the] Commission has
full opportunity to express itself before final adoption of [the constitution], there
is grave danger that it will not be approved by the Commission." 25
MacArthur's reply to McCoy on April 15 removed any doubts as to his
opposition to the FEC. The supreme commander rejected the assumption that
the allies were acting in good faith. Rather, FEC intrusion into constitutional
questions represented "a planned and concerted attack" on American authority
in Japan "under the veneer of diplomacy and comradeship." By insisting that it
approve the draft constitution prior to its ratification, "The Far Eastern
commission is reversing American policy," MacArthur wrote.
The purpose underlying such requirement is not clear, but its effect is
capable of doing immeasurable harm to the occupation as it will undoubtedly prejudice many Jap[anese] people against the instrument itself who will
therefore look upon it as a thing forced upon Japan at the point of Allied
bayonets.... There can be no free will when the threat of disapproval by
the Allied powers overhangs all deliberation, discussion and debate of the
constitutional issue.
MacArthur rebuked McCoy for failing to prevent FEC interference in occupation
affairs. He concluded with typical bombast: "Appeasements, small as they may
seem, rapidly become cumulative to the point of danger. If we lose control of this
sphere of influence under this policy of aggressive action [by the FEC], we will
not only jeopardize the occupation but hazard the future safety of the United
States. " 26
If anyone was "reversing American policy," of course, it was MacArthur,
through his implacable hostility to allied participation in the occupation as had
been agreed upon at Moscow. American officials were too timid to take issue with
the general. In commenting on MacArthur's message, the director of the Office of
Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent, proposed that the State Department
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straddle the FEC-SCAP dispute, disagreeing with neither side. "Concurrence
should be expressed with General MacArthur's general approach," Vincent told
Secretary Byrnes, while also "indicating simply, without legalistic argument,"
that the department supported the FEC's claim to have a say on the constitution.
Yet, by making such a distinction, McCoy's reply to MacArthur, revised by
Vincent and approved by Byrnes, read like an apology. While telling MacArthur
that the constitution would in some way come before the FEC, the message also
said that "our view is in full accord with yours that the Commission should take
no formal action on a new Constitution" unless it failed to meet the criteria of
the Potsdam declaration. McCoy concluded with assurances to MacArthur that
"I will always protect your flank and rear." 27
MacArthur had addressed his reply to McCoy personally. Therefore, McCoy
was not obliged to reveal its contents to the commission. Indeed, given the
cable's insulting tone, he would have been foolish to do so. For several weeks,
however, MacArthur did not respond to the FEC's queries of April 12. SCAP's
silence provoked further resentment among the allied members, who now felt
that MacArthur was simply ignoring them. 28 The allies vented their resentment
with new demands for recognition of the commission's right to set the terms for
constitutional ratification. McCoy opposed such expressions of assertiveness,
fearing that they would reinforce SCAP's view of the FEC as a threat. He
deflected a proposal by the Soviet and Indian delegates to use a constituent
assembly or plebiscite rather than the Diet as the instrument of ratification.
McCoy described the issue as a procedural one and therefore of concern to the
Allied Council rather than the FEC. Likewise, McCoy opposed a motion by New
Zealand on May 13 declaring that "no Constitution for Japan shall be finally
adopted until it has been approved by the Far Eastern Commission." According
to McCoy, such a declaration would "prevent us from getting that complete
cooperation that I am trying to get" because it called into question promises
already made by American officials. Byrnes and MacArthur had publicly stated
that the constitution must be approved by the Far Eastern Commission, McCoy
told his colleagues; "I can assure you that there is no doubt on the part of the
United States or General MacArthur ... that we have that authority and that the
Far Eastern Commission will have to approve the Constitution." McCoy spoke in
good faith, but he was promising more than he could deliver. 29
In part, the FEC's irritation at receiving no reply to the April 12 messages was
misdirected. After some prodding, MacArthur had sent the FEC a lengthy cable,
routing it according to standard practice through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In it
the supreme commander rejected the FEC proposals and reiterated his views
regarding the proper role of the commission. Although milder in tone, the
substance of the message followed closely MacArthur's April 15 cable to McCoy.
Certainly, SCAP showed no signs of relenting in his determination to deny the
FEC a role in constitutional reform: "The Commission could render no better
service to the cause of democracy," he wrote, "than to permit the Japanese
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Government and people . . . to proceed unshackled, unhindered, and in complete
freedom to work out their constitutional reforms, examining the situation only
after action thereon has been completed. " 30 Anticipating an adverse FEC
reaction, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), the principal
coordinator of American foreign and defense policy, suppressed the message.
Meanwhile, the allied members continued to press McCoy for a reply from SCAP.
Finally, on June 5, the State Department released the text of MacArthur's replypostdated to June 4 to conceal its delay by SWNCC. As anticipated, its content
only angered the allies further. Sir Carl Berendsen spoke for all in predicting the
consequences of letting SCAP define the FEC's role: "What we are facing now is
nothing less than the continued usefulness and authority of this Commission."
He continued: "Here is a Commission set up with the consent of our
governments, including the United States Government, given certain powers. It
has got to find a means of exercising those powers . . . or it has got to resign itself
to the fact that it cannot perform its functions .. . . We cannot go on like this. " 31
The commission was facing, as Berendsen said, a trial of strength between
itself and SCAP. It was not a contest to which the FEC looked forward with relish.
Nor was it one the commission could hope to win without strong support from the
U.S. government. Such support was not forthcoming. Instead, when SWNCC
threw its weight into the dispute, it did so by attacking the prerogatives of the
FEC's chairman. Before the commission began prying into serious issues, McCoy
enjoyed a measure of autonomy. A State Department memorandum of March 2,
for example, noted approvingly that, as chairman of an international body,
McCoy was not subordinate to any single government. Now that the FEC had
become troublesome, however, SWNCC imposed strict controls on McCoy. As a
result of a May 7 decision, the FEC's American representative was directly
subordinated to SWNCC. Henceforth, the committee would dictate in detail the
positions of the American delegation. If the commission balked at an American
proposal, McCoy was to shut off discussion and turn to SWNCC for guidance.
Furthermore, SWNCC had no sympathy for the FEC's challenge of MacArthur.
Therefore, its intervention in FEC affairs only reinforced SCAP's efforts to
undermine the commission.32
With both SCAP and the American foreign policy apparatus in Washington
arrayed against it, the FEC by the summer of 1946 was fighting for survival. The
commission's frustration regarding constitutional reform was repeated in numerous other areas: reparations, economic recovery, food supplies, education,
agrarian reform, and the return of looted cultural objects. American responsibility for the commission's problems was plain. Citing the arrogance and inflexibilty
of American behavior toward the FEC, one dissenter within the State Department
complained of the lack of discretion permitted U.S. representatives "who must
interrupt negotiation of all issues before the Far Eastern Commission in order to
obtain, step by step, approval of the most minute verbal changes from several
departments." Such restrictions reduced the negotiator's role to that of "a

DiplomatInKhaki

Page 198

06/11/20 3:18 PM

THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

199

humiliated clerical stooge." This unwillingness to permit the American delegation any latitude reflected Washington's fear of MacArthur and "the habit of
measuring all policy controversies in terms of (his] imagined desires, prejudices,
and objectives." Adopting SCAP's perspective injected into negotiations "an
element of narrow self-interest ... which corrupts honest discussion of every
important policy issue." The American attitude succeeded only in creating
"strains, distrust, suspicion and complications" in American relations with the
other FEC members. 33
John Kenneth Galbraith, the noted economist who was then a member of the
FEC's American delegation, offered a similarly scathing indictment. The
commission's activities, Galbraith wrote, "consist(ed] mostly of laborious debate
and either ultimate rubber stamping of pre-existing United States positions or
indefinite delay." Attempts to confine FEC jurisdiction to absurdly narrow limits
required American representatives "to assert arguments that are casuistical if
not phony." Preoccupied with doing nothing to offend SCAP, the United States
had "stalled, delayed, or otherwise interfered with (the] efficient functioning of
the Commission." Such behavior convinced the allies that the United States had
no real interest in their opinions while suggesting an American determination
"to assert the same monopolistic influence in Japan that the Soviet Union asserts
in Eastern Europe. " 34
Galbraith wanted his government to revitalize the FEC, thereby living up to its
commitments at Moscow. The United States found it more convenient to ignore
its allies, however, and permit the commission to shamble along, hamstringing it
further whenever it threatened to interfere with the occupation. For example, on
constitutional reform, the FEC doggedly kept trying to catch up with SCAP,
despite the futility that marked its efforts. The newly elected Diet began
considering SCAP's constitution on June 20. Two weeks later, the FEC solemnly
passed a policy decision mandating the "Basic Principles for a New Japanese
Constitution" -as if that document were yet to be written. MacArthur received
this FEC decision, blandly announced that the draft constitution conformed in
every respect to FEC requirements-a view with which the commission emphatically disagreed-and urged Washington to prevent publication of the FEC
decision. MacArthur claimed that such a "restrictive and mandatory directive
would . . . provoke a revulsion of the Japanese people" against the constitution
because it "would instantly become clothed with the taint of Allied force."
SWNCC agreed and ordered McCoy to block publication. SCAP could ignore an
unpublished decision virtually without penalty, again permitting the United
States to frustrate the commission's intent. 35
By way of a minor victory, the FEC did secure several amendments to the draft
constitution, aligning it more closely with the commission's "Basic Principles."
But, in conceding to demands for more explicit guarantees of universal suffrage
and popular sovereignty-and in rejecting several other commission objections-MacArthur did not overlook the opportunity to attack the FEC yet again.
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The commission's attempt "to force perfection in detail," he told the secretary
of state on July 26, threatened to "vitiate our very aim and purpose to secure
adoption of a constitution which expresses the free will of the Japanese people."
As a member of the FEC's American delegation dourly noted, "MacArthur's
position of objecting to amendments to the constitution made by the Commission
as 'interfering with the will of the Japanese people' was slightly inconsistent with
the fact that he himself was responsible for having written the constitution and
having handed it to the Japanese Government to enact." 36
The United States had thwarted the FEC's hopes of either drafting the
constitution or determining the method of its ratification. Yet the allied members
clung to the provision in the policy decision of March 20 that required the
commission to "pass upon" the constitution before it became valid. In July, the
United States sought to sap the meaning from even that modest assertion of
authority. To the allies, the March 20 policy decision meant that no constitution
would go into effect without some positive act of indorsement by the FEC. In
avowing American recognition of the commission's right to approve the
constitution, McCoy reinforced that view. Now the United States began an effort
to narrow even further the commission's role. In what even Blakeslee characterized as an exercise in "Mediaeval casuistry," the U.S. government argued that
the new Japanese constitution did not need the formal approval of the FEC in
order to become effective. Rather than a positive indorsement, the March 20
policy decision merely required the commission's acquiescence. So long as the
commission did not disapprove the constitution, it would go into effect. This
distinction was a crucial one. If actual approval were required, a majority of the
commission's members or a veto by one of the Big Four could stall ratification.
But to have the FEC "pass upon" the constitution through its silence would
permit the United States to use the veto to muzzle any attempt to disapprove it. 37
By early September, after weeks of examining SCAP's draft, the FEC turned to
this question: Would it acquiesce in the Diet's ratification of the constitution? Or
would it attempt to block ratification and invite yet another confrontation with
SCAP and the U.S. government? The most vocal allied members retained serious
substantive reservations about the draft. Australia believed that SCAP's constitution still contained several important flaws and labeled the provision renouncing
war "somewhat of a joke." The Soviets considered the draft to be inconsistent
with both the Potsdam Declaration and the FEC's own "Basic Principles." Great
Britain said that there was "no question of [giving the document] positive
approval." New Zealand restated its view of the Diet's inadequacy as an
instrument of ratification. Despite such reservations, the allied members shied
away from forcing the issue through any collective assertion of disapproval.
Instead, they indicated a willingness to accept even a defective constitution on the
condition that the commission be permitted to review it after its promulgation.38
By conceding this authority to review the constitution, the United States could
purchase the unopposed acceptance of its ratification. The United States
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promised to pay the allies' price-not now, but later. SWNCC's pos1t10n, as
related by McCoy to the FEC on September 19, was that the commission should
postpone any action on the question of review until after the constitution had
been promulgated: "Deferment of action, [however, was] entirely without
prejudice to the right of the commission to review the constitution at an
appropriate time." To demonstrate American sincerity, McCoy on September 21
offered a motion-for discussion rather than immediate action-that affirmed
the continuing jurisdiction of the FEC and called for the commission to review
the constitution after it had been in effect a full year. The allies accepted this bid
as the best they could expect. 39
The Japanese Diet ratified the constitution on October 7. Consistent with
McCoy's promises, the FEC immediately sought to establish its review authority.
On October 17, the commission unanimously approved a policy decision identical
to McCoy's proposal of September 21. The United States then exasperated its
allies by announcing that it would not publish the decision until MacArthur
approved it. Only through publication would the Japanese government and
people be notified of the commission's review authority-hence the issue's
importance to the FEC. MacArthur took advantage of this opportunity to declare
his opposition to announcing the decision for at least a year. He then denounced
the specter of any review by the FEC as threatening to reduce the constitution
from a "genuine expression of the popular will" to a "frail skeleton of
temporary expedience overshadowed by the threat of forced abrogation or
revision at the point of Allied bayonets. " 40
American refusal to publish the decision of October 17 produced yet another
volley of allied protests. As the Australian representative remarked, those nations
that "made a condition of our acquiescence in the constitution that this decision
should be passed" resented the manner in which the United States had abused
their trust. Moreover, MacArthur's "contemptuous language"-in British representative Sir George Sansom's phrase-infuriated the allies. Australia, New
Zealand, and India joined Britain in denouncing SCAP's message. Virtually
without exception, the allied members agreed that MacArthur's reply was "weak
in its argument and insulting in its tone." Privately, McCoy confessed that he was
inclined to agree with this interpretation. By way of apology for the message's
bluntness, McCoy explained lamely that MacArthur's response "had actually
been addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and this accounted for its somewhat
peremptory tone.' ' 41
Frank McCoy possessed to a high degree the soldier's virtue-and limitation-of obedience. Over the course of fifty years of service, he fulfilled his
responsibilities as an agent of American foreign policy with diligence and
dependability. During the summer and fall of 1946, he loyally supported SCAP
and his government in their attempts to protect American interests in Japaneven though the effort required the emasculation of the commission he headed.
His loyalty was not, however, without personal cost. McCoy's duties required him
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to assist in perverting the Moscow agreement, to renege on commitments made
to his colleagues, and to subject himself to their scorn. By the end of 1946, he had
had enough.

McCoy broke ranks over the issue of implementing legislation. Putting the
constitution into effect would require the Diet to enact a series of measures
dealing with everything from judicial organization and a criminal code to human
rights and financial regulations. As early as September, the FEC had indicated its
interest in examining such legislation to insure its consistency with the Potsdam
Declaration and the commission's policies. McCoy agreed that the commission
possessed the authority to exercise such oversight and notified the State
Department of his position. Nothing more was said of the matter until November
when, with the constitution ratified, the Diet began to consider the means of
implementation. The War Department instructed MacArthur to provide the FEC
with copies of the draft legislation before the Diet. MacArthur ignored the order.
When allied members began badgering their chairman to produce the drafts,
McCoy was left once more to make excuses. When McCoy subsequently asked
that the War Department prod MacArthur into compliance, the department's
Civil Affairs Division suggested instead "that the United States try to dodge its
prior commitment and try to keep the commission from sticking its nose into
implementing legislation." McCoy protested that such a policy would keep the
commission out of what took place in Japan until it had been passed. He
continued: "This was what General MacArthur had tried to do with respect to the
Constitution, and it had put the U.S. members of the Commission in a very
embarrassing position.... The Commission was charged with making policy and
General MacArthur ought to remember that fact." The following month, McCoy
presented his case in a letter to Assistant Secretary of State John H. Hilldring,
the State Department member of SWNCC. McCoy argued that to deny the FEC
the authority to review implementing legislation "would challenge its rights ...
and needlessly irritate the members of the Commission." McCoy's responsibility
was to make the FEC function as a successful organization. He could do so only
by fostering a spirit of cooperation between the FEC and the United States: "It
would embarrass General McCoy to be forced to take a position contrary to the
strongly held views of most of the other members of the Far Eastern Commission
on an issue which the commission is convinced involves its rights ... and it
would hamper him in his efforts to maintain cordial relations within the
Commission.' ' 42
McCoy's appeal produced no results. MacArthur continued to ignore the
commission's requests for drafts of the legislation. By the end of December,
reports reached the commission that the Diet was enacting implementing
measures. The inevitable blowup in the FEC occurred on January 2, 1947, with
Sir Carl Berendsen leading the way. "Mr. Chairman," he began,
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this is the last, and so far as I am concerned the word is accurate, the last of
a lengthy series of instances in which successive attempts by the Far Eastern
Commission to exercise ... its functions have been stultified ... . I am
making no criticism of General MacArthur.... Indeed, I cannot believe ...
that what have ... appeared to be deliverate [sic] discourtesies have indeed
been intended to be such.... [Yet] it was unquestionably known to the
Supreme Command that the Commission ... considered itself, rightly or
wrongly, to be concerned with the text of the implementing legislation. And
this was not the view of one or two members of the Commission, perhaps
ignorant or ill-advised-it was the unanimous view of the whole Commission, including the representative of the United States.
Now the Diet had begun passing the measures without the FEC ever having seen
them, " leaving to the Commission no option but to accept the situation as it is or
.. . to embark upon the much more difficult task" of persuading the Diet to alter
legislation already enacted. 43 After the New Zealander concluded, the Australian
delegate observed that Berendsen's "disquiet is shared by every member around
this table today. The Commission has made known from the very beginning of its
existence its interest in the constitution and in the implementing legislation." He
assured McCoy that MacArthur had little "to worry about in referring things to
the Commission. We are not here to snipe at him." But, he concluded, "we do
want the right to participate in the formulation of policy in Japan." Sympathizing
with his colleagues, McCoy made no reply.44

By the end of 1946, MacArthur had won his trial of strength with the FEC. It had
been no contest. Although several of the commission's members refused to
accept the. verdict, further resistance was ineffective. Henceforth, the United
States dropped all pretense of treating the commission with seriousness. For
example, when the commission demanded publication of its policy decision on
reviewing the constitution, the United States agreed in March 1947 to publish it
everywhere but in Japan, the only place where it mattered. When the FEC in
1948 indicated its determination to reexamine the constitution anyway, the
United States announced that it would permit such a review only if conducted
"as inconspicuously as possible and with a minimum of debate." The United
States refused to entertain the notion that such a review might actually change
the constitution. The commission's impotence with regard to the constitution
continued to be matched in other areas in which it took an interest. When the
FEC, contrary to American wishes, attempted to raise a new issue, SWNCC
simply refused to provide McCoy with an American position on the matter. As a
result, items languished on the commission's agenda for months without action.
When the United States did want the commission to act, it was merely to indorse
American proposals without amendment. But American officials soon lost
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patience with the FEC's cumbersome method of reaching decisions. Vowing, in
the words of the secretary of war, that the United States would no "longer be
balked by the FEC," SWNCC began attaching an ultimatum to each position
paper sent to the commission. The United States gave the FEC a period of time,
usually twenty-one days, to adopt an American proposal as a policy decision.
Otherwise, the United States would issue it unilaterally as an interim directive. 45
For its part, the commission continued to hold weekly meetings, circulate
memoranda, and even make "decisions." But by 1947 an air of unreality
permeated its undertakings. The FEC's most notable achievement of that year
was to adopt the "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" on June 19. In
Blakeslee's retrospective view, this decision ranked among the commission's
"most important." In fact, it signified only a belated and meaningless acceptance of principles that the United States had been unilaterally applying to Japan
for nearly two years. As Berendsen remarked, the commission invited the derision
of public opinion in passing a measure that events had long overtaken. Even
McCoy admitted that its passage would serve historical purposes and little else.
The Americans would have been happy to dissolve the FEC and be done with it.
But scrapping the commission required unanimous concurrence of the veto
powers and such consent was not forthcoming. As a next best solution, one State
Department official in 1948 suggested that the commission be packed off to
Tokyo. Chief among the benefits expected from such a move was that "an end
would be put to the existence of several hundred government officials whose role
and primary responsibility in Washington has been to keep some activity going in
the Far Eastern Commission." But SCAP opposed the idea, so the commission
remained where it was. 46
As he had over the issue of constitutional review, McCoy continued to serve as
an advocate for the FEC to his own government-though with negligible effect.
He protested, for example, American misuse of so-called interim directives.
Continued use of this method to circumvent the FEC, he told Hilldring, "would
antagonize the other states on the Far Eastern Commission ... and above all ...
would be inconsistent with a basic policy of the United States and my own
instructions: to support the principle of International Cooperation." McCoy
admitted that a multilateral body "normally reaches its conclusions more slowly
than does a single state." Such delay, he believed, was the price that any state
must pay for the recognized advantages of a policy of international cooperation.
Moreover, American criticism of delay in the FEC was especially inappropriate
given the American tactic of intentionally withholding policy papers from the
commission for months at a time. This practice caused repeated postponements
of matters before the commission. At the other extreme, McCoy cited instances in
which the FEC had responded promptly to American requests that it adopt a
measure "as a matter of urgent importance," only to have SCAP neglect to
implement the policy. 47 McCoy's appeal had no effect. By the autumn of 1947, the
attachment of deadlines to American proposals in the FEC had become
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standard practice. By the end of the year, SWNCC had gone a step further,
deciding that, in the absence of an FEC policy decision, MacArthur possessed the
"authority to make the necessary policy decision himself and take appropriate
implementing action thereon. " 48
This increasing boldness of American efforts to bypass the FEC in 1947 and
1948 matched the hardening of U.S. attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Still
pursuing the goal of international cooperation, McCoy failed to appreciate the
Cold War's impact on American diplomacy. Although he sensed that his
government's lack of support for the commission by 1947 stemmed in part from
"the belief that the Russians took an intransigent and uncooperative attitude in
the FEC," he insisted that such a belief was unwarranted. In fact, he said, "the
Australians and New Zealanders had been more difficult on the Commission than
had the Russians." According to Blakeslee, throughout 1946 and 1947, the
Soviets behaved in a "surprisingly cooperative and conciliatory fashion." In
March 1948, one American on the FEC staff could still defend the commission as
a valuable forum for showing the Soviets that "they have more to gain by sitting
down and negotiating their differences with us ... than by proceeding entirely
on their own." The unifying theme of McCoy's chairmanship, he wrote, had
always been "the assumption that international cooperation is essential, and that
agreement with the Russians is not only desirable but possible." A full year after
the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine had committed the United States to
combating the spread of communism, such sentiments betrayed the extent to
which Americans on the FEC had lost touch with the current premises of
American foreign policy. 49
American absorption with the Cold War insured the failure of McCoy's
attempts throughout 1948 and 1949 to revive international cooperation by
reminding his government of its obligations under the Moscow agreement. In
May 1948, McCoy took his case directly to George C. Marshall, now secretary of
state. McCoy assured his old friend that "until recently the active Soviet member
[had] appeared anxious to cooperate with other delegations." It was only after the
United States initiated a more unilateral policy in regard to Japan that the
Soviets became increasingly critical of SCAP and the United States. "The
problem of the United States in the Far Eastern Commission," he continued, "is
not the Soviet Union, but the other nine states whose general friendship it is to
our interest to maintain." American inflexibility, intentional obstruction of the
commission's work, unilateral shifts in basic policy, and, above all, SCAP's
penchant for exceeding his legal authority all eroded that friendship. McCoy
suggested a number of proposals to salvage the situation: to submit new basic
policy problems regarding Japan to the FEC in accordance with the terms of
reference; to annul the apparent decision to encourage SCAP whenever possible
to take independent action; to refrain from using interim directives; and,
generally, to adopt a more cooperative attitude toward the FEC, showing "a
willingness to give reasonable consideration to the views of the other states. " 50
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However much Marshall may have sympathized with McCoy's plight, the State
Department that he headed had little interest in fuzzy notions of international
harmony in the Pacific. To be sure, the department sought solidarity, but it was
the ideologically charged solidarity of American-led resistance to expanding
Soviet influence. The accelerated revival of the Japanese economy formed an
essential component of that effort, aimed at converting Japan into a Westernaligned bulwark of anticommunism. This goal required that real authority over
occupation policy reside in Washington, not in Tokyo where MacArthur's
whimsical reformist agenda reflected his own political ambitions as much as it
did any rigorous strategic vision. So Marshall's more assertive State Department
set about wresting control of occupation policy from SCAP. Yet, if this initiative
represented an important shift in American policy, it did not imply State
Department support for a more muscular FEC. On the contrary: To the extent
that MacArthur's nominal subordination to the allies created opportunities for
him to play off his own government against the commission, policymakers in
Washington were determined to keep the FEC weak. 51
Not surprisingly, therefore, Marshall was willing to respond to only part of
McCoy's critique, promising to eliminate delays in stating U.S. positions on
matters pending before the FEC. Yet even Marshall's intervention had no effect.
Six months later the commission was still waiting for numerous papers that the
United States had promised from fourteen to twenty-three months earlier. The
American attitude regarding the "Concentration of Economic Power in Japan"
illustrates the problem. The commission waited from August 1946 to May 1947
for an initial statement of American views on this subject. Shortly after the FEC
received that statement, the American position changed and the American
delegation withdrew the paper and suspended negotiations, pending submission
of a revised version. The United States promised the new version by October
1947. A year later, the FEC was still waiting for it. Eventually, in November 1948,
the United States rewarded the commission's patience by announcing that it had
no intention of giving its views on economic concentration until the FEC
demonstrated why any paper on the subject was actually necessary. 52
In January 1949, McCoy brought the FEC's problems to the attention of yet
another secretary of state, Dean Acheson. McCoy prefaced his memorandum for
Acheson by quoting at length the president's State of the Union message of
January 5. "Our guiding star," Truman said, "is the principle of international
cooperation. To this concept we have made a national commitment as profound
as anything in history. To it we have pledged our resources and our honor." With
that as background, McCoy recounted the FEC's demise, which he attributed to
American "delays in submitting policy papers ... , delays in reaching [U.S.]
positions on papers pending in the Commission ... [and] delays due to a change
in [U.S.] policy." American obstructionism had convinced the allies that the
United States was not acting in good faith, preferring instead to "carry out
important measures in Japan under SCAP's ... authority without regard for the
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Far Eastern Commission which has the right to formulate policy." McCoy
objected to such cavalier treatment, arguing that the United States was legally
and morally bound to support the FEC. Criticizing U.S. attempts to coerce the
commission, McCoy pointed out that the FEC's charter did not "warrant the
United States Government assuming or demanding that the Commission should
adopt a policy introduced by the United States. The other states have not only
rights under the Terms of Reference but often . . . have national interests
involved." In the FEC, as in other international organizations, therefore,
"discussion, compromise, [and] agreement" should guide American conduct.
McCoy called for increased American flexibility and cooperation, a "policy of
making concessions to our friends on minor matters in order to advance a major
objective: gaining their cordial support in the critical situation in the Far
East." 53
Although conceding the accuracy of McCoy's diagnosis of the FEC's failure,
the State Department dismissed it as irrelevant. No one would, of course, wish to
quarrel with the principle of international cooperation, wrote Assistant Secretary
of State Charles E. Saltzman in summarizing McCoy's memorandum for
Acheson. Saltzman admitted that the United States had disrupted the efficient
functioning of the commission (though he placed most of the blame on
MacArthur and the army). Yet he insisted that these were peripherai"issues. More
important was the fact that "General McCoy takes inadequate account of the
extent to which circumstances have changed since 1946 and early 1947." Since
then, he continued, "the Soviet Union has adopted an open policy of world
aggression, [using even] the FEC as a propaganda sounding board to attack the
United States' policies in Japan and elsewhere." In response to this threat, the
Truman administration "adopted a policy of firm resistance to Soviet aggression,
a policy which must be applied in the FEC as at all other points where U.S. and
Soviet interests meet." As part of that resistance, the United States decided to
rebuild Japan, converting its former enemy into the linchpin of its anticommunist
strategy in the Pacific. As Saltzman noted, this decision had been made without
consulting the allies of the United States, many of whom opposed it vehemently.
For this reason, he wrote, "the time would seem to have come for [the FEC] to
restrict its · policy-making activities so as to permit the Japanese to proceed in
their own way with the implementation and assimilation of the measures already
directed." With the onset of the Cold War, in other words, the FEC lost its
usefulness as a vehicle for sharing responsibility and fostering international
harmony. Henceforth, the commission could be of use only as a minor
propaganda outlet. American diplomats would not negotiate but merely debate
with their adversaries. According to Saltzman, the United States should stand up
to the Soviet Union in the commission "even at the cost of contributing to
U.S.-U.S.S.R. friction. " 54
By January 1949, while Harry Truman proclaimed his nation's dedication to
international cooperation, State Department officials were blaming the Soviet
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Union for the absence of American cooperation in international councils. Yet the
attempt to explain American unilateralism as a product of the Cold War is
unconvincing. Since the establishment of the FEC, the United States had
systematically undermined the commission. Before the Cold War began, American policy toward the FEC helped destroy any chance for harmony in the Pacific,
however slight that chance may have been. Forced to choose between honoring
its promises to its allies and implementing its own design for Japan, the United
States without hesitation chose the latter. As chairman of the commission, McCoy
bore his share of responsibility for the FEC's failure. McCoy had hoped for a
policy of genuine cooperation that would permit the FEC a meaningful role in
formulating occupation policy. Yet, when MacArthur's ego demanded that the
United States strip the FEC of any real authority, McCoy acted as his
government's instrument in that effort. Too late, he sought to reverse course,
arguing that the benefits of cooperation outweighed the short-term advantage of
unilateralism. By that time, however, senior American officials had embraced the
logic of the Cold War. Obsessed by their contest with the Soviet Union, they
viewed Wilsonian ideals as naive and sentimental. Hence, they ignored McCoy's
appeals and dismissed McCoy himself as an old man who failed to grasp the
realities of the postwar world.
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By 1949, the Far Eastern Commission had become moribund. Its chairman was a
seventy-five-year-old man whose declining health interfered with his duties with
growing regularity. These circumstances prompted McCoy to retire from public
life once and for all. Effective the last day of November 1949-fully a half-century
since he had joined Leonard Wood's staff in Cuba-McCoy resigned as FEC
chairman and chief American delegate. In recognition of McCoy's service, the
State Department presented him with its Superior Service Award.1 Despite
nagging medical problems, McCoy enjoyed an active and productive retirement.
After leaving the FEC, he and Frances remained at 1633 31st Street N.W., in a
house acquired when they had moved to Washington in 1945. It was the first
house that McCoy's peripatetic career permitted them to own. The retired soldier
and diplomat busied himself with a variety of projects. Membership in the
Philippine Club of New York, of which he was a former president, offered
opportunity for reminiscing about the days of empire with old cronies such as
Cameron Forbes and Peter Bowditch. As honorary chairman of the American
Leprosy Foundation, formerly the Leonard Wood Memorial, he took an active
interest in the campaign to alleviate the effects of the disease that had been
Wood's great personal cause. McCoy devoted most of his energies to the
Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association. After becoming the organization's
president in 1951, he led the effort to purchase and donate to the people of the
United States an island in the Potomac River to be maintained as a natural
preserve in Roosevelt's memory. He also laid the groundwork for the purchase of
Sagamore Hill, Roosevelt's home at Oyster Bay, as a memorial to him. McCoy
followed with satisfaction the continuing success of younger comrades such as
Matthew Ridgway, now a four-star general. He may even have felt a certain
209
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vindication when Ridgway became supreme commander in the Far East in April
1951, following MacArthur's relief by President Truman. (From Tokyo, Ridgway
graciously wrote his old mentor: "Through all my efforts runs the unfailing
inspiration of your guidance and leadership through the years."2 )
In 1953, McCoy made a final jaunt from home, spending a leisurely vacation in
Honduras. By the end of the year, his health had deteriorated considerably. For
several months, he was either hospitalized or confined to his home with what
doctors had diagnosed as leukemia. Finally, on June 4, 1954, he died at Walter
Reed Army Hospital. At funeral services conducted on June 8, George C.
Marshall and Ridgway, now army chief of staff, led two squads of pallbearers from
the post chapel at Fort Myer, Virginia, to nearby Arlington National Cemetery.
There McCoy was laid to rest on a knoll overlooking the deceased veterans of the
Spanish-American War-just a few feet from the gravesite of Leonard Wood. 3

In an editorial published after his death, the New York Times praised McCoy as
an "outstandingly brilliant" public servant who had been "one of the best
soldiers this country has produced." Reviewing McCoy's career, the Times
concluded that "military terms are far too restricted to describe his unusual
service to his nation." What qualities earned McCoy such accolades? Despite the
Times's assertion of his brilliance, McCoy was not an exceptionally gifted man.
Although able and intelligent, he possessed neither imagination nor critical
insight, especially when it came to viewing with detachment the men and
institutions to which he devoted his life. An appraisal by Sir George Sansom
comes closer to the mark. "He was a man of no great intellect," the British
diplomat and scholar remarked of McCoy, "but he had character-so much more
important than intellect." Chief among the attributes of that character were a
sense of duty, unimpeachable personal integrity, and loyalty to those whom he
served. Although often partisan, he was no ideologue. His strongest attachments
were to the army, the nation, and cherished associates such as Theodore
Roosevelt, Wood, and Stimson rather than to any particular body of thought.
McCoy's own views changed frequently, reflecting the temper of the day or the
assumptions of the reigning political leadership. This remained the case whether
those assumptions reflected turn-of-the-century Anglo-Saxonism, Wilsonian idealism, or the cautious collective security of Henry Stimson. Only after World War
II did McCoy find himself out of step, espousing international cooperation while
the Truman administration was girding itself for the Cold War. 4
This malleability helps to explain McCoy's usefulness to divergent national
administrations. To implement policy, political leaders want reliable agents, not
free thinkers. To his masters, McCoy time and again demonstrated his ability to
serve with competence, discretion, and self-effacing loyalty. This last quality
deserves special emphasis. As a military professional, McCoy understood the
need for discipline in any complex undertaking. Even when he disagreed with
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American policy, as during his years with the FEC, he would not permit his own
opinions to override his obligation to support his superiors. McCoy refused to
engage in bureaucratic obstructionism, media leaks, or public protest. When
pushed into the unfamiliar role of dissenter, he presented his objections quietly,
respectfully, and hence, on the whole, ineffectively.
Given this country's tradition of civilian control of the military, McCoy's
superiors had every reason to expect such obedience from a professional soldier.
Rather than assuming, therefore, that McCoy made himself useful as an agent of
American foreign policy despite being a soldier, we may well conclude that he did
so because of that fact. McCoy understood authority and respected its prerogatives. However delicate, obscure, or ambiguous an assignment, McCoy's
masters could depend on him to carry it out. He was free from the most common
disabilities of public officials of our own day. He catered to no special interests.
He entertained no ambitions for elective office and so felt no obsessive concern
for his "image." He was no publicity monger-exposure in the press benefited
his ego only slightly and his career not at all. And last, he did not view public
service as a means to enrich himself. 5
As a personality, McCoy displayed none of the flamboyance of MacArthur or
Wood. Unlike Pershing or Marshall, he never exercised great wartime responsibilities. Lacking intellectual originality, he left no legacy comparable to Billy
Mitchell's theory of air power. And so, despite the generous praise that marked
his passing, McCoy was soon forgotten-even as his friends and associates were
being elevated into the pantheon of American military heroes. This was to be
expected. Theodore Roosevelt was supposed to have remarked once that "Frank
McCoy is the best soldier I ever laid eyes on." One can agree with TR that
McCoy was in many ways an extraordinary soldier. But weighing his achievements against his limitations, Frank McCoy was not a great man.6

Even if McCoy himself merits only a narrow place in history, the implications of
his career deserve scholarly consideration. McCoy's ties to civilian elites and his
frequent ventures outside the traditional military realm call into question
commonly held assumptions about the fabric of American civil-military relations.
The interaction of civilian and military elites that McCoy's career illustrates
suggests a reality more complex than most scholars acknowledge in portraying
the pre-1940 military establishment as isolated and alienated. Such a conclusion
does not dispute the existence of popular suspicion of the military in McCoy's
day. Nor does it take issue with the notion that the average soldier of the pre-1940
era felt neglected. Yet, if historians should not discount altogether the concept of
an isolated military, neither should they overstate it. To be sure, throughout
McCoy's life, many Americans, from religious leaders to intellectuals, arrayed
themselves against the encroachments of militarism. At the same time, important
segments of the governing elite found military views compatible with their own
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and came to see military men as useful instruments of policy. As far back as the
Spanish-American War, the shrewdest and most talented members of the officer
corps exploited this sympathy to great advantage. By aligning themselves with
helpful civilian allies, they advanced their own careers and gained a chance to
play a broader role in public life. By joining Leonard Wood's circle in Cuba,
McCoy secured his entry into this select group. His subsequent career in colonial
government and diplomacy testifies to the opportunities available to members of
this military elite. His friendship with like-minded political leaders, diplomats,
businessmen, and journalists illustrates the bonds linking the civilian elite to
their military brethren.
McCoy's recurring participation in foreign policy challenges the contention
that civilian leaders before 1940 neglected to consult military officers on
diplomatic issues. Instead, lacking bureaucratic mechanisms for coordinating
policy with the army and navy, civilian officials routinely sought the counsel of
individual officers whom they held in high regard. Friendship, not position in the
hierarchy, sustained this informal channel of civil-military coordination, as the
relationship between McCoy and Stimson suggests. Thus, in the evolution of
American civil-military coordination, McCoy stands as a transitional figure. With
others, he bridged the gap between the negligible coordination that characterized nineteenth-century policy formulation and the elaborate apparatus and
ritualized procedures that have piled up since World War 11.7
The willingness with which McCoy embraced this role disproves the theory
that soldiers believed that their military status precluded them from involvement
in making national policy. Well-connected members of the military elitebuilding on the tradition of politicized soldiers such as Wood and responding to
the encouragement of civilians such as Theodore Roosevelt-refused to accept
officership as a bar to participation in the debate over broad national issues.
Rather, they welcomed opportunities to contribute to the formulation and
implementation of policy, thereby insuring that the military's perspective on a
variety of issues received a hearing.
Called upon to act as a partner-albeit a junior one-in shaping and executing
American foreign policy, Frank McCoy appeared repeatedly outside the narrow
domain to which soldiers were ostensibly restricted, serving his country in causes
great and small, admirable and unworthy. Combined with the careers of such
military contemporaries as Leonard Wood, Tasker Bliss, and James G. Harbord,
an appreciation of McCoy's life makes it impossible to confine the military
strictly to the battlefields of the American past. A persuasive interpretation of the
professional soldier's role in American history must concede him a place in both
war and peace. If seldom genuinely popular or decisively influential, leading
military professionals did operate comfortably within the main currents of
national life, thereby leaving a small but distinctive imprint on the events of their
time.
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Tucked within the quiet of Memorial Church in Harvard Yard hangs a gilded
tablet honoring a once renowned Harvard graduate. Among the chapel's tokens
of remembrance, the tablet is neither prominent nor today much noticed. Yet it
represents an unusual tribute: Apart from Leonard Wood, the other sons of
Harvard commemorated in the chapel gave their lives in wartime service to their
country. Installed in happy remembrance of Wood by McCoy and others of the
general's aides, the tablet impresses the present-day visitor as unusual for other
reasons as well. The very setting seems anachronistic. For a great secular
university to concede to God real estate that might otherwise support a
laboratory or lecture hall suggests a throwback to a departed era. Nor, one
imagines, does Harvard any longer celebrate as especially exemplary the ideals
that lead dutiful young men to die doing the bidding of the state.
Above all, the inscription on this small memorial renders it a curiosity. The
words are quaint, and the values they signify seem n~ive and almost embarrassingly unsophisticated. Yet the words depict their subject as he would want to
be remembered, honoring him as
Soldier
Saver of Lives
Lover of Manly Sport
Restorer of Provinces Abroad
Forger of Sword and Shield
at Home
One can imagine McCoy, to whom eloquence never came easily, laboring over
these phrases, determined in this simple testimonial to capture the essence of the
man whom he had served so long and loved so dearly. If, in the end, the
inscription recalls the essential Wood, it evokes something of his era as well: its
robust and expansive spirit; its presumptuous idealism somehow combining
benevolence with paternalism; its confidence in American righteousness; its illconcealed, even unabashed bellicosity.
The tumultuous events of more recent times have rendered obsolete many of
the values that animated Wood and that McCoy shared. Our differing outlook
would not surprise McCoy because his own life and experience encompassed
profound changes. McCoy never claimed to be other than a man of his own time;
he would insist, therefore, that later generations judge him by the standards to
which he himself had subscribed. It would have pleased him to think that words
written to honor Wood might also serve as his own epitaph.
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in Report of the Philippine Commission (1903), part l, exhibit S, p. 484. McCoy to family,
October 15, 1903, Box 3, McCoy Papers.
28. Scott, Memories, p. 325; McCoy to Carpenter, December 2, 1903, Box 10, McCoy
Papers.
29. Millett, The General, p. 178; Scott, Memories p. 327; McCoy to Carpenter,
December 2, 1903, Box 10, McCoy Papers. Emphasis added.
30. Leonard Wood Diary, November 25, 1903, Box 3, Wood Papers; "Report of General
Wood as to Abrogation of Bates Treaty,'' Report of the Philippine Commission (l 903), part
l, exhibit T, pp. 489-490.
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31. "Acts of the Moro Legislature, 1903-1906," Box 216, Wood Papers; Thompson,
"Governors," p. 50.
32. McCoy to mother, May 25, 1905, cited in Hagedorn, Wood, 2: 55; Thompson,
"Governors," pp. 40-44.
33. Hagedorn interview with McCoy, June 7, 1929, Box 18, Hagedorn Papers; Wood to
J. St. Loe Strachey, January 6, 1904, cited in Hagedorn, Wood, 2: 14; "Report of the
Governor of the Moro Province" (1906), pp. 351, 357.
34. McCoy to family, September 2, 1904, Box 3, McCoy Papers; "Report of the
Governor of the Moro Province" (1906), pp. 340, 345.
35. Thompson, "Governors," pp. 77-80; Jornacion, "Time of Eagles," pp. 163-164;
Gowing, Mandate, pp. 108, 143.
36. McCoy to family, November 30, 1903, Box 3, McCoy Papers; Scott, Memories, p.
376; "Report of the Governor of the Moro Province" (1906), p. 347; "Report of the
Governor of the Moro Province," Report of the Philippine Commission (1905), part 1
(Washington, D.C., 1905), p. 345; Report of the Philippine Commission (1904), part 1,
(Washington, D.C., 1905), p. 10.
37. Gowing, Mandate, p. 151.
38. McCoy to family, April 12, 1904, Box 4, McCoy Papers; Notebook 2 (December 11,
1903-June 17, 1904), Box 1, McCoy Papers.
39. McCoy to family, May 6, 1905, Box 1, McCoy Papers.
40. McCoy to family, January 5, 1905, Box 4, McCoy Papers; Wood Diary, April 4 and 7,
1904, Box 3, Wood Papers.
41. James H. Reeves to George T. Langhorne, March 1, 1906, Box 37, Wood Papers.
42. Ibid. The exchange between Wood and Langhorne is quoted by Thompson,
"Governors," p. 83.
43. McCoy to family, March 10, 1906, Box 4, McCoy Papers; McCoy interview with
Hagedorn, June 7, 1929, Box 22, Hagedorn Papers; see also Hagedorn interview with
Stuart Heintzelman, April 2, 1930, Box 22, Hagedorn Papers. Heintzelman, another aide
present at Dajo, recalled that "when [Wood] was mentally upset he would be subject to the
attacks."
44. McCoy to family, March 10, 1906, Box 4, McCoy Papers; Wood to Andrews, March
9, 1906, Box 11, McCoy Papers.
45. For a summary of press comment on Jolo, see "Killing Women and Children in
Jolo," Literary Digest 32 (March 24, 1906): 433-434.
46. Wood to War Department, March 13, 1906, Box 37, Wood Papers.
47. Wood to Roosevelt, May 14, 1906, Box 37, Wood Papers.
48. Scott's defense of Wood, solicited by Secretary of War Taft, with endorsements by
Taft and Roosevelt is reprinted in U.S., Congress, Senate, Attack by United States Troops
on Mount Dajo, S. Doc. 289, 59th Cong., 1st sess. For a highly colored account, see McCoy
to Andrew Peters, September 4, 1914, Box 3, McCoy Papers. Suggestive of the fleeting
interest in the incident is that the Literary Digest surveyed editorial opinion on the
subject only once; the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature contains only four citations
on the Bud Dajo-and two are defenses of Wood.
49. McCoy to family, December 3, 1903, Box 3, and March 4, 1904, Box 4, McCoy
Papers; John R. White, Bullets and Bolos (New York, 1928), pp. 215-217. Saranaya is
described in "Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province" (1904), pp. 577-578.
50. McCoy to family, May 20 and July 11, 1904, Box 4, and July 17, 1904, Box 3, McCoy
Papers.
51. Translation of letter, Ali to Wood, July 14, 1904, Box 4, McCoy Papers. A Filipino
official translated the letter from Arabic to Spanish; McCoy further translated it into
English (Dispatch Book 5 [June-July 1904], Box l, McCoy Papers).
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52. McCoy to family, December 12, 1904, Box 3, McCoy Papers. Langhorne's comments
to Wood are cited by Gowing, Mandate, p. 153. Langhorne functioned as acting governor
while Wood was in the United States on medical leave. For the importance that the
Americans attributed to Ali's elimination, see "Report of the Governor of the Moro
Province," Report of the Philippine Commission (1906), pp. 343, 352. In it, Wood asserts
that in the Cotabato Valley "some 20,000 recognized Datto Ali's authority" and that "his
resistance kept the whole valley stirred up."
53. McCoy to military secretary, Department of Mindanao, October 31, 1905, and
Buchanan to Wood, May 9, 1906, Box 11, McCoy Papers.
54. McCoy to military secretary, October 31, 1905, Box 11, McCoy Papers.
55. Ibid.
56. Roosevelt to McCoy, January 3, 1906, Box 4, McCoy Papers; New York Times
[hereafter cited as NY1], October 29, 1905; Richard Barry, "The End of Datto Ali,"
Colliers, June 9, 1906, p. 17. Nor was Bud Dajo the last such episode in the Moro
pacification. As late as June 1913, Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing, then governor of the
province, killed over 500 Moros in an assault on Bud Bagsak on Jolo (see Donald Smythe,
Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing [New York, 1973], pp. 186-204).

CHAPTER 4
AN AVAILABLE AGENT
l. For one testimonial on McCoy's reputation, see Horace Fletcher to McCoy, April 11,
1907, Box 12, Frank Ross McCoy Papers, Library of Congress; hereafter cited as McCoy
Papers.
2. McCoy to family, November 21 and 28, 1905, Box 4, McCoy Papers.
3. For the origins of the boycott and diplomatic efforts to resolve it, see Delber L.
McKee, Chinese Exclusion versus the Open Door Policy, 1900-1906 (Detroit, 1977),
Chapters 6-9. On Roosevelt's reaction to the Lienchow Massacre, see Howard K. Beale,
Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, 1956), pp.
238-242. On American military preparations, see Richard D. Challener, Admirals,
Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Princeton, N.J., 1973), pp. 215-218.
4. McCoy to family, December 26, 1905, Box 4, McCoy Papers. The results of McCoy's
inspection are his "Notes on Canton," Box 11, McCoy Papers. McCoy recalled the
mission in a conversation with Nelson T. Johnson, U.S. minister to China, August 2, 1932,
vol. 52, Nelson T. Johnson Papers, Library of Congress.
5. Roosevelt is quoted by Beale, Roosevelt, p. 245.
6. McCoy to family, April 17, 1906, Box 4, McCoy Papers; McCoy to military secretary,
War Department, Box 11, McCoy Papers; Wood to McCoy, August 22, 1906, Box 37,
Leonard Wood Diary and Papers, Library of Congress; hereafter cited as Wood Papers.
7. On the Cuban insurrection, see Allan R. Millett, The Politics of Intervention: The
Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909 (n.p., 1968), Chapters l and 2. Steinhart's
reports from Havana are reprinted in "Report of William H. Taft, Secretary of War, and
Robert Bacon, Assistant Secretary of State, of What Was Done Under the Instructions of
the President in Restoring Peace in Cuba," U.S., War Department, Annual Reports of the
Secretary of War, 1906 (Washington, D.C., 1906), pp. 444-447; hereafter cited as TaftBacon Report.
8. Ralph Elden Minger, "William Howard Taft and the United States Intervention in
Cuba in 1906," Hispanic American Historical Review 41 (February 1961): 79.
9. Millett, Politics, pp. 148, 151-153; Taft to McCoy, September 24, 1906, Box 12,
McCoy Papers.
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10. Millett, Politics, pp. 93-94.
11. McCoy to Wood, October 18, 1906, Box 37, Wood Papers. McCoy's correspondence
with rebel commanders Faustino Guerra, E. Loynaz Del Castillo, and Orestes Ferrera is
reprinted in the Taft-Bacon Report, pp. 502-504. On the disarmament of insurgents see
Taft-Bacon Report, p. 525, and Taft to General Montero, October 5, 1906, Box 12, McCoy
Papers.
12. McCoy to Wood, October 18, 1906, Box 37, Wood Papers. Historians have endorsed
McCoy's view of the stakes in the 1906 revolt. Describing the disputing factions, for
example, Dana Munro comments that "in general there was little difference in their
programs or policies" (Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean,
1900-1921 [Princeton, N.J., 1964], pp. 125-126).
13. McCoy to Mrs. Wood, October 7, 1906, Box 37, Wood Papers; Taft-Bacon Report,
pp. 450-451; see also Wood to Steinhart, December 28, 1906, Box 37, and McCoy to
Wood, July 14, 1907, Box 39, Wood Papers.
14. McCoy to Wood, October 18, 1906, Box 37, Wood Papers. On Estrada Palma's
resignation and the decision to establish a provisional government, see Millett, Politics,
pp. 96-102.
15. See, for example, the list of participants from the first occupation, dated September
27, 1906, in Box 12, McCoy Papers. It describes the positions occupied by each and
identifies those considered especially able. Allan Millett notes that the "striking common
denominator" of officers in the provisional government was that "they had been effective
administrators in Leonard Wood's Cuban government" (Millett, Politics, p. 152). See also
the cable from Matthew E. Hanna to McCoy, October 26, 1906, Box 12, McCoy Papers.
16. McCoy to Mrs. Wood, October 7, 1906, Box 37, Wood Papers; Magoon to Taft,
October 19, 1906, Box 12, McCoy Papers; McCoy to Wood, October 28, 1906, Box 37,
McCoy Papers.
17. McCoy to Wood, November 16, 1906, Box 12, McCoy Papers; McCoy to Wood, July
14, 1907, Box 39, Wood Papers; Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: An Inner History of
American Empire, 1900-1934 (Lexington, Ky., 1983), pp. 44-45.
18. J. Franklin Bell to McCoy, November 22, 1906, Box 12, McCoy Papers.
19. McCoy to Magoon, November 28, 1906, Box 12, McCoy Papers.
20. William Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston, 1952), p. 6.
21. Ibid., pp. 6, 45; see also Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club (New York, 1978), pp.
17-18.
22. William Franklin Sands, Our Jungle Diplomacy (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1944), pp. 5-6.
On Grew, see his memoir, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 2 vols.
(Boston, 1952), 1:12-13.
23. Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., "Bureaucracy and Professionalism in the Development of
American Career Diplomacy," Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy, ed. by John
Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody (Columbus, Ohio, 1971), p. 152; Robert D.
Schulzinger, The Making of the Diplomatic Mind (Middletown, Conn., 1975), p. 111. For
examples of Family correspondence, see Boxes 5- 7 of the Leland Harrison, Jr., Papers,
Library of Congress, which contain numerous exchanges with Henry P. Fletcher, Joseph C.
Grew, and James Logan. The Straight-Fletcher correspondence is found in Boxes 3 and 4 of
the Henry P. Fletcher Papers, Library of Congress [hereafter cited as Fletcher Papers], and
on reels 3-5 of the Willard Straight Papers, Cornell University Archives, Ithaca, New York.
24. While visiting the Roosevelt home at Oyster Bay, for example, McCoy reported a
long ride in the morning, followed by chess with Theodore, Jr. Then, in midafternoon,
"the President routed me out" for five sets of tennis in a "drizzly rain" (McCoy to family,
undated, Box 7, McCoy Papers).
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25. Mrs. J. Borden Harriman, From Pinafores to Politics (New York, 1923), p. 267;
George V. Allen, "Notes on 'The Family,'" in "A History of DACOR,'' compiled by
Richard Fyte Boyce, unpublished manuscript in the possession of the Diplomatic and
Consular Officers, Retired (Washington, D.C., n.d.), pp. 98-99.
26. For a complete Family roster, see ibid., pp. 110-112.
27. Straight to Fletcher, March 10, 1916, Box 4, Fletcher Papers.
28. "The Reminiscences of James F. Curtis," Columbia Oral History Collection, Butler
Library, Columbia University, New York, pp. 312-313. An early Family member, Curtis
was assistant secretary of the Treasury from 1909 to 1913 and deputy governor, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, from 1914 to 1919. William Appleman Williams, AmericanRussian Relations, 1781-1947 (reprint ed., New York, 1971), pp. 107, 108, 127.
29. Straight to Fletcher, April 6, April 18, and June 3, 1914, Box 3, Fletcher Papers.
Family membership also earned free publicity. When Woodrow Wilson selected Fletcher
as ambassador to Mexico, Family journalist George Marvin published an adulatory profile
of the appointee, touting him as "a diplomatist of the new order" and claiming that "a
better selection could not have been made" ["Henry P. Fletcher,'' The World's Work 31
(January 1916): 443, 450].
30. Untitled memorandum, July 2, 1919, Box 25, McCoy Papers; McCoy to James G.
Harbord, January 11, 1923, Box 25, McCoy Papers; McCoy to Roosevelt, undated, Box 57,
McCoy Papers; Wood to McCoy, December 13, 1907, Box 39, Wood Papers.
31. Charles E. Magoon, Report of Provisional Administration, 1908 (Havana, 1909), pp.
135-137; Magoon to Taft, April 8, 1908, Box 12, McCoy Papers.
32. McCoy to family, May 8, 1908, Box 4, McCoy Papers; McCoy to Taft, May 9, 1908,
Box 12, McCoy Papers.
33. McCoy to Taft, May 9, 1908, Box 12, McCoy Papers; McCoy to Brig. Gen. Clarence
Edwards, Bureau of Insular Affairs, undated [May 1908], Box 10, McCoy Papers; McCoy to
Wood, May 8, 1908, Box 43, Wood Papers.
34. Magoon, Report, pp. 137-138.
35. McCoy to family, January 1, 1909, January 13, [1909], April 2, 1910, April 10, 1910,
Box 5, McCoy Papers; acting adjutant, 3d Cavalry, November 20, 1908, Box 12, McCoy
Papers.
36. McCoy's 1909 efficiency report is at 58071, U.S., War Department, "Records of the
Adjutant General," Record Group 94, National Archives; [hereafter cited as RG 94, NA].
37. Stimson Diary, "Trip to Arizona and New Mexico in September and October
1911,'' "Work of the War Department in the Autumn of 1911," "My Chicago Speech,''
"Army Appropriation Veto," Henry Lewis Stimson Diary and Papers, Yale University
(hereafter cited as Stimson Papers); Stimson to McCoy, December 24, 1912, 1993336, RG
94, NA; McCoy to Stimson, December 25, 1912, Box 37, Stimson Papers; Stimson, My
Vacations (privately printed, 1949), pp. 134-143.
38. James L. Abrahamson, America Arms for a New Century: The Making of a Great
Military Power (New York, 1981); McCoy to Frankfurter, November 11, 1913, Box 13,
McCoy Papers.
39. Ibid. For other views by McCoy on reform see his letter to another preparedness
advocate, Theodore Roosevelt, April 19, 1913, Box 13, McCoy Papers. For a discussion of
Wood's views see Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought from
Washington to Marshall (New York, 1962), pp. 208-217.
40. Robert Stelark to McCoy, May 25, 1911, Box 13, McCoy Papers. Numerous letters in
Box 13 indicate McCoy's role in covert intelligence activities.
41. Wood to Lindley M. Garrison, October 11, 1913, Box 74, McCoy Papers. This
memorandum summarizes for the secretary of war the origins of the Atrato question and
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Wood's subsequent actions. For background on the "Atrato routes," see Gerstle Mack,
The Land Divided: A History of the Panama Canal and Other Isthmian Canal Projects
(reprint ed., New York, 1974), Chapter 20.
42. Wood Diary, December 20, 1911, Box 6, Wood Papers.
43. Cheney, "Diary," Box 74, McCoy Papers, provides a narrative of the expedition.
44. Ibid.; Cheney to Wood, February 12, 1912, Box 74, McCoy Papers; Cheney to
McCoy, "Supplementary Memorandum," February 12, 1912, Box 74, McCoy Papers.
45. Ibid.

CHAPTER 5
MEXICO AND THE APPROACH OF WAR
1. Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton, N.J., 1956), p. 347; see also
Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico, rev. ed. (New York, 1976), p. 140.
2. Cline, United States and Mexico, pp. 126-128, 130-134.
3. Ibid., pp. 140-151, 155-160, 172-174.
4. McCoy to Borglum, October 2, 1913, Box 13, Frank Ross McCoy Papers, Library of
Congress [hereafter cited as McCoy Papers]; McCoy to Scott, March 14, 1914, Box 13,
McCoy J.'apers.
5. Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler, " The Plan of San Diego and the
Mexican-United States War Crisis of 1916: A Reexamination," Hispanic-American
Historical Review 58 (August 1978): 383-385.
6. McCoy to Stimson, April 1, 1915, Box 48, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary and Papers,
Yale University [hereafter cited as Stimson Papers]; McCoy to family, March 15 and
August 20, 1915, Box 5, McCoy Papers.
7. McCoy to family, April l, 1915, Box 5, McCoy Papers.
8. McCoy to family, undated [May 1915], May 24, and June 4, 1915, Box 5, McCoy
Papers. Arthur S. Link's comprehensive discussion of the Lusitania crisis is found in
Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality (Princeton, N.J., 1960), pp. 368-455.
9. McCoy to family, May 24, 1915, Box 5, McCoy Papers; Roosevelt to McCoy, June 22
and July 10, 1915, and July 9, 1916, McCoy to Roosevelt, July 1, 1915, Gordon Johnston to
McCoy, June 17, 1915, and McCoy to Johnston, undated, Box 14, McCoy Papers; McCoy to
family, August 4, 1916, Box 5, McCoy Papers; Stimson to McCoy, July 19, 1916, and
McCoy to Stimson, August 2, 1916, Box 57, Stimson Papers. On Roosevelt's reaction to
the Lusitania's sinking, see William Henry Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility: The Life
and Times of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1961), pp. 476-477.
10. McCoy to family, August 20, (1915], Box 15, McCoy Papers; Wood to McCoy, July 9
and October 28, 1915, Box 14, McCoy Papers; Johnston to McCoy, June 17, 1915, Box 14,
McCoy Papers; Straight to McCoy, August 21 and 27, 1915, Box 14, McCoy Papers.
Plattsburg widened the interaction between civilian and military elites. There, Straight
befriended army captains Halstead Dorey and Gordon Johnston, both intimates of McCoy
and members of the Wood circle. John Garry Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers: The
Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920 (Lexington, Ky., 1972), p. 67 (n46). In
addition, see John Whiteclay Chambers II, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modem
America (New York, 1987), pp. 73-101.
11. Straight to McCoy, June 30, 1915, Box 14, McCoy Papers.
12. Harris and Sadler, "Plan of San Diego," pp. 388-390.
13. Ibid., p. 389; McCoy to family, September 5, 1915, Box 5, McCoy Papers.
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14. McCoy to family, September 5 and 30, 1915, and September [1915], Box 5, McCoy
Papers; "Report of the Secretary of War," U.S., War Department, Annual Reports of the
Secretary of War, 1915, Part 1 (Washington, D.C., 1916), p. 7. For press reaction to the
border raids, see Literary Digest 51 (September 18, 1915): 576-578.
15. Croly to McCoy, September 8 and 24, 1915, Box 14, McCoy Papers; "On the
Mexican Border," The New Republic 4 (October 9, 1915): 256-257. McCoy advocated
recognition of Carranza's government as "for the moment the nearest thing to
responsibility in Mexico" (McCoy to family, October 10, [1915], Box 5, McCoy Papers).
16. New York Times, October 22, 1915; McCoy to family, October 25, 1915, Box 5,
McCoy Papers.
17. McCoy to Wood, November 10, 1915, Box 89, Leonard Wood Diary and Papers,
Library of Congress [hereafter cited as Wood Papers]; McCoy to family, November 24,
1915, and January 23, March 26, and May 23, 1916, Box 5, McCoy Papers.
18. James Parker, The Old Army: Memories, 1872-1918 (Philadelphia, 1929), pp.
424-427; McCoy to family, May 23, 1916, Box 5, McCoy Papers.
19. Harris and Sadler, "Plan of San Diego," pp. 399-400; Arthur S. Link, Wilson:
Confusions and Crises (Princeton, NJ., 1964), pp. 299-301; McCoy to family, June 21,
1916, Box 5, McCoy Papers.
20. "Report of the Chief of Staff," U.S., War Department, Annual Reports of the
Secretary of War, 1915, Part 1 (Washington, D.C., 1916), p. 190; Parker, The Old Army, p.
425.
21. McCoy to family, July 7, 1916, Box 5, McCoy Papers.
22. McCoy to family, July 11 and August 21, 1916, Box 5, McCoy Papers; McCoy to
Wood, July 19, 1916, Box 89, Wood Papers; McCoy to Wood, November 3, 1916, Box 14,
McCoy Papers.
23. McCoy, Principles of Military Training (New York, 1917), pp. 9, 95, 152-160, 175,
364.
24. McCoy to family, November 26, 1916, Box 5, McCoy Papers; Parker, The Old Army,
p. 426.
25. On Hanna's tole in Cuba, see James H. Hitchman, Leonard Wood and Cuban
Independence, 1899-1902 (The Hague, 1971), pp. 51-59. For evidence of Hanna's
continued close relations with the Family, see Fletcher to McCoy, November 8, 1921, Box
16, McCoy Papers; Phillips to McCoy, October 25, 1915, Box 14, McCoy Papers; McCoy to
family, June 9, 1917, Box 6, McCoy Papers. The Family's intimacy with some of Woodrow
Wilson's most vocal opponents did not go unnoticed. As Phillips recorded privately on
February 9, 1917: "There was considerable Hurry to-day over Fletcher's staff and its
Republican flavor. Frank McCoy, being General Wood's right hand man, is assumed by
some to be anti-administration; Fletcher is also tainted some people think" (diary entry,
William Phillips Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University).
26. McCoy to family, February 22 and March 16, 1917, Box 6, McCoy Papers.
27. McCoy to Maj. Ralph H. Van Deman, March 14, 1917, 9700-87, U.S., War
Department, "Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs," Record
Group 165, National Archives; hereafter cited as RG 165, NA. Van Deman was the officer
to whom McCoy reported at the War Department.
28. On the Zimmermann Telegram, see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for
Progressivism and Peace (Princeton, NJ., 1965), pp. 342-346, 353-359, 433-436.
29. File 862.2012, U.S., Department of State, "General Records of the State Department," Record Group 59, National Archives [hereafter cited as RG 59, NA]. This file
contains numerous reports of alleged Mexican aid to Germany. See especially Frank L.
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Polk to Fletcher, April 24, 1917, 862.2012/332a, and Pershing to War Department, March
29, 1917, 862.2012/165, RG 59, NA; Lansing to Wilson, April 18, 1917, 711.12/43A, RG 59,
NA (microfilm series M314, reel 2).
30. McCoy to family, March 27, 1917, Box 6, McCoy Papers; Friedrich Katz, The Secret
War in Mexico: Europe, the United States and the Mexican Revolution (Chicago, 1981), p.
433.
31. McCoy to Van Deman, undated (received by War Department, April 19, 1917),
9700-93, RG 165, NA; McCoy to Van Deman, April 4, 1917, 9700-91, RG 165, NA.
32. "Memorandum for the Ambassador relative to German Activities in Mexico," May
3, 1917, 862.20212/331 (microfilm series M336, reel 55), RG 59, NA; McCoy to chief of the
War College Division, General Staff, May 29, 1917, file 9944-G-l, RG 165, NA; Intelligence
Section, War College Division, "Weekly Intelligence Summary," June 9, 1917, in Richard
D. Challener, comp., United States Military Intelligence: Weekly Summaries, June 20ctober 13, 1917 (New York, 1978).
33. McCoy to family, May 10, 1917, Box 6, McCoy Papers; Fletcher to Polk, May 22,
1917, Box 4, McCoy Papers; McCoy to family, June 9, 1917, Box 6, McCoy Papers.

CHAPTER 6
WORLD WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH
1. McCoy to Cheney, September 15, 1920, Box 16, Frank Ross McCoy Papers, Library
of Congress [hereafter cited as McCoy Papers]; see also McCoy to James G. Harbord,
November 14, 1927, James G. Harbord Papers, New York Historical Society.
2. Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends (Garden City, N.Y., 1967),
pp. 136, 147, 151, 155; Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway
(New York, 1956), p. 34; McCoy to family, July 1, 1917, Box 6, McCoy Papers.
3. A full list of the members of the GHQ staff is found in Order of Battle of the United
States Land Forces in the World War: American Expeditionary Forces (Washington, D.C.,
1937), pp. 1-3. The role of the staff is discussed in Edward M. Coffman, The War to End
All Wars (New York, 1968), pp. 124-127, and in Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the
Armies (Bloomington, Ind., 1986), pp. 33-38.
4. McCoy to family, June 21 and December 20, 1917, Box 6, McCoy Papers; Straight to
Dorothy Straight, January 2, 1918, reel 6, Willard Straight Papers, Cornell University;
Robert Bacon to wife, October 24, 1917, quoted in James Brown Scott, Robert Bacon: Life
and Letters (Garden City, 1923), p. 308; McCoy to Mrs. Bacon, undated, ibid., pp. 311-312;
Stimson Diary, February 15 and April 14, 1918, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary and Papers,
Yale University [hereafter cited as Stimson Papers]; James G. Harbord, Leaves from a War
Diary (New York, 1925), pp. 99, 129-133, 155-160; McCoy to family, September 3, 1917,
Box 6, McCoy Papers.
5. McCoy to family, July 1 and October 10, 1917, Box 6, McCoy Papers.
6. Stimson Diary, January 4, 1918, Stimson Papers; McCoy to family, March 25, April
10, and April 12, 1918, Box 6, McCoy Papers.
7. Hugh J. Reilly, Americans All: The Rainbow at War (Columbus, Ohio, 1936), p. 208;
McCoy to family, May 6, 1918, Box 6, McCoy Papers.
8. McCoy to Mrs. Wood, May 26, 1918, Box 193A, Leonard Wood Diary and Papers,
Library of Congress; Reilly, Americans Al~ pp. 209,213; McCoy to family, May 21 and June
4, 1918, Box 6, McCoy Papers; Francis P. Duffy, Father Duffy's Story (New York, 1919), pp.
92-93.
9. Duffy, Father Duffy's Story, pp. 96, 122; Reilly, Americans All, p. 212.
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10. American Battle Monuments Commission , 42d Division: Summary of Operations in
the World War (Washington, D.C., 1944), pp. 6-12 [hereafter cited as ABMC with unit
designation]; D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, 3 vols. (Boston, 1970), 1:
173-177. This biography of Douglas MacArthur, chief of staff of the Forty-second
Division, provides a thorough narrative of the Rainbow's battle history in World War I.
11. Reilly, Americans All, pp. 272-273, provides McCoy's account of the action at
Champagne.
12. Ibid.; ABMC, 42d Division, pp. 12-15; James, MacArthur, 176-180.
13. Coffman, War to End All Wars, pp . 234-245; ABMC, 42d Division, pp. 17-18. On
the significance of the Aisne-Marne counteroffensive, see Smythe, Pershing, pp.
152-158.
14. ABMC, 42d Division, pp. 18-22; Reilly, Americans All, pp. 379-380; James, Years of
MacArthur, 1: 182-185.
15. ABMC, 42d Division, pp. 23-24; Reilly, Americans All, pp. 380-381; James, Years of
MacArthur, 1: 185. According to Father Duffy, McCoy expressed vigorous opposition to
the proposed attack (Father Duffy's Story, p. 163).
16. Reilly, Americans All, p. 382; James, Years of MacArthur, 1: 186-189. During World
War II, Donovan headed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
17. Duffy, Father Duffy's Story, pp. 189-191; ABMC, 42d Division, pp. 26-30.
18. Reilly, Americans All, pp. 382-383. Among the regiment's dead at the Ourcq was
the poet Joyce Kilmer.
19. McCoy to family, August 6 and 20, 1918, Box 6, McCoy Papers; Edward Bowditch to
W. Cameron Forbes, August 11, 1918, W. Cameron Forbes Papers, Houghton Library,
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NA.
32. Draft letter, McCoy to Kellogg, February 15, 1928, Box 8, Francis Le Jau Parker
Papers, Library of Congress; hereafter cited as Parker Papers.
33. NYT, March 13, 1928.
34. Munro to Francis White, February 18, 1928, Box 14, Francis White Papers,
National Archives [hereafter cited as White Papers]; memo entitled "Nicaragua," March
2, 1928, 817.00/544 1/2, RG 59, NA.
35. NYT, March 14, 1928; "Deputies-14 March 1928," Box 1990, U.S., Department of
State, "Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions," Record
Group 43, National Archives (prepared by a Guardia Nacional stenographer, this
memorandum describes events in the Chamber of Deputies; hereafter cited as RG 43, NA);
"Legality versus Necessity," undated memo, Box 80, McCoy Papers; McCoy and
Eberhardt to Kellogg, March 14, 1928, Box 80, McCoy Papers.
36. On March 26, 1928, McCoy wrote William Howard Taft: "It looked for a time here
as though the government might follow President Palma's lead and throw full responsibility at me, and at one time I dug out of the Foreign Relations for 1906 the copy of your
proclamation which inaugurated the provisional government" (Box 22, McCoy Papers).
37. Walter B. Howe, "Development of the Presidential Decree of March 21, 1928," Box
7, Parker Papers.
38. U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States (1927), vol. 3 (Washington, D.C., 1942), pp. 482-485, reprints the decree; hereafter
cited as FRUS.
39. Washington Herald, April l, 1928, scrapbook, Box 93, McCoy Papers.
40. U.S., Congress, Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., April 16, 1928, p. 6523;
see also the series of articles by Carlton Beals in The Nation from February through April
1928. According to Beals, "if Sandino had arms he could raise an army of ten thousand
men by snapping his fingers; ... if he marched into Managua, the capital, tomorrow, he
would receive the greatest ovation in Nicaraguan history" ("This is War, Gentlemen!"
The Nation 126 [April 11, 1928]: 406).
41. "Memo on Sandino," undated, Box 1953, RG 43, NA; undated memorandum, Box
79, McCoy Papers.
42. Kellogg to McCoy, March 3, 1928, Box 79, McCoy Papers.
43. McCoy to Kellogg, March 5, 1928, 817.00/5450, RG 59, NA. Rear Adm. David F.
Sellers reported to the Navy Department that there was a "deep feeling of resentment"
among the marines that any army officer had been appointed to the type of mission "that
had always been done in the past by the Navy or Marine Corps" (Sellers to Admiral
Charles F. Hughes, April 6, 1928, Box 3, David Foote Sellers Papers, Library of Congress;
hereafter cited as Sellers Papers).
44. McCoy to Kellogg, March 5, 1928, 817.00/5450, RG 59, NA.
45. Sellers to Hughes, April 6, 1928, Box 3, Sellers Papers. Later Sellers commented:
"Just why it was thought necessary to confer rank upon General McCoy which made him
temporarily senior to the Squadron Commander while in Nicaragua and thus lower the
prestige of the Navy, has never been clear or understood," but since "controversies about
rank and precedence ... generally brand those who engage in them as being captious or
of small mental caliber," the admiral had been reluctant to complain too loudly (Sellers to
Munro, January 4, 1929, Box 3, Sellers Papers).
46. McCoy to Stimson, April 16, 1928, Box 99, Stimson Papers; Feland to Sellers, April
19, 1928, Box 6, Sellers Papers.
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47. NYT, March 1 and June 15, 1928; McCoy to Kellogg, August 2, 1928, Box 79,
McCoy Papers.
48. Eberhardt to Kellogg, July 20, 1928, 817.00/5845, RG 59, NA; Munro to White, June
28, 1928, Box 14, White Papers; Summerlin to Kellogg, July 21 , 1928, 817.00/5848, RG 59,
NA.
49. Robert E. Olds to McCoy, April 13, 1928, Box 14, White Papers.
50. Richard Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty (Maryknoll, N.Y., 1977), p. 71; Feland to
Sellers, March 22, 1928, Box 3, Sellers Papers; Eberhardt to White, January 31, 1929, Box
11, White Papers; "Executive Memorandum No. 22 of the American Electoral Mission in
Nicaragua," November 22, 1928, Box 79, McCoy Papers; McCoy to Elias R. Beadle,
August 30, 1928, Box 6, File 1, U.S. Marine Corps, "Records of Marine Units in
Nicaragua," Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland.
51. Macaulay, Sandino Affair, p. 128; NYT, October 31 , 1928.
52. McCoy reported that after dinner one evening, he became "the principal target ...
in a symposium on Nicaragua, being quizzed with interest by Senators Hiram Johnson
and Walsh of Montana. Frances [his wife] thought I was too mild and lacking in
belligerency. With intent, however, and you will be glad to know that I didn't raise my
voice" (McCoy to family, June 7, 1928, Box 8, McCoy Papers).
53. McCoy to Blanton Winship, February 28, 1937, Box 60, McCoy Papers; Stimson to
White, September 23, 1927, 817.00/5043 1/2, RG 59, NA; McCoy to Stimson, August 14,
1927, Box 95, Stimson Papers.
54. See Boxes 21 and 22, McCoy Papers, especially Felix Frankfurter to McCoy,
October 11, 1928, and Newton D. Baker to McCoy, November 7, 1928, Box 21; also,
McCoy to Stimson, October 24, 1928, Box 101, Stimson Papers.
55. "Summary of Events and Policy from Stimson Agreements to Date," undated, Box
79, McCoy Papers.
56. Kellogg to McCoy and Eberhardt, April 19, 1928, FRUS (1928), vol. 3, p. 534;
McCoy to family, July 5, 1928, Box 8, McCoy Papers; Munro, United States and Caribbean
Republics, p. 249.
57. Munro to McCoy, May 17, 1928, Box 21, McCoy Papers.
58. McCoy to Capt. Alfred W. Johnson, USN, June 13, 1930, Box 25, McCoy Papers; see
also draft cable, Parker to McCoy, May 22, 1928, Box 8, Parker Papers.
59. Draft cable, Parker to McCoy, May 22, 1928, Box 8, Parker Papers.
60. Eberhardt to Kellogg, June 27, 1928, 817.00/5782, RG 59, NA; NYT, July 8, 1928;
"Notes on Session of 23d July," Box 1977, RG 43, NA (these are handwritten minutes of
the election board proceedings made by its secretary, Maj. Cary I. Crockett).
61. Eberhardt to Kellogg, July 27, 1928, 817.00/5913, RG 59, NA; NYT, September 8,
1928.
62. McCoy to family, September 15, 1928, Box 8, McCoy Papers.
63. NYT, October 13, 1928.
64. NYT, November 5, 1928.
65. NYT, November 10, 1928; Munro, United States and Caribbean Republics, p. 254.
66. The Nation 127 (November 7, 1928): 467; NYT, November 18, 1928; New York
Herald Tribune, November 16, 1928, scrapbook, Box 93, McCoy Papers.
67. McCoy interview with Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., undated, Box 89, McCoy Papers.
68. Undated memorandum, Box 79, McCoy Papers.
69. Sellers to Hughes, November 1928, Box 3, Sellers Papers.
70. Draft cable, McCoy to Kellogg, November 14, 1928, Box 79, McCoy Papers.
71. NYT, December 18, 1928, and February 7, 1929.
72. Kamman, Search for Stability, pp. 186, 194-208.
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CHAPTER 9
TROUBLESHOOTING FOR STIMSON
1. William R. Garner, The Chaco Dispute: A Study of Prestige Diplomacy (Washington,
D.C., 1966), pp. 21-51; David H. Zook, Jr., The Conduct of the Chaco War (n.p., 1960), pp.
49-52; Gordon Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America
(Cambridge, Mass., 1938), pp. 66-72.
2. Garner, Chaco Dispute, pp. 57-58. For Kellogg's efforts to persuade Bolivia and
Paraguay to consent to a commission of inquiry and conciliation and to recruit members,
see U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States (1929), vol. l (Washington, D.C., 1942), pp. 818-835; hereafter cited as FRUS.
3. The protocol establishing the commission is reprinted in FRUS (1929), vol. l, pp.
835-836; McCoy, "Informal Memorandum on the Organization and Procedures of
International Commissions and Conferences," undated, Box 90, Frank Ross McCoy
Papers, Library of Congress [hereafter cited as McCoy Papers].
4. Bowditch to Forbes, January 7, 1929, W. Cameron Forbes Papers, Houghton Library,
Harvard University; Frederick P. Hibbard (U.S. charge in Bolivia) to Stimson, October 26,
1929, 724.3415/805, U.S., Department of State, "General Records of the State Department," Record Group 59, National Archives [hereafter cited as RG 59, NA]; McCoy,
"Confidential Report of the American Commissioners, Commisson of Inquiry and
Conciliation, Bolivia and Paraguay," Box 70, McCoy Papers, p. 87 [hereafter cited as
"Confidential Report"].
5. Conversation between Stimson and Eduardo Diez de Medina (Bolivian minister),
August 21, 1929, 724.3415/669, RG 59, NA; Garner, Chaco Dispute, p. 61; Bryce Wood,
The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932-1942 (New York, 1966), p. 21.
6. Proceedings of the Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation, Bolivia and Paraguay
(Washington, D.C., 1929). This volume, which exceeds 1,200 pages, contains the minutes
of all plenary sessions along with a variety of Bolivian and Paraguayan memorials,
statements, maps, and appendices. McCoy to Munro, May 11, 1929, 724.3415/525, RG 59,
NA; H.F. Arthur Schoenfeld to White, May 13, 1929, 724.3415/527, RG 59, NA; McCoy to
family, May 22, 1929, Box 8, McCoy Papers. The commission's resolution on the exchange
of prisoners is reprinted in FRUS (1929), vol. 1, pp. 852-853.
7. McCoy to family, June 24, 1929, Box 8, McCoy Papers; McCoy to Robert L. Bullard,
August 12, 1933, Box 29, McCoy Papers; "Confidential Report," pp. 16-17, 30, 33, 49.
8. McCoy to family, undated, Box 8, McCoy Papers; "Confidential Report," pp. 48, 51,
57, 86.
9. Emerson B. Christie, "The Chaco Boreal," undated, 724.3415/652 l/2, RG 59, NA
(this was a State Department study prepared at McCoy's request); McCoy to Malcolm
Davis, May 7, 1934, Box 31, McCoy Papers; "Confidential Report," pp. 47, 52-55, 80-81,
82-84.
10. McCoy to Bolivian and Paraguayan delegations, August 31, 1929, 724.3415/688, RG
59, NA; "Confidential Report," pp. 61-62, 64-69. The text of the proposed convention of
arbitration is reprinted in FRUS (1929), vol. l, pp. 875-880.
11. Stimson to George L. Kreek (U.S. minister to Paraguay), September 7, 1929,
724.3415/686B, RG 59, NA; Stimson to Hibbard, September 7, 1929, 724.3415/686A, RG
59, NA; Bolivian delegation to McCoy, and Paraguayan delegation to McCoy, September 9,
1929, 724.3415/714 1/2, RG 59, NA.
12. Mc<;:oy to Bolivian and Paraguayan delegations, September 12, 1929, 724.3415/714
1/2, RG 59, NA; "Confidential Report," pp. 73-74.
13. "Confidential Report," pp. 40-42, 46. For the conciliation protocol, see FRUS
(1929), vol. 1, pp. 860-861.
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14. "Confidential Report," p. 108; McCoy to Stimson, September 16, 1929, 724.3415/713
112, RG 59, NA.
15. Stimson to Hibbard, September 16, 1929, 724.34151704A, RG 59, NA; conversation
between White and Diez de Medina, September 17, 1929, 724.3415/704 112, RG 59, NA;
Hibbard to Stimson, October 9, 1929, 724.3415/774, RG 59, NA; Hibbard to Stimson,
October 26, 1929, 724.3415/805, RG 59, NA. For assessments of McCoy's performance
that suggest forbearance and impartiality on his part, see conversation between Stimson
and General Guillermo Ruprecht (the Uruguayan delegate), undated, 724.34151714, RG
59, NA, and "Supplementary Memorandum by the Secretary General and the Counsellor
of the Commission," undated, Box 70, McCoy Papers.
16. McCoy to Kellogg, December 30, 1929, Box 13, Francis White Papers, National
Archives; McCoy to Malcolm W. Davis, May 7, 1934, Box 31, McCoy Papers.
17. "Confidential Report," p. 102. Although not indicative of any unique prescience,
McCoy's prediction on page 33 of his "Confidential Report" -that failure to resolve the
territorial issue would lead to war-proved correct. For an account of the BolivianParaguayan armed conflict of 1932-1935, see Zook, Conduct of the Chaco War.
18. Stimson Diary, February 14, 1931, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary and Papers, Yale
University; hereafter cited as Stimson Papers. Stimson apparently overcame temptation;
McCoy did not fill in for Cotton during the latter's illness.
19. On McCoy's continuing involvement with Nicaragua, see Stimson Diary, January
13, 29, and 30 and February 2, 5, and 20, 1931, Stimson Papers.
20. New York Times [hereafter cited as NY1], July 22, 30, and 31; August 5, 22, and 30;
and September l, 1930.
21. McCoy to Stimson, August 11, 1930, Box 107, Stimson Papers; NYT, September 25,
1930.
22. Grayson Kirk, Philippine Independence (New York, 1936), pp. 73-107.
23. For a comprehensive statement of the Hoover administration's position, see U.S.,
Congress, Senate, Independence of the Philippine Islands, S. Doc. 150, 71st Cong., 2d
sess. Later, during the Manchurian crisis, Stimson remarked that "the whole trouble with
Japan and her intransigence is based upon her belief that we are going to give up the
Philippines and that we do not wish to remain a Far Eastern power"; were the United
States to correct that misapprehension, "we should have no trouble with Japan" (Stimson
Diary, February 3, 1932, Stimson Papers).
24. Stimson to McCoy, June 11, 1930, Box 106, Stimson Papers; Stimson Diary, October
1, 1930, Stimson Papers. According to William R. Castle, around the time of his
inauguration, President Hoover "had practically decided" to appoint McCoy governor
general but chose Dwight Davis at the last minute (William R. Castle Diaries, February 28
and May 18, 1929, Houghton Library, Harvard University).
25. Stimson Diary, October 3 and 4, 1930, Stimson Papers. McCoy's association with
the unpopular regime of Leonard Wood did his candidacy little good in Philippine eyes.
26. Ibid., May 19, 1931.
27. Ibid., June 3, 10, and 14, 1931.
28. Memorandum prepared by McCoy and Quezon, June 18, 1931, Box 27, McCoy
Papers. Emphasis added.
29. McCoy to Hurley, "Concerning relations between the United States and the
Philippine Islands, summarizing considered views of all executive departments, with
certain conclusions and recommendations," June 18, 1931, Box 83, McCoy Papers.
30. Stimson Diary, June 14, 1931, Stimson Papers; Theodore Friend, Between Two
Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines (New Haven, Conn., 1965), pp. 61-67; Henry L.
Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1948), pp.
147, 149. Reason exists to question the sincerity of Quezon's support for the plan from the
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outset. Hoover and Stimson clearly had McCoy in mind as the last governor general to
oversee the transition to dominion status. But in October 1931, before the demise of the
dominion plan, Quezon and his colleagues succeeded in blocking another attempt to
appoint McCoy as governor general (Stimson Diary, October 29, 1931, Stimson Papers).
31. For an adulatory account of Butler's career, see Lowell Thomas, Old Gimlet Eye:
The Adventures of Smedley D. Butler (New York, 1933); more recent is Hans Schmidt,
Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American
Military History (Lexington, Ky., 1987).
32. Schmidt, Maverick Marine, p. 204.
33. Ibid., pp. 205-208.
34. NYT, January 27 and 30, 1931; Stimson Diary, January 27, 1931, Stimson Papers.
For an account of the affair from Butler's point of view, see Robert B. Asprey, "The CourtMartial of Smedley Butler," Marine Corps Gazette 43 (December 1959): 28-34.
35. Thomas, Gimlet Eye, p. 307; NYT, January 30, January 31, and February 3, 1931;
"Our Comic Opera Court-Martial," Literary Digest 108 (February 28, 1931): 10.
36. Stimson Diary, January 30 and February 4, 1931, Stimson Papers.
37. Ibid., February 4 and 6, 1931.
38. McCoy, "Memorandum to go with newspaper articles-Smedley Butler," October
30, 1931, Box 26, McCoy Papers; NYT, February 9 and 10, 1931.
39. Stimson Diary, January 30 and February 6, 1931, Stimson Papers.

CHAPTER 10
THE LYTTON COMMISSION
l. League of Nations, Manchuria: Report of the Commission of Enquiry Appointed by
the League of Nations (Washington, D.C., 1932), pp. 67-72 [hereafter cited as Lytton
Report]; Gary B. Ostrower, Collective Insecurity: The United States and the League of
Nations during the Early Thirties (Lewisburg, Penn., 1979), p. 11.
2. Henry L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis: Recollections and Observations (New
York, 1936). Manchuria also received extensive treatment in Stimson's memoirs (see
Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War [New York, 1948],
Chapter 9). The best study of Stimson's role in the crisis is Armin Rappaport, Henry L.
Stimson and Japan, 1931-1933 (Chicago, 1963). The best overall study is Christopher
Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League, and the Far Eastern Crisis of
1931-1933 (New York, 1973). For an extended treatment of McCoy's role, see Susan
Bradshaw, "The United States and East Asia: Frank Ross McCoy and the Lytton
Commission, 1931-1933," (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1974).
3. Akira lriye, Across the Pacific (New York, 1967), pp. 182-186; Thorne, Limits, pp.
50-52, 56.
4. Thorne, Limits, pp. 50-52, 56; Rappaport, Stimson, p. 36.
5. Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression (New Haven, Conn.,
1957), passim; Rappaport, Stimson, pp. 34-37; Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, p. 56.
6. Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, pp. xi, 34; Stimson Diary, September 22, October 9, and
October 16, 1931, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary and Papers, Yale University [hereafter cited
as Stimson Papers].
7. Stimson Diary, September 23 and 24, 1931, Stimson Papers.
8. Rappaport, Stimson, p. 30; Stimson Diary, October 16 and 19, 1931, Stimson Papers.
9. Stimson Diary, November 14, 1931, and April 27, 1932, Stimson Papers.
10. Ibid., November 20 and 21, 1931, February 21, 1932, and April 28, 1932; Stimson to
Reed, August 11, 1932, 793.94 comm/334A, U.S., Department of State, "General
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Records of the State Department," Record Group 59, National Archives (hereafter cited
as RG 59, NA]; Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, p. 188; Ostrower, Collective Insecurity, pp.
102, 125.
11. Stimson Diary, December 21 and 22, 1931, Stimson Papers; Maj. Gen. Frank Parker
to McCoy, January 6, 1932, Box 28, Frank Ross McCoy Papers, Library of Congress
[hereafter cited as McCoy Papers]. McCoy was actually the third candidate considered.
The League itself suggested Walter D. Hines, a New York City lawyer, and Stimson
proposed Henry P. Fletcher, McCoy's compatriot from 1718 H Street and a retired foreign
service officer. When both Hines and Fletcher declined the appointment, Stimson
recorded that he was "very much relieved ... because I think McCoy is a better man than
either of those two" (Stimson Diary, December 22, 1931, Stimson Papers).
12. Prentiss Gilbert to Stimson, December 23, 1931, 793.94 comm/13, RG 59, NA;
Stimson Diary, December 26, 1931, Stimson Papers.
13. Stimson Diary, December 26, 1931, Stimson Papers.
14. Ibid., January 20, 1932, and February 1, 2, and 4, 1932. Because he was in
Washington preparing for his mission at this time, McCoy also assisted Stimson and the
State Department inner circle in drafting the secretary's well-known letter to Senator
Borah (James C. Thompson, Jr., "The Role of the State Department," Pearl Harbor as
History, ed. by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto [New York, 1973], p. 93).
15. Biographical data on the commissioners is contained in Box 77, McCoy Papers.
16. Personal interview with Maj. Gen. William Biddle, USA, Ret., Alexandria, Virginia,
July 7, 1978. Lieutenant Biddle accompanied McCoy in the capacity of military aide.
17. Biddle, "Military Narrative of the Travels and Work of the Far Eastern Commission
of Inquiry," Box 76, McCoy Papers, p. 9; McCoy to family, March 4, 1932, Box 8, and
McCoy to Sherman V. Hasbrouk, April 15, 1932, Box 28, McCoy Papers; Japan Advertiser,
March 6 and 7, 1932, scrapbook, Box 95, McCoy Papers.
18. "Record of Interview with Lieut. General Araki-War Minister of Japan," March 5,
1932, Box 72, McCoy Papers.
19. "Record of Interviews with Mr. Yoshizawa, Foreign Minister of Japan," March 7,
1932, Box 76, McCoy Papers.
20. "Military Narrative," pp. 10-11; Nelson T. Johnson to Stimson, March 26, 1932,
793.94 comm/150, RG 59, NA.
21. "Military Narrative," p. 19; Lytton Report, pp. 84-88; Thorne, Limits, pp. 204-210;
Stimson Diary, February 8, 1932, Stimson Papers.
22. Lytton Report, p. 84; Wilbur J. Carr (acting secretary of state) to American consul,
Shanghai, March 18, 1932, 793.94 comm/146, RG 59, NA; McCoy to family, April 9, 1932,
Box 8, McCoy Papers.
23. Lytton Report, p. 84; McCoy to family, April 9, 1932, Box 8, McCoy Papers.
24. McCoy to family, April 9, 1932, Box 8, McCoy Papers; Taylor to McCoy, March 18,
1932, Box 29, McCoy Papers.
25. McCoy to family, April 9, 1932, Box 8, McCoy Papers. For further evidence of
McCoy's favorable opinion of the Kuomintang, see "Military Narrative," pp. 28, 34.
26. Lytton Report, p. l 1. McCoy apparently found the layover in Peking discouraging.
To a friend he wrote: "It is pretty hard to keep up the guise of hopeful peacemakers when
we are wandering around in such dense oriental jungle" (McCoy to Col. T. A. Roberts,
April 5, 1932, Box 29, McCoy Papers).
27. Blakeslee, "The Lytton Commission," speech delivered to the U.S. Army War
College, December 7, 1932, Box 78, McCoy Papers; Joseph Grew, "Memorandum of
Conversation between the Ambassador and General F. R. McCoy," July 14, 1932, 793.94
comm/310, RG 59, NA; Johnson to Stimson, June 16, 1932, 793.94 comm/316, RG 59,
NA.
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28. McCoy to family, May 19, 1932, Box 8, McCoy Papers; M. S. Myers (U.S. consul
general in Mukden), undated memorandum, 793.94 comm/281, RG 59, NA; Blakeslee,
"Lytton Commission"; "Military Narrative," p. 71. For a firsthand account of Japanese
security measures, see Amleto Vespa, Secret Agent of Japan (Garden City, N.Y., 1938), pp.
147-159.
29. "Record of Interview with Lt. General Honjo, Commander in Chief, Kwantung
Army," undated, and "Record of Interviews with Colonel Komatsubara, Chief of Special
Service, Kwantung Army, Harbin," May 13, 1932, Box 76, McCoy Papers.
30. "Memorandum of Conversation between the Ambassador and General F. R.
McCoy," July 14, 1932; Blakeslee, "Lytton Commission"; C. Walter Young, "An
Interview with General Ma Cha Shan," October 4, 1933, Box 30, McCoy Papers. McCoy
developed a high opinion of the Japanese forces in Manchuria. He told Henry Luce, the
publishing magnate, in Peking that the Kwantung Army was "a magnificent war
machine"; Japan had "soldiers that any officer would be proud to command," and they
"were prepared to ... settle the issue by combat" ("Conversation," June 10, 1932,
793.94 comm/297, RG 59, NA).
31. Lytton Report, p. 12.
32. "Memorandum of Conversation between the Ambassador and General F. R.
McCoy," July 15, 1932, 793.94 comm/310, RG 59, NA; "Record of Interview of Count
Uchida, Foreign Minister of Japan," July 14, 1932, Box 76, McCoy Papers.
33. "Memorandum of Conversation between the Ambassador and General F. R.
McCoy," July 15, 1932. Emphasis in the original.
34. "Record of Interview of Count Uchida, Foreign Minister of Japan," July 14, 1932;
"Memorandum of Conversation between the Ambassador and General F. R. McCoy," July
14 and 15, 1932; McCoy to Gordon Johnston, June 18, 1932, Box 28, McCoy Papers;
McCoy to Mrs. Ogden Reid, June 17, 1932, Box 29, McCoy Papers.
35. "Record of Interview of Count Uchida, Foreign Minister of Japan," July 12 and 14,
1932.
36. Ibid.
37. "Memorandum of Conversation between the Ambassador and General F. R. McCoy,"
July 14 and 15, 1932; "Conversation," July 21, 1932, 793.94 comm/340, RG 59, NA.
38. McCoy to Stimson, July 22, 1932, Box ll l, Stimson Papers.
39. McCoy to family, March 4, 1932, Box 8, McCoy Papers.
40. Blakeslee to Hornbeck, September 14, 1932, reprinted as an appendix to Rappaport, Stimson, pp. 207-231; McCoy to family, August 8, 1932, Box 8, McCoy Papers.
41. Blakeslee to Hornbeck, September 14, 1932, in Rappaport, Stimson, pp. 207-231;
"Work of the Commission," June 13, 1932, vol. 52, Nelson T. Johnson Papers, Library of
Congress [hereafter cited as Johnson Papers).
42. Blakeslee to Hornbeck, September 14, 1932, in Rappaport, Stimson, pp. 207-231.
43. Ibid.; Biddle interview, July 7, 1978.
44. McCoy to family, September 6, 1932, Box 8, McCoy Papers; Lytton Report, pp. 23,
29, 38, 71, 97, 126, 128.
45. Lytton Report, pp. 129-131, 133-138.
46. "Report of League Commission, etc.," September 1, 1932, vol. 52, Johnson Papers.
McCoy told Johnson that the United States "did not appreciate the methods of the
Japanese," especially that country's penchant for initiating hostilities by means of
unannounced, preemptive attacks. McCoy and Johnson both agreed that the Japanese
"would be quite capable ... of attacking us."
47. Blakeslee to Hornbeck, September 14, 1932, in Rappaport, Stimson, pp. 207-231;
Stimson Diary, September 26, 1932, Stimson Papers; see also Stimson to McCoy, October
5, 1932, Box 28, McCoy Papers.
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48. "Summary of American Editorial Opinion on the Lytton Report," October 5, 1932,
793.94 comm/433, RG 59, NA; Rappaport, Stimson, p. 174.
49. Rappaport, Stimson, pp. 183-184, 188-191.
50. Ibid., pp. 185-188; Hugh Wilson to Stimson, November 25 and December 4, 1932,
793.94 comm/560 and 603, RG 59, NA.
51. Wilson to Stimson, December 4, 1932, 793.94 comm/604, RG 59, NA.
52. Stimson Diary, December 31, 1932, and January 4, 1933, Stimson Papers. Even
before Stimson could meet with McCoy, Secretary of War Patrick Hurley drafted him to
assist in writing Hoover's veto of a just-passed Philippine independence bill (see folder
labeled "Philippine Islands 1932 [sic) Veto Message," Box 83, McCoy Papers).
53. Thorne, Limits, pp. 334-336; Rappaport, Stimson, pp. 198-199.
54. Cranford to Military Intelligence Division, War Department, July 13, 1932, 793.94
comm/318, RG 59, NA.
55. McCoy to Lytton, September 4, 1933, and Lytton to McCoy, October 3, 1933, Box
30, McCoy Papers.

CHAPTER 11
NEW DIRECTIONS
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McCoy Papers, Library of Congress; hereafter cited as McCoy Papers.
2. Stimson Diary, February 10 and March 2, 1933, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary and
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to family, June 1, 1933, Box 8, McCoy Papers; McCoy to Blanton Winship, June 13, 1933,
Box 31, McCoy Papers; McCoy to George Corcoran, September 6, 1933, Box 29, McCoy
Papers.
4. McCoy to Corcoran, September 6, 1933, Box 29, McCoy Papers.
5. MacArthur to McCoy, April 11, 1934, Box 32, McCoy Papers.
6. McCoy to family, May 1, 1934, Box 8, McCoy Papers; McCoy to MacArthur, May 1,
1934, Box 32, McCoy Papers; "Notes on the question of the continuance of compulsory
military training at the University of Minnesota," April 30, 1934, Box 32, McCoy Papers;
Charles Chatfield, For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914-1941 (Knoxville,
Tenn., 1971), pp. 152-158.
7. The Kansas Industrialist, February 21, 1934, Box 89, McCoy Papers; "The Army,"
April 4, 1934, Box 89, McCoy Papers; Stimson Diary, October 5, 1934, Stimson Papers;
McCoy to H. Otley Beyer, November 8, 1934, Box 31, McCoy Papers.
8. McCoy to family, April 3, 1935, Box 8, McCoy Papers; Forrest C. Pogue, George C.
Marshall: Education of a General (New York, 1963), PP- 288-289, 298-299. McCoy and
Marshall remained close friends thereafter (see Larry I. Bland, ed., The Papers of George
Catlett Marshall: "The Soldierly Spirit," December 1880-June 1939, 2 vols. [Baltimore,
1981- ], 1: 344, 406, 506, 615-616).
9. Col. Charles Burnett to McCoy, January 30, 1936, Box 33, McCoy Papers.
10. McCoy to family, March 11 and June 16, 1936, Box 8, McCoy Papers.
11. McCoy to family, July 1, 1936, Box 8, McCoy Papers; Stimson Diary, November 22,
1935, and January 14, 1936, Stimson Papers; McCoy to Walter H. Mallory (executive
director of the Council on Foreign Relations), May 18 and October 29, 1936, Box 72,
McCoy Papers; "A Conference for University Men on a Reassessment of the Traditional
Bases of American Foreign Policy," Box 72, McCoy Papers; "Conference for University
Men on 'Ways of Staying Out of War,' " Box 72, McCoy Papers; Edgar P. Dean to McCoy,
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June 15, 1938, Box 72, McCoy Papers; on the history of the Council on Foreign Relations,
see Robert D. Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs (New York, 1984).
12. New York Times [hereafter cited as NYT], July 29, 1938, and October 9, 1939; for
McCoy's honorary degrees, see Box 100, McCoy Papers.
13. McCoy to Forbes, August 20, 1938, W. Cameron Forbes Papers, Houghton Library,
Harvard University [hereafter cited as Forbes Papers]; draft article for the St. Louis PostDispatch, November 29, 1938, Box 89, McCoy Papers; "Remarks to Herald-Tribune
Forum," October 26, 1938, Box 89, McCoy Papers; "Broader Aspects of National
Defense," January 31, 1939, Box 90, McCoy Papers; "A System for the Conduct of War by
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[typescript in Box 90, McCoy Papers]; see also NYT, May 4, 1939.
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as History, ed. by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York, 1973), pp. 166, 188.
15. McCoy to Stimson, December 6, 1934, Box 118, Stimson Papers.
16. Laurence A. Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on
Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy (New York, 1977), pp. 70-72.
Although the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Association were on
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be Christian-like" (McCoy to Harvey N. Pike, December 22, 1942, Box 68, Foreign Policy
Association Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin; hereafter
cited as FPA Papers, Madison).
17. Foreign Policy Association (FPA), Fifty Years: The Story of the Foreign Policy
Association, 1918-1968 (New York, n.d.), pp. 3-7; Frank Winchester Abbott, "From
Versailles to Munich: The Foreign Policy Association and American Foreign Policy"
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20. NYT, July 10, 1939; "Democracy and Foreign Policy," October 29, 1939, Box 90,
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Speaker's Bureau, December 18, 1940, "FPA Office Reports," Foreign Policy Association
Files, maintained at FPA headquarters, 345 E. 46th Street, New York; hereafter cited as
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example, see his "Our Relations with the Far East," in Foreign Policy Reports 19
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in FPA Files, New York); "Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Foreign
Policy Association," January 27, 1943, "FPA Corporate Record, Jan. '43-Jan. '45," FPA
Files, New York.
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during World War II (New York, 1967).
25. Shoup and Minter, Imperial Brain Trust, pp. 118-122; Schulzinger, Wise Men, p.
.
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Forbes, February 26, 1941, Folder 182, Forbes Papers; on U.S. concerns over Axis
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Hemisphere Defense (Washington, D.C., 1960), pp. 6-14.
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Stimson (Boston, 1960), pp. 478-482; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active
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28. Stimson Diary, December 16, 1941, Stimson Papers; NYT, December 17, 1941;
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Joint Committee on the Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack (79th Cong., 1st sess.), Pearl
Harbor Attack, part 39 (Washington, D.C., 1946), pp. 1-18; Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn
We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York, 1981), pp. 592-604.
31. Stimson Diary, January 25 and 26, 1942, Stimson Papers. The Times and Sun
quotations, both from editions of January 26, 1942, are in Box 84, McCoy Papers, which
contains other clippings pertaining to the Roberts Report.
32. The best scholarly analysis of the reasons for American unpreparedness on
December 7 is Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, Calif.,
1962). Melosi, Shadow of Pearl Harbor, traces the course of the controversy stemming
from the attack.
33. NYT, June 28 and July 3, 1942.
34. Undated press release [July 1942], Box 79, McCoy Papers; Stimson Diary, July 9,
1942, Stimson Papers.
35. Stimson Diary, July 1 and 6, 1942, Stimson Papers; press release, July 8, 1942, Box
79, McCoy Papers.
36. Stimson Diary, July 9, 1942, Stimson Papers; "Secret Saboteur Trial," unidentified
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37. Stimson to McCoy, August 11, 1942, Box 79, McCoy Papers; McCoy to McCormick,
August 13, 1942, Box 79, McCoy Papers.
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CHAPTER 12
THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION
1. George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947):
582; Henry R. Luce, "The American Century," Life 10 (February 17, 1941): 61-65; on
American public opinion in 1945, see John Lukacs, 1945: Year Zero (Garden City, N.Y.,
1978), Chapter 7.
2. "Establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission," SWNCC 65/2, April 27,
1945, U.S., Executive Branch, "Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee,"
Record Group 353, National Archives; hereafter cited as SWNCC Records, RG 353, NA.
This document, approved by the president on June 5, 1945, indicated that U.S. interest in
an allied commission stemmed from the fear that the American people would support
"only grudgingly" a situation in which the United States "would carry the sole burden"
for the occupation. U.S., Department of State, Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress
(Washington, D.C., n.d.), pp. 7-8; for the terms of references of the FEAC, see ibid., pp.
67-68; George H. Blakeslee, The Far Eastern Commission: A Study in International
Cooperation, 1945 to 1952 (Washington, D.C., 1953), pp. 2-5.
3. McCoy's resignation as president of the Foreign Policy Association was effective
April l, 1946. Honoring McCoy's contributions to the FPA, Mrs. Thomas Lamont, a
member of the association's board of directors, contributed $100,000 to the FPA to
establish the Frank R. McCoy Fund (Florence Lamont to William W. Lancaster, July 20,
1946, "FPA Office Reports," Foreign Policy Association Files, FPA headquarters, 345 E.
46th Street, New York).
4. Blakeslee, Far Eastern Commission, pp. 5-7.
5. Ibid.
6. William R. Castle Diaries, November 15, 1945, Houghton Library, Harvard University; McCoy to Byrnes, October 26, 1945, Box 223, U.S., Department of State, "Records of
the Far Eastern Commission," Record Group 43, National Archives [hereafter cited as
FEC Records, RG 43, NA].
7. "Confidential Minutes for F.E.A.C. Meetings," November 7 and 16, 1945, Box 3,
FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
8. Blakeslee, Far Eastern Commission, p. 12-13. On U.S. reluctance to revise the FEAC
terms of reference and its determination to avoid any loss of authority in doing so, see
SWNCC 65/12, October 18, 1945, SWNCC Records, RG 353, NA.
9. "Far Eastern Commission Terms of Reference," December 30, 1945, Box 3, FEC
Records, RG 43, NA. This document contains the terms of reference of both the FEC and
the Allied Council.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid. All of the safeguards of U.S. authority with the exception of the veto were
lifted directly from McCoy's October 26 memorandum to the secretary of state, cited
above. These safeguards subsequently became the devices by which the United States
disabled the FEC.
12. "Summary of Meeting of U.S. Delegation, Far Eastern Commission," January 13,
1947, Box 224, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
13. The commission continued to call itself the FEAC throughout its trip to Japan.
Once back in Washington, however, it assumed its new title and added a representative of
the Soviet Union. The commission's secretariat, internal organization, and operating
procedures remained unchanged; McCoy continued to serve as permanent chairman of
the FEC.
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14. "The Reminiscences of Sir George Sansom," Columbia Oral History Collection,
Butler Library, Columbia University, p. 77. Sansom was a prominent Japanologist and a
member of the British delegation to the FEC. Blakeslee, "Report on the Far Eastern
Commission's Trip to Japan, December 26, 1945-February 13, 1946," George Hubbard
Blakeslee Papers, Clark University; hereafter cited as Blakeslee Papers.
15. Nelson T. Johnson, "Memorandum of Interview with General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur," January 30, 1946, Box 43, Nelson T. Johnson Papers, Library of Congress
[hereafter cited as Johnson Papers). MacArthur told the FEC that the Japanese emperor
was the "most perfect example of a stooge or Charlie McCarthy that one could imagine,"
but he favored his retention. For McCoy's impressions of the trip to Japan, see
"Memorandum by the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission to the Secretary of
State," March 4, 1946, U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States (1946), vol. 8 (Washington, D.C., 1942), pp. 159-160;
hereafter cited as FRUS.
16. Transcript of first meeting, February 26, 1946, Box 7, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
17. Johnson, "Memorandum by the Secretary General of the Far Eastern Commission," January 30, 1946, FRUS (1946), vol. 8, 124; New York Times [hereafter cited as
NYTJ March 13, 1946; Blakeslee, Far Eastern Commission, p. 55.
18. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964
(Boston, 1985), pp. 126-128, 135; Blakeslee, Far Eastern Commission, pp. 45-47; for a
revised version of the draft constitution, see Department of State, Occupation of Japan,
pp. 117-132; MacArthur's public endorsement of the constitution is at ibid., pp. 132-133.
19. Transcripts of third and fourth meetings, March 14 and 20, 1946, Box 7, FEC
Records, RG 43, NA; "Reminiscences of Sir George Sansom," p. 75.
20. Transcript of third meeting, March 14, 1946, Box 7, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
21. Transcript of fourth meeting, March 20, 1946, Box 7, FEC Records, RG 43, NA; for
the policy decision and consultation, see FRUS (1946), vol. 8, pp. 182-184.
22. "Reply by General MacArthur to Far Eastern Commission on Timing of Elections," March 29, 1946, Department of State, Occupation of Japan, pp. 138-140.
23. Transcript of sixth meeting, March 30, 1946, Box 7, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
24. Transcript of fifth meeting, March 27, 1946, Box 7, FEC Records, RG 43, NA; on the
FEC's surprise at SCAP's announcement of a draft constitution, see transcript of
sixteenth meeting, June 20, 1946, Box 7, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
25. "Far Eastern Commission Communication for General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur," April 10, 1946, FRUS (1946), vol. 8, pp. 194-196; McCoy to MacArthur,
undated [April 1946), Box 221, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
26. MacArthur to McCoy, April 15, 1946, FRUS (1946), vol. 8, pp. 202-205.
27. Vincent to Byrnes, April 19, 1946, Box 237, FEC Records, RG 43, NA; McCoy to
MacArthur, April 22, 1946, FRUS (1946), vol. 8, pp. 213-214 (original in Box 221, FEC
Records, RG 43, NA).
28. "Summary of Meeting of American Group on the Far Eastern Commission," May
6, 1946, Box 224, FEC Records, RG 43, NA; Blakeslee, Far Eastern Commission, pp.
49-50.
29. Transcript of eleventh meeting, May 13, 1946, Box 7, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
Because McCoy placed great value on the appearance of consensus, he was reluctant to
use the veto. When opposing a motion, McCoy simply recommended that it be referred
back to a committee for further discussion. The other members, knowing that McCoy
could veto a proposition if pushed into doing so, fell into the habit early on of acquiescing
in his requests for deferral. Eventually, however, the practice greatly annoyed the allies,
who resented McCoy's enjoying the benefits of a veto while priding himself in not having
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employed it (see transcript of forty-second meeting, January 23, 1947, Box 7, FEC
Records, RG 43, NA).
30. MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 4, 1946, FRUS (1946), vol. 8, pp.
220-226.
31. Transcripts of thirteenth and fourteenth meetings, May 29 and June 5, 1946, Box 7,
FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
32. Ibid. "Tactics to be employed in FEC Proceedings," March 2, 1946, Box 223, FEC
Records, RG 43, NA (this memorandum went on to recommend that McCoy be informed
"that the State Department desires him to pursue a policy of great generosity in meeting
the desires of other nations .. . to participate responsibly and very actively in the FEC
activities"); SWNCC 294/1, May 7, 1946, SWNCC Records, RG 353, NA.
33. Unsigned memorandum, "ESP and JK Views Regarding the Far Eastern Commission," undated [July 1946], Box 223, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
34. Galbraith to John H. Hilldring (assistant secretary of state for occupied areas), July
15, 1946, Box 223, FEC Records, RG 43, NA. There was, of course, another view. Those
who made the pilgrimage to Tokyo generally took the position, expressed by one observer,
that the FEC was "out of touch with realities" and insufficiently appreciative of the job
that SCAP was doing (see Kenneth Colegrove to McCoy, April 26 and June 15, 1946, Box
237, FEC Records, RG 43, NA; and C. Stanton Babcock to Nelson T. Johnson, July 11 and
26, 1946, Box 43, Johnson Papers).
35. FEC 031/19, "Basic Principles for a New Japanese Constitution," reprinted in
Activities of the Far Eastern Commission: Report by the Secretary General, February 26,
1946-July 10, 1947(Washington, D.C., 1947), pp. 65-66; Byrnes to Johnson, July 12, 1946,
FRUS (1946), vol. 8, pp. 266-267. On allied dissatisfaction with the draft, see Berendsen's
remarks in transcript of twenty-first meeting, July 25, 1946, Box 7, FEC Records, RG 43,

NA.
36. For correspondence pertaining to amending the constitution, see FRUS (1946), vol.
8, pp. 276-280, 289-291; summary of U.S. delegation meeting, August 19, 1946, Box 224,
FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
37. Bl!lkeslee to Dwight Lee, July 6, 1946, Box 9, Dwight E. Lee Papers, Clark
University; hereafter cited as Lee Papers. In a policy statement drafted at McCoy's
direction and approved by SWNCC, Blakeslee went so far as to argue that to permit the
FEC to approve the constitution would violate the Potsdam declaration's promise to create
a government "in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people"
[SWCC 228/8, July 16, 1946, FRUS (1946), vol. 8, pp. 269-271].
38. Transcripts of twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, and twenty-eighth meetings, September 12,
19, and 25, 1946, Box 7, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
39. Daniel Fahey to McCoy, September 6, 1946, Box 221, FEC Records, RG 43, NA;
transcripts of twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh meetings, September 19 and 21, 1946, Box
7, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
40. FEC 031/40, Activities of the Far Eastern Commission, p. 67. MacArthur's response
to the October 17 policy decision is reprinted in FRUS (1946), vol. 8, pp. 352-353.
41. Transcripts of thirty-second, thirty-third, and thirty-fifth meetings, October 31,
November I, and November 21, 1946, Box 7, FEC Records, RG 43, NA; summary of
meetings of U.S. delegation, November 12, 1946, Box 224, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
42. McCoy to acting secretary of state, September 24, 1946, FRUS (1946), vol. 8, pp.
317-318; summary of meeting of U.S. delegation, November 18, 1946, Box 224, FEC
Records, RG 43, NA; McCoy to Hilldring, December 27, 1946, Box 238, FEC Records, RG
43, NA.
43. Transcript of thirtieth meeting, January 2, 1947, Box 7, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
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44. Ibid.
45. "The Question of Publication of the FEC Policy Decision on the Review of the New
Japanese Constitution," undated, Box 221, FEC Records, RG 43, NA; MacArthur to State
Department, January 22, 1949, Box 221, FEC Records, RG 43, NA; W. Walton Butterworth
to Conrad Snow, March 21, 1949, Box 221, FEC Records, RG 43, NA; Howard C. Peterson
to Hilldring, May 12, 1947, FRUS (1947), vol. 6, pp. 390-392; SWNCC 380, July 22, 1947,
SWNCC Records, RG 353, NA.
46. Blakeslee, Far Eastern Commission, p. 194; transcript of fifty-ninth meeting, May
29, 1947, Box 8, FEC Records, RG 43, NA; Robert W. Barnett to Charles E. Saltzman,
September 23, 1948, Box 223, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
47. McCoy to Hilldring, August 11, 1947, FRUS (1947), vol. 6, pp. 271-273.
48. SANACC 380/2, October 24, 1947, Box 238, FEC Records, RG 43, NA; SANACC
389, December 5, 1947, "State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee Records,"
RG 353, NA (this committee, known by the acronym SANACC, was the successor to
SWNCC).
49. Summary of meeting of U.S. delegation, September 8, 1947, Box 224, FEC Records,
RG 43, NA; Blakeslee to Lee, June 16, 1946, Box 9, Lee Papers; "A Survey of the Attitudes
of the States Composing the Far Eastern Commission," undated, Box 6, Blakeslee Papers;
Samuel S. Stratton to McCoy, March 9, 1948, Box 223, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
50. "The United States and the Far Eastern Commission," May 18, 1948, Box 224,
FEC Records, RG 43, NA. This was the talking paper that McCoy used for his interview
with Marshall.
51. Michael Schaller, "MacArthur' s Japan: The View from Washington," Diplomatic
History 10 (Winter 1986): 10-14.
52. Frank G. Wisner to William H. Draper, June 23, 1948, Box 223, FEC Records, RG
43, NA; "U.S. Responsibility for Delay in the FEC," November 23, 1948, Box 223, FEC
Records, RG 43, NA; see also Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan (New
York, 1985), p. 123.
.
53. "The Far Eastern Commission: Accomplishments and Problems," January 24,
1949, Box 223, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
54. Saltzman to Acheson, undated [January 1949], Box 223, FEC Records, RG 43, NA.
Another State Department memorandum circulated at this time proposed that McCoy be
instructed "to discontinue efforts to carry on the work of the Far Eastern Commission in a
spirit of international harmony and accord" and to pay more attention to verbal sparring
with the Soviets (Jack B. Tate to W. W. Butterworth, January 11, 1949, Box 223, FEC
Records, RG 43 NA).

CHAPTER 13
THE END OF THE DAY
l. McCoy to Carolyn Martin, May 17, 1949, Box 73, Frank Ross McCoy Papers, Library
of Congress [hereafter cited as McCoy Papers]; John H. Finlator to McCoy, October 6,
1950, Box 55, McCoy Papers.
2. For papers pertaining to McCoy's postretirement activities, see Boxes 83-85 and 88,
McCoy Papers; Ridgway to McCoy, September 19, 1951, Box 56, McCoy Papers; see also
Ridgway's memoir, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway(New York, 1956), p. 37.
3. Blakeslee to McCoy, March 31, 1953, Box 56, McCoy Papers; McCoy to William A.
Delano, November 7, 1953, Box 19, William A. Delano Papers, Yale University; New York
Times [hereafter cited as NY1], June 6, 1954; personal interview with Brig. Gen. Sherman
V. Hasbrouk, USA, Ret., Stone Bridge, New York, June 3, 1980. Section 21 of Arlington
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National Cemetery, where Wood and McCoy are buried, is a VIP plot. Since 1954, only
John Foster Dulles and Chief Justice Earl Warren have joined the two soldiers.
4. NYT, June 6, 1954; "The Reminiscences of Sir George Sansom," Columbia Oral
History Collection, Butler Library, Columbia University, pp. 76-77.
5. After fifty years of public service, McCoy's estate was not even large enough to pay
off the mortgage on his house. In a conversation with the author, Forrest Pogue recalled
that after McCoy's death General Marshall raised sufficient funds from among McCoy's
old friends to enable Mrs. McCoy to stay in her home.
6. "The Army's McCoy," Literary Digest 121 (April 25, 1936), scrapbook, Box 97,
McCoy Papers.
7. Richard D. Challener has already pointed out the importance of this personalized
civil-military consultation (see Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy,
1898-1914 [Princeton, NJ., 1973], pp. 402-412).
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